The complex process of dividing Scotland from the rest of the UK has barely been discussed, but there are some vital questions to consider
A yes vote in September's Scottish independence referendum will
trigger the complicated process of breaking up the United Kingdom. A
Scottish choice for independence must be respected; that is vital if the
UK is to continue to be a democracy. But respecting Scotland's choice
does not mean abandoning the interests of the 60 million people who live
in the rest of the UK (rUK for short). That affects the substance of
any independence negotiations, but also how long the process would take,
and who would take part.
The process of achieving Scottish independence is far from easy. In reality, the process of severing Scotland from UK/rUK will go on for very many years, no matter what. The immediate negotiations would have to address a number of difficult issues, including the future of the nuclear submarine bases on the Clyde, the division of the UK national debt, the future of North Sea oil and gas and other national assets, border security, as well as how to resolve the myriad other issues that would need to be resolved in the coming months, years and perhaps decades. At that stage, Scotland would also need to resolve – probably not with UK involvement – such key issues as its currency , EU membership and its citizenship law. As important as the resolution of each separate issue would be the trade-offs between them – which would be quite important for the rUK side though more important for Scotland. And once negotiated, these large and important proposals would need to be legislated for at Westminster, and approved at Holyrood – which itself could well take nearly a year.
On the Scottish side, Alex Salmond has been keen to talk of a cross-party "Team Scotland" of negotiators for some time . On the UK/rUK side, there is increasing recognition that it would be wrong for Scottish politicians at Westminster to take part in independence negotiations on the UK/rUK side. People in rUK need to have confidence that their negotiators have only had their interests at heart in those talks, and that means Scottish MPs and ministers cannot take part.
Several Lib Dem ministers recognised this some time back; last week, the Lords constitution committee made the point very forcefully . As the UK government would continue to represent Scotland in many areas until independence day, this would mean creating special parallel machinery – including cabinet committees, and perhaps even meetings of cabinet without Scottish ministers – to manage negotiations and the independence process.
But this could be complicated by timing issues. There is a tension here. There are very strong reasons to want Scotland to become independent as soon as possible. That would avoid the "constitutional limbo" that concerns the constitution committee, respect Scottish voters' choice to be independent – and also mean that rUK did not include and seek to govern a nation that had rejected the UK in such a formal manner. The prospect of the UK government being second-guessed by Scotland and unable to make policy for rUK for a protracted period would undermine democracy in rUK. A quick process would probably take around 18 months to complete, assuming a sense of urgency on both sides, though even that is rather long given the democratic imperatives. While the Scottish government's proposed period of 16 months seems rather arbitrarily chosen, it might be workable – but for the fact the 2015 UK general election falls in the middle of it.
The general election disrupts the process hugely. As others have pointed out, the election campaign will itself consume politicians' attention at just the time progress needs to be made in independence talks , and the prospect of a change of UK government partway through makes it hard for the government to do much before the election . But there is a worse possible situation: what happens if Labour comes out of the 2015 election as narrowly the largest party? The likelihood is that such a Labour government would need Scottish MPs to make up its majority, but would lose that when Scottish MPs left parliament on independence day.
Not only would rUK face a change of government without an election, but the party in government would not have a mandate from rUK voters for independence negotiations. This would be the West Lothian question put on steroids. It would imply, for instance, that any independence negotiations would need to involve the Conservatives (as the presumptive successor to Labour and/or holding the largest number of rUK seats) in the independence negotiations – these could not be treated as a purely executive matter, as the Lords constitution committee proposes. And it would call for a good deal of constitutional imagination and flexibility to respond to such a difficult and unusual situation.
One way round this would be for a very rough-and-ready negotiation of independence, so that independence day was 7 May 2015, polling day. That would be horrendously difficult to accomplish, but might be the least bad of the options given the problems that Scottish independence creates otherwise.
The process of achieving Scottish independence is far from easy. In reality, the process of severing Scotland from UK/rUK will go on for very many years, no matter what. The immediate negotiations would have to address a number of difficult issues, including the future of the nuclear submarine bases on the Clyde, the division of the UK national debt, the future of North Sea oil and gas and other national assets, border security, as well as how to resolve the myriad other issues that would need to be resolved in the coming months, years and perhaps decades. At that stage, Scotland would also need to resolve – probably not with UK involvement – such key issues as its currency , EU membership and its citizenship law. As important as the resolution of each separate issue would be the trade-offs between them – which would be quite important for the rUK side though more important for Scotland. And once negotiated, these large and important proposals would need to be legislated for at Westminster, and approved at Holyrood – which itself could well take nearly a year.
On the Scottish side, Alex Salmond has been keen to talk of a cross-party "Team Scotland" of negotiators for some time . On the UK/rUK side, there is increasing recognition that it would be wrong for Scottish politicians at Westminster to take part in independence negotiations on the UK/rUK side. People in rUK need to have confidence that their negotiators have only had their interests at heart in those talks, and that means Scottish MPs and ministers cannot take part.
Several Lib Dem ministers recognised this some time back; last week, the Lords constitution committee made the point very forcefully . As the UK government would continue to represent Scotland in many areas until independence day, this would mean creating special parallel machinery – including cabinet committees, and perhaps even meetings of cabinet without Scottish ministers – to manage negotiations and the independence process.
But this could be complicated by timing issues. There is a tension here. There are very strong reasons to want Scotland to become independent as soon as possible. That would avoid the "constitutional limbo" that concerns the constitution committee, respect Scottish voters' choice to be independent – and also mean that rUK did not include and seek to govern a nation that had rejected the UK in such a formal manner. The prospect of the UK government being second-guessed by Scotland and unable to make policy for rUK for a protracted period would undermine democracy in rUK. A quick process would probably take around 18 months to complete, assuming a sense of urgency on both sides, though even that is rather long given the democratic imperatives. While the Scottish government's proposed period of 16 months seems rather arbitrarily chosen, it might be workable – but for the fact the 2015 UK general election falls in the middle of it.
The general election disrupts the process hugely. As others have pointed out, the election campaign will itself consume politicians' attention at just the time progress needs to be made in independence talks , and the prospect of a change of UK government partway through makes it hard for the government to do much before the election . But there is a worse possible situation: what happens if Labour comes out of the 2015 election as narrowly the largest party? The likelihood is that such a Labour government would need Scottish MPs to make up its majority, but would lose that when Scottish MPs left parliament on independence day.
Not only would rUK face a change of government without an election, but the party in government would not have a mandate from rUK voters for independence negotiations. This would be the West Lothian question put on steroids. It would imply, for instance, that any independence negotiations would need to involve the Conservatives (as the presumptive successor to Labour and/or holding the largest number of rUK seats) in the independence negotiations – these could not be treated as a purely executive matter, as the Lords constitution committee proposes. And it would call for a good deal of constitutional imagination and flexibility to respond to such a difficult and unusual situation.
One way round this would be for a very rough-and-ready negotiation of independence, so that independence day was 7 May 2015, polling day. That would be horrendously difficult to accomplish, but might be the least bad of the options given the problems that Scottish independence creates otherwise.
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