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Friday, February 28, 2014

With or without TPS, there’s hope for undocumented Filipinos in US



  • Avenues for regularization still open for undocumented Filipinos
  • But fear, procrastination, fatalism are obstacles
  • Undocumented must rely on accredited nonprofits and professionals in order to avoid scams
Robert Yabes, Catholic Relief Services
of Santa Clara County. ASIA.WIDMI.COM PHOTO


SOUTH SAN FRANCISCO, California – Catholic Charities of Santa Clara County recently briefed the news media on the potential benefits available for undocumented Filipinos, despite delays in Comprehensive Immigration Reform and US approval of a Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation for the Philippines.

Undocumented Filipinos still have other avenues to try, said Immigration Legal Services Program Director Robert Yabes and his team of Board of Immigration Appeals (IBA)-certified team.

Yabes decried the low number of Filipinos willing to do something about their being out of status. “In Santa Clara County, 70 to 80 percent of our clients are Latinos. Asians, just 10 to 20 per cent. The rest are from the Middle-East, Africa and other countries.”

“Out of 1.7 million qualified for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival or DACA (signed by President Obama in June 2012 for qualified youth, granting them a two-year work permit and a guarantee that they will not be deported), only 537,000 applied (as of July 2013). Only four percent of these were Asians. Of these, less than one percent or 0.7 were Filipinos. There are about 22,000 eligible Filipinos but only 18 per cent or 4,000 applied.”

Yabes offered the manana (procrastination) and bahala na (leave it to God) attitudes among Filipinos as the culprits.

But according to San Jose Peace & Justice Center, the $456 cost of application and the $550 fee for assistance puts DACA beyond most young people’s reach. And only a fourth of these could produce the required documents.Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.

Yet, apparently, the fear factor among many Filipinos “who fear being criminalized” is the biggest obstacle. Many fear that the collateral information gathered from the application will be used against their relatives and friends.

Yabes told FilAm Star, “Even people applying for US Citizenship need to disclose their spouse’s immigration status. But the DHS does not go after (those undocumented as revealed in the application) even if they have the same address and contact information as the applicant.”

“Homeland Security’s top priority is to go after people with criminal records or people who have been in the immigration court system and did not follow the judge’s order (like those still in the US despite a voluntary departure order).There are too many undocumented immigrants in the US and it is impossible to go after all of them.”

“Logic dictates, why would the government provide a benefit like DACA, encourage the undocumented to apply and then destroy all of it by arresting relatives of the applicants? It does not make sense.”

The DHS website for DACA confirms that the said information will not be disclosed to US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and US Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) unless there is a matter of national security, fraud or criminal offenses.

Although Question number 10 (addressing this concern) contains the waiver: “This policy, which may be modified, superseded or rescinded at any time without notice, is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by law by any party in administration, civil or criminal matter.”

Also invited to the media briefing were staff from Catholic Charities’ sister organizations in San Francisco and San Mateo who were mostly Latino. And here the complex issue of immigration reform reared its complex head, with different ethnic groups differing in their needs and reactions. The Latinos have been struggling with it for a while and have learned to work the system and practically shook the Filipinos from their paralyzing fear.

One stood up to point out that although TPS for El Salvador was extended for some other reason in 2001, “nothing happened to the people who stopped applying (for TPS). It won’t be good politics for the US to deny these benefits to Filipinos. Anyway, it’s better to have something than nothing. Even if it’s just the peace of mind of having a social security number and a driver license.”

BIA-accredited Representative Juan Gil Garcia from Santa Clara County chimed in, “DHS usually prioritizes who is a high risk for removal or deportation. The court would send the case to ICE because they are shorthanded. It is possible that deportation might happen. But so long as the petition is based on humanitarian reasons, there are other possibilities.”

“I’ve never seen a positive outcome from fear-based decisions. Those people who’ve been afraid all these years have been doing so needlessly.”

They said that those who took advantage of TPS have “bought houses, raised their children and put them through school.”

Garcia added, “Once TPS is granted but extension does not happen (after about two years), ICE will not go to their homes. If somebody has acquired deportation notice, maybe. But each case is unique. There is always judicial process. Worst case scenario, (if deportation occurs), you can ask for voluntary deportation within 120 days. Then there are other possibilities.”

Yabes said, “If TPS is granted to the Philippines, it will be the first time that the US will grant it to an Asian country. (Current TPS designated countries include: El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Somalia and more recently, Sudan, South Sudan and Syria.) When Indonesia was struck by a tsunami, there was no TPS. In my experience, you don’t reject any benefit because it leads to permanency.”

Also from Santa Clara County, BIA-accredited Representative Roela Vazquez presented “some things good that may come out of bad things:” the T Visa (granted to victims of human trafficking such as the Filipino teachers in El Paso, Texas and Baltimore) who were preyed upon by unscrupulous recruiters, the U Visa (granted to victims of crimes like torture, rape, domestic violence, assault, prostitution, being held hostage, abduction, slave trade, kidnapping, etc.), the self-petitioning Violence Against Women Act or VAWA (often invoked for abused spouses of US citizens) and the Special Immigrant Juvenile Status or SIJ (provided for alien juvenile in state juvenile court systems who were abused, abandoned or neglected.

Source: globalnation.inquirer.net

Three steps the UK should take to stop the CAR from turning into another Rwanda



To date Britain has regarded the bloody conflict as “not one for us”







BY MARCUS MANUEL

There is increasing evidence of widespread killings in the Central African Republic. The BBC World Service reported live from a convoy seeking to save the lives of a few. Thanks to the African Union peacekeepers the convoy of mainly Muslims successfully negotiated its way through multiple impromptu checkpoints controlled by self-defence Christian militias. But the risks are great. When a young man fell from a lorry a mob quickly surrounded him, hacking him to death in minutes.
As the new interim President seeks to lead the country out of conflict she is having to deal with the   downward spiral of violence that has gripped CAR. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees describes the situation as a “humanitarian catastrophe of unspeakable proportions. Massive ethno-religious cleansing is continuing.” The UN Secretary General has called on the international community to deploy more troops within a matter of weeks, recognising that a UN peacekeeping force – even if approved by the Security Council – will take six months to be deployed.

Why is it taking so long to mobilise these urgently needed troops?

International experts will cite complicated international law and regional politics. But as in Rwanda in 1990s the fundamental reason is fear.

Fear of failure is understandable. Syrian peace negotiations have just failed. In the 1990s it was the failure of US Marines in Somalia – immortalised by the film Black Hawk Down – that was fresh in everyone’s mind. But set against these failures there have also been successes such as UK achieved in Sierra Leone. And, after a slow start, the NATO intervention in Bosnia saved many lives.

Fear of the cost remains the final killer. As aid budgets are cut around the world, this not the time to be rattling the tin with a large and uncertain price-tag. The cost of a 10 to 20,000 force will be of the order of $1 billion a year – one per cent of donors’ aid budgets and 0.1 per cent of donors’ military spend.

But if the cost of action is expensive, the cost of inaction will be even greater.

Development agencies know that if this crisis is not solved soon a much more expensive humanitarian crisis looms. Twenty years ago CAR soldiers were about to riot because their wages hadn’t been paid. One donor desperately tried to raise $10 million needed to bridge the gap. When the money wasn’t forthcoming, soldiers torched the capital. Donors spent $100 million in emergency humanitarian assistance to pay for reconstruction.

This time the cost of the humanitarian crisis will be much higher. The killings are causing the vital trade flows of food and seeds to seize up. In a few months the rains will come, much of the country will become impassable, and it will be too late to plant crops. And so inevitably will come a food emergency.

To date the UK has regarded CAR as “not one for us”. But we also have a long and proud tradition of being one of the most generous contributors to humanitarian appeals. And we have unique expertise in peace making and peacekeeping.

So what should the UK do?

First we should offer to help the French. The UK is about to share a French aircraft carrier. A good place to start to learn how to work together to great effect would be to work together in the Central African Republic.

Second, the UK should lead on the issue of funding of troops from other countries. We need to signal our readiness to fund other countries that are willing and able to send troops.

Third, the UK should lead the redesign of the whole international peacekeeping system so it can act with humanitarian style speed and determination. When a flood or earthquake strike teams are dispatched overnight even before donors know the full extent of the catastrophe. The world needs a rapid reaction force that is ready to go and can be deployed with the speed that the UK did in Sierra Leone.

Finally, the UK should be in lead for a global redistribution of development aid. As CAR’s own leaders have noted, the dire poverty indicators are the root cause of the conflict. Yet the country receives just £40 of development aid each year for each person living in extreme poverty. Richer more stable countries receive more than four times that amount. The UK is increasingly focused its development aid on the poorest most fragile states. The rest of the world needs to do the same.

After Rwanda the world said “Never Again”. The international community needs to act now to make that promise true for the Central African Republic.

Source: independent.co.uindependent.co.uk

Faahfin: Qaraxii ka dhacay degmada Cadicasiis ee magaalada Muqdisho -Sawiro





Subaxnimadii maanta oo Khamiis ah ayaa mar kale qarax weyn ka dhacay magaalada Muqdisho gaar ahaan Degmada Cabdicasiis, meel u dhaxaysa Bar Fiat iyo isgoyska Jubba. Qaraxan ayaa lala eegtey maqaaxi ku dhaw Xarunta Hay’adda Sirdoonka Dowladda federaalka ah ee Soomaaliya.

Inta la ogyahay 11 qof ayaa ku dhimatey qaraxa dad kale oo badana waa ku dhaawacmeen kuwaas oo isugu jira shaqaalaha hay’äadda sirdoonka iyo kuwo rayid ah oo maqaaxida u soo shaahdoontey.

Warar aan la xaqiijin ayaa sheegaya in Madaxweyne Xasan Shiikh Maxamuud uu qorsheynayey in uu maanta booqdo xarunta sirdoonka qaranka, ayna dhici karto in weerarku ahaa mid qorsheysan.

Ururka al-Shabaab ayaa sheegtey weerarkan waxayna sheegeen in ay ku dileen saraakiil sarsare oo ka tirsaneyd hay’adda sirdoonka iyo kuwo ajnabi ah, waxaana ay wacad ku mareen in ay siim wadayaan weerarada caynkan oo kale, waxaana sidaan ay ka sheegeen Idaacadda ku hadasha afka al-Shabaab ee magaceeda la yiraahdo Andulus.

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Raysalwasaaraha Soomaaliya ayaa qaraxan ku tilmaamey mid calaamad u ah guuldarada kooxda al-Shabaab!, Raysalwsaaare Cabdiweli oo maalmo ka hor sheegey in shacabka Soomaaliyeed maqli doonaan war ay ku farxaan oo ku aadan kooxda argagagaxa ku haysa, ayaa mar kale ka tacsiyeeyey falkan ka dhacay meel dolwaddu si weyn u ilaaliso.

Jimcadii hore ayey ahayd markii koox ka tirsan ururka al-Shabaab ay weerar ku qaadeen Wadnihii Dowladda ee Villa Somalia una suurta gashey in ay ka dhexdagaalamaan gudaha Madaxtooyada halkaas oo ay ku dileen saraakiil sar-sare.

Mid kamid ah Xildhibaanada Baarlamaanka Federaalka Soomaaliya ayaa ku baaqey in la gaarey xilligii Dowladda wax laga weydiin lahaa amniga, waxaana uu ku baaqey in Afhayenka Baarlamaanku fadhi deg-deg ah isugu yeero Xildhibaanada maadaama dowladdu muuqato in amnigu faraheeda ka sii baxayo,

Xildhibaanka ayaa baaqiisa ku daabacay barta Twitterka isaga oo si adag uga hadley amniga sii xumaanaya.


Let's Give Somalia's Government the Non-Recognition It Deserves BY J. PETER PHAM


BY J. PETER PHAM
atlanticcouncil.org
One year ago the Obama administration broke with the Somalia policy of its three predecessors by according diplomatic recognition to the government of the Federal Republic of Somalia. Last month, in his annual Worldwide Threat Assessment report to Congress, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper bemoaned that the Somali regime’s “persistent political infighting, weak leadership from President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, ill-equipped government institutions, and pervasive technical, political, and administrative shortfalls” provided an opening for al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabaab militants to continue targeting Western interests. Indeed, Mohamud’s regime is itself perhaps the greatest obstacle to security and progress in the Horn of Africa, and the most effective US policy on Somalia would begin by reversing the decision to recognize it.
US-State Secretary Hillary Clinton-with-Somali-President-Hassan-Sheikh-Mohamud
Former US State Secretary Hillary Clinton with-Somali President Hassan Sheikh-Mohamud January 17, 2013
But in the world of Washington decision making, policy reversals that appear to concede significant errors of judgment are seldom made quickly. Even though the latest Somali government has proven to be as feckless and corrupt as its predecessors, the US administration is unlikely to abandon it as an object of state building until it completes its current spiral into collapse. Still, policymakers should do what they can at the margins to back America away from this failed choice and require all Somali actors to earn their engagement by the United States through their performance.
In this strategy of “earned engagement,” the international community would engage Somali actors instrumentally, offering its traditional clans, civil society organizations, regional authorities and government entities (including those of the de facto independent Republic of Somaliland and the autonomous Puntland State) equal-opportunity access to international resources—but only to the extent that they meet benchmarks of effectiveness. (Africa Center Deputy Director Bronwyn Bruton and I laid out this approach in detail in a 2011 Foreign Affairs article.)
The current state-building attempt in Somalia, only two years old, unfortunately was vitiated almost from the start. At the London Conference on Somalia hosted by British Prime Minister David Cameron in February 2012, the international community opened a complicated process whereby Somali elders, representing the clans and sub-clans which remain the permanent framework of Somali society, were to pick a broadly representative constituent assembly. That assembly was then to prepare a constitution and give way to a parliament, which would elect the president.
But many of the “elders” chosen to begin the process were not elders at all. A vetting process, meant to weed out puppets of militia strongmen as well as those with a history of violence or who lacked basic literacy, was predicated on Somalia’s political rivals serving as a check on each other. Instead, the strongmen put aside their differences and colluded to pack the conference of elders. A senior Africa Union official confided to me in the summer of 2012 that “at least 40 percent” of the supposed elders had no legitimacy as such. Subsequently, it was widely reported, by The Economist among other sources, that these phony representatives turned around and sold seats in the new 275-member parliament for as much as $25,000 each.
When the new legislature convened on September 11, 2012, under the protection of African Union peacekeepers at the Mogadishu airport, the widely-discredited incumbent president of the outgoing Transitional Federal Government, Sharif Ahmed, won the largest number of votes, falling just shy of the majority needed for another term in office. According to well-sourced media reports at the time, what may have caused his loss in the subsequent round of balloting was his own greed: he was reportedly given $7 million dollars from Gulf sources to buy his reelection and yet, until the desperate second round of the vote, doled out stingy payments in the $10,000 range to the electors. When parliament members learned the sum he actually had at his disposal, many turned against him and threw their support behind a dark-horse candidate, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, a civil society activist with close ties to the (relatively) moderate Islamist movement al-Islah (“Reform”).
In less than eighteen months since then, this government has gone through two prime ministers and countless cabinet reshuffles. Given the brief tenures they can expect to hold, senior government officials largely view their appointments as opportunities for self-enrichment and other corruption before they are forced to move on.
One of few high-ranking officials with a reputation for probity, Central Bank Governor Yussur Abrar, a US citizen of Somali origin who had had a successful career in international banking at AIG and Citigroup, was forced to resign in late 2013 after less than two months in office because she refused to go along with persistent corruption in the president’s office and would not sanction a questionable contract pushed by the president and foreign minister. In what UN Special Representative for Somalia Nicholas Kay described as a “body blow” to donor confidence, Ms. Abrar fled Mogadishu fearing for her safety and submitted her resignation after landing in the United Arab Emirates.
“Systematic abuses” by the Somali regime have allowed weapons for government forces to be diverted to warlords and al-Shabaab militants, according to the United Nations’ Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea. Evidence assembled by UN experts indicated that advisors of President Mohamud have helped plan weapons deliveries to both Islamist militants and criminal gangs.
Militant violence continues regularly throughout Mogadishu and other cities, including some of the most heavily fortified areas. A car bomb exploded at the gate of Mogadishu’s international airport February 13, killing six people. On February 21, militants attacked the presidential palace with a car bomb and gunfire, leaving at least eight people, including two government officials, dead before they were driven off. Artillery shells fired from outside the capital during the day, and sustained night-time attacks with mortars and gunfire, are regular features of life.
Merely reporting these problems has become dangerous. The government repeatedly has attacked the independent Shabelle Media Network, winner of the 2010 Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Prize. It has withheld a broadcast license to Radio Shabelle, which operated for a decade before the current regime came into being. In October, the Interior Ministry ordered the company to vacate its premises (which not only house its studios, but also serve as a safe haven for journalists, several of whom have had their homes destroyed by al-Shabaab terrorists). One week later, government forces stormed the building, beating and arresting some three dozen journalists and other employees, and confiscating and destroying broadcast equipment. The most recent World Press Freedom Index, released by Reporters Without Borders, ranks Somalia ranks 176th out of 180 countries in the freedom of information.
In the two decades between the collapse of the Siad Barre dictatorship in early 1991 and the inauguration of the current regime in late 2012, Somalia has seen no fewer than fifteen attempts by outsiders to install a central government. While the United States never formally severed relations with Somalia, neither did it officially recognize any entity as the country’s de jure government. The ambiguity of that policy gave considerable freedom for America to advance its security objectives and those of its allies without the constraint of a regime that was at best a notional sovereign.
More than one year after the surprise decision to recognize the government, the US has opened no US diplomatic representation in Somalia, nor nominated even a non-resident chief of mission. In March last year, as Johnnie Carson ended his tenure as assistant secretary of state for African affairs, he singled out the “remarkable progress” in Somalia and South Sudan as the principal achievement of his four years in office. (South Sudan subsequently has seen the outbreak of a civil war that has left more tens of thousands dead since mid-December.) One cannot help but conclude that the recognition of the Somali government was largely political theater detached from reality. On the ground, the regime’s lack of popular legitimacy has undermined the progress made by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and others towards defeating the challenge of al-Shabaab once and for all.
It is high time that the US and other countries stop trying to pick winners and losers in Somalia’s internecine conflicts—not that they ever had much success in that endeavor—and let proven effectiveness and legitimacy that flows from really governing (as opposed to merely mimicking the external trappings of a state) determine who deserves to be recognized.
J. Peter Pham is director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Somaliland gunshot victim gets new face, new life




By Nadine Kalinauskas | Good News
Thanks to compassionate surgeons in Brisbane, Australia, a gunshot victim from Somaliland has a new look — and is looking forward to a new life.
When Ayaan Mohamed was 2 years old, she was permanently disfigured by a gunshot to the cheek during Somalia's civil war.
She was left unable to close her right eye. Food fell from the hole in her cheek when she ate. She couldn't escape the uncomfortable stares and awkward questions.
Taunted and bullied over her looks, Mohamed dropped out of high school and rarely revealed her face from beneath a veil.
"She wears it to cover the deformity. She covers it because people would stare, children would cry,"said Edna Adan Ismail, Somaliland's former foreign minister and first lady. "It's not easy to look at."
Mohamed's mother went to their local hospital several years ago, seeking help. The hospital in Hargeisa, Somaliland, however, didn't have the expertise to treat Mohamed. According to CNN, it still doesn't.
Ismail heard Mohamed's story and spent the next 11 years seeking help to repair the young woman's face.
After finally being granted a medical visa — because her injuries weren't deemed life-threatening, her initial application was denied, as was her visa application to the United States — and thanks to the fundraising efforts of two Australian Rotary clubs, Mohamed, now 25, traveled from Somaliland to Brisbane with Ismail for the life-changing surgery.
"Here's a woman who's only begging to have medical treatment which she's not able to access anywhere else. I'm glad that the decision was reversed," Ismail told CNN.
"She's a brave woman. She's had to live with this a long time... she's very relaxed. I'm the one who's falling apart," Ismail added.
Last Saturday, on their day off, surgeons at the Wesley Hospital in Brisbane rebuilt Mohamed's face in an 11-hour surgery. They did so free of charge.
"Essentially Ayan is missing most of the tissue of her midface from the bottom part of the eye socket, the whole top jaw and most of the cheekbone and her palate," oral and maxillofacial surgeon Dr. John Arvier, who headed the surgical team, told CNN prior to the surgery.
"The surgery will involve replacing, with a small synthetic implant, the rim of the eye socket. Then the bulk of the missing tissue will be replaced by muscle that comes up under the cheekbone on the side of the head."
He then explained that a plastic surgeon would rebuild her nostril with cartilage from her ear. Extensive dental work would help reshape her smile.
"She's happy and looking forward to it," Ismail said last week, translating for Mohamed. "She's happy to get her face back."
As she heals from her successful surgery, Mohamed is making plans for her new life. She wants to go back to school — and become a doctor.
http://ca.news.yahoo.com/blogs/good-news/somaliland-gunshot-victim-gets-face-life-175100373.html

Thursday, February 27, 2014

Somalia: field experiences of a Spanish colonel

REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 
On Wednesday, February 5 celebrate a talk under the Master in International Security and Strategic Studies  from the University of Granada, in which some members of GESI were lucky to learn and exchange views with the Cavalry Colonel D. Alberto Gonzalez Revuelta , Diploma in Staff and former student of the Master.
Colonel González Revuelta, who works regularly with this group, recently returned from Somalia , where he has been stationed for six months as part of the European Union Military Training Mission Somalia . The objective of the discussion was therefore closer to all present to the situation we are living in the African country, and to analyze its causes and study the possible evolution of a state, considered as failed, which currently accounts for the attention and efforts of much of the international community. All thanks to the experience and clarity of view of someone like the Colonel, who has been working in the field and has real knowledge of the state of the Somali conflict.
The content of the talk was extremely interesting and all attendees had the opportunity to exchange views and wanted to ask how natural and relaxed way. Despite the complexity of the conflict, Colonel explanations were precise and illuminating, and therefore from my top GESI in this post some of the ideas that came to collation.
Features Somalia
Our guest opened the talk with a brief introduction about the characteristics, evolution and current situation of Somalia, to put us all in perspective and guide the discussion.
Between geographical, geo-strategic and demographic characteristics of the country should be in addition to its important location in the Horn of Africa, highlighting the fact that there is no official population census due to the lack of status that has been plunged Somalia during more than two decades. The estimate is that in this country live between 7 and 9 million people of Somali ethnicity and Sunni Muslim. Moreover, extreme poverty and conflict has led a process of diaspora in which they're drawn a million and a half people who have had to emigrate to other neighboring countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya or primarily Anglo-Saxon countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada and the U.S., as well as a number of displaced persons inside the country close to another million and a half. The money that is forwarded based exiles of the livelihoods of many Somali families and, at present, the country's political and ruling class is composed of returnees who have been trained abroad.
The determinant for understanding society and the Somali political factor are the clans . In Somalia, there are 6 major clans, based on family ties, which are distributed more or less differentiated form throughout the entire country. The two clans are located in central Somalia are the most involved in the conflict and border clans enjoy support from those countries with which limited, although Islam is present in all decisions. At present, the percentage of demographic representation enjoyed by each clan has been respected in shaping the Somali Federal Government (GFS) and the Parliament, so that these institutions reflect in its membership the actual representativeness of each clan. During the 20 year absence of state in Somalia, clans vied for power and trying to provide basic services in their respective territories. Now, the presence of a common custom in Al Shabab, enables enemy clans remain united in government.
Current Political Situation
As for the political situation, Colonel differentiated the internal and external factors that determine the current state of conflict. As principal internal element stresses the GFS , which has replaced the interim government set up by the UN. The latter was formed by the families to pressure UN threatened to withdraw support was offering the country if an agreement was reached to establish a provisional government. Achieved an agreement, not without difficulty, the current GFS aims to continue the path begun by the previous, underpinning the State and providing basic services. While weakness is manifest and warlords still retain much power. Al Shabab is undermining its legitimacy and even piracy problem that initially attracted international attention, appears to be controlled, is still far from being completely eradicated. The pirates are adapting to the situation and send supply ships to the shores of India to operate in that area.
As external factors , it is worth noting the high number of international actors in Somalia and the prevailing lack of coordination between them. Stands out above all the role performedAMISOM in its fight against Al Shabab, but each and every one of the countries of the African Union mission have their own interests in the country. There are also a large number of UN agencies related to the coordination of which leaves much to be desired. The European Union carries out a comprehensive approach when attempting to resolve the situation in the region. Therefore, in Somalia has launched a number of initiatives, both civilian and military, in support of GFS. In addition, there are European countries like Italy or the UK, former metropolitan area, maintaining bilateral relations outside the community effort. On the other hand, Turkey is making a strong commitment in the country as a model of intervention in African politics, seeing that their integration into the European Union does not just occur.United States does not act directly but through private development companies that follow their dictates.
The territorial situation of Somalia is also notable for its uniqueness and highlights the conflict. During these two decades of absence of the state, the northern regions of Somaliland and Puntland have been the only ones to have enjoyed some control and stability. However,Somaliland unilaterally declared its independence was not recognized Mogadishu, even though no state has recognized it, maintains very good relations with Britain. Meanwhile,Puntland is considered autonomous though it recognizes the government in Mogadishu, the same happens with Jubaland in the south. In addition, there Puntland untapped oil fields being studied by British companies who negotiate an exploitation concession with the government. AMISOM forces are not authorized by the resolution of the UN to act in Puntland or Somaliland, which has its involvement in counterterrorism efforts, since it is not ruled out that Al Shabab moved its sanctuary to the zone
Al Shabab
Particular mention must be made ​​to the Islamic terrorist group Al Shabab, which could be analyzed from its evolution  to its current state, its enclaves or type of attacks they use. The international community, which came to the Horn of Africa, among other reasons, to combat piracy, now stay at home to combat Islamist extremism and believes that defeating Al Shabab is a prerequisite for the normalization of the Somali state requirement.
The connection with Al Qaeda Al Shabab has always been evident, but in 2012 its final integration occurs, which has meant the arrival of fighters from the outside as well as an important tactical and logistical support. At the time, there is a risk that Somalia becomes a terrorist stronghold if not finish with the group, which would mean that many members of the group were sent to other countries to fight in jihad.
Al Qaeda also provides financial support to Al Shabab. The Somali group financed mostly used with the exploitation of charcoal through the port of Kismayo, which was sold in Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates despite the existing trade embargo. However, where AMISOM forces recover that port in 2012, Al Shabab passes financed aid received from Al Qaeda through Yemen. Other methods are used for income extortion business from Mogadishu or the fees they charge to NGOs working in their areas of control. With the latter method are also achieved money, a form of explicit international recognition that they control a specific area and provide protection therein.
The enclaves where the jihadists retain control match rural interior of the country, as AMISOM has successfully unleashed the most important cities, including the capital. However, Al Shabab maintains cells is these urban centers and therefore retains the ability to act on them whenever you want. Specifically in Mogadishu, despite being released and concentrate all forces and national and international institutions, an average of 18 attacks per weekwhose objectives focus on senior government and military, in addition to entrepreneurs who have not satisfied the amount claimed in extortion. The type of attack is typically used to commit to launch hand grenades, mortar fire, targeted attacks or other more complex in a suicide attack followed by a second attack with machine gun or car bomb occurs when you are making the medical care. The institutions are concentrated in three villas within the capital, with its system of protection. The government is in Villa Somalia, which has 5 security circles. Al Shabab has only been able to enter the third moment.
In terms of composition , Al Shabab integrates members from all Somali clans, with more homogeneity than the government itself. His current focus of international jihad, achieved after the "Blow Godane" makes it possible to offer a common goal beyond the interests of each clan. However, this same feature can cause the group to lose root and support in the population if it continues radicalized and attacking people indiscriminately, despite having other incentives to recruit members, such as higher wages offered by the organization compared to their fighters with offering the Somali National Army. In addition, the campaign with drones used against them leads to Al Shabab extreme social control and prohibit communication systems, which takes him away from the population.
Current situation of conflict and possible evolution
Currently, the progress achieved by the Somali government and the international community, led by AMISOM, are extremely fragile. Despite having succeeded in driving al-Shabab from the main urban centers and have shown its superiority in the approach to a conventional battle, the Islamist group is considering a strategy of asymmetric conflict difficult to combat.AMISOM has reached the limit of its capabilities and the Somali National Army has a tough road ahead and modernization preparation for taking over his responsibilities .
To achieve this goal, and running a training process based on the international aid that aims to address the difficult task of consolidating an army that has more than 20 years without exist . This has meant that, at present, one of the most worrying gaps within the Somali Army is the lack of middle management as there are for general hand, Soviet training, and other troops, whose men are good fighters but ill soldiers. In addition, the case so far, the government had a budget to pay only 11,000 soldiers, members of Sector 1 was protecting Mogadishu. The remaining sectors, four more, were funded by local militias and warlords allied with the government, so the loyalty of these soldiers was to the local chiefs. As one of the challenges to achieve this year is that the GFS pay full wages Army to procure support and promote a vision of security that takes into account the whole nation.
Meanwhile, while on one hand it is in the process of improving the training and gear of the Somali army, the other United Nations approved Resolution No. 2124 increasing the forces of   AMISOM by 4,400 troops , in addition to providing mission African Union airmobile capacity by helicopter units which increase the speed to move their forces in the fight against Al Shabab. So far, this fight was done in bouts of limited nature and redeemed forces, mainly company type units. For its part, the UN agency (UNSOA) providing logistical support to AMISOM, will also perform at the logistical support of those articles nonlethal character (such as fuel and food) to Somali Army.
Conclusions
As seen, the encounter left essential to understand the Somali conflict and to guide us for the future of the same lessons. However, there are three ideas that Colonel González Revuelta greatly stressed. First, that the favorable situation that currently prevails and has been hard-earned is reversible,  and can even occur crack return to instability and chaos , which has recently been targeted by the Secretary General himself United Nations, Ban Ki-moon.
Second, the large number of actors operating in Somalia, with particular interests and often opposing, makes very difficult the coordination and organization necessary to seat the state project and consolidate progress. In this sense, the Colonel made ​​a comparison with the case of Mali in which, besides the different idiosyncrasies of the country itself, differs mostly undisputed leadership there offers France, which does not occur in the case of Somalia.
Third and finally, our guest noted the urgent need to end terrorism by Al Shabab as a prerequisite for achieving stability for the consolidation of the state in Somalia. However, in a country where the division between clans and the conflict of interest is so obvious, is always the question of what happens when an end to all that binds, for now, all parties, which is fighting a common enemy: Al Shabab.
Ferro Joaquín Rodríguez is research assistant of GESI