WHAT WORLD ANALYSIS SAID ON WESTGATE MALL TERROR ATTACK

Why Israel is advising Kenya in mall attack response

Israel has been a close ally of Kenya since 2002 when militants bombed an Israeli-owned luxury hotel in Mombasa, killing 13 people, and fired two missiles at an Israeli airliner as it took off, narrowly missing the aircraft.

Jerusalem

Scarred by memories of a pair of attacks on Israeli targets in Africa a decade ago, Israel has dispatched a team of experts to its close ally Kenya to advise authorities on the bloody standoff at a Nairobi shopping mall.

While officials refuse to discuss the precise nature of the assistance, Israeli leaders have made it clear they believe the defeat of the Al Qaeda militants behind the mall attack will have great meaning around the world.

"Israel is always ready to help other countries, other friendly countries, in combating terrorism. I think that terrorism has become a threat to the entire world and therefore countries — United States, Israel and other Western countries — should cooperate," Yuval Steinitz, Israel's cabinet minister for strategic affairs, told The Associated Press.

Israel has had strong commercial interests across Africa for decades. But only in recent years has it begun to view Africa, particularly eastern Africa, as being of vital strategic interest in the battle against Islamic extremists. One of those groups, Al-Shabab, has claimed responsibility for the Nairobi attack, which has left dozens dead.

RECOMMENDED: What is Somalia's Al Shabab?

Kenya has been a leading player in this Israeli effort, although it is certainly not alone. The two countries exchange intelligence, and Israel has provided security training to the eastern African country, according to experts and officials.

In all, more than 40 senior African dignitaries have visited Israel in the past two years, according to the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Among them were the presidents of Rwanda, Uganda, Togo and South Sudan, as well as the prime minister of Kenya. The president of Nigeria is expected soon.

An Israeli diplomat who has participated in these meetings said the changes in the region unleashed by the Arab Spring were a key catalyst for these visits. The changes have led to increased activity by Islamic extremists and unleashed a flood of weapons across the region following the downfall of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi.

The diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was discussing a confidential diplomatic issue, said the threat of Islamic fundamentalism has been a major topic of discussion.

Specifically, he said, the African leaders have been interested in Israel's firsthand experience battling Islamic militants.

Although the groups in Africa are not believed to have direct links to those fighting Israel, they have similar ideologies and international sponsors. Israel says that its foe Iran ships weapons to militants in the Gaza Strip through Africa. The Horn of Africa is also a strategic shipping route for Israel.

"What they would want is basically to share understanding and information more than anything else," the official said, adding it is "no secret" that Israel exports some weapons to Africa.

Israeli officials refuse to say what type of military assistance is sent to African allies or who is being armed, saying only that any sales must be aboveboard and approved by the Defense Ministry. The ministry declined to comment.

Dani Arditi, a former chairman of Israel's Counter-Terrorism Bureau and National Security Council, said a pair of attacks on Israeli targets near the Kenyan resort city of Mombasa in 2002 marked an important turning point. In those attacks, militants bombed an Israeli-owned luxury hotel, killing 13 people, and fired two missiles at an Israeli airliner as it took off, narrowly missing the aircraft.

"Since then, the cooperation, intelligence cooperation mainly ... is a high priority in Kenya," he said. He said cooperation also included "training, exercising together" but refused to elaborate.

Israeli interests in Kenya run deep. According to the website of Israel's embassy in Nairobi, Israel has provided technical assistance in areas such as agriculture and medicine for decades, in some cases going back to the days before Kenyan independence in 1963.

This cooperation continued even after Kenya and other African states cut diplomatic ties with Israel following the 1973 Mideast war. During the 1976 commando operation in which Israel rescued dozens of hostages from Entebbe Airport in Uganda, Israeli aircraft were permitted to refuel in Kenya. Diplomatic ties resumed in 1988.

More recently, Israel and Kenya signed a treaty to cooperate in the fight against terrorism, money laundering and other crime in 2011.

Today, Israelis are a visible part of Nairobi's large expatriate community. They run businesses in a number of fields, and they have opened several cafes and restaurants — including at least four in the Westgate mall. No Israelis are known to be among the dead.

Israeli defense officials confirmed a team of experts was dispatched to Nairobi within hours of the hostage crisis.

The officials, who declined to be identified because they were discussing a confidential security matter, would not say what types of services were being provided, but said armed fighting units were not part of the delegation.

Nitzan Nuriel, another former head of the Counter-Terrrorism Bureau, said Kenya was among three African countries, along with Tanzania and Ethiopia, to receive security training from Israel about two years ago. At the time, Israeli police, military and counterterrorism officials trained counterparts in the three countries, he said.

Nuriel said the training is part of a broader effort that began in earnest with a trip to five African countries by then-Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman in 2009.

Nuriel, who accompanied Lieberman, said at every stop the message was clear. "Everything having to do with the war on terror, we have a common enemy. Let's cooperate," he quoted African officials as saying.

In addition to Kenya, he said Uganda, Ethiopia and Tanzania have strong intelligence cooperation with Israel, providing information on some 10 Islamist groups, including Al-Shabab and Boko Haram, a similar group in Nigeria.

In addition, West African countries provide intelligence on Hezbollah operatives involved in drug-running and money laundering, Nuriel said.

Hagai Katz of Magal Security Systems Ltd., an Israeli security company, said his firm this year completed a $25 million project securing Kenya's port in Mombasa. In 2012, it was responsible for stadium security at the African Cup in Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, he said.

Nir Shaul, founder of Israeli security company Nirtal, said his firm has provided training and equipment — including night-vision technology and helmets — to anti-terror police forces and presidential guards across Africa in recent years.

"An untrained soldier is very dangerous," Shaul said. "A trained soldier can target the terror cell without doing surrounding damage that turns the citizens against the ruling power."

___

Daniel Estrin contributed to this report.

 

At Westgate, a New Model of Terror for the Shabaab?

The ongoing siege at the Westgate shopping mall, in Nairobi, by Al Qaeda Shabaab fighters, in which at least sixty-two people have been shot dead, is close to its denouement. The Kenyan military has begun retaking the mall, and has started a final push to capture or kill the dozen or so gunmen still hiding in the building. (The Kenyans may also be getting advice or help from American and Israeli special forces or private contractors, which some reports suggest are on the scene.) The gunmen are burning mattresses to afford some cover and, probably, the privacy to say final prayers. However it ends, the attack will have lasting implications far beyond Kenya. Just as the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi was the opening salvo in the global war on terror, so this attack marks a decisive evolution of Islamist extremists away from the pyrotechnics of Al Qaeda and toward butchery as practiced by Nigeria’s Boko Haram, a group that claims to fight for Sharia law by murdering civilians and soldiers. If Islamist Twitter accounts are to be believed, some of the gunmen may be (have been) Americans and Swedes of Somali extraction, as well as the usual frontline jihad assortment of Arabs, Chechens, and Uzbeks. The presence of local Muslims is more significant. If the madness, what might be called the “Boko loco,” can take hold among youth in Kenya, with its strong tradition of concord between religions, it will be harder to contain elsewhere.

It is important to understand where the attack took place. Westgate is a center of life for wealthy Kenyans and expatriates. Their children all have played in the little plasticky playground off the food court. There isn’t a decently paid journalist in Nairobi who hasn’t pitched a story using the WiFi in the Israeli-owned café downstairs. Tyler Hicks, of the New York Times, is one of the finest war photographers of his generation. He crept in and took photographs where he more usually did his grocery shopping. What is true of journalists is even more true of the Kenyan élite. President Uhuru Kenyatta’s nephew and his nephew’s fiancé were among the dead. So the government response, and the reporting, is inflected with an intimate understanding of context: the battlefield has come to them.

Then there is the Nairobian state of mind, which veers between vitality and fatalism. Last year, I played in a poker tournament in the Westgate casino. At three in the morning, I wandered out past the deserted food court where many were shot dead on Saturday. On the upper parking deck, where the gunmen would enter the building this weekend, there was just a Kenyan-Indian, a Chinese gambler, and a security guard. I had that morbid moment which many Nairobians who move across the city at night experience, feeling alive but wondering if I would die on the way home. I drew in the cool air, glanced at the stars, and set off on a wild drive—wild with potholes, drunk drivers, thugs, even hyenas. I have never been driven off the road by carjackers as other Nairobians have, but if it did happen there would be recognition: Ah, it is this moment, the one that I have been fearing. This is the collective feeling of Nairobians towards the Westgate attack. It is crushing, but it is not a surprise. Kenyan troops entered Somalia in 2011 and scattered the Al Qaeda Shabaab fighters. Everyone knew an attack from the Shabaab or its affiliates was likely. Many think that there are more to come.

The first implication of the attack is on Nairobi’s urban development. Will the city choose to become more open or more closed? With its population set to double to eight million in the next decade or so, design choices are powerfully relevant. The poor are already excluded from prosperous life by security arrangements. The temptation will be for more reinforcement. But if walls get higher, and those who drive cars between fortified points are further separated from those who go on foot and live in crowded places, the result will be a metropolis that is uncompetitive and unsafe.

The second implication is short-term economic loss. The Shabaab’s ambition to attack the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, and other places where foreigners gather, is a hammer blow to tourism. Well-heeled Americans who are a mainstay of the local safari industry are likely to stay away. The goriness of the killings may dampen the enthusiasm for Africa among Western executives whose companies won’t want to put them in harm’s way (or pay the insurance).

Politically, the attack is likely to strengthen the mandate of President Kenyatta just before he seeks to dismiss charges of crimes against humanity brought against him by the International Criminal Court. Kenyans will likely rally behind the son of the father of the nation, and behind the armed forces. In a country where lynching of suspected thieves by mobs is commonplace, there is certain to be an appetite for what President Kenyatta calls swift and very painful retribution against the masterminds behind the attack. This might spill over into manhunts for innocent Kenyan-Somalis, and lead to a rise in hate speech against Muslims from opportunistic Pentecostalist pastors (a quite contrary Nigerian influence). That could further isolate the impoverished Kenyan coast and push young men into the arms of jihadist or secessionist groups.

The seemingly inevitable martyrdom of the gunmen in a shopping centre will win the Shabaab more respect among Islamist radicals. For them, “Boko loco” has the advantage that its practitioners are in it to the death. I wrote a novel, “Submergence,” in which much of the story takes place among Shabaab fighters in Somalia. I tracked Al Qaeda commanders, including Fazul Mohammed, a Comorian, who led the 1998 Nairobi bombing and was shot dead in Somalia last year. What I observed was that while belief comes first for the commanders, they are able to recruit boys for whom martyrdom precedes understanding. The commanders think in binary terms, black and white, and approve of whatever slaughter provides clarity of division and sets the dogs of war on Muslims. For the recruits, austerity is part of the attraction. Hunger, malaria, improperly set bones, rotted out teeth—these only drive them towards martyrdom. How to win the battle for ambiguity will be a challenge not just for Kenya going forward, but for African countries for whom the Internet has opened the way not just for economic growth, but also for “Boko loco” propaganda.

J. M. Ledgard’s latest novel is “Submergence.” He directs the Future Africa initiative at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and was a longtime Africa correspondent for the Economist.

Westgate Mall Attack News and Analysis Round-Up

Posted by MikeMiesen

 

The attack on Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, by al Shabaab terrorists, appears to be almost over. I’ll keep updating this as I find smart analysis and up-to-date reports:

• “Far from spreading fear that al Shabaab is on the ascendency, the Westgate attack should be seen as a last-ditch attempt by an ailing group to bolster its own internal networks…” - interesting take by a security analyst on al-Shabaab’s attack
• “The terrorists are divided and losing ground. But they seem determined to go down fighting.” - another interesting take, focusing more on the political economy of al-Shabab and its internal power struggle that left the more extreme element ascendant
• “On Saturday, as the full nature of the Westgate raid became clear, al-Shabab on Twitter claimed this was the first of many attacks to come. If it quickly executes other attacks in Kenya, this would suggest a profound resurgence. If it fails to generate another attack over the next six months, the Westgate attack may represent a last desperate attempt to generate popular support, resources, and personnel.” – Foreign Policy analysis on the attack and what it does and doesn’t show about al Shabaab’s current state (short version: not sure)
• A very good backgrounder on the rise of Salafi Islam in Kenya and Somalia, from the perspective of Kenyan al Shabaab deserters, in Foreign Affairs earlier this year

Kenya Mall Siege Will Help Terror Group Recruit In US, Say Experts -- Joshua Rhett Miller, FOX News

The grisly massacre at an upscale Kenyan shopping mall by al-Shabab militants is a “great shot in the arm” to the Al Qaeda-linked group’s efforts to recruit fighters from the West, including the U.S., terror experts tell FoxNews.com.

At least 62 people have been killed and nearly 200 others were injured in the Saturday attack by al-Shabab, an extremist Islamic group believed to have roughly several thousand fighters, including a few hundred foreigners. Some of those include recruits from Somali communities in the United States and Europe and intelligence analysts said Monday those numbers could grow now that al-Shabab militants have attacked, running counter to the Obama administration’s claims that Al Qaeda and its global affiliates are weakening.

Westgate Mall Terrorist Attack: Lessons for Kenya

The terrorist attack by Somali-based Al-Shabaab at the up-market Westgate Shopping Mall in Westlands Nairobi, on 21st September 2013 was a brutal retaliation for Kenya’s military operations in southern Somalia, that began in October 2011. The Kenya Defense Forces are part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which is led by the African Union and UN-backed peacekeeping forces. Dubbed “Operation Linda Nchi” (Operation Defend the Country), the initial purpose of the invasion was to pursue Al-Shabaab militants who had been accused of kidnapping several foreign tourists and aid workers in Kenya. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the militant group is actively recruiting Kenyans from different ethnic groups into its terrorist operations. A report by the United Nations Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritea noted that: “Since 2009, the group has rapidly expanded its influence and membership to non-Somali Kenyan nationals who today constitute the largest and most structurally organized non-Somali group within Al-Shabaab.”

Nicknamed “Kenyan Mujahideen” by Al-Shabaab leadership, these youngsters who have converted to Islam, form around 10% of the group’s overall forces. Poverty is a key factor leading to their recruitment. Moreover, since they have a physical build that matches indigenous Kenyans, they easily blend within the general population without much suspicion. For instance, Elgiva Bwire Oliacha who was jailed for life in 2011 for grenade attacks in Nairobi, hails from Busia, went to schools in Nairobi, and was brought up in a strict Catholic family. Various reports indicate that Al-Shabaab’s goal is to establish a multi-ethnic generation within East Africa. Since 2011-2013, Kenyans in different parts of the country have suffered a number of fatal and non-fatal attacks within bars, churches, mosques and other public places, attributed to Al-Shabaab.

It was revealed that apart from the invasion, the Kenyan government had another plan for Somalia codenamed the “Jubaland Initiative” whose aim was “to be the creation of a Jubaland, encapsulating Gedo, Lower Juba and Middle Juba in Southern Somalia, bordering northern Kenya with a population of 1.3 million. The establishment of Jubaland, according to Kenya’s diplomatic and intelligence bureaucrats, would have two phases. First, it was meant to act as a “buffer zone” to safeguard Kenya from negative effects spawned by the “lawlessness in Somalia” – which included religious extremism, the flow of small arms and contraband, terrorism, piracy, uncontrolled refugees – and to safeguard Kenya’s economic interests. The second phase would seek to establish the roots of a solid Somalia. The “Jubaland Initiative” is supposed to be modelled on the Puntland and Somaliland experience. Puntland and Somaliland are two provinces in northern Somalia that broke away from and declared their own autonomous governments.” (By Wanjohi Kabukuru in New African, April 01, 2012). A politically stable Somalia is important for Kenya’s trade expansion in the Horn of Africa.

Combating insecurity

Kenyans continue to decry the escalating insecurity that affects their socio-economic fabric. They fault the government for not having forensic laboratories that can record data with profiles of suspected terrorists, their sponsors and sympathizers. Retired Captain Simiyu Werunga, who is a security expert and the director of African Centre for Security and Strategic Studies, maintains that “it would be difficult for Kenya to win the war against terrorism in the absence of a proper mechanism to profile suspects, which creates a reserve of information that security organs can easily refer to.” Nonetheless, the Anglo-Leasing scandal which rocked Kibaki’s government during his first term, is blamed for having hindered the creation of such labs. The National Intelligence Service is also in question for not justifying its huge annual allocations of over Ksh10 billion, in relation to curbing insecurity. During the 2013/14 fiscal year, a total of Ksh1.2 billion has been set aside to erect a National Forensic Laboratory to facilitate criminal investigations in order to get justice for victims of crime.

Another security expert, Dr. Ochieng Kamuthai, asserts that the Kenyan government must have a new approach in fighting terrorism by advancing its weaponry, applying new technologies, gathering intelligence by infiltrating terrorist cells and by being ahead every time. Kenya is a key ally of the West in their fight against terrorism and should seek more assistance in terms of cash and equipment. In October 2012, former president Kibaki assented to the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012 which is expected to lawfully disrupt the networks of financiers and sympathizers used by terrorists, to conduct their crimes.

According to Werunga, some factors affecting the security sector in Kenya include: lack of modernization of the security system and serious lapses of coordination between intelligence, the police and the Executive. Generally, there is no centralized coordination in the security sector. Within the top security apparatus, there is the element of shifting blame and giving excuses such as “I was not aware; I was not informed; we were not given the intelligence; this caught us unawares.” Last year, the former Internal Security minister admitted that the National Police Service lacks sufficient personnel and equipment to combat crimes in the country. There are around 80,000 regular and Administration Police for over 40 million Kenyans. The state security organs are reactionary and not proactive and to a good extent, do not apply early warning systems. Poor governance and the use of security forces by politicians to divide the electorate are also part of the problems ailing the sector. The biased deployment of security personnel by Kibaki’s government within ODM strongholds during the 2007/08 post election violence is a case in point. Additionally, the violent eviction of members of the Maasai community from their ancestral land in Narasha village in Naivasha in July 2013 in the presence of security personnel, clearly showed that the Jubilee government supports inhumane acts against poor Kenyans.

“Kenya’s Presidents have been loath to give up their control over policing; it has always been the surest way for them to gather intelligence on threats to their authority and has forever been a tool for interdicting this threat. Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel Toroitich arap Moi and Mwai Kibaki used the police to stamp their authority in Kenya; but none of them saw fit to direct that policing’s principal purpose was the safety of the public first, and national security, that is, the preservation of the State and its authority, next. As a result, even in the early years of Kenya’s Independence, citizens were frequently at the mercy of bandits and criminals, but the presidency, the State and State authority was always secure.” (In: maunduville blogspot July 4, 2013).

International views

“Crime and corruption are among the biggest concerns of the locals. The city is one of the most dangerous urban areas in sub-Saharan Africa. Although the situation is better than a decade ago, most middle-class and wealthy urban dwellers refrain from walking on city streets after dark, a situation that has led to the popularity of the city’s shopping malls in its rich western districts as quasi-entertainment centers” (In: usatoday.com September 21, 2013).

Simon Tisdall reported in the guardian.com on September 22nd 2013 that: “The attack on the Westgate shopping centre in Nairobi by Islamist militants from the Somali-based al-Shabaab terrorist group is a direct product of the long-running failure of western powers and African Union countries to end more than 20 years of anarchy in the “failed state” of Somalia. But it also reflects the outcome of a brutal power struggle within al-Shabaab that has brought the group’s hardline global jihadist wing to the fore.” Tisdall suggests that Al-Shabaab has internal leadership wrangles and that the Nairobi attack was an effort to stamp its authority, despite being weakened by the Kenyan military.

“The Shabab, who have pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda, used to control large parts of Somalia, imposing a harsh and often brutal version of Islam in their territory. They have beheaded civilians and buried teenage girls up to their necks in sand and stoned them to death. But in the past two years, the African Union forces, including the Kenyans, have pushed the Shabab out of most of their strongholds. The worry now, current and former American officials said Saturday, is that this attack could be the start of a comeback.” (By Jeffrey Gettleman and Nicholas Kulish in the New York Times on 21st September 2013).

“The fight against crime cannot be fought alone and fortunately, many countries [including the United States] are placing substantial resources within the borders of Kenya. Stability within Kenya has the potential to create an example for surrounding African nations. While the figures of crime facing Kenya are still some of the worst in East Africa, there is still considerable potential for a stable economy, government, and successful police force. First, the ratio of police to citizens needs to improve drastically. It is extremely unlikely for such a low number of police to actually make a significant difference in Kenya’s security. In addition to hiring more police officers, the salary and living conditions need to improve. Low pay and a lack of public respect breeds a sizeable amount of corruption, which puts a severe damper on the economy. Until the relationship between the police and Kenyan people improves, it is unlikely for crime levels to make any major statistical decline.

Furthermore, the court system in Kenya needs a reorganization and overhaul because the utilization of police prosecutors has proven itself to be ineffective and outdated.” (See Crime and Development in Kenya, 2010, Vol. 2 NO. 09 pp1-2).

Jared Odero

Nairobi attack: Why Kenya and why now?

When Kenya sent thousands of soldiers across the border to hunt down Al-Shabaab in Somalia, the Islamist militant group warned they would get their revenge. On Saturday, and through the weekend, the nightmares promised by Al-Shabaab became a bloody, body-strewn reality. SIMON ALLISON explains how Somalia’s messy civil war spilled out of its borders, and wonders if Kenya’s politicians will ask themselves the hard questions, or revert to the bombast that got them involved in the first place.

It’s easy to forget, wandering through Nairobi, that this is a nation at war. There are a few clues – the mirror checks for car bombs, the metal detectors in supermarkets and public buildings, the odd grenade outside a nightclub – but the battlefield is far away and the fighting sporadic. In this year’s presidential election, the war wasn’t even a campaign issue, with candidates preferring instead to bicker about parliamentarians’ salaries and the International Criminal Court.

There’s no forgetting now.

With 68 people dead in the fancy Westgate shopping mall, at least 175 others nursing bullet injuries and an unknown number being held hostage somewhere in the building, the war has arrived in Nairobi in the most tragic possible way.

Kenya can’t say it wasn’t warned. Ever since October 2011, when 4,000-odd Kenyan troops were summarily dispatched across to the border into Somalia with a mandate to hunt down and destroy Al-Shabaab, the Islamist militant group has been promising a massive, bloody revenge. Although it was always tempting to dismiss Al-Shabaab’s hyperbole as empty, Comical Ali-style bluster, the group has form when it comes to revenge.

Remember it is only three years since the last major terrorist attack in Africa, when 76 died in twin bombings in the Ugandan capital Kampala as they watched the World Cup final. This was in direct response to Uganda’s military intervention in Somalia, involving thousands of Ugandan soldiers operating under the aegis of the African Union Mission in Somalia.

Of course, being warned is not the same as being able to prevent these kinds of attacks. Nairobi’s gunmen were clearly inspired by the Mumbai 2008 attacks, which analysts said at the time could be the template for terrorism of the future. Easier and cheaper than bombs, requiring just a handful of machine guns, plenty of ammo and a few men (and, in Nairobi, at least one woman) willing to die for their cause. And without going on full, permanent lockdown, what can cities do to prevent such an attack?

Still, in the light of this weekend’s tragic scenes, it is worth revisiting Kenya’s sudden decision to get itself involved in Somalia. Unlike Uganda’s internationally approved military support for Somalia’s fragile central government (along with troops from Burundi, and more recently Djibouti and Sierra Leone), Kenya’s was a unilateral intervention that took everyone by surprise. And their goal was less about restoring stability in Somalia and more about wiping out Al-Shabaab and establishing a de facto buffer state between the two countries, a buffer state it hoped would keep Somalia’s instability from spilling over its borders and threatening Kenya’s vital tourism and shipping industries.

Before Kenya went to war that is exactly what had been happening. In the absence of any effective government, piracy in Somalia flourished, as did kidnappings for ransom. As pickings grew slim in Somalia itself, the pirates, kidnappers and militant groups trying to fund their operations looked further afield, with Kenyan tourist resorts – flush with wealthy western tourists – identified as perfect targets. Two foreigners were taken from two different coastal resort towns, while another two foreign aid workers were abducted from a refugee camp near the Somali border. The future for Mombasa port was also looking grim, with shipping companies looking for alternative destinations that would take them out of pirate range. Along with the flood of Somali refugees into Kenya, this was all too much for the country’s unpopular government of national unity (who would also have welcomed the distraction from their own governance record and the popular approval boost that so often accompanies major military action).

And so Kenyan troops were sent in to one of Africa’s most intractable conflicts. Al-Shabaab, then in control of most of Somalia (and alleged to have participated in some of the Kenyan kidnappings) was the obvious target.

Kenya’s involvement was welcomed cautiously by the African and international diplomatic community, and has fundamentally altered the balance of power in Somalia. Whereas Amisom’s approach was essentially defensive, Kenya went straight on the attack and ousted Al-Shabaab from most of its important strongholds, including its de facto capital in the port city of Kismayo. It allowed the federal government in Mogadishu to extend its reach and gave Amisom the encouragement it needed to secure Mogadishu properly, which explains the mini renaissance some say the city is currently enjoying (including hip restaurants, ice cream shops and TEDx talks).

The pressure has hit Al-Shabaab hard. Divisions in the group deteriorated into infighting, with several prominent defections. It has lost plenty of territory it once controlled, although it still remains in charge of vast swathes of the country. This pressure, ironically, may explain the timing and the spectacular nature of the Nairobi attack this weekend. In the face of fading influence, it is fighting to stay relevant and remain in the headlines.

Subsequent to the unilateral invasion, Kenyan troops were folded into Amisom and given a seal of international approval. Yet this retrospective legitimisation could not disguise that their intervention was in fact an invasion, and that the risk of blowback was always going to be high, especially when it became clear that Kenya’s involvement was seriously hurting Al-Shabaab.

On that front, Al-Shabaab have delivered. Kenya’s leaders now have some serious, difficult questions to ask themselves. Why is Kenya in Somalia? Is it worth staying? How likely are repeat attacks? Crucially, with President Uhuru Kenyatta already promising to “punish” those responsible, they need to ask whether sending even more troops in Somalia, with an even more aggressive mandate, is the best way to protect Kenyan citizens in the long run.

Also important for everyone to remember is that Al-Shabaab’s actions do not define Somalia, or Somalis (after all, Al-Shabaab’s primary target has always been Somalis themselves). Kenya has a sizeable Somali population and an entire suburb (Eastleigh) that is known as the Somali district. This has previously been the site of xenophobic violence, with Kenyans targeting Somalis in response to other attacks attributed to Al-Shabaab. Kenya’s leaders have a duty to remind their citizens that this is not acceptable.

There is also a worry that this tragedy will be used as a bargaining chip in the trials of Kenyatta and his deputy, William Ruto, at the International Criminal Court. Already Ruto has requested that the court delay his trial so that he can deal with the aftermath of the massacre and there are rumours that Kenyatta wants to use it to bolster his argument that he is unable to attend his trial in person.

In the middle of this ongoing tragedy, Kenya needs good leadership more than ever. This is Kenyatta and Ruto’s chance to show they can provide it, even if they haven’t in the past. They owe the Westgate victims at least that much. DM

Photo: Women carrying children run for safety as armed police hunt gunmen who went on a shooting spree in Westgate shopping centre in Nairobi September 21, 2013. REUTERS/Goran Tomasevic

Former Ambassador: Kenya Attack Shows Al-Shabab’s Weakness

Al-Shabab, the group that has claimed responsibility for the Kenya mall attack, is backed by al-Qaida and originates in Somalia, but includes members from around the world.

David Shinn, former U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia and a professor of international affairs at George Washington University, tells Here & Now that a major goal of the group is “to establish an Islamist state in Somalia.”

Al-Shabab has an antagonistic relationship with Kenya, Shinn says, because Kenyan military forces had a large role in weakening al-Shabab’s influence in Somalia, including dislodging them from the strategically important city of Kismayo, Somalia.

Shinn says the Kenyan mall attack shows al-Shabab’s weakness.

“You have a situation where al-Shabab has illustrated its organizational skill, in order to pull off an attack like this,” Shinn said, “But I think the more important point is that by attacking a soft civilian undefended target in a neighboring country, you illustrate that there are significant limits to what you can do militarily. Because al-Shabab has not been successful in attacking the African Union forces inside Somalia … so in that sense, it does demonstrate weakness. And I think that’s the more important point to take out of this.”

 Kenya mall siege will help terror group recruit in US, say experts

The grisly massacre at an upscale Kenyan shopping mall by al-Shabab militants is a “great shot in the arm” to the Al Qaeda-linked group’s efforts to recruit fighters from the West, including the U.S., terror experts tell FoxNews.com.

At least 62 people have been killed and nearly 200 others were injured in the Saturday attack by al-Shabab, an extremist Islamic group believed to have roughly several thousand fighters, including a few hundred foreigners. Some of those include recruits from Somali communities in the United States and Europe and intelligence analysts said Monday those numbers could grow now that al-Shabab militants have attacked, running counter to the Obama administration’s claims that Al Qaeda and its global affiliates are weakening.

“We’re still credible and we’re alive. So come join us. That’s going to be the message."- Mark Schroeder, Stratfor

“Clearly the attack in Nairobi and the target was selected for its propaganda value,” said Mark Schroeder, vice president of Africa analysis at Stratfor, a geopolitical intelligence firm. “Al-Shabab has really not been successful attacking hardened sites in Somalia, so it clearly shifted its method by attacking this preeminent shopping mall in Nairobi. It will be a great shot in the propaganda arm to show that al-Shabab is a vibrant militant group.”

By selecting and ultimately carrying out an attack on a soft target such as a shopping mall frequented by Westerners and affluent locals, al-Shabab — which means “The Youth” in Arabic — sent a clear message to would-be jihadists, Schroeder said.

“We’re still credible and we’re alive,” he said. “So come join us. That’s going to be the message.”

Of the group’s fighters, only a “few dozen” are believed to be Americans, but that figure could grow following the guerrilla-style attack several years after al-Shabab warned it would target Kenya in retaliation for the country’s role in sending troops to Somali in 2011.

“What they do is identify and cultivate religious leaders in the Somali communities, the imams of the mosques, and, through covert means, use those imams to identify vulnerable Somali youth who can travel back to Somalia and participate as fighters or smuggle back material support,” Schroeder said of al-Shabab’s effort to recruit Americans.

While Minnesota — home to the largest Somali population in the U.S. — remains the primary potential domestic breeding ground, other pockets exist in Iowa and Arizona, Schroeder said.

“They struggle in school, they can’t rise and succeed,” he said of potential American-born recruits, adding that they’re likely disenfranchised with the American way of life and subject to emotional manipulation.

Omar Hammami, an Alabama native who became one of Somalia’s most visible Islamic rebels, was killed this month after weeks on the run following a falling out with al-Shabab’s top leader, Mukhtar Abu Zubeyr, also known as Godane. Along with an American-born former spokesman for Usama bin Laden, Hammami, who was known as “The American,” is one of the most notorious U.S. citizens to join global jihadi groups.

From al-Shabab’s perspective, attracting someone like Hammami or Adam Gadahn potentially “opens up a path of travel” that may facilitate attacks elsewhere.

“The scrutiny of Americans traveling through airports and security checkpoints is significantly less,” said Katherine Zimmerman, a senior analyst at the American Enterprise Institute. “You’re kind of waved through.”

The key concern for U.S. intelligence officials regarding al-Shabab moving forward is to ensure that no American-born citizen receives training from the group and then returns stateside, she said.

About 50 Americans of Somali descent have traveled to Somalia to join al-Shabaab in recent years, and about half have been killed, Fox News has learned. Congressman Peter King, R-N.Y., said on Sunday that the intelligence community believes about 20 of those recruits are still active.

“That’s of significant concern for us,” Zimmerman continued. “Al-Shabab certainly has the capabilities to carry our an attack in Kenya and has links down into Tanzania as well, but I don’t think it’s at the level it can carry out a full-scale attack on the [United States].”

Other security analysts contacted by FoxNews.com said Saturday’s attack is unlikely to have a strong effect on the group’s overall recruiting efforts, largely due to the nature of the target.

“In a way, it shows they’re still active and that will have some appeal to some individuals, but at the same time, going after shopping malls is not exactly as admirable a target as going after military targets,” said Dan Byman, a senior fellow at Brookings Institution, a Washington-based think tank.

Byman, who said the group has extensive ties to Somali expatriates in Europe and North America, thinks al-Shabab has the aspirations and the capability to carry out an attack on U.S. soil, but no indicators suggest a strike is imminent.

“Yes, but I don’t want to be melodramatic about it,” Byman said of a possible U.S. attack, adding that any such incident would likely be small-scale.

Prior to Saturday’s attack that saw five Americans among its wounded, al-Shabab has claimed responsibility for the July 2010 bombings in Uganda that killed more than 70 people and ongoing onslaughts in Somalia, a country of roughly 10 million.

James Carafano, vice president of defense and foreign policy studies at The Heritage Foundation, said the group’s main priority following Saturday’s assault will be to expand its foreign hand.

“It’s a lot easier to recruit somebody than it is to organize a terror attack, so it’s a different set of activities,” he told FoxNews.com. “Right now their priority is to attract foreign fighters, but that doesn’t mean they won’t focus on that in the future.”

The Security Lapses That Led to the Nairobi-Mall Terrorist Attack

As Kenyan security forces fought a fierce gun battle against al-Shabab militants at Nairobi’s Westgate shopping mall on Monday, trying to break the three-day hostage siege, some wondered how the country’s intelligence and police services could have missed the warning signs of a spectacular attack in the heart of the capital, despite the U.S. plowing billions of dollars a year into Kenya’s antiterrorism efforts — the fifth biggest such U.S. program in the world.

One clue, say experts, could lie with the patchy Kenyan police forces, which NGOs and diplomats have for years accused of rampant corruption and lack of professionalism. “You have to address corruption if you want to address terrorism,” says Anneli Botha, a senior terrorism researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, or ISS, in Pretoria, South Africa, who had spent the past three weeks in Nairobi helping to train Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Police Unit. Botha, a former police captain herself, says corruption among Kenyan police — including bribe taking among border-security officers — makes it very difficult to tackle terrorist threats. “It is a big issue among police forces, not only in Kenya but around the continent,” she told TIME by phone on Monday, back home in South Africa.

The attackers, believed to number between 10 and 15, stormed the mall on Saturday morning, while a children’s cooking contest — well publicized — was in process. About five armed attackers burst through one of the main entrances, guns blazing, while another four entered through an underground parking lot. After hours of fierce gunfire, Kenyan officials said on Monday afternoon they had broken the over 50-hour-long siege, which killed about 69 people, including at least three armed militants. Defense chief General Julius Karangi told reporters the group set mattresses on fire inside the building — explaining why thick black smoke billowed from the mall most of the day — in a ploy to escape the security cordon that ringed the area. 

“We have an idea who these people are, and they are clearly a multinational collection from all over the world,” he said.

But that’s little comfort to the families of victims — many whom must wonder what went wrong. In an effort to smash al-Shabab’s network in Kenya, police have recently cracked down hard on suspected terrorists, rounding up hundreds of people, frequently on patchy evidence and with little legal redress.

In May, Human Rights Watch said Kenyan police had “unleashed 10 weeks of hell” in Nairobi’s Somali refugee communities, “torturing, abusing and stealing from some of the country’s poorest and most vulnerable people,” according to Gerry Simpson, who wrote a 68-page report titled You Are All Terrorists. Refugees told the organization that police had rounded up at least 1,000 people and raped several of them.

In another attempt to dismantle al-Shabab’s networks, Kenyan police have also tried to remove Somalis from city neighborhoods, and house them instead in refugee camps. That has infuriated Somalis, many of whom have lived in Kenya for decades. And apart from the Somalis themselves, police suspicion has fallen also on Muslim Kenyans, several of whom are thought to have joined al-Shabab. Witnesses to Saturday’s Nairobi siege told journalists they had seen “black men” among the attackers, and some speculate that those might include Kenyans.

In fact, the recent police crackdown could well have aggravated the situation in two ways: by boosting the organization’s ability to recruit Kenyans, and by alienating the very people Kenya needs to sniff out intelligence about al-Shabab’s plans. “The Somali population is disaffected,” says Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Africa specialist at the Congressional Research Service in Washington, who authored a report in February on Kenya’s potential threats. “The police patrols and crackdowns in the Somali communities have gone up quite a bit over the past couple of years,” she told TIME by phone on Monday. “It contributes to a lack of trust in the authorities, with people not quite so willing to report what is going on.”

In truth, there might have been little to prevent Saturday’s attack, which occurred in a bustling commercial hub where hundreds of people converge on Saturdays, and which has several entry and exit points. Blanchard says U.S. officials have long regarded Nairobi as a prime target for a major terrorist attack, especially since the Kenyan government intervened militarily in 2011 against al-Shabab strongholds in Somalia. Both she and Botha believe Kenyan police and military have foiled several al-Shabab plots in the capital. “It is rather surprising that an attack of this kind has not happened before,” Blanchard says. “There are a large number of Westerners, and the U.N. headquarters [for East Africa] is there.”

While there are some security guards at the entrances to Westgate mall, Botha says their presence is “window dressing.” And Botha’s colleague in Nairobi, Emmanuel Kisiangani, senior Kenya researcher for ISS, says although the guards have magnetic wands, “I’m not sure they have been functioning.” He told TIME on Monday that although officials will surely ramp up security in Nairobi after the attack, he predicts that “in a month’s time it will be relaxed again. The security is not maintained.”

Nairobi mall strike signals terrorist rise across Africa

By James Blitz in London and Javier Blas in Lagos

The attack claimed by the Somali-based al-Shabaab movement on Nairobi’s Westgate shopping centre is the most striking indication yet of how Islamist militant terrorism is on the rise across African states.

In recent years militant groups such as al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have carried out a string of atrocities in order to further their political and religious struggles against regional governments.

Western intelligence officials say none of these groups is in a position to carry out a direct attack on European or US territory. The one jihadist group that is still deemed capable of such an assault is al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, based in Yemen. One of its chief figures, Ibrahim al-Siri, is regarded as a threat to western security because he is a sophisticated bombmaker.

That said, experts say the shopping mall attack, attributed by many to al-Shabaab, is a sign of how these groups are expanding their capability on the African continent, targeting westerners even if they lack the ability to strike on US and European territory. “The Nairobi attack was executed with a theatrical brutality that was surprising,” one former British intelligence official said. “It showed al-Shabaab moving out of its domestic arena in Somalia and into the Kenyan capital with a degree of planning that is deeply alarming.”

In the course of this year, there have been several indications of how ruthless these militant groups are becoming. Last week, the jihadist group Boko Haram killed more than 100 people in a single attack in northeast Nigeria, one of the deadliest raids by the Islamist militants since their violent campaign started in 2009.

In January, Islamic militants from AQIM killed 40 foreigners in an assault on the isolated In Amenas natural gas facility in southern Algeria. “We are watching a creep-up of attacks – particularly in size and publicity,” said a security expert who advises oil companies operating in Africa and the Middle East.

There are several reasons why these groups may be growing in capability. One factor in their favour is the huge dispersal of weapons stocks across the region in the wake of the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime in Libya. A second factor is that all three groups appear to be co-operating with one another in order to boost capability. “There have been reports, for example, of AQIM offering training to al-Shabaab,” says Valentina Soria, a terrorism analyst with IHS Janes.

A third factor is the weakness of regional governments in combating these militants’ operations. Last year, AQIM was able to lead a jihadist takeover of a large part of northern Mali, pushing government forces into retreat. A French intervention ultimately reversed their gains. In Nairobi, questions are already being asked about why the Kenyan security forces failed to predict and combat an attack on a target as obvious as the Westgate mall.

"What may be new, however, is that al-Shabaab may feel that the killing of westerners adds significantly to the impact of their operation"
- Valentina Soria, terrorism analyst at IHS Janes

What is attracting international attention to the increased capability of these African militant groups is the extent to which westerners are the victims of their atrocities. Ms Soria says the fact that westerners are being killed does not mean that groups such as al-Shabaab are espousing the anti-western values of the core al-Qaeda group and its founder Osama bin Laden.

“The motives of al-Shabaab are still largely regional. They are motivated by hostility towards Kenya because of its assistance to international efforts to fight al-Shabaab inside Somalia. What may be new, however, is that al-Shabaab may feel that the killing of westerners adds significantly to the impact of their operation, in particular because of the damage it does to the Kenyan economy.”

Kenya, which also has its own homegrown extremists who nurse global ambition, arrested ten people in connection with the attacks on Monday and has pointed to an international terror network that may be involved in the mall strike.

African jihadists’ strategy of targeting westerners on the continent poses a new challenge for western policy makers. In recent years, the US and European security services have had strong success in foiling complex foreign jihadist plots aimed at striking people inside their own countries. As a result, much of the focus of domestic intelligence services in the US and UK is focused on combating homegrown Islamist terrorism.

The In Amenas and Nairobi attacks may indicate that western governments need to think a lot harder about protecting their nationals abroad. “What we can’t yet judge is whether these events in Nairobi represent a new trend in attacks on foreigners that we have to factor into our calculations,” says one western government official.