World Press Freedom Index 2013 - Africa

press release

In Somalia (175th, -11) 18 journalists were killed, caught up in bomb attacks or the direct targets of murder, making 2012 the deadliest in history for the country's media.

The Horn of Africa state was the second most dangerous country in the world for those working in news and information, behind Syria. In Eritrea (in last place in the index for the sixth successive year), no journalists were killed but some were left to die, which amounts to the same thing. With at least 30 behind bars, it is Africa's biggest prison for journalists. Of 11 incarcerated since 2001, seven have died as a result of prison conditions or have killed themselves. Since the independent media were abolished more than 10 years ago, there are no independent Eritrean news outlets, other than outside the country, and terror prevails.

East Africa is also a region of censorship and crackdowns. Omar al-Bashir's Sudan, where more newspapers were seized and the arrests of journalists continued during the summer, is stuck firmly in 170th place, in the bottom 10 of the index. Djibouti (167th, -8), which also has no independent media, detained a correspondent of the foreign-based news site La Voix de Djibouti. Despite the release of two Swedish journalists arrested in 2011, Ethiopia(137th) fell ten places because of its repressive application of the 2009 anti-terrorist law and the continued detention of several local journalists.

Political unrest in Mali and the Central African Republic

Mali (99th, -74), which was long presented as the continent's star performer in democracy and press freedom, was prey to the political events that overtook it during the year. The military coup in Bamako on 22 March and the seizure of the north of the country by Touareg separatists and Islamic fundamentalists exposed news organizations to censorship and abuses. Many northern radio stations stopped broadcasting, while in the capital several Malian and foreign journalists were assaulted. All these occurred before the external military intervention in January 2013.

The Central African Republic was ranked 65th in 2012. Events after the outbreak of the Seleka rebellion at the very end of the year (radio stations ransacked, one journalist killed) were not taken into consideration in this index, thus preventing the country from falling more than 50 places. These will be included in the 2014 version. In Guinea-Bissau (92nd, -17) a media blackout and military censorship that followed the coup on 12 April explain that country's drop.

Africa's predatory censors

Yahya Jammeh, King Mswati III, Paul Kagame, and Teodoro Obiang Nguema, together with other heads of state such as Issaias Afeworki (Eritrea) and Ismael Omar Guelleh (Djibouti) are members of an exclusive club of authoritarian African leaders, some eccentric others stern, who hold their countries in an iron grasp and keep a firm grip on news and information. Their countries, respectively Gambia (152nd), Swaziland (155th), Rwanda (161st) and Equatorial Guinea (166th), are all among the bottom 30 in the index. Media pluralism has been whittled away and criticism of the head of state discouraged.

The biggest losses

Chad, which fell 18 places to 121st, saw journalists harassed and roughed up, the publication of the newspaper N'Djamena Bi-Hebdo temporarily halted and its publisher sentenced to a suspended prison term, and a highly repressive bill kept under wraps. The slow but sure progress that followed the formation of a national unity government in Zimbabwe (133rd, -16) in 2009 and the granting of publication licences to several independent newspapers appeared to have stalled. Violence and arrests of journalists still niggle and if elections go ahead as planned in 2013, the atmosphere for the media promises to be tense. Relatively high placed in 2011-2012, South Sudan (124th) fell 12 places after the murder of a columnist - the first killing of its kind in the new country - as news organizations and journalists awaited the approval of three new laws on the media.

Despite the holding of a national media conference in Cameroon (120th, -23), the future of the sector remains both uncertain and worrying. In the upper reaches of the index, Niger (43rd) nonetheless fell 14 places as a result of the irresponsibility of a few journalists who succumbed to the temptation to abuse the freedom that they enjoyed. Within the space of four months in Tanzania(70th, -36), one journalist was killed while he was covering a demonstration and another was found dead, a clear victim of murder.

Burundi (132nd) fell only two places but remains a low position. Summonses of journalists declined but the case of Hassan Ruvakuki, given a life sentence reduced to three years on appeal, has created an atmosphere of fear among the media.

Return to normality

After a dreadful year in 2011, marked by the dictatorial behaviour of the late President Bingu Wa Mutharika, a violent crackdown on demonstrations and the murder of the blogger Robert Chasowa, Malawi (75th) recorded the biggest jump in the entire index, up 71 places, close to the position it held in 2010. Similarly, Cote d'Ivoire rose 63 places to 96th despite persistent problems. It had plummeted in the previous index because of a post-election crisis and the murders of a journalist and another media worker, as well as the civil conflict that broke out in Abidjan in April. Uganda (104th) was up 35 places thanks to a better year, but things were far from satisfactory as far as the media were concerned. The year ended with President Yoweri Museveni making open threats to several radio stations.

Promising gains

For Senegal (59th, +16), 2012 was a year of hope. The presidential election took place in a peaceful atmosphere for the media, despite a few regrettable assaults on journalists, and President Macky Sall, who had declared himself willing to decriminalize press offences, took office. Much remains to be proved in 2013, as was illustrated by the prison sentence handed down on a journalist in December.

In Liberia (97th, +13), the presidential election in November 2011 had been tainted by the closure of several media outlets and attacks on journalists. In 2012, the atmosphere improved greatly. In the summer, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf became the second African head of state, after Mahamadou Issoufou of Niger, to sign the Declaration of Table Mountain, thereby undertaking to promote media freedom.

Namibia (19th), Cape Verde (25th) and Ghana (30th) maintained their record as the highest ranked African countries.

Somalia: International Donors Cut Aid and Inflate the Somali Federal Government

By Dr. Michael A. Weinstein,

A closed source, who cannot be further identified, confirms the judgment that the "donor"-powers/U.N. are in the process of scaling back their financial commitment to "Somalia," and reports that the power distribution among the major Somali domestic political actors has altered in response to the "donor"-powers' tilt toward the Somali Federal Government (S.F.G.) and away from Somaliland and Puntland, with the latter most adversely affected.

According to the source, funding for the programs and projects in "Somalia" is being initially cut by twenty-five percent . At the same time, relocation of agencies to Mogadishu is eating into the remaining funds, and the S.F.G. is "demanding" from the "donor"-powers a greater share of the shrinking aid pie, and getting it. The S.F.G.'s bigger slice is at the expense of N.G.O.s, especially Somali agencies and civil-society organizations.

Amidst their financial drawback, the source reports, the "donor"-powers are engaged in a fierce competition for influence with the S.F.G., which is why they are meeting its "demand." Turkey, which has committed itself foursquare to the S.F.G., has goaded the European Union and the Western "donor"-powers into a competition for the S.F.G.'s favor. Great Britain is leading the charge, having been handed the lead "donor"-power role in Somalia by the United States.

The tilt towards the S.F.G. has gone so far, says the source, that ninety-eight percent of security funding and ninety percent of governance funding are going to it. At the same time, says the source, the S.F.G. remains weak, not even in control of districts in Mogadishu, much less the areas beyond the capital.

The present weakness of the S.F.G., coupled with the largesse being heaped upon it and the increasing probability that it will be further rewarded by the "donor"-powers moving to have the United Nations arms embargo against it lifted, has stimulated opposition to the tilt and to the S.F.G. by domestic actors that feel they have been shortchanged and left out. According to the source, Puntland, the nascent Jubbaland state, and the Haber Gedir sub-clan of the Hawiye, which resists dominance in the S.F.G. by the Hawiye-Abgal, have attempted to reverse the tilt without success. Somaliland also stands to lose, but the source reports that the "donor"-powers are reluctant to abandon it at present.

Looking ahead, the source says that Somaliland and Puntland will receive their normal funding through 2013, but that 2014 is a question mark, given that the "donor"-powers plan at that time to make the World Bank the lead funding agency for "Somalia." According to the source, the World Bank has held meetings with Somaliland and the S.F.G., and with no other entities our authorities.

The source expects the World Bank to put the S.F.G. on a performance test to determine the level of funding it deserves. Somaliland and Puntland have until 2014 to show that they deserve their own funding. Regional states (Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya) , the African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia (AMISOM), and the regional cooperation organization (I.G.A.D.) will be kept in place and continue to receive funds.

Analysis

A description of the structured political dynamics in which the international and domestic (Somali) actors function can be drawn from the source's report.

At the center of the picture is the S.F.G., which is characterized simultaneously by a deficit of political power and a surfeit of international ("donor"-power) favor. It has been the beneficiary of competition between Turkey and the E.U. countries for influence over the S.F.G., now that they have created it as something they can fight over by giving it legitimacy.

The problem (for the "donor"-powers ) of their inflation of the S.F.G. is that the S.F.G. is politically weak on the ground, so weak that it will need substantial support from the "donor"-powers to gain de facto control over its de jure territory. Yet the "donor"-powers are cutting their aid to "Somalia" substantially. That the S.F.G. will govern even south-central Somalia is unlikely. Yet it will be expected by the "donor"-powers to "deliver." The S.F.G. is getting enough pie to make other domestic actors envious and resentful, but not enough pie to hand out to potential opponents and prevail on the ground.

It is unclear whether lifting the U.N. arms embargo against the S.F.G. would strengthen the latter sufficiently to change the picture of political weakness coupled with international favor. The S.F.G.'s domestic opponents believe that it would change the distribution of power to their disadvantage. On February 6, the British Telegraph newspaper reported that the U.S. is pushing the U.N. Security Council to lift the embargo. The Telegraph's diplomatic source says that the move would be done to give a "political lift" rather than a military advantage to the S.F.G. by signaling that it is considered to be a sovereign government rather than a trusteeship entity. The revocation of the embargo would, says the diplomatic source, involve easing imports of weapons while maintaining "a strict monitoring mechanism." The U.S. is reportedly being resisted by Great Britain and France, because the latter fear that arms might get into the hands of factions loyal to (ex-) warlords. As it stands, the S.F.G. is an empty shell with a glittering façade and, as the source put it, all the other actors are being drawn "into its orbit."

The underside of the highly unstable condition of a weak actor being favored externally is the mobilization of opposition to the S.F.G. taking on a clan-conflict cast. Characterizing the S.F.G. as a government dominated by Hawiye-Abgal, the opposition unites on a clan basis against the perceived threat of clannist domination. If that is the political dynamic into which the Somali political actors are entering, its final moment is civil war. One must ask whether or not the "donor"-powers have factored the possibility of civil war into the calculations that lead them to favor the S.F.G. How much clan-based opposition to the S.F.G. will there be in south-central Somalia? How will the authorities and quasi-authorities through shouth-central Somalia react to the perceived Hawiye-Abgal dominance? How can clan-based conflict be averted?

The above is not to say that the civil-war scenario has a high probability of eventuating, but that its possibility has emerged. In the short term, the factions in the south-central regions need time to organize authorities and sort out local disputes before they are ready to challenge overtly the S.F.G. Somaliland is likely to harden its independence stand, especially with the "donor"-powers seeming to be willing to deal with it directly; and Puntland, which is hurt the most by "donor"-power favor towards the S.F.G., will be forced to reassess its strategies and options. Puntland's president, Abdirahman Farole, is witnessing one of his negative scenarios coming true: the re-emergence of Mogadishu as a "city-state" dominating Somalia. The S.F.G.'s inflation threatens to alienate Puntland from the "Somalia" project.

Puntland is the other actor, beside the S.F.G., that deserves closer consideration; it has been left on the other side of the tilt. Puntland's grand strategy from its inception has been to gain the benefits of association with a Somali central government ("donor"-power access, legal standing) and the substance of self-rule by declaring autonomy until a satisfactory form of political rule was instituted in south-central Somalia. At that time it would enter a weak federation in which its previous autonomy was in all significant respects preserved.

That strategy now appears to be failing as Puntland undergoes a period of political change to a multi-party democracy. What will be Puntland's next move? Will it opt for independence? Will it join forces with the variegated opposition to the S.F.G. in south-central Somalia? Will it knuckle under and be folded into the S.F.G.? Somaliland has avoided the day of reckoning temporarily. Puntland is there. Its leverage, more than ever, depends on the political form that the southern region takes, whether it follows Puntland or the more centralized form being forwarded by the S.F.G. A separate source reports that the S.F.G. is backing the ex-warlord Barre Hirale against the factions trying to form the Jubbaland state, with Puntland supporting those factions. It is a proxy conflict opening up within Somalia, initiated by Somali actors. One can expect more such confrontations, particularly if clan rivalry becomes the basis for conflict among Somali factions.

Conclusion

The underlying dynamics of the "donor"-power tilt toward the S.F.G. has been to inflate the S.F.G. without having given it the power to back that up, and to deflate Puntland. This new balance creates an unstable situation in which the S.F.G. would be tempted to cross what, for Puntland, would be a red line. The two are already competing through proxies in the south. The point of an overt split and open hostility between the two has not yet been reached.

Meanwhile, the more the opposition to the S.F.G. takes on a clan-conflict cast, the more difficult it will be to resolve disputes, such as bringing Puntland and the S.F.G. into accord.

A third source, on the ground in south-central Somalia, says that the "donor"-powers prefer to deal with a small close group of Somali officials, if for nothing else than convenience and expediency. If that is the case, then one can understand why they do not take the power positions of Somali actors into their calculations, particularly the consequences of a redistribution of power.

Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University in Chicago weinstem@purdue.edu

Nancy Tate: Consider implications of U.S. drone attacks

A resident of the southern Yemeni town of Jaar gestures as he stands near… (Khaled Abdullah, Reuters…)

By Nancy Tate

In the Jan. 27 story, "A model base in drone wars," we learn about the "busiest Predator drone base outside the Afghanistan war zone." Located in Djibouti, "an impoverished former French colony," this base is in a prime strategic position on the Gulf of Aden, near Yemen and Somalia.

This is unfortunate for the Djiboutians. Their country is now the site for very dangerous military operations. One must ask what part the roughly 1 million citizens of Djibouti played in the decision to allow this base, right next to their city, for a mere $38 million a year lease.

It is also unfortunate for Djibouti in the hazards that the drones pose. The article describes drones crashing after takeoff, crowding busy airways,and exhibiting other occasional, mysterious haywire behavior. The people of Djibouti may be worried about "blowback" that could target their country for welcoming a U.S. drone base.

One questions this militarization of U.S. policy in Africa — the article says we have "half a dozen U.S. drone and surveillance bases" there — when Africa, as much or more than any other region, is crying out for creative, nonviolent solutions to its conflicts, for creative humanitarian aid projects, and for creative responses to the climate change crises affecting so many on the continent.

Militarization, like the U.S. Djibouti base, is likely to exacerbate these problems and delay, hamper or deny creative solutions. Some writers see the deployment of U.S. troops in Africa (The Associated Press reports that Army teams may go to as many as 35 African nations in 2013) as a route to establishing access to resources, notably minerals.

The Jan. 27 article does not deal with the victims of drone attacks, but it is important to know that in total dozens of attacks have taken place in Yemen (with estimates ranging from 42 to 147) and Somalia (from three to nine), according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism at City University of London. Civilians and children are among the dead in both countries. (The numbers for drone strikes and deaths are much higher in Pakistan.) In response to international concern about the issue of "remote targeted killings through the use of unmanned vehicles" the United Nations last month announced an investigation into the legality and casualties of drone strikes.

We need to think carefully about the implications of the deadly drone strikes. While drones give us the security of knowing U.S. troops are not in harm's way and provide some forms of "intelligence" in places where U.S. access is difficult, we know we do not have the right to execute, murder, assassinate and kill people in other countries.

The fact that drones have powerful cameras and are piloted from a distance of 8,000 miles makes their use a fascinating technical feat for some, but in no way exonerates us from the moral and legal violations for which we are all responsible as citizens of the country carrying out drone attacks that leave people dead.

If we cannot accurately determine real threats when we have troops on the ground (witness the number of detainees at Guantanamo who had absolutely nothing to do with or terrorism), how can we expect to make such a determination from a drone flying thousands of feet overhead?

We can be sure that the persistent reality of drones buzzing in the sky — with people on the ground never knowing when or where drones may strike — creates terror in the hearts of the people living under the threat of drones.

We must realize that our expansion of drone use is fueled to a significant extent by those who build them; General Atomics, Raytheon and Lockheed Martin are some of companies. Those companies have an insatiable desire for our tax dollars to build more and more drones, which of course translates into the need for more and more places to use drones, whether domestically or in a remote country like Djibouti.

If we want to get our deficit under control and build a sustainable economy benefiting people, we must question and curtail drone bases, military outposts and armament profiteers.

Nancy Tate of Riegelsville is a staff person for the Lehigh-Pocono Committee of Concern, Bethlehem.

Following Attacks, US Strengthens Training in Africa By Joshua Philipp Epoch Times Staff

U.S. Air Force pararescuemen and U.S. soldiers prepare to load a simulated casualty onboard an awaiting CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter during a training exercise in the Grand Bara Desert, Djibouti, on Jan. 16, 2013. U.S. training operations in Djibouti are key to the U.S. mission in Africa. (Airman 1st Class Nicholas Byers/U.S. Air Force)

By Joshua Philipp

Recent terrorist attacks in Africa, coupled with the brewing conflict in Mali, have given U.S. leaders a call to action. In response, the United States has reaffirmed its commitment to uproot terror cells in the region, and is increasing efforts to train and unify African militaries to address the problem locally.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is the main culprit behind the recent terrorist attack, including the attack in Algeria that left 37 hostages dead. The group is also among the Islamist fighters in Mali and is linked to the Sept. 11 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Benghazi, Libya.

During interviews with CNN and NBC on Feb. 3, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said that the United States will work with partner nations to contain terrorist organizations in the region, noting that AQIM in particular is still a problem in the Middle East and North Africa.

“We were always aware that there was AQIM [there]. Now we’re focused on AQIM as a result … of the French action, but we were also anticipating that we would have to move into North Africa,” Panetta said, according to the Pentagon’s American Forces Press Service (AFPS).

“Wherever they are, we have to make sure they have no place to hide,” Panetta said. “[The] bottom line is al-Qaeda is our enemy, and we have to make sure we go after them.”

Terrorist groups, meanwhile, have threatened to attack Western countries, including the United States and France.

On Feb. 22, Mohammed al Zawahiri, the younger brother of al-Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri, said “France lit the fire, it started the war and if this continues, the first to burn will be Western people,” during an interview broadcast by Euronews, The Long War Journal reported.

According to Max Abrahms, terrorism researcher and fellow at John Hopkins University, while al-Qaeda and its affiliates have been severely weakened, “When a terrorist says they will attack a country, I think we really need to listen.”

He said that the threat against the United States was likely legitimate, “but with the violence spilling out of the Maghreb, it’s more likely to fall on France.”

U.S. Air Force pararescuemen and U.S. soldiers prepare to load a simulated casualty onboard an awaiting CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter during a training exercise in the Grand Bara Desert, Djibouti, on Jan. 16, 2013. (Airman 1st Class Nicholas Byers/U.S. Air Force)

“Many of the immigrants from France, beginning in the 1960s, come from Algeria.” Abrahms said, adding, “France has been much more involved in military operations in the Maghreb than the United States has been.”

A Subtle Approach

The U.S. approach to dealing with al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups will likely fall on the shoulders of the U.S. mission in Djibouti. The small country is at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, just 20 miles across the strait from Yemen and on the northwest corner of Somalia, and the base there is home to one of the major U.S. operations in Africa.

“Soon after the 9-11 attacks, the United States recognized the strategic importance of Djibouti and with cooperation from the country’s government established Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa as part of the U.S. Central Command,” states a report from AFPS.

One year after the formation of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007, the command took over operations in Djibouti as well as the 1,800 U.S. troops that are part of Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA).

The key function of the mission in Djibouti is not fighting, however. Rather, its main purpose is to train the militaries of other African nations.

According to AFPS, the approach “can be done at a fraction of the cost of what it would cost if the United States fielded its own troops in the region,” and U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Rob Baker, commander of CJTF–HOA, told AFPS that it “is exactly consistent with the chairman’s Joint Force 2020 vision of small footprint, low visibility, low cost.”

“It’s one of the best examples we have in our government of what happens when the State Department and DOD cooperate on a joint venture,” Baker added.

The base works with U.S. embassies in the region to coordinate training, which includes everything from marksmanship to training commanders and countering insurgents.

The other main function of the base—thanks to a second operational order from AFRICOM—has placed Baker in charge of defeating al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda in East Africa, AFPS reported.

“We do that in different ways, first by training East African militaries to be successful when they fight in Somalia, and second, we do it by sharing information with our partners in the region,” he said.

Department of State spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said during a Jan. 22 press briefing that 700,800 troops from several African nations were moving in to help take back Mali. Nuland said that the troops were “further to the support that we have been offering both in terms of training, pre-deployment, sustainment, [and] lift.”

Somalia: Can US recognition bring stability?

H. E. Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud 'Siilaanyo' Somaliland President

President Silanyo read out an open letter from the US State department: “US recognition of the government of Somalia will not prevent the US from engaging with Somaliland, nor prevent us from conducting our programs in Somaliland, we made sure to clarify this with the Somali government before deciding to recognize them.”

by Said Mohamud Isse

After over two decades of famine, Islamic extremism and piracy, Somalia may be showing signs of revival.

The country seems to have turned the corner, creating an inkling of hope for many Somalis who have never seen a meaningful peace, but rather bullet holes. For years, the country has been the perfect example of a failed state, but things are looking up for the war-torn nation.

Since 2007, the extremist Islamist group al-Shabaab controlled much of southern Somalia, and large part of the Capital Mogadishu. It imposed strict Sharia law, banning aspects of western culture such as sport, films and art. Many experts were surprised, however, when they withdrew from Mogadishu in 2011, paving the way to the first democratic elections in 42 years.

A year later, the new Somali parliament elected Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as president, closing the chapter of a decade old transitional governments. They began the process of restoring diplomatic ties and in January 2013, the United State of America officially recognised the Somali government for the first time in 21 years.

The federalism debate

Somalia might be defying all the odds, but there has been criticism from within the country. The autonomous state of Somaliland proclaimed their independence in 1991, but they are not officially recognised by any government. They fear that the US’s decision to recognise Mohamud’s government weakens their own bid for recognition.

However, Mogadishu based Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS) has endorsed the move saying: “The U.S. recognition of the Somali government…is a great and timely opportunity that could contribute to Somalia’s effort to retake its rightful place among community of nations.”

“In the two decades Somalia took hiatus from the international scene, many opportunities that could have helped Somalia shed the ‘failed state’ designation appeared and vanished with the same speed. Thus, it’s up to the Somali government and citizens to ensure the US recognition does not turn out, yet again, another squandered opportunity.”

Tress Thomas, who is researching federalism in Somalia for his PhD, told The Foreign Report that some federalism advocates believe that President Mohamud will use US recognition to stifle the development of regional administrations. The government may be able to use international aid as a point of leverage to increase Mogadishu’s overall power.

“However, these could be overblown reactions. The first test will be how President Mohamud manages Mogadishu’s involvement in the formation of aspiring states like Jubaland and established ones like Puntland and Somaliland, which he has yet to visit.

“The second test will be what decisions the Somali parliament reaches on how to divide federal and regional powers and responsibilities within an amended constitution. The effect of US recognition on Somalia’s stability hinges partly on these indicators, and President Mohamud will be judged significantly by how he manages these matters.”

Federalism has been debated in Somalia more recently, as many Somalis believe that centralized government led by Mogadishu would only lead to isolation of other parts of the country. Others, however, argue that federalism will only perpetuate the division and conflict in the country.

Somali writer Mohamud Uluso, writing for Hiiraan Online, expressed his concerns: “Secession, clan based federalism, and unitary decentralized political system…are obstacle to the recovery of the lost nation of Somalia.”

Uluso commends the US for their decision to recognise the Somali government, and he believes that it will help the government to bring peace and economic prosperity to the country. “The US diplomatic recognition of the government of Somalia gives impetus to the implementation of these goals and offers space and encouragement for internal unity and dialogue,” Uluso said in the article.

Dual track policy

In 2010, the US government announced a dual track policy for Somalia. It was intended to support the Djibouti peace process, while also broadening the US’s engagement with responsible regional administrations, civil society and clan leaders that seek voice in Somalia’s future. On track one, the policy supported the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia as well as the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The second track supported education and maternal health as well as encouraging democratic elections across Somaliland, Puntland and other emerging regional administrations.

The Somaliland government was one administration that benefited the policy, but officials called the recent US recognition a “slap in the face” for Somaliland’s ambition to secede from Somalia.

“If re-unification talks between Hargeisa [the Somaliland capital] and Mogadishu restart in the near future, Mogadishu likely will begin with more leverage since both parties know that the US remains hesitant to recognize Somaliland,” said Tress Thomas.

“However, Somaliland’s best available counter-strategy may be to govern itself so successfully that other foreign countries begin to afford it more legitimacy. This could help Somaliland build more international support but reflects a more long-term strategy,” he continued.

US statement on the Somali government recognition did not mention whether the US will abandon the dual track policy, but Tress Thomas thinks that’s unlikely: “There has not been any evidence to suggest that there will be significant changes in the US dual track policy. If anything, these statements show that the United States is depending on Somaliland and Somalia to choose their own course for future cooperation.”

Somaliland president, Ahmed Mohamud Silanyo, has assured Somali lawmakers that US recognition of Somali government will not affect Somaliland’s ambition to secede from Somalia. “Our relation with the US nothing has changed, it will be as it was before,” President Ahmed Silanyo said.

President Silanyo read out an open letter from the US State department: “US recognition of the government of Somalia will not prevent the US from engaging with Somaliland, nor prevent us from conducting our programs in Somaliland, we made sure to clarify this with the Somali government before deciding to recognize them.”

The government in Somalia will hope to use the greater legitimacy that comes from the US’s recognition to roll out reforms throughout the country. But they will also have to find a solution to the question of Somaliland’s independence, something that seems to be an ever more impossible task as neither side dares go against their polarized electorate.

Silenced in Israel, Spy Tale Unfolds in Australia

Australia’s ABC News says on its Web site that Ben Zygier was Prisoner X, who died mysteriously in an Israeli prison cell.

 

By   JODI RUDOREN

The first reports about the death of Prisoner X leaked out in 2010, both in Israel and the United States, where a blogger identified the mystery man as a former Iranian general. Government censors immediately forced an Israeli news site to remove two items related to Prisoner X — and journalists were interrogated about it by the police.

On Tuesday, after an extensive Australian television report identifying Prisoner X as an Australian father of two who became an Israeli spy, the prime minister’s office summoned Israeli editors to a rare meeting to remind them of the court order blocking publication of anything connected to the matter.

It remains unclear what Prisoner X might have done to warrant such extreme treatment — and such extreme secrecy, which human rights groups have denounced as violating international law. What is clear is that the modern media landscape makes the Israeli censorship system established in the 1950s hopelessly porous: the Australian report quickly made the rounds on social media, prompting outraged inquiries from opposition lawmakers on the floor of Parliament.

“The Israeli public will know sooner or later what happened,” declared Nahman Shai, a Parliament member from the Labor Party.

Aluf Benn, the editor of the Israeli daily Haaretz, said the government forced him and another news organization to delete items about the Australian reports from their Web sites on Tuesday. Later, Haaretz posted an article on the unusual editors meeting and the parliamentary discussion.

“They live in a previous century, unfortunately,” Mr. Benn said of the Israeli administration. “Today, whatever is blocked in news sites is up in the air on

Facebook walls and Twitter feeds. You can’t just make a story disappear. I hope that they’re more updated in whatever they do professionally.”  

The prime minister’s office and prison service declined on Tuesday to comment. “I can’t tell you anything; I’m not dealing with this,” said the prison spokeswoman, Sivan Weizman. “I can’t answer any question about it. Sorry.”

On Wednesday, the Israeli government partially lifted the gag order to allow local media to publish reports quoting the foreign press, and headlines quickly went up on Israeli Web sites.

Haaretz, which had splashed the story across the top of its print front pages on Wednesday despite the ban, using articles about the parliamentary inquiries and columns complaining about censorship, published an instant package on its site: a news story in which virtually every sentence was attributed to the Australian TV report; a reaction piece from the Australian Jewish community; an article about an Australian government inquiry into how its embassy in Tel Aviv handled the matter; and two columns questioning Mossad practices. Its Web site feature a photo of the dead man’s grave.  

Ynet, the Web site that had published the items taken down under government order in 2010, ran an article headlined, "’Dead Mossad Agent’ Affair Revealed."

The Jerusalem Post offered, "Report Reveals Alleged Identity of Prisoner X,’ while the Times of Israel, another news site, blared, "Canberra Simmers Over Report Australian Mossad Agent Killed Self in Jail," noting the Australian government’s inquiry.  

Maariv, a Hebrew daily, posted a picture of the dead prisoner, along with articles about past Mossad scandals, the agency’s use of Australians, and the American blogger who got it wrong.

Radio programs were filled with discussion of the story on Wednesday morning, with media specialists and former judges discussing the question of censorship and security in the Internet age.

The Australian report, a half-hour segment based on a 10-month investigation that was broadcast Tuesday on the ABC News magazine program “Foreign

Correspondent,” identified Prisoner X as Ben Zygier and said he had used the name Ben Alon in Israel. Mr. Zygier immigrated to Israel about a decade before his death at age 34, married an Israeli woman and had two small children, according to the report.

JERUSALEM — The story had all the trappings of a spy thriller: an anonymous prisoner linked to Israel’s secret service, Mossad, isolated in a top-security wing originally built for the assassin of a prime minister. A suicide — or was it a murder? — never officially reported. A gag order that barred journalists from even acknowledging the gag order. And a code name to rival 007: Prisoner X.

“ABC understands he was recruited by spy agency Mossad,” read a post on the Australian network’s Web site. “His incarceration was so secret that it is claimed not even guards knew his identity.” Mr. Zygier “was found hanged in a cell with state-of-the-art surveillance systems that are installed to prevent suicide,” it said, adding that guards tried unsuccessfully to revive him and that he was buried a week later in a Jewish cemetery in a suburb of Melbourne.

A spokeswoman for the Australian government said in an e-mail that its embassy was unaware of the prisoner’s detention until his family asked for help repatriating the remains, and that she could not “comment on intelligence matters (alleged or actual).”

The Australian report builds on news items from 2010 that described the death of Prisoner X in solitary-confinement cell 15 in a part of Israel’s Ayalon Prison said to have been created especially for Yigal Amir, who killed Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. Prisoner X was not allowed visitors or a lawyer, according to those reports.

Richard Silverstein, an American blogger, claimed in 2010 that Prisoner X was Ali-Reza Asgari, a former general in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and a government minister, who had previously been reported to have defected to Israel and cooperated with Western intelligence agencies. On Tuesday, Mr. Silverstein acknowledged his error, saying his source apparently was part of “a ruse designed to throw the media off the scent of the real story.”

Bill van Esveld, a Jerusalem-based analyst with Human Rights Watch, said the reports suggested a serious violation of international law. “That’s the most basic obligation you can think of, not disappearing people,” he said. “You can’t take somebody into detention, deny any knowledge of them, and not allow their families to be in communication with them, not allow them to see a lawyer or have any due process. That’s what needs to be looked into.”

Dov Hanin, a member of Parliament from the left-wing Hadash Party, on Tuesday questioned Israel’s justice minister, Yaakov Ne’eman, about Prisoner X, asking:

“Are there people whose arrest is kept a secret? What are the legal monitoring mechanisms in charge of such a situation? What are the parliamentary monitoring systems in charge of such a situation? And how can public criticism exist in cases of such a situation?”  

Mr. Ne’eman replied that the matter did not fall under his jurisdiction, but said, “There is no doubt that if true, the matter must be looked into.”

Israel has long employed a military censor and refused to acknowledge certain operations, most recently its airstrike last month in Syria. Most politicians here offer only winks and nods about Israel’s well-known nuclear program, and Israeli journalists are left to quote foreign news media reports about such things. Two weeks ago, Reporters Without Borders ranked Israel 112th out of 179 countries on its annual press freedom index.

But even within that context, experts said the Prisoner X situation was extraordinary. They likened it to the case of Marcus Klingberg, a Soviet spy who was held in Israel for years under a false name.

“There are some episodes in the history of Israel that are still kept under the strongest secrecy thick veil possible,” said Ronen Bergman, an Israeli journalist and contributing writer for The New York Times Magazine who is writing a book about the Mossad. “Some of them are 40 years old, 50 years old, and are still under thick, thick secrecy, and anyone violating this secrecy would be thrown into jail himself.”

Mr. Bergman said he had information about Prisoner X but could not share it because “so far the gag order is in motion and I’m an Israeli citizen.” Three former directors of the Mossad also refused on Tuesday to comment on the case.

“This is the topic you want to talk to me about? No way,” said Danny Yatom, who headed the spy agency in the late 1990s and later served as a Labor member of Parliament. “I don’t know if it is true or not. Even if I would have known if it were true, I wouldn’t have talked about it.”

Exclusive: U.N. monitors see arms reaching Somalia from Yemen, Iran

(Reuters) - As the United States pushes for an end to the U.N. arms embargo on Somalia, U.N. monitors are reporting that Islamist militants in the Horn of Africa nation are receiving arms from distribution networks linked to Yemen and Iran, diplomats told Reuters.

The U.N. Security Council's sanctions monitoring team's concerns about Iranian and Yemeni links to arms supplies for al Shabaab militants come asYemen is asking Tehran to stop backing armed groups on Yemeni soil. Last month Yemeni coast guards and the U.S. Navy seized a consignment of missiles and rockets the Sanaa government says were sent by Iran.

According to the latest findings by the monitoring group, which tracks compliance with U.N. sanctions on Somalia and Eritrea, most weapons deliveries are coming into northern Somalia - that is, the autonomous Puntland and Somaliland regions - after which they are moved farther south into Shabaab strongholds.

The supply chains in Yemen are largely Somali networks in that country, council diplomats said on condition of anonymity.

"In Galguduud (central Somalia), Shabaab received arms, including IED (improvised explosive device) components," a Security Council diplomat said, referring to one of the Somalia/Eritrea Monitoring Group's most recent confidential reports. Several other council diplomats confirmed his remarks.

Other weapons supplied included PKM machine guns, said the group's monthly report for January.

The monitors were scheduled to informally brief Security Council members on Friday but the meeting was canceled due to a major snowstorm, diplomats said. The U.N. monitors favor a gradual easing of the arms embargo rather lifting it as the Americans and the Somali government advocate, the diplomats said.

Yemen is proving to be of central importance for arming Shabaab, the monitors' reporting shows, both because it is feeding arms into northern Somalia and because it has become a playing field for Iranian interests in Somalia and elsewhere.

The U.N. Security Council's Panel of Experts on Iran, which monitors compliance with the Iran sanctions regime, including the arms embargo on Tehran, is also looking at Yemen and evidence of Iranian arms shipments across Africa, council diplomats told Reuters.

Iran's U.N. mission did not respond immediately to a request for comment.

The monitors found Iranian and North Korean-manufactured weapons that came to Somalia viaLibya at a base of the U.N.-backed African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia. Diplomats who follow the issue said the arms were apparently recovered by the peacekeepers and raised important questions.

"Why are Iranian and North Korean small arms finding their way into Somalia from Libya? Do they date from before the arms embargoes (against both North Korea and Iran)? How did they get there from Libya?" a council diplomat asked.

"It certainly emphasizes the point that Somalia is a country awash with arms and still very fragile," the diplomat said.

CONCERNS ABOUT LIFTING ARMS EMBARGO

U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has said the 15-nation council should consider lifting the arms embargo to help rebuild Somalia's security forces and consolidate military gains against the al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab militants.

It is a position that has the strong backing of the United States, which is pushing for an end to the 21-year-old U.N. arms embargo. The Security Council imposed it in 1992 to cut the flow of arms to feuding warlords, who a year earlier had ousted dictator Mohamed Siad Barre and plunged Somalia into civil war.

Diplomatic sources said Ban's recommendation to support an end to the embargo did not appear in earlier drafts of his report but was added later on. It has happened before that a secretary-general's reports on various issues have been amended before publication in response to complaints from member states.

Diplomats said Britain, France and Argentina are the council members most reluctant to end the arms embargo, preferring a gradual easing of it instead. The Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group has also opposed the idea of lifting it and see their latest findings as proof of why that would be unwise, diplomats said.

Those who oppose scrapping the arms embargo say Somalia's security sector still includes elements close to warlords and militants, an allegation the Somali government rejects. They also say the government can still get arms despite the embargo via requests to the U.N. sanctions committee.

"There are no Somali warlords that threaten peace and stability in Somalia," the alternate permanent representative for Somalia, Idd Beddel Mohamed, told Reuters. "They are normal citizens now, members of parliament. The embargo must be lifted."

But diplomats said the monitors have a different view - namely that specific units of the Somali security forces have links to warlords and are putting pressure on the Somali government to push for the arms embargo to be lifted.

Those in favor of lifting the embargo want a monitoring mechanism to ensure that arms purchased by the government do not end up in the hands of insurgents. But they also feel that the government should have the means to continue improving security around the country as it appears to have Shabaab on the run.

The U.S. mission to the United Nations declined to comment on the monitors' reporting because it is confidential.

Last week a U.S. official said Washington was merely backing a request by the Somali government and the African Union to end the arms embargo.

The U.S. government last month recognized the Somali government for the first time in more than two decades.

U.N. discussions on the Somalia arms embargo are expected to continue through March, when the Security Council must pass a resolution to renew the mandate of the AU peacekeeping force.

(Reporting By Louis Charbonneau; editing by Christopher Wilson)

Source: Reuters

Arms Trade Networks In Yemen, Iran Fueling Somalia Conflict

Written by Al Bawaba News

Islamist militants in Somalia are receiving arms from Yemen and Iran, Western diplomats told Reuters.

The arms trade networks involved in the scheme would be in breach of a U.N. embargo on weapons exports to Somalia.

A monitoring team sent by the U.N. Security Council raised the concerns over the arms shipments as Yemen is requesting Iran stop backing insurgent groups on its soil.

Most of the weapons enter Somalia via the two northern autonomous regions of Puntland and Somaliland before being transported south to Al Shabaab rebels.

The monitors found the North Korean- and Iran-made weapons at a base of the U.N.-backed African Union (AU) peacekeeping force in Somalia, which raises the question of the possibility of arms smuggling networks operating within the AU force.

The weapons are said to include improvised bombs and Russian-designed PK machine guns.

“Why are Iranian and North Korean small arms finding their way into Somalia from Libya? Do they date from before the arms embargoes [against both North Korea and Iran]? How did they get there from Libya?” a council diplomat asked Reuters.

The U.S. is pushing for an end to the 21-month arms embargo, imposed in 1992.

“There are no Somali warlords that threaten peace and stability in Somalia,” the alternate permanent representative for Somalia, Idd Beddel Mohamed, told Reuters. “They are normal citizens now, members of parliament. The embargo must be lifted.”