Sunday, January 27, 2013
Hope, and Lessons, in Somalia
Editorial
Somalia has been the paradigm of failed states since before 1993, when militants shot down two Black Hawk helicopters and killed 18 American soldiers in Mogadishu. One of the world’s poorest, most violent countries, it has been pummeled by warring militias, famine and pirates. But the country recently has shown enough positive movement that the Obama administration last week hosted President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Washington and recognized Somalia’s government for the first time in more than two decades. The evolution is worth examining as the West tries to grapple with militants in Mali.
The election of Mr. Mohamud, a moderate political activist and academic, by Parliament last September ended eight years of corrupt and failed transitional governments. Backed by a new Constitution, he has started building governing institutions with a focus on security, on delivering public services and on judicial and financial reform. Investment from the Somalian diaspora, Turkey and elsewhere is coming back. So are foreign embassies.
None of this would have happened if the security situation had not also improved. Since 2006, the country has been torn by an insurgency led by the militant group Al Shabab, which claims allegiance with Al Qaeda. But since 2011, African Union troops, backed by American drone and aircraft strikes on targeted militant leaders, have pushed Al Shabab out of the capital and other key towns. Washington has poured $650 million into the African Union force over the last six years and spent hundreds of millions more on humanitarian and development assistance for Somalia.
The decision to recognize the Somali government was a reasonable move that will open the door to other American and international aid and may make Mr. Mohamud’s political adversaries think twice about trying to throw him out. But it would be a mistake to read too much into the progress that has been made. The government is weak and doesn’t control much territory beyond the capital. Its army is virtually nonexistent. Al Shabab still lurks as a dark force. If the African Union force, and especially Kenyan and Ugandan troops, left Somalia anytime soon, the gains could all be lost. It remains to be seen whether competing warlords and clans can ever cooperate to build a real state. Mr. Mohamud needs to follow through on a United Nations plan for reconciliation.
It is early to draw firm conclusions, and there are many differences, but Somalia may offer some cautionary advice for the fight now being waged by France at the other end of the African continent against militants in Mali. Degrading militants is likely to take years. Regional forces, rather than foreign forces from farther afield, are best positioned to lead the fight. And political progress is at least as important as military gains.
----------
A version of this editorial appeared in print on January 26, 2013, on page A18 of the New York edition with the headline: Hope, and Lessons, in Somalia.
International Crises Group Recommendations: Kenya’s 2013 Elections
17 Jan 2013
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Kenya’s elections this year should turn the page on the bloodshed of five years ago, but the risk of political violence is still unacceptably high. A new constitution, fresh election commission and reformed judiciary should help. But the vote, now set for 4 March 2013, will still be a high-stakes competition for power, both nationally and in 47 new counties. Forthcoming trials before the International Criminal Court (ICC) of four Kenyans for their alleged role in the 2007-2008 post-election violence look set to shape the campaign. The potential for local violence is especially high. Politicians must stop ignoring rules, exploiting grievances and stoking divisions through ethnic campaigning. The country’s institutions face fierce pressure but must take bold action to curb them. Business and religious leaders and civil society should demand a free and fair vote. So too should regional and wider international partners, who must also make clear that those who jeopardise the stability of the country and region by using or inciting violence will be held to account.
Many reforms were initiated to address the flawed 2007 polls and subsequent violence. A new constitution, passed in a peaceful referendum in August 2010, aims to fortify democracy and temper zero-sum competition for the presidency by checking executive power. New voting rules require the president to win more than half the votes and enjoy wider geographic support. Power is being devolved to 47 counties, each of which will elect a governor, senator and local assembly. Despite recent mishaps, the new Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) still enjoys public trust. Judicial reform, including the appointment of a respected new chief justice, also augurs well for a more robust response to electoral fraud and disputes.
The new institutions, however, have their work cut out. The ICC proceedings are influencing political alliances and the campaign. The four individuals facing trial deny the charges and maintain their innocence. While the cases aim to erode impunity long enjoyed by political elites and may deter bloodshed, they raise the stakes enormously. The two most powerful of the accused, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, look set to contest the elections on a single ticket (Kenyatta for president, Ruto for deputy president). Both have politicised the ICC cases, deepening ethnic polarisation, and have accused Prime Minister Raila Odinga, their strongest opponent, of conspiring with foreigners against them.
The Kenyatta-Ruto alliance would be a strong ticket. Aware that Kenyans want an end to impunity, both have pledged to comply with the ICC, even if they win. Yet, regardless of the outcome of their cases, a president facing lengthy trial before the ICC could potentially have extremely damaging implications for reform and foreign relations, which Kenyatta’s backers should ponder carefully. For the moment, their eligibility to run for office remains in doubt; a case challenging their compliance with new constitutional requirements for public officials’ integrity is with a high court and may find its way by appeal to the Supreme Court. Were the courts to find Kenyatta and Ruto ineligible after the closing date for submitting nomination papers on 30 January, their supporters would be unable to choose alternative candidates, which might lead to strong protests and even spark conflict. Dealing as it does with a highly charged political issue, whichever way it goes, the final decision is likely to be contentious. If possible, the date of any decision should be announced in advance so the security agencies and others can prepare accordingly.
Other signs are also troubling. Political parties and politicians flout new rules unchecked. The IEBC’s bungled procurement of voter registration kits reduced the confidence it previously enjoyed and suggests it may struggle to resist enormous pressure as the vote approaches. The late start to registration has cut all fat from the electoral timeline, and any flaws will heighten tension. The IEBC must work transparently with parties and other stakeholders to clarify and regularly review the timeline, so as to avoid any further – and highly-charged – delays.
Voter education will be crucial. It is the first general election under the 2010 constitution, with new rules that are considerably more complex than previous polls (each voter will cast six ballots). Limiting confusion and misunderstandings could help reduce disputes and election-related conflict. It is also vital that the IEBC provide sufficient access and information to citizen observers and other civil society groups. They must be able to plan their deployment properly and enjoy full access to every part of the election process, especially the tallying of results. Such groups can also be useful allies in bolstering commissioners’ ability to resist political interference.
Insecurity too poses a huge challenge. Despite the reforms, many structural conflict drivers – continuing reliance on ethnicity, competition for land and resources, resettlement of internally displaced people (IDPs), and poverty and youth unemployment – underlying the 2007-2008 violence remain unresolved and may be cynically used by politicians to whip up support. Many of those who fled the turmoil remain displaced. Land disputes feed local tension. Youth unemployment is still very high and, together with poverty and inequality, means a steady flow of recruits for criminal groups and militias that can be mobilised to intimidate opponents and their supporters or protest results, as they have in the past. Attacks blamed on the extremist Al-Shabaab movement and clashes over land can cloak political violence. Meanwhile, police reform has lagged and the security forces look ill-prepared to secure the polls. An experienced inspector general of police, David Kimaiyo, has been appointed, but the delay in his selection means little time remains for significant security reform. Multi-agency security planning, which has also lagged, must be completed and implemented.
Ethnic campaigning and horse-trading as alliances formed – by Kenyatta and Ruto but also other leading politicians – have deepened divides. How the supporters of either of the two main tickets, those of Deputy Prime Minister Kenyatta and former cabinet minister Ruto running and of Prime Minister Odinga and Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka respectively, would respond to losing a close vote it perceives as flawed, or even to early signs it is falling behind, is unclear. International partners, including regional neighbours whose economies rely on a peaceful transition, should monitor any signs of interference or violence and weigh in quickly to deter it. Devolution, for all its benefits, introduces new conflict dynamics, as competition between groups for power and resources controlled at county level becomes fiercer.
All these challenges are surmountable, especially given the remarkable determination of most to avoid a repeat of 2007-2008. But they require concerted action by Kenya’s institutions and their allies, and – most important – clear signals to leaders who are seen to be prioritising the pursuit of power. The people deserve better. To put the horror of five years ago behind them, they deserve the chance to vote without fear and elect leaders committed to reform and ready to serve society as a whole rather than the narrow interests of its elites.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To President Kibaki and the government of Kenya:
1. Press all candidates to commit publicly to respect election rules, campaign peacefully and contest the results through legal, non-violent means.
2. Continue to urge the national and all provincial security committees to complete security planning, identify vulnerable counties and deploy accordingly.
3. Support the IEBC proposed Joint Risk Assessment and Response Centre for sharing information and coordinating operations among national and local security organisations and committees, as well as civil society groups.
To Kenya’s political parties and coalitions:
4. Commit publicly, and together, to respect rules, campaign peacefully, avoid hate speech and divisive mobilisation and pursue any petitions or other election grievances only through legal channels.
5. Recruit party agents early and work with international partners to ensure they understand their role and follow the rules in the polling centres.
To Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto:
6. Provide the public with a clear, detailed account of how you would propose to govern while also conducting your defences before the ICC, taking into account the time required and the demands of appearing in person in court on a different continent.
To the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) and acting registrar of political parties:
7. Improve outreach and communication with stakeholders, including political parties, candidates, the media and, in particular, civil society, with which a strong alliance is especially important to resist political pressure; and provide citizen observer groups the information they need in a timely manner.
8. Press for all candidates at national and county level and political parties to adhere stringently to the Code of Conduct enacted as part of the 2011 Elections Act.
9. Keep tight focus on operational planning, especially on vote counting and tallying of results, including for the likely presidential run-off; and make results for both rounds publicly available and disaggregated by polling stream to allow for their verification by citizen observers and party agents.
10. Take action, in coordination with the National Cohesion and Integration Commission, against political parties and candidates that violate rules, campaign divisively or use hate speech.
To Kenya’s business and religious leaders and other influential citizens, including the media:
11. Denounce publicly hate speech and ethnic chauvinism and use actively their resources for civic and voter education.
12. Consider carefully the implications for Kenya of a president facing trial before the ICC.
To Kenyan civil society groups:
13. Form ad hoc umbrella committees to capitalise on each organisation’s expertise and avoid duplication, in order to find a collective voice and increase their influence; continue preparations to monitor the campaign and vote, use parallel vote tabulation responsibly and work with and support the IEBC if it is performing well.
To regional leaders, especially the governments of the East African Community:
14. Send unambiguous public and private messages against political interference with the elections and especially against the use of or incitement to violence.
15. Support the efforts of the joint East African Community election observation team, as well as of other observation missions.
To Kenya’s other regional and wider international partners, especially the African Union, U.S., European Union and its member states, UN and International Financial Institutions:
16. Send unambiguous public and private messages that politicians must not meddle with the IEBC or the judiciary and that political violence will be sanctioned, including, if appropriate, by adopting travel bans or asset freezes.
17. Ensure all regional and wider international observation missions deploy early, to as many counties as possible, and cooperate to align their statements and avoid duplication.
Nairobi/Brussels, 17 January 2013
Eritrea: When is a mutiny not a mutiny?
by Cedric Barnes
On Monday 21 January, a number of unofficial sources reported that 100 or so soldiers had invaded Eritrea’s Ministry of Information and taken over state-owned Eri-TV. During their occupation, the soldiers began broadcasting a statement demanding the implementation of the constitution — never enacted by Parliament — and the release of thousands of political prisoners, including a number of high-profile journalists, and former ministers, senior military officers and officials known as the “G15”, before the station went off air. The rest of the armed forces were described as “quiet”, as was the city, and no shots were fired either in the taking or surrender of the Ministry.
It is hard to tell what exactly happened, or why. News from Asmara is opaque at the best of times, and this apparent military-led protest — or “small incident” as the Eritrean government is terming it — is the latest in a number of informally reported developments, only a few substantiated, suggesting cracks in the unusually regimented state. Since there are no accredited independent journalists in Eritrea, the only alternative to government media is diaspora-driven opposition news websites. These can be illuminating, because Eritrea is a curiously intimate place, with members of the same family occupying top government positions while their close relatives are vocal anti-government activists abroad.
What has emerged was that 2012 was a remarkably newsworthy year for the usually unnoticed county. It began with Ethiopia and Eritrea trading accusations after foreign tourists were attacked and five killed by Ethiopian rebel groups in the Afar region, which is close to the border between the two states. Addis claimed the rebels were under Eritrean direction, justifying Ethiopian reprisals in March against rebel camps across the border. Further incursions were reported in late May — just after Eritrean Independence day — with Ethiopian troops apparently occupying new positions inside Asmara’s territory. Eritrean forces, surprisingly and perhaps ominously for their government, put up little resistance.
From late March until late April, the normally omnipresent Eritrean President Isaias Afkwerki was absent from public life, prompting speculation he was sick, even dead. When he reappeared, little explanation was given, and he looked in good health at Independence Day celebrations. Coincidentally a few months after Isaias resurfaced, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi disappeared from public life; his death was announced on 21 August.
Meles’s death was studiously underplayed by the Eritrean government, though it was a topic of anxious speculation among the population at large, who were concerned about a change in Ethiopian policy — Meles was popularly perceived as less hawkish towards Eritrea. At that time information emerged that the Eritrean government was arming civilians — many of whom have basic military training — apparently unconcerned that weapons might be later turned against the government.
By the latter half of 2012, more rumours were circulating of discord in the government about the state and direction of the country and the ups and downs of high-profile ministers and military commanders, variously perceived as pro-reform or rivals to the president. Indicative of declining morale, in early October, two air force pilots absconded with the presidential plane toSaudi Arabia, claimed asylum, and made a statement critical of their head of state. But this was just one, albeit dramatic example, of the tens of thousands of other Eritreans who fled during the year. The last unconfirmed rumour in November was that the stalwart Minister of Information, Ali Abdu, had also disappeared.
What does the latest incident signify?
It ended peacefully, at least so it seemed. The protesting soldiers were transported to the outskirts of Asmara, their fate so far unknown. Web-based reports claim that the government is talking to the protest leader, Colonel Saleh Osman, a veteran of the liberation war and respected serving officer reputed to have refused orders to withdraw from the city of Assab during the 1998-2000 border war with Ethiopia– a last stand that, many Eritreans believe, pushed Ethiopia to agree to a peace deal.
Some sources claim that with the TV protest, Saleh was simply demanding political reform. But others suggest that this is a well-orchestrated warning by senior military figures who stand to lose from political and economic reform that the ruling People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) has been mooting for the past year. Either way, partisan analysis dominates.
While not a coup, or even a mutiny, this highly unusual behaviour by Eritrea’s troops, is still significant. The last major protest by “veteran” fighters was in 1993, and this incident comes in the 20th anniversary year of Eritrea’s formal independence. Of course, the Eritrean calendar starts in September, so we are already well into what seems to be a momentous though uncertain year for Eritrea.
source: http://www.crisisgroupblogs.org/africanpeacebuilding/2013/01/24/eritrea-when-is-a-mutiny-not-a-mutiny/
TOP SECTRET/Warqad Sir Ah; Wareegtadii Lagu Go'aamiyey Xukumkii Dilka Ahaa Ee Lagu Fuliyey 43-kii Qof Ee Burco Lagu Toogtay 20.12.1984. + Sawirka Wareegtada.
Oslo (Ramaas) Dec.30, 2012 – shabakada ramaasnews waxa ay
akhristeyaasheeda halkan ugu soo gudbineysaa waraaq sir ah, taas oo ka soo
baxday xafiiskii ku xigeenka xeer ilaaliyaha guud ee maxkamadii ciidamada
qalabka sida.
Warqadda oo ah tii lagu fuliyey dilkii toogashada ahaa ee
lagu xukumay 43-kii qof ee loo dilay magaalada Burco, dadkaas oo loo laayey
qabiilka ay ahaayeen oo kaliya.
Qoraalka ayaa u qoran sidan:
HR.192/84 RG Burco, 20/12/84
UJEEDDO:- FULIN XUKUN DIL AH
KU XIGEENKA XEER-ILAALIYAHA GUUD CQS
MARKUU ARKAY:- Go'aanka Maxkamada Dagaalka C.Q.S.
Lam 190/84 ee 20-12-84, kaas oo lagu cayimay
ciqaabta dilka ah ee lagu xukumay eedaysanaasha kala ah.
1- Dilsuge – Qaasin Qodax Jaamac
2- “ -
Cabdiraxmaan X. Maxamed Siraad
3- “ -
Ciise Ibraahin Ismaaciil
4- “ -
Siciid Maxamed Ismaaciil (Madoobe)
5- “ -
Aadan Nuur Ismaaciil (Coraaq)
6- “ -
Yaasiin Axmed Warsame (Soonaani)
7- “ -
Axmed Cabdi Xasan
8- “ -
Cabdi Maxamed Cali (Dhagjar)
9- “ -
Axmed Yuusuf Mire
10- “ - Cabdi
Jaamac Xasan (Sanweyne)
11- “ -
Maxamed Yuusuf Ismaaciil (Comaas)
12- “ - Axmed
Xasan Ismaaciil (Yunbur)
13- “ -
Diiriye Cismaan Yuusuf (Laba Lugood)
14- “ - G/le
Maxamed Cali Qorane
15- “ -
Ex.S/A.Shukri Maxamed Samatar - (Qurmiye)
16- “ -
Ismaaciil Saalax Wiriye “
17- “ -
Maxamed Samatar Axmed “
18- “ -
Saleebaan Hirad Aadan “
19- “ - Cali
Cabdi Xasan “
20- “ - Aadan
Jaamac Warsame “
21- “ -
Maxamed Maxamuud Cabdi “
22- “ - Axmed
Ismaaciil Maxamed “
23- “ - Cali
Cumar Diiriye “
24- “ - Muuse
Xasan Ibraahin “
25- “ - Cali
Giire Cabdi “
26- “ -
C/laahi Maxamed Faarax Taakuliye
27- “ - Aadan
Cali Ibraahin Qurmiye
28- “ - Cabdi
Maxamed Yuusuf Taakuliye
29- “ - Cabdi
Xasan Jaamac “
30- “ - Cabdilaahi Xuseen Nuur Korto
31- “ - Cali
Xuseen (Inta dambe way masaxantay)
32- “ -
S/Alifle Axmed (Inta dambe way masaxantay)
33- “ -
Magacu wuu masaxmay
34- " - S/Alifle Faarax (Inta dambe way masaxantay)
35- " - Jaamac Cabdilaahi Saciid
36- “ -
Dable Maxamed Cige Xabad
37- Edsane - Cabdi Cali Axmed
38- “ -
Saciid Cismaan Geelle
39- “ -
Abuukar Cabdilaahi Rooble
40- “ -
Cabdilaahi Saalax Giir
41- “ -
Cawil Saalax Giire
42- “ -
Ibraahin Maxamed Xandulle (Ina Aar) - Maqane
43- “ -
Cabdi Xuseen Dheere - Maqane
In la fuliyo maanta 20/12/84 Saacadda 0700 subaxnimo
laguna fuliyo goobta toogashada Burco.
MARKUU ARKAY:- QOD.227 XEER
MARKUU ARKAY:- QOD. 69 XEER
MARKUU ARKAY:- Xeer lam 54 ee 14.8.82
WUXUU GO'AAMIYEY
In go'aanka maxkamadda la fuliyo laguna fuliyo meesha iyo
waqtiga ay cayintay, ayna fuliyaan koox ciidan ah oo hogaaminaayo Sarkaal ku
haboon isaguna C.Q.Sida kuwaas ahaan K.D.S.iyo daraawiishta Booliiska.
WUXUU KALOO GO'AAMIYEY
In aasidda dadka iyo wixii kharaj ah loo xilsaaray
D/Hoose ee Burco si toos ahna uu u maamulaya Guddoomiyaha Maamulka Degmada
Burco.
KU XIGEENKA XEER ILAALIYAHA GUUD CQS
G/LE YUUSUF MUUSE FAARAX
Akhri Lifaaq Asliga ah ee hoose:
source: Ramaasnews.com
Maxaad Ka Taqaanaa Ninka Loogu Magac Daray Cusbitaalka Caruurta Dr. Maxamed Aadan Sheekh oo maanta ay xadhiga ka jartay Marwada 1aad ee Qaranku Dhakhtark
Waxa magaalada Torino ee dalka Talyaaniga ku geeriyoodey, Allaha u nariistee, Dr Mohamed Adan Sheikh, oo hore mas’uuliyado kala geddisan ka soo qabtay dawladdii hore ee Jamhuuriyaddii Dimoqoraadiga ee Somalia, muddo badanna ahaa maxbuus siyaasadeed, xukumaddii milateriga ee Siyaad Barre.
DR Mohamed Adan Sheikh, waxa uu ku geeriyoodey cusbitaal ku yaalla magaalada Torino, halkaasi oo uu degganaa ilaa intii uu ka soo baxay Somalia, kana shaqayn jirey. Waxanu u geeriyoodey xanuun soo ritey oo muddo sanad ahba hayey.
Taariikh-nololeedkii marxuumka.
Sida laga soo xigtey dadkii aqoonta u lahaa ee ugu dhawaa, taariikhdii DR Mohamed Adan Sheikh oo koobanina waa sida soo socota:
- Wuxuu ku dhashay dhulka howdka looyaqaan agagaarka Galaadi korkeeda sannadkii 1936.
- waxaa asaga oo 5 jirah lakeenay magalada Mogadishu halakaas oo dugsi ka bilaabay.
- Macallin buu noqday ayada oo dalka Talyaaniga waxabarasho oo u aaday horrantii 1950dii.
- wuxuu jaamicadda Rome ka bartay Dhaqtarnimo asaga oo dalka ku soo noqday 1963, noqdayna dhaqtarkii ugu horreyey oo Soomaali ah oo dadka qala (First Somali Surgeon) asaga oo ka shaqeyeynjiray Isbitaal Martini & Digfer .
- 1970 wuxuu noqday wasiirkii caafimaadka .
- 1973 wuxuu noqday wasiirkii Tacliinta sar, waxanu qayb weyn ku lahaa asaasigii kulliyadaha jaamicada, gaar ahanna jaamicaddii daawooyinka iyo dhakhtarnnimada .
- Aakhirkii 1974 ayaa la xiray oo kacaankii milateriga la isafgarnwaayey sagaal billood ayuna xirna .
- 1975 wuuxuu noqday guddomihii hogaaka idologiyadda ee Xisbigii Hantiwaddaga .
- 1980 wuxuu noqday wasiikii Warfaafinta .
- 1982 marlabaada ayaa la xiray asaga oo lala xiiray madax-badan oo siyaasiyiin ah oo ay ka mid-ahaayeen madaweyne ku- xigeenkii Ismaaciil Cali Abukar halkaas oo uu lix sano labaatanjirow ku xirnaa ayaada oo Amnesty International ugu magacadartay MAXBUUSKI SIYAASIKA EE 1984.
- markii maxkamadii siidayseyna 1988 ayaa hal sano oo kale guriga lagu xiray.
- 1990 ayu Dalka Talyaaniga u soo dhoofay halkaas oo magalada Torino uu soo dagay.
- Shaqadiisii hore ee Dhakhtarnimdii ayu ku noqday hase yaashe 1997 ayu doorahso ka qaybgalay waxaana loo doortay xubin dowladda hoose ee magalada Torino muddo kaddib wuu ka baxay oo dhakhatarnimadiisii buu ku noqday aysaga oo cisbitaalka Torino ku yaal ka noqday agasimaha caafimaadka ee cisbitaalka halkaas oo uu hal sano ka hor ka howl gabay .
- ugu dabeyntii wuuxuu hadda madax ka ahaa xarunta Cilmibaarista Piemonte ee loogu talgalay Dhaqanka Africa (Centro Piemontese di Studi Africani)
- DR. MOHAMED ADEN wuxuu qoray la buug oo la kala yiraahdo Arrivederci a Mogadiscio. Somalia: l’indipendenza smarrita oo micneheedu yahay XAMAR BAAN ISKU ARKI DOONAA: XORNIMADA NAGA SIBIIBIXATAY iyo SOMALAI NON E’ UN’ISOLA DEI CARAIBI oo ah SOMALIA MA AHA JASIIRAD CARIBBEAN
- Wuxu marxuumkaasi ka tegey xaas iyo 3 carruur ah oo hadda hadda muddakar ah.
Marwada 1aad ee Jamhuuriyada Somaliland Aamina Sh. Maxamed Jirde (Aamina Weris) ayaa maanta munaasibad si heer sare ah loo soo agaasimay ayay xadhiga ka jartay Cusbitaalka Caruurta ee Caasimada Hargesya. Cusbitaalkan oo ah mid aad u wayn waxa loogu magac daray Dr. Maxamed Aadan Sheekh oo EEBE naxariistiisa jano ha siiyee aynu taariikh nololeedkiisa kor kaga soo sheekaynay.
Wasiirkii hore ee wasaaradda arimaha gudaha Somaliland Dr Maxamed Cabdi Yuuusuf Gabboose oo munaasabadaas ka hadlay ayaa sheegay in Dr Maxamed Aadan Sheeekh ALLE ha u naxariistee ay u suuro gashay inuu Somaliland ka dhiso dhakhtarkan isagoo gacan ka helayey macalimiinta Jaamacadda Turino ee Dalka talyaaniga.
Intaasi Kadib waxan akhristayaasha jecelahay in aan u soo bandhigo Maqaal uu qoray Waiye fiiro dheer leh: oo la yidhaa Maxamed Amiin.
Dardaarankii Dr. Mohamed Aadan Sheekh & Furaha Wadahadallada, Somaliland-Somalia
Furaha dhabbaha wada-hadalada labada dhinac, Somalia iyo Somaliland waxay ka bilaabmi karaan in la qiro baahida ah abuurista xaalad debecsan oo hordhac u noqota turxaan bixin iyo kalsooni abuur. Si loo dhayo dhaawacyda iyo tabashada dadka reer Somaliland (Healing processes and measures).
Arrinkani waa mid qiima weyn ku leh cilmiga diblomasiyada iyo dhaqanka wada hadalada iyo xallinta khilaafaadka.
Dr. Mohamed Aadan Sheekh, Alle ha u naxariistee, markii uu ogaaday in geeridiisii soo dhawaatay ayaa wuxuu kula dardaarmay xaaskiisii inay Hargeiysa ka dhisto Cusbitaal.
Taasi waxay wax weyn ka beddeshey aragtidii dadka reer Hargeysa ka qabeen dadka reer Soomaaliya waxaanay u beddeshay dhinaca wanaagsan. Waxaa kale oo halkan xusid mudan hadalo ka soo yeedhay Dr. Abdilaahi Osoble Siyaad, markii uu ku dooday in dadka reer Somaliland ay hore-ba u diideen aftidii Dastoorkii 1963kii loo codaynayey oo ay ahayd in lagu xalaaleeyo midnimadii labada dhinac. waxaa kale oo arrinkan meel muuqata oo wax-ku-oola ka iska taagey Ambassador Abdillaahi Addow, markii uu lahaa, waa in Somaliland loo wada hadlaa si siman oo walaaltinimo ah. Waxaa kale oo xusid dheeraada mudan ninkii pilot-ka ahaa ee markii lagu amrray in uu ka qayb-qato duqaynta Hargeisa, isaga oo ka duulaya Madaarkeeda, iska bedelay ee diyaaradiisii la galay dalka Djibouti.
Waxaa intaba ka horeeyey oo sidoo kale mawqif cad iska taagey, Alle ha u naxariitee, ninkii la odhan jirey Abdilaahi Majoor, markii uu BBC ka yidhi Somaliland xaqbay u leedahay aqoonsi, maxaa yeelay markii la midoobayba waxay ahayd dawlad madaxnannaan oo adduunku aqoonsaday. mawqifyada sidan oo kale ahi waxay ka soo horjeedaan oo si toosa u burinayana weedhaha faraha baddan ee xanuunka badan oo aan loo miidaan deyin, sida 'Midnimadu waa Muqadas”, ma go’i karaan” xasuuq ma dhicin' IWM.
Cusbitaalka haatan dhismihiisu dhamaadka ku dhow yahay ee Dr. Mohamed Aadan Shiekh waxa uu tilmaan u yahay dhinaca wax-ku-oolka ah oo sahanka u ah mustaqbalka wadahadaladan maanta furmay.
Waxa uu sidoo kale horseed u yahay yuhuunta walaalnimada labada shacab. waxaa kale oo uu muraayad u yahay fekerkii hormoodka ahaa ee Dr. Mohamed Aadan Shiekh rumaysnaan jirey. Waxaan xasuustaa arrin la iiga sheegay mar ay isaga iyo Mohamed Siyaad Barre wada hadlayeen, waxaana iiga soo Weriyey, Alle ha u naxariistee Warsame Ali faarax (Warsame Juguf) waxaanu ii sheegay in Dr. Mohamed Aadan ku yidhi Siyaad Barre.. “Waar bi'waaye dalka ha burburin,burbur buu ku socdaayee, reerkana magaciisa ha ceebayn”
Haddaba, dalkii waa kaas burburay, waxaanan qabaa in reerkii Siyaad Barre ka dhashay aanu ceebaysnayne, waxaa ceeboobey uu yahay nidaamka ama xukunka keligi talis ah.
Maanta oo labaatan sano ka badan la sii kala maqnaa sababo badan oo la og-yahay dartood, waxaa maanta taagan baahi wayn oo ah in la ogaado xaqiiqada ah in wada hadaladu u baahan yihiin ragg ama dumar la feker ah Dr. Mohamed Aadan Shiekh, iyo ragga kale ee aan hore magacooda u xusay. Dhinaca Somalilandna waxaa loo baahan yahay in la ogaado in dadka reer Somalia aanay, dad ahaan isku wada raacsanayn waxa loo yaqaan 'Midnimada Muqaddaska ah' diktatooriga ah, ee ku dhisan argtida kiliya oo aan lahayn dulqaadka xambaarsan dareenka ka soo horjeeda kala-duwanaanshaha iyo is-ahaanshaha, dersnimo wanaaga, iyo wax-wada qabsiga, uu horseeday Dr. Mohamed Aadan Shiekh iyo ragga kale ee magacyadooda aan hore u xusay.
Haddaba waxaan leeyahay,wadahadaldu ha ku socdaan mabda'a dulqaadka iyo riiq-dheerida. Waana in lagu talo galo in wadahadaladu ay waqti dheer socon doonaan, maxaa yeelay waxaan qabaa in dawlad-dhiska Soomaalia aan weli waxba ka dhaweyn. oo gacmaha ajanebi ee ku jiraa kala wataan danno kala duwan oo u kala gaara, marka hore, marka labaad-na waxa keliya ee ay isla oggol-yihiin yahay in ay iska fogeeyaan dhibaatada Somalida. Taasina waa mid aan lagula yaabi karin, inta siyaasiyiina Soomaalidu ay wadaan “I jiid aan ku jiidee!.
Wabillahi tawfiiq.
Adam Muse Jibril
Email: adamjibril@hotmail.com"> adamjibril@hotmail.com
Inside Story - Somaliland vs Somalia
Why has Somaliland succeeded while mainland Somalia tops the list of failed states?
Amid the chaos that has afflicted Somalia in recent decades, there is an oasis of relative calm that is ignored by the rest of the world.
The self-declared Republic of Somaliland in the Horn of Africa announced its independence from the rest of Somalia in May 1991, and has been searching for recognition in vain since then.
It is now set to hold its second democratic presidential elections in eight years.
Somaliland, which is situated in Somalia's northwest, is a haven of relative peace while violence and instability has characterised Somalia, its capital Mogadishu and more recently the Gulf of Aden.
So why has Somaliland succeeded in creating effective governance and a viable economy while mainland Somalia tops the list of failed states with rampant lawlessness and piracy?
Joining the programme are Mohammed Abdillahi Omar, an analyst and commentator on political issues in the Horn of Africa, Abdi Samatar, a professor of geography and global studies at the University of Minnesota, and Afyare Elmi, a lecturer in international politics at Qatar University.
This episode of Inside Story aired from Wednesday, June 23, 2010.
Source:http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2010/06/2010623123754251181.html
Amid the chaos that has afflicted Somalia in recent decades, there is an oasis of relative calm that is ignored by the rest of the world.
The self-declared Republic of Somaliland in the Horn of Africa announced its independence from the rest of Somalia in May 1991, and has been searching for recognition in vain since then.
It is now set to hold its second democratic presidential elections in eight years.
Somaliland, which is situated in Somalia's northwest, is a haven of relative peace while violence and instability has characterised Somalia, its capital Mogadishu and more recently the Gulf of Aden.
So why has Somaliland succeeded in creating effective governance and a viable economy while mainland Somalia tops the list of failed states with rampant lawlessness and piracy?
Joining the programme are Mohammed Abdillahi Omar, an analyst and commentator on political issues in the Horn of Africa, Abdi Samatar, a professor of geography and global studies at the University of Minnesota, and Afyare Elmi, a lecturer in international politics at Qatar University.
This episode of Inside Story aired from Wednesday, June 23, 2010.
Source:http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2010/06/2010623123754251181.html
Saturday, January 26, 2013
CJA : Horn of Africa Human Rights Watch Committee (Hornwatch)
CJA : Horn of Africa Human Rights Watch Committee (Hornwatch)
Horn of Africa Human Rights Watch Committee (Hornwatch)
Hornwatch is a network of organizations bound together by common responsibilities on the promotion and protection of the universal ideals of human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in Islamic Shari’a, the Somaliland Bill of Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other international human rights instruments . The member organizations aim to reach their main goal through exchanging of information, developing a collective voice, amplifying their actions, and developing new tools and strategies in pursuing initiatives to protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms in Somaliland.
Hornwatch was founded in 1988 as a core action group in Djibouti by five university graduate students who had escaped the gross human rights violations and brutality of the Siad Barre regime. During the early years, Horwatch activities were concentrated on monitoring and reporting human rights violations in Somalia. Hornwatch was officially registered as non-governmental organization under Somaliland law on January 20, 1997. Hornwatch is an independent, non-governmental, non-partisan, and not-for-profit national human rights organization. Since its official establishment in 1997, Hornwatch, with the help of its partners, has been working on a national human rights agenda in Somaliland.
Hornwatch envisions a democratic, peaceful, and progressive Somaliland that fully respects the basic human rights of its citizens, recognizing the rights of the marginalized, and the excluded sectors of the society such as people with disabilities, women, youth, minorities, refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced persons. Hornwatch further envisions a Somaliland that fully adheres to the fundamental freedoms of a democratic society with a government that respects and complies with all the international human rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations covenants and human rights.
Horn of Africa Human Rights Watch Committee (Hornwatch)
Hornwatch is a network of organizations bound together by common responsibilities on the promotion and protection of the universal ideals of human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in Islamic Shari’a, the Somaliland Bill of Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other international human rights instruments . The member organizations aim to reach their main goal through exchanging of information, developing a collective voice, amplifying their actions, and developing new tools and strategies in pursuing initiatives to protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms in Somaliland.
Hornwatch was founded in 1988 as a core action group in Djibouti by five university graduate students who had escaped the gross human rights violations and brutality of the Siad Barre regime. During the early years, Horwatch activities were concentrated on monitoring and reporting human rights violations in Somalia. Hornwatch was officially registered as non-governmental organization under Somaliland law on January 20, 1997. Hornwatch is an independent, non-governmental, non-partisan, and not-for-profit national human rights organization. Since its official establishment in 1997, Hornwatch, with the help of its partners, has been working on a national human rights agenda in Somaliland.
Hornwatch envisions a democratic, peaceful, and progressive Somaliland that fully respects the basic human rights of its citizens, recognizing the rights of the marginalized, and the excluded sectors of the society such as people with disabilities, women, youth, minorities, refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced persons. Hornwatch further envisions a Somaliland that fully adheres to the fundamental freedoms of a democratic society with a government that respects and complies with all the international human rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations covenants and human rights.
East Africa: Crisis and Development in the Horn of Africa - Two New Books On a Volatile Region
BOOK REVIEW
By Magnus Taylor
Crisis in the Horn of Africa: politics, piracy and the threat of terror, Peter Woodward
Peter Woodward will be known to many as a long-time historian of the Horn of Africa and particularly Sudan, where his Sudan, 1898-1989: the unstable state is an essential work.
His newest book is an overview of the entire region with a sexed-up title, probably seeking to play in to the hands of the so-called 'policymakers' eager to find assistance on approaching issues of strategic interest, notably, Islamic terrorism and maritime security.
They may be somewhat disappointed. Woodward's book is a somewhat drier (and better) affair, comprised by a short history of each of the countries in the region (Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan, with Eritrea and Djibouti sharing a chapter), and including broader sections on 'The Evolution of the Horn', 'Regional Relations' and 'International politics.' It is more a history of the Horn within an evolving international system, than a focus on any particular 'hot button' issues.
Woodward is a writer of traditionally scholarly style and is always eager to comment on the development of a body of literature which influenced the way in which the outside world has considered the Horn.
For example, that on 'quasi', 'failed' and 'collapsed' states (Chris Clapham et al) have been greatly influenced by political developments in the region, notably related to Somalia's political disintegration. He references the development of the post 9/11 sub-discipline of 'terrorism studies' which would incorporate work on the Horn as part of the 'arc of crisis' supposedly stretching from Afghanistan, via Pakistan to Yemen and Somalia.
Woodward's histories of the different state actors in the Horn are largely pivoted on the end of the Cold War and the political systems that developed in this key period of transition for Africa.
The histories are comprehensive and readable, but are at times ploddy and a little repetitive. Personal portraits of key figures such as Meles Zenawi, who reportedly "forged an intellectual and later personal relationship with economist Joseph Stiglitz in his resistance to the nostrums of the IMF", give the reader some light relief amongst the barrage of historical details.
The best of the country histories is, as you might expect from Woodward, on Sudan. He writes with obvious intellectual respect for Hasan al-Turabi - 'the emince grise' of Sudan's attempt to construct the first Islamist state in the Arab and sunni Muslim world. Woodward, however, does not shy away from the more violent elements of the 'revolution' notably the creation of 'Ghost houses' - "places of arbitrary detention, torture, mutilation and death".
The history of the creation of South Sudan is dealt with in detail including a run-down of the various failures to come to an agreement to end the long-running civil war, despite significant outside assistance.
Woodward seems agnostic about the creation of the new state, although closes the chapter with a quote from Sudanese academic Jok Madut Jok, "At the moment, South Sudan is only slightly more than a geographical expression."
The chapter on regional relations is perhaps the best of the whole book, bringing in details of the history and main players the reader has been introduced to earlier. Hasan al-Turabi appears again as the progenitor of an outwardly projected Islamism aiding insurgencies in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia in the early 1990s.
Most of the internationally significant issues in the Horn are regional issues - for example the 'terrorism' listed in the title may have begun with the harbouring of Osama Bin Laden in Sudan in the mid 1990s and found its most troubling expression with the rise of the 'al-Qaeda affiliated' al-Shabaab in Somalia in the mid 2000s, but it has also drawn other East African powers - notably Kenya and Uganda - militarily in to the region. It is refreshing to read a history book that is also largely up-to-date, with reference made to the Kenya invasion of Southern Somalia in October 2011.
In sum, Woodward's work provides an excellent and intellectually stimulating aid to thinking about the Horn of Africa and the many different interactions between its states, and also the wider world. But it probably fails in becoming a 'crossover' text that will attract anyone but those with a specific interest in the region.
Pastoralism and Development in Africa: dynamic change at the margins, Eds. Andy Catley, Jeremy Lind and Ian Scoones
This collection of essays fnability' series is an altogether different beast, put together by three academics from the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex. It does however largely focus on the 'Greater Horn' region, taking as its focus developmental processes occurring at the 'margins'.
Despite a seemingly recurring history of drought, and the attendant human tragedies of starvation and destruction of livelihood for pastoral communities, this book argues that "there is much to be learned from development successes, large and small in [the Horn]."
Pathways to development in these areas "often remain hidden, under the radar, informal, sometimes illegal, sometimes in contradiction to the priorities and interests of national political elites in the region, and rarely in line with standard, mainstream prescriptions."
The book seeks to counter received wisdom - for example, border and boundaries, spaces which we might ordinarily associate with conflict and the parochial affairs of 'untamed' peoples, are approached as zones of creativity and innovation unfettered by the heavy-hand of the state.
The editors might well be seen as being in sympathy with the lives of pastoral peoples who, to use the words of James Scott in his seminal work on the south-east Asian highlands, have "developed the art of not being governed." The same might equally be said of pastoral peoples in the Horn of Africa.
As with Woodward, the authors do (briefly) attempt to place such 'ungoverned' spaces within the dominant global narratives on The War on Terror.
In this context, marginal spaces in the Horn have the capacity to strike fear in to the hearts of western policymakers who value centralised control - 'peace building', good governance' and 'conflict resolution' - as the preferred method of imposing developmental programmes on such regions .
The authors instead call for a new perspective "that sees the margins as the centre, borders as zones of exchange, and borderlands as sites of creativity and innovation in response to adversity."
Time and space prevent a fuller examination of all the contributions contained within Pastoralism and Development in Africa. The book pursues the general argument described above via a number of different of different case studies from the growth of camel milk marketing in the Somali region of Ethiopia to distance learning strategies for Kenya's pastoralist communities.
In his 'endpiece' Peter Little concludes that pastoralism will continue, but will change - it is not a static way of living, but is impacted by the same processes of modernisation that effect the centre. A sustainable future for pastoralism is possible, and I recommend reading this book to better understand what it might look like.
Magnus Taylor is Editor, African Arguments online
By Magnus Taylor
 |
| Crisis in the Horn of Africa: politics, piracy and the threat of terror |
Crisis in the Horn of Africa: politics, piracy and the threat of terror, Peter Woodward
Peter Woodward will be known to many as a long-time historian of the Horn of Africa and particularly Sudan, where his Sudan, 1898-1989: the unstable state is an essential work.
His newest book is an overview of the entire region with a sexed-up title, probably seeking to play in to the hands of the so-called 'policymakers' eager to find assistance on approaching issues of strategic interest, notably, Islamic terrorism and maritime security.
They may be somewhat disappointed. Woodward's book is a somewhat drier (and better) affair, comprised by a short history of each of the countries in the region (Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan, with Eritrea and Djibouti sharing a chapter), and including broader sections on 'The Evolution of the Horn', 'Regional Relations' and 'International politics.' It is more a history of the Horn within an evolving international system, than a focus on any particular 'hot button' issues.
Woodward is a writer of traditionally scholarly style and is always eager to comment on the development of a body of literature which influenced the way in which the outside world has considered the Horn.
For example, that on 'quasi', 'failed' and 'collapsed' states (Chris Clapham et al) have been greatly influenced by political developments in the region, notably related to Somalia's political disintegration. He references the development of the post 9/11 sub-discipline of 'terrorism studies' which would incorporate work on the Horn as part of the 'arc of crisis' supposedly stretching from Afghanistan, via Pakistan to Yemen and Somalia.
Woodward's histories of the different state actors in the Horn are largely pivoted on the end of the Cold War and the political systems that developed in this key period of transition for Africa.
The histories are comprehensive and readable, but are at times ploddy and a little repetitive. Personal portraits of key figures such as Meles Zenawi, who reportedly "forged an intellectual and later personal relationship with economist Joseph Stiglitz in his resistance to the nostrums of the IMF", give the reader some light relief amongst the barrage of historical details.
The best of the country histories is, as you might expect from Woodward, on Sudan. He writes with obvious intellectual respect for Hasan al-Turabi - 'the emince grise' of Sudan's attempt to construct the first Islamist state in the Arab and sunni Muslim world. Woodward, however, does not shy away from the more violent elements of the 'revolution' notably the creation of 'Ghost houses' - "places of arbitrary detention, torture, mutilation and death".
The history of the creation of South Sudan is dealt with in detail including a run-down of the various failures to come to an agreement to end the long-running civil war, despite significant outside assistance.
Woodward seems agnostic about the creation of the new state, although closes the chapter with a quote from Sudanese academic Jok Madut Jok, "At the moment, South Sudan is only slightly more than a geographical expression."
The chapter on regional relations is perhaps the best of the whole book, bringing in details of the history and main players the reader has been introduced to earlier. Hasan al-Turabi appears again as the progenitor of an outwardly projected Islamism aiding insurgencies in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia in the early 1990s.
Most of the internationally significant issues in the Horn are regional issues - for example the 'terrorism' listed in the title may have begun with the harbouring of Osama Bin Laden in Sudan in the mid 1990s and found its most troubling expression with the rise of the 'al-Qaeda affiliated' al-Shabaab in Somalia in the mid 2000s, but it has also drawn other East African powers - notably Kenya and Uganda - militarily in to the region. It is refreshing to read a history book that is also largely up-to-date, with reference made to the Kenya invasion of Southern Somalia in October 2011.
In sum, Woodward's work provides an excellent and intellectually stimulating aid to thinking about the Horn of Africa and the many different interactions between its states, and also the wider world. But it probably fails in becoming a 'crossover' text that will attract anyone but those with a specific interest in the region.
Pastoralism and Development in Africa: dynamic change at the margins, Eds. Andy Catley, Jeremy Lind and Ian Scoones
 |
| Pastoralism and Development in Africa |
Despite a seemingly recurring history of drought, and the attendant human tragedies of starvation and destruction of livelihood for pastoral communities, this book argues that "there is much to be learned from development successes, large and small in [the Horn]."
Pathways to development in these areas "often remain hidden, under the radar, informal, sometimes illegal, sometimes in contradiction to the priorities and interests of national political elites in the region, and rarely in line with standard, mainstream prescriptions."
The book seeks to counter received wisdom - for example, border and boundaries, spaces which we might ordinarily associate with conflict and the parochial affairs of 'untamed' peoples, are approached as zones of creativity and innovation unfettered by the heavy-hand of the state.
The editors might well be seen as being in sympathy with the lives of pastoral peoples who, to use the words of James Scott in his seminal work on the south-east Asian highlands, have "developed the art of not being governed." The same might equally be said of pastoral peoples in the Horn of Africa.
As with Woodward, the authors do (briefly) attempt to place such 'ungoverned' spaces within the dominant global narratives on The War on Terror.
In this context, marginal spaces in the Horn have the capacity to strike fear in to the hearts of western policymakers who value centralised control - 'peace building', good governance' and 'conflict resolution' - as the preferred method of imposing developmental programmes on such regions .
The authors instead call for a new perspective "that sees the margins as the centre, borders as zones of exchange, and borderlands as sites of creativity and innovation in response to adversity."
Time and space prevent a fuller examination of all the contributions contained within Pastoralism and Development in Africa. The book pursues the general argument described above via a number of different of different case studies from the growth of camel milk marketing in the Somali region of Ethiopia to distance learning strategies for Kenya's pastoralist communities.
In his 'endpiece' Peter Little concludes that pastoralism will continue, but will change - it is not a static way of living, but is impacted by the same processes of modernisation that effect the centre. A sustainable future for pastoralism is possible, and I recommend reading this book to better understand what it might look like.
Magnus Taylor is Editor, African Arguments online
Des préparatifs d’envergure à Ottawa pour honorer la mémoire de Djama Mahamud Haid
Des préparatifs d’envergure à Ottawa pour honorer la mémoire de Djama Mahamud Haid
Les communautés djiboutienne et somalilandaise d’Ottawa vous invitent à une cérémonie de prière et de souvenir à la mémoire de Djama Mahamud Haid. L’ancien gouverneur de la Banque Centrale de Djibouti a été sans conteste un des piliers du développement économique et social de Djibouti durant ses quinze années à la tète de la Banque Centrale. La perte de cet homme d’Etat visionnaire et bourreau de travail doté d’un caractère généreux a été durement ressentie à Ottawa. Amis et anciens collaborateurs de Djama Mahamud Haid partagerons leurs commentaires sur la vie, carrière et principales contributions de l’ancien gouverneur.
Location and Time; Ottawa City Hall, 110 Laurier Avenue West
Sunday, February 3rd, 2013 at 5pm
Contact; Abdiqadir Sonkorleh : (613)600-9059
 |
| Djama Mahamud Haid. |
Les communautés djiboutienne et somalilandaise d’Ottawa vous invitent à une cérémonie de prière et de souvenir à la mémoire de Djama Mahamud Haid. L’ancien gouverneur de la Banque Centrale de Djibouti a été sans conteste un des piliers du développement économique et social de Djibouti durant ses quinze années à la tète de la Banque Centrale. La perte de cet homme d’Etat visionnaire et bourreau de travail doté d’un caractère généreux a été durement ressentie à Ottawa. Amis et anciens collaborateurs de Djama Mahamud Haid partagerons leurs commentaires sur la vie, carrière et principales contributions de l’ancien gouverneur.
Location and Time; Ottawa City Hall, 110 Laurier Avenue West
Sunday, February 3rd, 2013 at 5pm
Contact; Abdiqadir Sonkorleh : (613)600-9059
A response to Jesper Carlsen Cullen’s piece titled” A third way for Somaliland and Somalia”
By: Mohamed A. Mohamoud and Mohamed A. Duale
We write with reference to Jesper Carlsen’s piece titled” A Third way for Somaliland and Somalia” published on 19 January, 2012 on Somaliland Times and various Somaliland websites.
First, Mr. Jesper selected to discuss a topic that he is not familiar with thus a novice. However, we have to thank to Jesper for raising an interesting and important issue, which touches vital and pivotal issue for Somalilanders and that is the independence of Somaliland.
The central aim of Jesper’s piece is what he called “Loose Union” between Somaliland and Somalia, which he asserts is the third way option available for Somaliland and Somalia. Before analyzing Jesper’s piece, it’s of paramount important to first explain the historical facts and the union that issues that surround Somaliland’s experience during the 31 years of the fateful amalgamation with the South.
We hope that Jesper would gain knowledge of the history of the union that he is talking about in order to stop insinuating erroneous remedies “A LOOSE UNION”
Somaliland was the first Somali speaking state to become independent on 26 June, 1960 with more than35 Countries as well as the United Nations offering official recognition.
Compared to other contemporary de-facto states then in existence Somaliland became unique historical for having deferred its sovereignty and united with the Ex-Italian trust territory as a result of Somalilanders who started and struggled for the idea of a Greater Somalia.
The folly of this was that Somaliland rushed headlong in to immediate union-unconditionally and poorly prepared. The union was never legally ratified by the two States. Somaliland conceded the presidency, the prime minister, and the key ministerial posts.
The nationalist fervour in with which Somalilanders rushed into union with the Somalia in 1960 quickly turned to disappointment and dissatisfaction when it became apparent that their voice in the government of the Republic was marginal. In 1961 a group of young, Northern army officers that had newly graduated from military colleges in Britain rebelled against what they perceived as unfair treatment by the Southern dominated army leadership and their Southern political masters. This rebellion was quickly put down and the rebels rounded up and imprisoned, however the action of the young officers elicited widespread popular support in the North and the Northern ministers and MPs interceded with the government and the officers were released and reinstated
Right at the outset, the Somali sense of proportional balance was ignored. The South provided the capital city, the anthem, the flag and the constitution. The inequality started from the beginning. According to veteran Hasan Essa Jama, former SNM Chairman, It was not political merger but rather political take over, “The naivety of the political leaders of Somaliland in allowing the Southerners to occupy almost all the high offices of state inevitably resulted in a political takeover rather than a merger of equals. Soon, Somaliland was treated as an administered province and later as an occupied territory”.
While examination how the first friction between the two states started Ambassador Mohamed Osman Omer, who originates from Somalia, notes “The first friction between the two newly Independent territories started when Somaliland felt it had raw deal in the distribution of government seats allocated to it in the first united government in 1960, when the posts of the President and that of the Prime minister were both taken by the “South” while the Prime minister of Somaliland, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, was named Minister. Somaliland regarded this as a belittling and humiliating.
In the context of the union experience between Somaliland and Somalia, it is also important to note that during the 31 years of union no infrastructure was constructed in the north, i.e. no roads, schools, hospitals, telecommunication facilities etc.
During the 31 years of union, Somalilanders experienced and suffered one of the worst human rights violations, which included summary executions, rape, torture, imprisonment or detainment without charges. More than 50,000 people were killed and 500,000 people were forced to flee from their towns. These acts flagrantly violated not only human rights norms but also humanitarian norms relating to the protection of victims of non international armed conflicts.
Mr. Jesper, whether you and your fellow Somali unionists like it or not, the fact of the matter is that Somaliland would never re-unite again with Somalia, whatever the circumstances might be. It is a political fact of life that Somalilanders would continue their journey for the quest of recognition even if it takes the coming hundred years.
When Mr. Jesper is talking about loose union, he ignores a fundamental and basic element of self determination and statehood, namely political consent. Citizens of a state must consent to be citizens of that state and they must consent to the political structures of such a state. Anything short of such consent amounts to coercion and negates the legitimacy of the state. The simple fact is that the people of Somaliland will not countenance any arrangement that does not recognize their independence and their right to self determination as a sovereign nation. They voted for this independence in 2001 when they ratified the ‘independence’ constitution by a margin of 97% in favor.
In the middle of his text, Mr. Jesper argues that “THE INDEPENDENCE OF SOMALILAND WOULD FUEL THE CONFLICT IN THE REGION”. To set the record straight, Somaliland’s case poses no threat to the peace and stability in the region as a whole, when it comes to colonial borders in Africa as well as the current political situation prevailing in the region.
According to an Africa Union fact-finding mission report about Somaliland in 2005, “Objectively viewed, Somaliland’s case should not be linked to the notion of “opening a Pandora’s box”. Somaliland’s recognition would serve the greater interest of the region and would contribute the stability and development of the region.
In the end of his text, Jesper argues that “ Somaliland’s governance record has been tarnished in recent years and that the November 2012 local council elections was characterized with multiple voting and bias in the National Electoral Commission. He further states that 20 people were killed during the election”.
First of all, Somaliland has a good elections track record having conducted five successful democratic elections ranging from local councils, parliamentary to presidential during the last ten years and termed properly free and fair by international election missions that observed them.
These elections prove the political maturity of Somaliland people as well as their model of democracy and state building. Nevertheless, there have been a number of Post-election violence, like the recent one where four people died and it’s also worthy to mention that there have been shortcomings and multiple voting during the 2012 local council elections.
This does not mean that Somaliland’s democracy is tarnished and every new transitional democracy is expected to encounter the above mentioned problems. Comparing Somaliland’s 2012 local council elections with the elections that took place in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda, one can simply conclude that the post-election violence that erupted in Somaliland was the lowest and most negligible in the region.
According to Jesper’ remark that” Somalilanders are now sympathetic about loose union”; it is not only misleading and false but also artificial, because is not based on the reality on the ground.
One of the main reasons that Somaliland started negotiations with Somalia was to get International recognition and the negotiations have demonstrated Somaliland’s political maturity and that it has grown as a fully functioning state with all traits of democratic government.
Somaliland’s main obstacle in garnering the much needed 21 years quest for recognition emanates from the fact that Somalia remained a failed state during all this period thus a closed door for proper avenues of separation negotiations of two equal independent partners, STATE to STATE.
Let Mr. Jesper and his Unionist minded be reminded that Somaliland’s independence is non-negotiable and irrevocable. Somaliland leaders are bound by the Constitution of Somaliland, which mandates them to safeguard the independence of Somaliland.
Written by:
Mohamed A. Mohamoud and
Mohamed A. Duale
Somaliland Independent Intellectual Forum (SIIF)
Email: siifsomaliland@gmail.com
Hargeisa, Somaliland
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)