China-Africa relations: looking beyond the critics

Babette Zoumara and Abdul-Rauf Ibrahim

Opinions on the impact of the China-Africa relations differ among observers. For instance, Thierry Bangui, a development consultant and a native of the Central African Republic, and Fweley Diangitukua, a Congolese economist, believe that the mutual benefit (win-win situation) is a hoax (InfoSud 2010). These observers argue that China importing its own workforce to work in aid projects granted to Africa is disadvantage for Africa but beneficial to China since it allows China to solve its domestic unemployment problem (Gaye 2006). They claim that China offers astronomical projects to Africa but that fewer jobs were created in recipient countries, especially for locals. In fact, the same observation was made by Beuret and Michel (Beuret and Michel 2008). It is speculated that part of the Chinese government's policy is to encourage Chinese entrepreneurs to travel abroad and seek greener pastures and that Africa happens to be the destination these entrepreneurs were privileged to be (Li et al. 2012; Cisse 2012). These investors are believed to come with fierce competition (as they are allegedly supported by the Chinese government) especially in the informal economic sector, which is normally a reserved area for local entrepreneurs. It has been pointed out that this situation has the tendency of causing conflict between the disadvantaged locals and Chinese entrepreneurs (Adisu et al. 2010). In Dakar (Senegal) for instance, there were reports that half of the local traders were bankrupt because of cheap made-in China goods imported by Chinese businessmen. Consequently, unemployment was said to be on the rise and that life was increasingly difficult by the day (Beuret and Michel 2008).

ARE CHINA’S RELATIONS WITH AFRICA NEOCOLONIAL?

The emergence of China as a new economic power and the deep relations it has with Africa drew and received global attention. For Africa which was formerly controlled economically by its development partners, now enjoys relations with a new and emerging power on a seemingly equal footing. The economic control of Africa and its natural resources have become the major issues for opposing interests by the big powers (Van Dijk 2009). As expected, China’s advancement into Africa is no exception; its relation with Africa has received condemnations from Africa’s traditional donors. In fact, the term neo-colonialism is usually used to describe the relations between China and Africa (Rotberg 2008). Some argued that the China-Africa relation was not different from the relation Africa had with the West (Gaye and Brautigam 2002). Yet still, others are worried about the fact that Beijing was cooperating with regimes denounced by the international community (Sudan and Zimbabwe) (Van Dijk 2009).

On the issue of colonization, Beuret and Michel estimated the number of Chinese in Africa to be around 750,000 while Zequan Huang, a reporter for the People's Daily (Renmin Ribao) put the figure to be around 500,000 and stressed that this could not be described as colonizing Africa. Similarly, Martyn Davies, director of the Centre for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University in South Africa argued that Chinese presence in Africa could not be described as colonization in fairness. To buttress his point, he pointed out that ‘there are 2,000 Chinese companies in Singapore and no one speaks of colonization, there are only 900 in Africa, the second continent in the world and everybody speak of colonization’ (Financial Times 2008).

CHINA’S LACK OF RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Meanwhile, Western scholars have also criticized the relations. They cite in particular, the perceived lack of China's respect for human rights and reluctance to fight corruption (Alessi and Hanson 2012). Alden (Alden 2007) is one of the few to have recorded these negative sentiments. In ‘China in Africa’ at page 104, he discussed the official U.S rhetoric focusing on issues of democracy and natural resources. He emphasized that the U.S perceives China’s presence in Africa an obstacle to (what they consider as) the fragile process of democratization and of course U.S grip on African resources (Alden 2007).

In this modern time, information management is essential and critical especially with respect to the terms and conditions of loans, investment and aid provided by developing partners to developing nations. For example, Brautigam in ‘The Dragon's Gift: the real story of China in Africa’ at page 2, used the term ‘gifts’ and ‘mysterious donations’ to describe loans, investment and aid projects offered by China to Africa because of the lack (according to her) of transparency in the funds paid to African countries. She indicated that aid provided by China raised very sensitive questions bothering on transparency, corruption and human rights issues (Brautigam 2009). Note that these issues have been raised severally by various people in the Western media. In 2006 for instance, Wieczorek Zeul, the then German development minister, stated in an interview that China perceived development in Europe as an alarm that just sounded. She openly criticized China’s aid policy to Africa and insisted that loans to Africa ‘should be linked with conditions’ (ECDPM 2007).

THE PROBLEM OF LOANS WITHOUT CONDITIONS

Similarly in 2007, Philippe Maystdt, past President of the European Bank, renewed this propaganda. He claimed that loans could drive the debt of Africa to dangerous levels if China continued to lend too easily; in other words, lend to Africa without conditions. He then, asked the European Union (EU) to open dialogue with China to discuss the problems of loans without conditions (ECDPM 2007). In the same year, Hilary James Benn, former British secretary for international development, cautioned the European Community during a visit to Malawi and boldly declared that ‘Chinese aid do more harm than good’ in Africa (ECDPM 2007). According to him, the unconditional aid could lead to setbacks in terms of democracy and human rights developments. Furthermore, Louis Michel, European commissioner for development, during an annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in 2006, advised the European Union to cease attacks on China on the issue of interest-free loans granted to the poorest countries. In fact, he strongly recommended inclusion of China as a partner for promotion of effective development of Africa (ECDPM 2007); in other words, to politically or strategically muzzle China. In a newspaper published by the China Youth Daily and the China Review in February 2007, Solana Javie, a former Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, supported the proposal of Louis Michel (Solana 2007). Perhaps, with these comments in mind, the then Director General of the European Commission launched a conference on the 28th of June 2007 dubbed ‘Partners in competition, EU, Africa and China’. This brought together 180 think-tanks and experts such as policy makers, academicians and representatives of civil society and business from China, Africa and the EU to deliberate on the way forward (ECDPM 2007).

‘THE SUN HAS SET IN THE WEST AND HAS RISEN FROM THE EAST’

Notwithstanding, some analysts see the relations as positive commitment to the development of Africa (Rotberg 2008; Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006). Even though some have highlighted the weakness of the relations and concluded that it was pernicious (Alessi and Hanson 2012), thorough and objective analyses show that the engagement is still deepened. Indeed, the partnership is largely appreciated on the African continent as it has boosted its growth (Li 2007). Under-developed several years ago, as majority of African countries were, China succeeded in breaking through the ranks of major economic and industrial powers and made positive impact (Li et al. 2012). It is therefore, not surprising that African leaders continue to seek ways to develop their countries with the assistance of China, especially and rightly so, as conditions imposed by Africa’s traditional donors did not lead to any definitive economic independence. No wonder the President of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, in striking and metaphorically speaking (right or otherwise) stated that ‘the sun has set in the west and has risen from the East’ to state his frustrations at the West and his confidence in China (Gaye 2008).

Beyond these critics, one thing is clear; the cooperation between Africa and its economic development partners (EU, China and US) are strategically different, and each is driven by economic self-interests. It is of vital importance therefore, that Africa approves on an equal footing, strategic and most consistent partner (business or otherwise) who recognizes, shares and respects it’s difficult but critical needs be it political, economic or social as well as sovereignty. Unfortunately, one of Africa's key problems that have hindered its development, irrespective of the kind of relationship, is responsive leadership. It appears that some of its leaders are not able to separate their own interests from the collective national interest; for example, the craze for political power at all cost. They also seem not to have been able to critically analyze the consequences of policy directives and recommendations from its development partners as happened with the IMF and World Bank, or are not able to reject programs that do not embrace the continents problems in totality.

An example in this case, in our opinion is the whole-sale adoption of western-styled governance (democracy) without at least setting up the foundations necessary for its sustainability and smooth running. This is not a suggestion for the total rejection of Western democracy or ideas however; we believe that Africa could have developed its own style of governance based on the Western experience, given its unique issues and characteristics without this ‘copy-paste’ that appears to be causing more harm than good in spite of the ‘democracy’ in most parts of the continent. After all, there were some sorts of governance (democracy) in Africa long before the appearance of the ‘everything Western is best’ mentality.

CONTINENTAL UNITY NEEDED IN APPROACHING CHINA

Another problem is the lack of coherent and collective policy. While China has a clear and strategic policy for Africa, Africa as a united force has no unified policy for its relations with China. Indeed, it is a worrying situation for a relation that is supposed to be based on mutual values in terms of cooperation, trust and development to lack this key ingredient. Each African country therefore, pursues the relation based on its unique needs and development agenda resulting in weak bargaining power in certain aspects and attracting less developmental projects from China. A further troubling aspect is the lack of adequate participation of the African private sector, media and academia in this partnership. For instance, during the conference on China-Africa in 2006, the African private sector was not adequately represented. There were nearly 300 Chinese private firms but only a handful of their African counterparts. This seems to suggest that as Chinese private companies show interest in building long term relations with Africa, the continents private firms do not appear to show much interest in sustaining the relationship or are not given the necessary incentive to augment governmental efforts. This will inevitably create gaps between internal policies of African countries and their implementations.

A NEW PLAN FOR DEALING WITH CHINA

Therefore, Africa must necessarily develop a coherent and structured plan in successfully asserting its political, economic and social ties with China. It must avoid repeating some of the mistakes committed in its past relations with its traditional development partners. In the meantime, African leaders must be able to define and formulate strategic and comprehensive policies, individually, for the influx of Chinese investments. For instance, they must exert pressure on China and together, differentiate and separate investments and loans CLEARLY from interest free loans, grants and aid projects. In fact, several writers have already pointed out the fact that there seem not to be difference, at least on the part of China, between investment and aid projects (Shinn 2012; Der Lug et al. 2011). For example, David Shinn, adjunct professor at George Washington University pointed out that China mixes aid with commercial deals, enabling Chinese construction enterprises access to infrastructural projects in Africa (Shinn 2012). Even the Center for Chinese studies (CCS) based in South Africa appears to agree with this. They believe that ‘Chinese government officials rarely distinguish aid and investments’ (Der Lug et al. 2011).

In any case, the distinction of projects will make it easier to handle and formulate appropriate policies to effectively manage respective projects (Investment, grants loans or grants) such that clearly China could be dealt with as a business partner in terms of investments and loan projects (commercial deals) or as a development partner when it comes to grants and aid projects. As it stands now, it is not easy to tell whether Africa sees China as business partner (an investor) or development partner (a friend). Furthermore, clear distinction of these projects will make easier for tracking and at the same time holding the various governments and implementing agencies accountable. This will among other things, ensure sanity, dedication to job, sense of duty, transparency and above all, mitigate corruption. In this regards, the private sector, business community, academia and more importantly, the media must be encouraged and given the opportunity to vet and critic these Chinese contracted developmental projects.

There are successful and intelligent men and women in all fields living in Africa as well as in the Diaspora that can give Africa value for money considering project contracts and negotiations. Until this is done and African leaders began using these best brains so as to obtain better deals from China, the relations will certainly not be totally different from Africa’s past ones.

ENDNOTES:

Adisu, K., Sharkey, T. and Okoroafo, S. C. (2010) ‘The impact of Chinese investment in Africa’, International Journal of Business and Management, 5, pp.1-9

Alden, C. (2007) China in Africa, London/New-York,

Alessi, C. and Hanson, S. (2012) Expanding China-Africa oil ties - council on foreign relations, 9557, pp.1-6

Beuret, M. and Michel S. (2008) Chinafrique-Beijing’s Conquest of the Black Continent, Hachette plurielle, France,

Brautigam, D. (2009) The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, Oxford University Press, pp.12-292

Cisse, D. (2012) FOCAC: trade, investments and aid in China-Africa relations. Policy Brief, Centre for Chinese Studies (CCS), Stellenbosch University, South-Africa, pp.1-4

Der Lugt, S.V., Hamblin, V., Burgess, M. and Schickerling, E., (2011) Assessing China’s Role in Foreign Direct Investment in Southern Africa, Centre for Chinese Studies (CCS) report, pp.36-39

Eisenman, J., and Kurlantzick, J. (2006) ‘China’s Africa Strategy’, Current History, pp. 219- 224

European Center for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), (2007) EU, China and Africa-A

Trilateral Partnership in Theory, A Bilateral One in Practice?, open document, Maastricht, pp. 1 – 6

Alee, R. and Mathew, G. (2008) Africa-China Trade: Big push to be more assertive, Financial Times Special Report, pp. 1-6 http://www.ft.com/cms/e1350f4-c9df-11dc-b5dc-000077b07658.pdf, accessed 24 April 2013

Gaye, A. and Brautigam D. (2002) Is Chinese Investment Good for Africa? Online debate, Council on foreign Relations, pp. 1-10, 12622, www.cfr.org, accessed 15 January 2013

Gaye, A. (2006) China-Africa-The dragon and the Ostrich (in French), L’Harmattan, Paris

Gaye, A. (2008) Africa and Europe in the new Geo-political World, Robert Mugabe cited by Adama Gaye, www.gabrielperi.org

InfoSud (2010) The West powerless to counter Chinese hegemony in Africa, article 2359,www.ritimo.org, accessed 30 April 2013

Li, A. (2007) China’s Engagement in Africa- Singular Interest or Mutual Benefit?’ Expert round table on resource governance in Africa in the 21st century, Beijing University, pp.1-5

Li, A., Liu, H., Pan, H., Zeng, A. and He, W. (2012) FOCAC Twelve Years Later-achievements, challenges and the Way Forward, Discussion Paper 74, Peking university, pp.11-43

Rotberg Robert I. (2008) China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence, Washington, D.C. and Cambridge, MA, pp. 21-37

Shinn, D. (2012) China’s Investment in Africa, www.chinausfocus.com, accessed 24 April 2013

Solana, J. (2007) Challenges for EU-China Cooperation in Africa, article 92678, pp. 1-3,

www.consilium.europa.eu, accessed 30 April 2013

Van Dijk, P. (2009) The new presence of China in Africa, Amsterdam University Press, pp. 13, 89,151-152

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*Babette Zoumara is with the Department of International Relations, College of South East Asian Studies, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, P. R. China

*Abdul-Rauf Ibrahim is with the Department of Chemical and Biochemical engineering, Xiamen University,Xiamen 361005, P. R. China

Madaxweynaha Somaliland Oo Caawa U soo Daawasho Tagay Tartanka Goboladda Ee Kubbadda Kollayga

Madaxweynaha Somaliland Mudane Axmed Maxamed Maxamuud (Siilaanyo) oo kubadii lagu ciyaaraya kor u haya Garoonka Timacade oo uu caawa u daawasho tagay

Madaxweynaha Somaliland Mudane Axmed Maxamed Maxamuud (Siilaanyo) ayaa caawa booqday oo kormeer ku tagay garoonka kubadda Kollayga ee Timacade ee Magaaladda Hargeysa, halkaasi oo ay ka socdaan Tartanka ciyaaraha kubadda kollayga ee goboladda dalka. Waxa caawa tartanka kubadda Kollayga Isku haleelay xulalka goboladda Maroodi-jeex iyo Sanaag.


Madaxweynaha Somaliland Mudane Axmed Maxamuud (Siilaanyo) ayaa markii uu garoonka soo galay 8:30 cawaysnimo ee caawa waxa mar qudha is qabsaday sacab aan kala go’ lahayn oo ay muddo daqiiqado ah u tumayeen Boqolaalkii qof ee u soo daawasho tagay garoonka kubadda Kollayga Timacadde ee Caasimadda Hargeysa.

Madaxweyne Axmed Siilaanyo waxa ku weheliyay booqashadiisa garoonka Timacade Wasiirrada Ciyaaraha Mudane Cali Siciid Raygal, Madaxtooyadda Mudane Xirsi Cali Xaaji Xasan, Kalluumaysiga Mudane Cabdilaahi Jaamac Cismaan (Geel-jire), Waxbarashadda Marwo Samsam Cabdi Aadan, Taliyaha Ciidanka Booliska Sareeye Guuto Cabdilaahi Fadal Iimaan iyo Marwadda Koowaad ee Somaliland Marwo Aamina Sh. Maxamed Jirde.

Parliament in Somaliland: reforming the upper house

The latest in a succession of scandals in the UK House of Lords is a reminder that oversight and restraint are crucial ingredients of strong democratic institution

Guurti Grand Borama Conference

By Hannah Gibson

Wilful neglect of effective checks and balances on the executive and legislature has been widespread in the post-independence era in sub-Saharan Africa. The imperial ambitions of presidents need to be curbed by law. In Cameroon, President Paul Biya pushed through reforms to abolish presidential term limits in 2008, enabling him to lead the country for his sixth consecutive term. Senegalese incumbent Abdoulaye Wade ran for a third stint in office in the 2012 elections, despite having introduced a two term cap on presidential tenure. Bicameral parliaments are seen as one way to provide a check on the executive, averting undue concentration of power in the hands of the president and cabinet.

AN UNRESTRAINED EXECUTIVE

In Malawi, during the presidency of Hastings Banda, the country’s legal system was routinely manipulated and used for political ends. The promulgation of a new multi-party constitution in 1994 was an important step in the creation of a new political and socio-economic order. Amongst numerous reforms, it provided for a directly elected National Assembly and an upper house in the form of an appointed Senate. The Senate was envisaged as a forum in which the traditional authorities, all of Malawi’s districts, women and the youth would be represented. The upper house was also to perform an important oversight function, providing a check on potential abuses of power by an unrestrained National Assembly.

The Malawian Constitution was initially introduced for a period of one year. By the time of its permanent adoption in 1995, the constitutional provision for the Senate had been removed. Abandoning the Senate was defended on the grounds of high running costs – the same reason would also be given in the case of Burkina Faso in 2002. Civil society groups criticised the decision, questioning the authority of the National Assembly to amend the constitution without public consultation. They voiced concerns about returning to a system with an overly powerful executive. In 2001, the provision for the Malawi Senate was repealed permanently.

In September 2012, MPs voted to abolish the Senegalese upper house of parliament. The change was proposed by newly-elected President Macky Sall who ran on a platform of reducing excessive government spending. Thirteen people died in floods that hit Dakar in August 2012. Sall said he was eager to spend the money saved by removing the 100-seat Senate (some CFA8bn or US$15m annually) on infrastructure improvements. But at what cost to the country’s political institutions?

Some commentators claimed that since half of the Senate’s members were appointed by the president, it functioned less as a check on the actions of the executive and more as a reward mechanism for political favours. However, Sall’s critics claimed that the move was aimed at weakening the opposition since most of the senators were supporters of ex-president Wade. Either way, if changes were needed might it not have been beneficial to retain the Senate but reform the way it was constituted and the function it served? Or indeed how much it cost? This is the question currently facing Somaliland’s parliament.

A BICAMERAL PARLIAMENT IN SOMALILAND

Somaliland announced secession from Somalia in 1991. The Somali National Movement (SNM) – an armed insurgency group which had helped to overthrow the Siyad Barre regime and assumed leadership of the country – promised that power would be transferred to a civilian government within two years. The SNM fulfilled its promise and at the 1993 Borama Conference of Elders, Mohamed Egal was chosen as the country’s first president. Also at Borama, it was decided that the parliament in Somaliland would be made up of two chambers: the House of Elders and the House of Representatives.

The House of Elders – or Guurti – is an institutionalised version of a traditional council. In recognition of the central role played by clan leaders in the demobilisation and disarmament process, the Guurti became part of the country’s formal political system. The problem comes now, twenty years later, as Somaliland is striving to enhance its multi-party democratic system and seeks international recognition. Many of the original members have died since it was first established. The Guurti has essentially become hereditary. Most have no formal education.

There is a widespread feeling that the Guurti is being called upon to perform tasks which are beyond its original remit and current abilities. “We need to reassess the mandate and membership of the Guurti”, says SNM veteran Abdirahman Duale “Boobe” in After Borama: Consensus, representation and parliament in Somaliland. “When it was first set up in 1990, its role was primarily one of mediation. What we have now is an old group of inexperienced people with a central role in legislation.”

TAKING SIDES

What shape should this reform take? Part of this ongoing debate relates to the issue of selection. If the members of the upper house were elected, there would be two elected chambers. Once again, only those who wield sufficient political clout – and with the means of financing a political campaign – would be able to secure a voice in the formal political system, rendering an upper house redundant.

An alternative is for the nomination of individuals to an upper house containing representatives from minority communities, civil society and experts in appropriate fields. As was envisaged – albeit briefly – in Malawi in 1994.

Perhaps the biggest opposition to reform comes from the current members of the Guurti. Changing the composition of the upper house will not prove popular with the incumbents. A position in traditional leadership structures has become an important way to gain influence – and, for some, to do business – in Somaliland. Even those who were not part of the original peace-making process of the early 1990s are likely to be reluctant to relinquish their positions without adequate incentives.

The answer to this conundrum is not immediately clear. Replicating systems developed over centuries in other parts of the world is of limited value. Institutional solutions to political problems need not be permanent. But they do need to remain relevant and appropriate.

The Guurti has not adapted well to the challenges of the legislative task of an upper house. Making decisions on intellectual property law, or assessing the terms of investment agreements on oil and gas, require different knowledge from that employed in the resolution of conflict. If an institution is required to perform both functions, its members must have appropriate skills for both tasks.

GOING FORWARD

One option would be for the Guurti to relinquish its parliamentary role. Instead, a new institution – possibly even extra-parliamentary – could be created with a remit to improve oversight, proactively engage with law-making, and be more broadly representative.

The Guurti’s traditional – and invaluable – role in mediation and conciliation, may well be needed again in the future of Somaliland and the wider Somali region. For this to be effective however, the Guurti needs to regain the moral authority and trust of the public that has diminished during its institutionalized incarnation.

Somaliland should be able to navigate such a transition – however fractious the process may prove. And if it does, it may find itself again setting the pace in developing fitting and adaptable political institutions. In time, others might choose to follow the example.

Hannah Gibson

Policy Researcher - Africa Research Institute

Raysut board clears terminal, grinding expansion projects

The estimated cost to be contributed by Raysut Cement for these projects is $24 million. This development and expansion will have positive impact on the performance results and profitability of the company in the future. Picture is used only for illustrative purpose. Photo – Times file photo

by Times News Service

Muscat: The board of directors of Raysut Cement Company, the Sultanate's largest cement producer, has approved four expansion projects at an estimated cost of $24 million, which will be funded by the company.

These projects are one each modern cement terminal at Duqm port and Somaliland's Berbera port, a grinding plant in Mukulla (Yemen) and enhancing production capacity of its sister firm Pioneer Cement Industries based in Ras Al Khaimah.

The Duqm terminal, which will have two silos with a capacity of 4,000 tonnes each, is for storing, packing and distributing cement. The terminal is coming up at the world class Duqm port, which is 2.25km long.

"The Duqm terminal expected to commence operation in the second half of 2014," said Mohamed Ahmed Al Dheeb, group chief executive of Raysut Cement, in a statement. 

The cement terminal in Berbera Port will be in joint venture with one of the local partners. This terminal is also for storing, packing and distributing cement, with all the facilities and equipment, including three silos in the capacity of 4000 tonnes each.

Financial support
 
The board of directors also approved a proposal to establish grinding plant in Mukulla, Yemen, through Mukalla Raysut Company (which is a sister concern) as a joint venture with a local partner with the capacity of 0.5 million tonnes per annum. This grinding plant will carry out grinding and packing of cement in Yemen.

Another proposal to expand the production capacity and production processes of Pioneer Cement Industries in Ras Al Khaimah, a subsidiary firm, was also approved. The projects include additional cement silo, upgrading of cooling system and environment management systems.

The estimated cost to be contributed by Raysut Cement in these projects is $24 million. This development and expansion will have positive impact on the performance results and profitability of the company in the future. 

The company's board also approved a proposal to provide financial support to Al Wafa'a Centre for Handicapped Children Education — Salalah to the tune of OMR100,000.

This represents part of the total amount previously approved by the annual general meeting regarding the social responsibility of the company.

Raysut Cement Company's consolidated profit before tax soared  33 per cent to OMR9.13 million for the first quarter of 2013, from OMR6.84 million for the same period last year. The group's revenue also edged up by 2 per cent to OMR25.22 million from OMR24.64 million during the period.

Egypt warns 'all options open' on Ethiopia dam

Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi. PHOTO/FILE  AFP

In Summary

• Ethiopia has begun diverting the Blue Nile 500 metres (yards) from its natural course to construct a $4.2 billion (3.2 billion euro) hydroelectric project known as Grand Renaissance Dam.

CAIRO

Egypt will demand that Ethiopia stop construction of a Nile river dam and warned "all options are open" if it harms its water supply, advisers to President Mohamed Morsi said on Wednesday.

"It is Egypt's right to defend its interests," said Ayman Ali, one of Morsi's advisers, in comments carried by the official MENA news agency.

"Other people have a right to seek their own interests. But there must be guarantees that the Ethiopian dam will not harm Egypt, otherwise all options are open," he added.

Presidential adviser Pakinam El Sharkawy said Egypt would demand that the upstream country end its construction of the dam.

The presidency has said the dam is a "national security" issue for Egypt.

"Demanding of Ethiopia to stop construction of the dam it intends to build on the Blue Nile will be our first step," MENA quoted her as saying.

Egypt believes more studies are needed on the dam's impact on its water supply which is almost entirely dependent on the Nile, although far more on the flow down the White Nile from the Great Lakes of East Africa, than that down the Blue Nile from the Ethiopian highlands.

Ethiopia has begun diverting the Blue Nile 500 metres (yards) from its natural course to construct a $4.2 billion (3.2 billion euro) hydroelectric project known as Grand Renaissance Dam.

The Blue Nile joins the White Nile in Khartoum to form the Nile which flows through Sudan and Egypt before emptying into the Mediterranean.

The first phase of construction is due to be finished in three years, with a capacity of 700 megawatts. Once fully complete, the dam will have a capacity of 6,000 megawatts.

Egypt believes its "historic rights" to the Nile are guaranteed by two treaties from 1929 and 1959 which allow it 87 percent of the Nile's flow and give it veto power over upstream projects.

But a new deal was signed in 2010 by other Nile Basin countries, including Ethiopia, allowing them to work on river projects without Cairo's prior agreement.

The United States is urging Cairo and Addis Ababa to work to resolve the issue, saying it has "seen good cooperation" over the past year "to jointly examine the impacts of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam."

"We encourage both countries to continue working together constructively to minimize the downstream impacts of (the dam) and develop the Blue Nile for the benefit of all the people in the region," a State Department statement said.

Torture of Human Rights Defenders in Somalia Under the Siad Barre Regime

Colonel Abdi Aden Magan, Somali War Criminal

Yesterday, 05/30/2013, in a federal court in Ohio, CJA client Professor Abukar Ahmed testified about his torture and unlawful detention during the brutal Siad Barre regime in Somalia. The defendant, Colonel Magan, was head of the notorious NSS Department of Investigations which was widely known to inflict psychological terror and physical torture against political prisoners and civilians. For press on the testimony click here and for more on the case click here.

From the left Professor Abukar Hassan Ahmed, torture victim, Kathy Roberts CJA leading Attorney

IN BRIEF

After discovering that his torturer resided in Columbus Ohio, on April 21, 2010, Professor Abukar Hassan Ahmed, a former constitutional law professor and human rights advocate in Somalia, contacted CJA and filed a case against Colonel Abdi Aden Magan for torture, cruel treatment, and arbitrary detention.  On May 30, 2013, nearly 25 years after his torture, he finally had his day in court.

Read the AP’s exclusive interview with him here.

On November 20, 2012, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio found the former investigations chief of the Somali National Security Service (NSS), Colonel Abdi Aden Magan, liable for the torture and arbitrary detention of CJA’s client, constitutional law professor and human rights advocate, Abukar Hassan Ahmed. The court’s decision in Ahmed v. Magan is historic in that it is the first judgment ever in a court of law to hold a member of the notorious and widely feared Somali NSS accountable for human rights violations committed under the brutal military dictatorship that ruled Somalia for 20 years, the Siad Barré regime. .

BACKGROUND

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In 1969, the Somali Armed Forces, led by Major General Siad Barre, toppled the democratically elected government of the new nation of Somalia. The National Security Service (“NSS”) was created as part of a series of measures designed to suppress and punish opposition to the Siad Barre regime. During the 1970s and 1980s, the NSS, carried out widespread atrocities against suspected opponents of the military dictatorship. Human rights reports implicate the NSS in the systematic use of extrajudicial killings, torture, rape, and arbitrary and prolonged detention.



The torture of Abukar Hassan Ahmed, a constitutional and international law professor at Somali National University detained for possessing a copy of an Amnesty International report, is an emblematic case of the brutality and impunity of the NSS during the Siad Barre regime.  Mr. Ahmed was an outspoken critic of the regime’s abuses of the Somali Constitution’s protections of human rights and freedom of expression.



Colonel Abdi Aden Magan, (“Magan”), served as Chief of the NSS Department of Investigations based at NSS Headquarters in the north of the capital city of Mogadishu from approximately 1988 to 1990.  As a member of the same favored Marehan sub-clan as Siad Barré at the head of the NSS Department of investigations, Magan directed the interrogation and torture of civilians perceived as opponents of the Siad Barre regime in order to terrorize the civilian population and deter it from supporting the growing opposition movements.



Magan came to the U.S. in 2000. He has lived openly in Columbus, Ohio since then.

 The plaintiff in this case was subjected to brutal torture under Magan’s direct orders:

Abukar Hassan Ahmed was arrested by NSS officers under Magan’s command, who confiscated the copy of an Amnesty International report he was carrying and transported him to the NSS Department of Investigations in the unventilated basement of NSS Headquarters.  He was held in solitary confinement in a small, windowless cell and his left wrist was tightly handcuffed to his right leg for twenty-four hours a day, except during interrogations.  The NSS officers first accused him of being a writer for Amnesty International and threatened to kill him if he did not confess. Magan subsequently interrogated him personally.  During this interrogation, Magan accused him of being a member of an opposition group established while he was in detention.  Magan told him that if he did not confess to being a member of this group, the NSS would torture him and obtain his confession through torture.  Mr. Ahmed was brutally tortured that same night.  Read more . . .


LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

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Complaint & Pre-Trial Motions

Read the Complaint

Ahmed v. Magan was brought before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District Court of Ohio on April 21, 2010.  The complaint accuses Magan of command responsibility and personal responsibility for torture; cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; and arbitrary detention.  This civil action was brought under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA). The case was filed jointly by CJA and the law firm of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP.  Latham & Watkins became co-counsel for Mr. Ahmed in the spring of 2011, working on a pro-bono basis.

Magan was initially represented by counsel, who filed a motion to dismiss on June 11, 2010.  We filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss on July 6, 2010.  On December 6, 2010, the judge invited the State Department to provide its opinion, before January 31, 2011, as to whether Magan is entitled to common law immunity.  CJA attorneys met with representatives from the State Department Office of Legal Advisor on January 18, 2011 to explain why we do not think that Magan is entitled to common law immunity.  Following our meeting, on January 26, 2011 the State Department filed a Notice of Potential Participation and asked the court to extend the filing deadline to March 15, 2011.  The court granted the additional time and administratively stayed the case until the U.S. submitted its position.  On March 15, 2011, the U.S. filed a Statement of Interest stating that Magan was not entitled to immunity in the case.  In April 2011, Magan filed a response challenging the U.S. Statement of Interest and Plaintiff filed a reply in support of the U.S. Statement of Interest.

On November 8, 2011, the Court denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint.  Judge Smith converted the motion to dismiss to a summary judgment motion and concluded that our client had timely filed the case and that there were no remedies available elsewhere, thereby precluding Magan from raising those defenses again.  Magan filed an Answer to the Complaint on December 6, 2011.

In December, 2011, the court granted Magan’s lawyer’s motion to withdraw from the case and granted Magan a twenty-eight day stay of the case during which time Magan was required to inform the Court and Plaintiff of whether he intended to seek new representation or proceed pro se.  On January 20, 2012, Magan filed a motion to stay the case for an additional three months to provide him additional time to procure counsel.  In the motion, he alleged that he was in Kenya caring for his ailing mother.  On January 23, 2012, the Magistrate denied Magan’s motion to further stay the case, but gave Magan the opportunity to renew his motion within 14 days supported by the following information: (1) a letter from Mr. Magan’s mother’s treating doctor describing her medical condition and giving a prognosis; (2) that doctor’s office telephone number and email address; (3) the efforts Mr. Magan has made to retain new counsel; and (4) his financial ability to retain counsel. Magan did not renew his motion to stay the case with the requested information and has since remained incommunicado with the Court and Plaintiff’s counsel. 

On April 10, 2012, in defiance of a court order, Magan failed to appear for his deposition.  In all, Magan ignored no less than five Court orders before the close of discovery.  On August 6, 2012, the court granted Plaintiff’s motion for evidentiary sanctions, deeming a number of key facts to have been conclusively established. Read the order here.   We presented our evidence in a case-dispositive motion for summary judgment  on August 9, 2012.  On November 20, 2012, the Court granted our motion for summary judgment.

On May 30, 2013 in Columbus, Ohio, CJA client Professor Abukar Hassan Ahmed finally shared his story in federal court; it is an all too common story of persecution and torture under the brutal Siad Barre dictatorship that once ruled Somalia. We await the court’s damages award.

Wafti Culus oo uu Hogaaminayo Taliyaha Ciidanka Qaranka Somaliland oo u Kicitimay Ethiopia iyo Khuburo ka tirsan Gaashaandhiga Masar oo Muqdisho ka Degay

Taliyaha Guud ee Ciidamada Qaranka Somaliland Sareeyo Gaas Ismail Mohamed Shaqale

Hargeysa – Taliyaha guud ee Ciidamadda Qaranka Somaliland Sareeyo Gaas, Ismaaciil Maxamed Shaqale iyo wafti saraakiil ah oo uu hogaaminayo ayaa shalay safar ugu kicitimay Magaaladda Adis-ababa ee xarunta dalka Ethiopia, kuwaas oo iyagu shalay ka duulay Madaarka Magaaladda Berbera ee xarunta gobolka Saaxil. Sida ay Wargeyska Haatuf u xaqiijiyeen Ilo wareedyo lagu kalsoon yahay ayaa sheegay in Taliyaha Ciidanka Qaranka Somaliland Sareeye Gaas Ismaaciil Shaqale oo ay weheliyaan Saraakiil ka tirsan hogaanada ciidanka oo uu ka  mid yahay hogaanka tababarka Ciidamada Korneyl Axmed Tansaani in socdaalkoodu ka dhashay marti qaad rasmi ah oo qaada doona mudo 4 maalmood ah ay ka heleen Wasaarada Gaashaandhiga dalka Ethiopia.

Warku waxa uu intaasi raaciyay in waftiga uu hogaaminayo Taliyaha Ciidanka Qaranka Somaliland mudada uu joogo Magaaladda Adis-ababa kula yeelan doono kulamo xasaasi ah Madaxda sarsare ee Ciidamadda Ethiopia isla markaana ay ka wada hadli doonaan xidhiidhada iyo cilaaqaadka dhinacyada iskaashiga amaanka, difaaca iyo guud ahaan sugida amniga mandaqada ee u dhexeeya labadda dal. Sidoo kale waxa ay xogahaasi intaasi ku darayaan in Socdaalka Taliyaha Ciidanka Qaranka Somaliland Sareeye Gaas Ismaaciil Shaqale uu ku tagay dalkaasi inay la xidhiidho sidii ay labada wadan sii kobciyaan xidhiidhkoodii dhinaca amniga maadaama oo mandaqadu gashay wakhti aad u xasaasi ah xaga amniga. Dhinaca kale kulankan xasaasiga ah ee Madaxda Ciidamada Somaliland iyo Ethiopia ee wakhtigan ayaa ku soo beegmay xili Xiisad cakirani oo ka dhalatey biyaha Webiga Niilka ay ka dhextaagan tahay dalka Masar iyo Ethiopia.

Dhinaca kale wararka aanu ka helayno dalka Somalia ayaa daboolka ka qaadaya in  Magaaladda Muqdisho ay maalintii shalayto 5/6/2013 ay soo gaareen Saraakiil Miratani oo ka socda wasaarada Gaashaandhiga Dalka Masar, waxaana Garoonka Diyaaradaha ee magaalada Muqdisho ku soo dhaweeyey Faarax Sheekh Cabdilqaadir, oo ah Wasiiru Dowlaha Madaxtooyada xukuumada Federaalka Somalia iyo Saraakiil ka tirsan Wasaaradda Gaashaandhigu Somalia oo loo xil saaray soo dhawaynta khuburada Miratani ee ka socda dalka Masar.

Sarkaal u hadley Dowladda Soomaaliya ayaa sheegay in Jeneraalada dalka Masar ay gacan ka geysan doonaan dib u dhiska ciidanka Qaranka Somalia, hase yeeshee Booqashadan ayaa ku soo beegmeysa xili ay sii adkaaneyso xiisadda u dhexaysa dalalka Itoobiya iyo Masar kadib markii Itoobiya bilowday in ay biyaha Webiga Niilka uga faa'iidaysto dhinaca tamarta iyadoo ka dhisaysa  Biyo-xidheenkii ugu weyn Qaarada Afrika. Madaxwaynaha Dalka Masar ayaa labo maalmood ka hor ugu hanjabey in ay dagaal la geli doonaan Itoobiya haddii ay xidho ama leexiso biyaha Niilka oo inta badan nolosha dadka Masaarida ah ay ku tiirsan tahay, waxaana ay hoosta ka xariiqdey in heshiisyada caalamiga ah ay u oggolaanayaan in ay dagaal la geli karto dalka biyaha ka xidha. Heshiis la gaadhay sanadkii 1929 muddadii Gudmeystaha ayaa xaq u siinaya Masar iyo Suudaan xuquuqda Biyaha Webiga Niilka Sadex meeloodow laba.

Dalka Masar ayaa hore loogu eedeyn jirey in Soomaaliya ay u haystaan qafaal ay ku cabsi geliyaan dalka Itoobiya, isla markaana u isticmaalaan siyaasadda Biyaha Niilka.

Maalintii shalay ayaa Younis Makhyoun, ee hoggamiya mid ka mid ah ururada Islaamiga ah ee dalka Masar, sheegay haddii Biyaha Wabiga Niilka ay Itoobiya ku yarayso Masar, in markaasi ay waajib ku noqonayso dalka Masar in uu taageero buuxda siiyo Jabhadaha ka soo horjeeda xukuumada dalka Itoobiya.

Madaxweynaha dalka Masar ayaa u saarey guddi gaar ah oo baadha saameynta ay ku yeelan karto Biyo-xidheenka weyn ee Itoobiya ay dooneyso in ay ku leexiso biyaha Niilka ee dalkeeda ka soo bilowda.

Itoobiya ayaa dhankeeda xasaasiyad weyn ka qabta galaangalka cusub ee Masar ay ku bilowdey Dowladda Soomaaliya, waxaana dadka qaarkiis isweydiinayaa in ay dib u bilaaban karto Proxy War, kaas oo ah Dagaal Soomaaliya aan dan ugu jirin oo loo isticmaalo dano kale.

Online Dating Success Stories From Married Couples

A recent study funded by eHarmony suggests that as many as 35 percent of Americans now meet their spouses online. What's more, the study suggests that those marriages are less likely to end in divorce than those that begin offline.

On Wednesday, we decided to put this statistic to the test by asking our followers on Twitter and Facebook to share their online dating love stories. Click through the slideshow below for 18 beautiful romances that started behind a computer screen and eventually led to marriage. Then, share your story in the comments!

Yet Another Analyst Thinks A Fingerprint Scanner Is Coming To The iPhone

 

The Huffington Post  |  By Alexis Kleinman

If you're sick of punching in a passcode to keep your iPhone secure, one Apple analyst has some good news for you.

Topeka Capital's Brian White became the latest Apple rumormonger to talk up fingerprinting technology may be coming to the iPhone 5S, Business Insider reports. "Our research suggests that users will simply place their finger on the home key of the iPhone 5S and this will automatically unlock the device, nullifying the need to enter a four-character Apple ID Password," White says.

If this James Bond fantasy sounds familiar, it should. This rumor has been floating around for quite a while, since Apple bought security firm AuthenTec in July 2012. AuthenTec has done a good deal of research on fingerprinting technology, and Apple's purchase of the company stipulated that AuthenTec was no longer allowed to license out its technologies to other companies, leading many to believe that Apple is making it an exclusive feature of its products.

Respected Apple analyst Ming-Chi Kuo of KGI Securities predicted fingerprint hardware for the "iPhone 6" in January. At the time, HuffPost made the case for why Apple will add print scanning to its next devices.
Although he is often trying to anticipate Apple's next moves, Brian White doesn't have the best prediction history. As we noted last year, White has wrongly predicted Apple's stock price and the iPad Mini release date, among other things. He did, however, get the iPhone 5's release date right, so he's got that going for him.

If you're anxious for answers, don't worry. Everything may be clear soon enough. Apple's World Wide Developers Conference is starting in just a few days, and the company is expected to clear up a lot of rumors and make some important announcements. However, if it keeps the lid on any new iPhone or iPad this June, as expected, we'll likely have to wait until the fall.