What are the Real Causes of the deepening diplomatic rift between Somalia and Ethiopia?

A recent agreement between Ethiopia and the breakaway region of Somaliland has sparked tension and worsened diplomatic relations with Somalia. The deal involves the lease of coastline to Ethiopia, giving the landlocked country access to the Red Sea. Somalia’s government has expressed anger over the agreement, leading to a rift between the neighboring countries. While the dispute is currently limited to diplomatic tensions, there are concerns about potential wider consequences.

President of Somaliland Republic Muse Behi and the Prime Minister of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed  

Political commentator Samuel Getachew, who specializes in Ethiopia, suggests that Ethiopia’s motivation for entering into this agreement with Somaliland is to gain strategic access to the Red Sea. This move could provide Ethiopia with a new route for trade and lessen its dependence on Djibouti for access to maritime trade routes. 

However, this decision has angered Somalia, which views the agreement as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The rift between the countries highlights the complex regional dynamics at play.

Activist Sharmake Ali, representing the UK-Somaliland Alliance, emphasizes the importance of understanding the historical context of Somaliland’s breakaway from Somalia. Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991 but has not gained recognition as a separate state. 

The recent agreement with Ethiopia could be seen as a bid by Somaliland to secure economic and strategic partnerships to bolster its position on the international stage. However, this move has provoked backlash from Somalia, which sees it as a challenge to its authority over the region.

Abdulkareem Jama, chair of the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies in Mogadishu, discusses the implications of the rift between Somalia, Ethiopia, and Somaliland. He highlights the potential for the dispute to escalate into a wider conflict and expresses concern over the lack of dialogue and cooperation between the countries. 

The volatile situation in the region could have destabilizing effects on the Horn of Africa and lead to further tensions between neighboring states. It is essential for all parties involved to engage in diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict peacefully.

The disagreement over the agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland underscores the need for dialogue and cooperation among states in the Horn of Africa. James Bays, the presenter, raises the question of whether there could be wider consequences resulting from the rift. The lack of unity and consensus among regional actors could create a power struggle that threatens the stability and security of the region. It is imperative for all parties to prioritize peaceful resolution and diplomacy to avoid further escalation of tensions and potential conflicts in the Horn of Africa.

In conclusion, the rift between Somalia, Ethiopia, and Somaliland over the recent agreement highlights the complex regional dynamics and historical tensions in the Horn of Africa. The dispute underscores the need for dialogue, cooperation, and diplomatic efforts to prevent further escalation and potential conflict in the region. It is essential for all parties involved to prioritize peaceful resolution and respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. 

The outcome of this dispute will have significant implications for the stability and security of the Horn of Africa, emphasizing the importance of finding a peaceful and mutually beneficial resolution to the conflict.

Somalia’s Denial Won’t Rewrite the BookSomaliland Has Proven Itself a De Facto State Deserving Recognition

The separation between Somaliland and the rest of Somalia began during the colonial era, when Britain administered the territory as a protectorate separately from Italian-governed areas further south.

       African Union 37 Summit 

When Somalia President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud took the stage at the 37th African Union Summit in Ethiopia’s capital of Addis Ababa on February 17th, 2024, his harsh criticism of the recent Ethiopia-Somaliland cooperation agreement displayed a short-sighted and counterproductive approach to a complex political issue with deep historical roots. Rather than advancing reconciliation, his remarks entrenched long-held positions and undermined opportunity for constructive engagement between key stakeholders in the Horn of Africa region. 

The Summit provided an opportunity for African leaders to discuss collaborative solutions to pressing challenges like food insecurity. However, Hassan utilized the forum to condemn Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s decision to formally recognize Somaliland and establish a security partnership through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). While no doubt playing to nationalist sentiment back home, the Somalia President’s reaction overlooks crucial context shaping realities on the ground.

The separation between Somaliland and the rest of Somalia began during the colonial era, when Britain administered the territory as a protectorate separately from Italian-governed areas further south. Nearly a century of isolated administration yielded distinct administrative structures, economic patterns, and cultural influences in both territories. When they unified as the Somali Republic in 1960 following independence, the forced union of such divergent regions was perhaps destined to face challenges.

From the outset, tensions arose between clans and between those nostalgic for colonial-era autonomy and supporters of Pan-Somali nationalism. The authoritarianism and perceived favoritism towards certain clans under dictator Siad Barre’s regime from 1969 intensified discontent, particularly in the northern regions of Somaliland. Armed rebellions ultimately led to Barre’s ouster in 1991 and Somalia’s descent into chaos, but Somaliland immediately took the opportunity to reclaim the sovereignty it had never fully relinquished.

While Hassan maintains that such a unilateral move violated Somalia’s borders, Somaliland’s self-declared independence is best understood as a reversion to the pre-1960 status quo, before being subsumed within the ill-fated Somali state project. In the three decades since, through sustained efforts and against all odds, Somaliland has emerged as one of the few relatively stable and democratic successes in the turbulent Horn of Africa region. It has consolidated effective self-governance, with institutions, security forces, government structures, and a populace that overwhelmingly favors maintained independence.

In contrast, despite ongoing international support and a succession of transitional administrations, large parts of Somalia remain under the control of Al-Shabaab militants and intermittent conflict. Somaliland’s experience underscores the failure of the 1960 union to unite distinct societies, as well as the viability of self-rule as an alternative to the instability that has plagued Mogadishu. While Hassan’s government clings to a vision of restored territorial control, Somaliland’s reality is one of a de facto independent state in all but name.

Ethiopia, as the dominant regional actor, is well within its rights to engage strategically with this reality by recognizing Somaliland’s sovereignty. In exchange for use of port facilities on Somaliland’s coastline, Abiy has brought added international legitimacy to the separatist administration’s effective rule. Given Somaliland’s record of delivering stability where Somalia struggles, this cooperative approach stands to strengthen security for all parties. Hassan’s hostile condemnation ignores political winds that have shifted definitively away from restored union after more than 30 years of distinct development.

Hassan’s remarks promoted an outdated narrative that fails to acknowledge the political realities that have emerged on the ground. While nationalism defines his rigid stance, pragmatism demands recognition that separate Somali and Somaliland societies with distinct geographies and identities have formed since the colonial era in the Horn of Africa.

At this stage, after over 30 years of effective self-governance and consolidation of sovereignty, Somaliland is clearly in a position to exist as an independently recognized state should its citizens democratically decide that path. Autonomy within Somalia is not a tenable framework given the turbulent history of their forced union and Somaliland’s clear trajectory towards independence.

Ethiopia’s engagement with Somaliland’s government constructively recognizes this reality and stands to strengthen security cooperation across the region. Rather than criticism, Hassan and Mogadishu would be wise to pursue negotiations in a spirit of reconciliation and mutual understanding and respect the right to self-determination. Only through open and pragmatic diplomacy between equal stakeholders can sustainable political solutions be found that bring long term stability to the Horn of Africa

Somalia: Briefing and Consultations at UN Security Council

Tomorrow morning (19 February), the Security Council will convene for an open briefing, followed by closed consultations, on the situation in Somalia. 

The anticipated briefers are Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and Head of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) Catriona Laing and Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson (SRCC) for Somalia and Head of the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) Mohamed El-Amine Souef.

Laing is expected to describe the latest political, economic, and security developments in Somalia based on the Secretary-General’s most recent report on UNSOM, which was published on 2 February and covers the period from 6 October 2023 to 24 January. The reporting period saw some progress towards achieving Somalia’s national priorities. In this regard, Liang may highlight the country’s admission to the East African Community (EAC) on 24 November 2023, its attainment of full and irrevocable debt relief from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank after reaching the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative completion point on 13 December 2023, and the Security Council’s 1 December 2023 decision to lift the arms embargo on the Somali government, which was established by resolution 733 of 23 January 1992 and amended through subsequent resolutions. (For more information on the arms embargo, see our 1 December 2023 What’s in Blue story.) Somalia’s candidature for a non-permanent seat on the Security Council for 2025-2026, representing the eastern Africa region, was endorsed at the AU summit that took place over the weekend (17-18 February) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Despite this progress, Somalia continues to face several challenges. Liang may highlight the ongoing discussions on the constitutional review process and the disagreements over proposals related to forms of government and the electoral model. In May 2023, the National Consultative Council (NCC)—which brings together the leaders of the federal government and the federal member states—discussed proposals to change the form of government from a parliamentary to a presidential system and adopt a one-man, one-vote electoral system to replace the clan-based formula that has traditionally been used to organise elections. These proposals have faced opposition, however, and the Secretary-General’s report refers to two meetings that Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud held with key opposition leaders in December 2023 to discuss their views on those proposals. Tomorrow, Liang may stress the need for the Somali government to undertake broader public consultations to reflect the views of a wider section of the Somali population and to ensure the necessary inclusivity in the constitutional review process.

The federal member state Puntland has not been participating in NCC meetings since January 2023 and has declared its intention to act independently until the finalisation of a new Somali constitution. Efforts by Puntland’s President, Said Abdullahi Deni, to change the federal state’s constitution to extend his term in office have also been a source of increased political tensions in the region over the last couple of months. In this regard, Laing may refer tomorrow to the state assembly and presidential elections that took place on 8 January, which resulted in Deni’s re-election. The Secretary-General’s report notes that Deni reached out to his rivals after the election with the aim of fostering political conciliation and that his inauguration on 25 January was attended by Mohamud and other state presidents.

The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland, a self-proclaimed republic in the northern region of Somalia, on 1 January has been another major issue in recent months. Somalia has rejected the MoU as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The MoU was signed two days after Mohamud and Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi met in Djibouti under the auspices of President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti and announced the resumption of dialogue between Mogadishu and Hargeisa, which had been stalled for almost a decade.

The Secretary-General’s report refers to a 2 January law passed by the Somali federal parliament nullifying the MoU and a 3 January NCC decision declaring it “null and void”. Council members discussed the matter in closed consultations on 29 January following Somalia’s request for an urgent Council meeting in a 25 January letter. (For more information, see our 28 January What’s In Blue story.) At the meeting, Council members apparently underlined the need to respect Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, expressed support for the AU’s initiative to deploy AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa Olusegun Obasanjo in order to foster dialogue among the parties, and called on the parties to de-escalate tensions and address the situation through dialogue.

It seems that one Council member suggested working on a draft press statement, but the members of the “A3 plus one” grouping (Algeria, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Guyana) argued that the issue is being handled at the regional level and stressed the need to respect the principle of complementarity. The “A3 plus one” grouping requested to postpone the Security Council meeting on Somalia from Friday (16 February) to Monday (19 February), apparently to await the outcome of the AU summit, which they expected would generate a positive outcome on the Ethiopia-Somalia issue. Instead, the summit saw controversies between the two countries over security arrangements. In a 17 February statement, Somalia accused Ethiopia of attempting to prevent its delegation, which was led by president Mohamud, from participating in the summit, and called on the AU to conduct a credible and independent investigation into the matter. Ethiopia has denied the accusations and reportedly said that “the Somali delegation was blocked when its security detail tried to enter a venue with weapons”. Mohamud was later allowed entry to the venue for the meeting.

Another expected focus of tomorrow’s meeting is the security threats posed by Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group affiliated with Al-Qaeda. The Secretary-General’s report documented 755 security incidents, including 216 terrorist incidents, and noted increased Al-Shabaab activity in the Lower Shabelle region in South-West State. According to the report, Al-Shabaab is increasingly using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and rockets to target personnel and facilities of the Somali government, ATMIS, and the UN. On 10 February, the group attacked a military base in Mogadishu, killing four Emirati troops and one Bahraini military officer who were on a training mission in Somalia. Council members are likely to condemn this attack at tomorrow’s meeting.

Souef is expected to focus on ATMIS’ support for the ongoing offensive operations by the Somali security forces to counter Al-Shabaab in central and southern Somalia, including in the Bakool, Hiran, Middle Shabelle, Galguduud, and South Mudug regions. He may also elaborate on ATMIS’ drawdown process and on ongoing discussions about post-ATMIS security arrangements. In accordance with resolution 2710 of 15 November 2023, which extended ATMIS’ authorisation, the mission has completed the second phase of its drawdown by withdrawing 3,000 personnel, and subsequently transferring seven Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) to the Somali government and closing two others. In the first phase of the drawdown process, ATMIS withdrew 2,000 personnel by the end of September 2023. The mission is currently undertaking efforts to prepare for the drawdown’s third phase, which will see the withdrawal of additional 4,000 troops by 30 June.

Pursuant to resolution 2710, Council members expect to receive, by 31 March, the outcome of a joint technical assessment by the Somali government and the AU evaluating the drawdown’s second phase as well as an update, by 30 April, on preparations for the drawdown’s third phase, taking into account the lessons identified from the first two phases. They also expect the Somali government to present a proposal for post-ATMIS security arrangements by 31 March. Souef may refer to the Somalia Security Conference held in New York on 12 December 2023, in which Somalia presented its Security Sector Development Plan, among other matters, proposing a new AU follow-on mission after ATMIS’ withdrawal by the end of 2024. He may also mention the Core Security Partners Group high-level consultative meeting convened by the AU on 13 February in Addis Ababa to discuss the impact of the drawdown’s second phase; to assess the state of preparedness to implement the third phase; and to consider the requirements for a post-ATMIS security arrangement, including the scope, size, composition, duration, and funding options of the follow-on mission.

It appears that the follow-on mission’s strategic concept of operations stipulates that the missions is expected to provide security and protection of key installations and critical infrastructure in the federal capital and federal member states; enable the continuation of political dialogue; ensure the protection of civilians; and ensure the protection of personnel, facilities, and equipment of the AU and the UN. The mission’s funding is expected to be a major issue, as the intention seems to be to seek support from UN assessed contributions. However, the US is apparently not keen to consider this follow-on mission within the framework of resolution 2719 of 21 December 2023 on the financing of AU-led peace support operations (AUPSOs). Its preference is apparently to apply the resolution to a new AUPSO with a smaller footprint and shorter duration.

Somaliland’s struggle for recognition amidst global geopolitical dynamics

The Republic of Somaliland finds itself at a critical juncture in its journey for international recognition. The catalyst for this seismic development materialized on the inaugural day of the year, marked by the signing of a MoU between the Prime Minister of Ethiopia and the President of Somaliland. The ensuing theatrics from Mogadishu paled in comparison to the global resonance of this geopolitical overture.

Expressions of support for Ethiopia reverberated globally, with even the United States and the People’s Republic of China weighing in, ostensibly championing the ‘sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity’ of Somalia. However, the hollowness of such endorsements is evident, given Somalia’s outsourcing of its own sovereignty to international patrons of various kinds since the trilogy of failed instances took place (TNG, TFG, FGS).

For all its bravado and chest-beating, it also seemed to have forgotten that it was its ‘avowed’ enemy in Ethiopia that had actually played the role as the implementer in restoring some semblance of political authority in Mogadishu — with its invasion of Somalia in 2006.

Ethiopia has strategically reignited the embers of Somaliland’s overlooked case for international recognition. The cause behind Ethiopia’s interest and whispered promise for recognition lies in the trade-off between ink and parchment, signifying a symbolic nod to statehood, and the tangible gains Ethiopia secures — a 50-year lease on maritime real estate in the Gulf of Aden, a strategic gateway to the Red Sea and, in extension, the Indian Ocean. Ethiopia, with calculated finesse, has deftly wielded the sword of recognition while reaching for the prospects of maritime dominance in the Gulf of Aden.

Strangely enough, adding to the geopolitical quagmire is Britain’s sudden resurgence of interest in Somaliland. While senior Tory MPs and former cabinet ministers advocate for recognition, it is crucial to remember Britain’s historical role as a stumbling block to Somaliland’s recognition. 

Its role in dissuading the US State Department from recognizing Somaliland in 2007–2008 remains a testament to geopolitical pragmatism devoid of moral scruples. Its overt support for resuscitating Somalia through the ‘Somalia Conferences’ in London since 2012 unveils a strategic calculus devoid of any amusing notions of ‘shared history’, and instead reveals a targeted goal to undermine the Republic of Somaliland by gradually pushing it under a co-federal system with the failed state of Somalia.

The jubilant atmosphere surrounding the MOU among Somalilanders is not only a celebration of potential recognition; it stems from the international limelight thrust upon them. They have suddenly found themselves encroaching on the center stage of global issues. 

Regional bodies such as IGAD and the Arab League offered their remarks about the MoU. It most recently was addressed at a meeting convened at the United Nations Security Council.

Yet, behind the scenes, Somalia tires itself, exhaustively in its desire to remain a committed opponent to Somaliland’s progress, throwing everything it has to object any independent trajectory and to hinder any charted course Hargeisa embarks upon.

The recent interest from Britain in recognizing Somaliland begs the question — why now? Geopolitics, in the words of Bismarck, is the art of the possible. The sudden interest, masquerading as a nod to shared history, is more likely a response to Ethiopia’s strategic moves. 

Britain, playing its hand in this geopolitical poker, seeks to position itself favorably, either by beating Ethiopia to the punch or undercutting the prospects of Somaliland’s quest for international recognition by way of a counter-offer.

There is no single underlying reason for the global commotion and 30-year-long hesitancy in recognizing Somaliland, but the complexity most certainly is grounded in its strategic location on the shores of the Gulf of Aden, not due to threats of terrorism, or even more laughably that it is somehow ‘not democratic enough’ to join the community of civilized states.

Positioned a mere arrow’s shot from the Bab Al Mandeb, the prospect of an independent and proud nation in this territory poses a threat to perceived allies and adversaries alike. 

The reluctance to recognize Somaliland reflects the pragmatic calculus of nations, where strategic interests often eclipse all attempts at persuasion by way of historical romanticisms.

As Somaliland maneuvers through these turbulent waters, the pursuit of international recognition becomes entwined with the broader currents of regional power dynamics, revealing the stark realities of geopolitical pragmatism. Its challenge remains that it must sail past such tempests and arrive at its charted destination intact.”

By Nuh Ismael is a senior information security analyst and independent UK-based researcher focusing on the Middle East & Horn of Africa affairs.

Sudan crisis: Ex-President Omar al-Bashir moved to priso

Ousted Sudan President Omar al-Bashir 

Sudan's former President Omar al-Bashir has been moved to Kobar maximum security prison, days after he was deposed in a military coup.

Reports say the ex-leader has until now been detained at the presidential residence under heavy guard. 

He is reportedly being held in solitary confinement and is surrounded by tight security.

Months of protests in Sudan led to the ousting and arrest of the long-time ruler on Thursday.

Uganda's Minister for Foreign Affairs Henry Oryem Okello told Reuters news agency the country would consider offering the deposed leader asylum if he applied, despite an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

As an ICC member, Uganda would have to hand over Mr Bashir if he arrived in the country. The ICC has not yet commented.

Until now, Mr Bashir's whereabouts since his removal were unknown. The coup leader at the time, Awad Ibn Auf, said Mr Bashir was being detained in a "safe place". He himself stood down soon afterwards.

Lt Gen Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman Burhan was then named as head of the transitional military council, to become Sudan's third leader in as many days.

Demonstrators have vowed to stay on the streets until there is an immediate move to civilian rule.

Protesters show calm conviction

By Joe Inwood, BBC News, Khartoum

A sea of doctors, shouting with such anger and passion that their voices crack. Thousands are still protesting outside the military institutions that for 30 years sustained the brutal regime of President Bashir.

Now, the military council that deposed him is struggling to maintain an increasingly fragile grip on power, while the man who once led the country sits in prison. 

Today it has emerged he is in solitary confinement, locked in the very place where so many of his victims were held, tortured and killed. 

Ordinary people have managed to bring an entrenched and violent regime to its knees. They have done it not through force of arms, but through calm conviction, passion and a dedication to their cause that you can see in their eyes. 

Who is Omar al-Bashir?

Mr Bashir led Sudan for close to 30 years.

He is accused of organising war crimes and crimes against humanity in Sudan's western Darfur region, for which the ICC issued an arrest warrant.

After months of protests - starting in response to a rise in living costs and morphing into calls for the government to resign - Sudan's military toppled Mr Bashir in a coup on Thursday.

The transitional military council was set up in the wake of his removal, and has said it will stay in place for a maximum of two years until a civilian government can be put in place.

What are conditions like in the prison?

Kober prison, situated on the east bank of the Blue Nile, was built during Britain's near 60-year colonial rule of Sudan. 

The building, built with bricks and surrounded by towering concrete walls, has the capacity to hold hundreds of prisoners. Space in its tiny cells, however, is said to be scarce. 

Many of the protesters and opposition leaders who took to the streets demanding Mr Bashir's resignation have been detained on its special wing for political prisoners. 

Sudan's feared National Intelligence and Security Service runs this wing, not the police.

• Omar al-Bashir: Sudan's ousted president

Sudan analyst Alex de Waal, who has visited the prison, told the BBC its infrastructure has not been updated since it was built. 

"The cells are very rudimentary, it is a very basic form of accommodation, there is no air conditioning or running water," he said. 

Nevertheless, the prison has a reputation for treating the inmates well and not subjecting them to random violence, he added.

A former detainee at the prison told AFP news agency that up to seven prisoners, most of whom are petty criminals, are typically housed in each cell. 

"There is a bathroom in each cell but no beds - only mattresses and mosquitoes," the former inmate, who was jailed there during protests against Mr Bashir's rule in January last year, said.

What's the latest with the protesters?

Demonstrators remain camped out the military headquarters in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum.

Reports on Monday said there had been efforts to disperse a sit-in, but protesters joined hands and troops stepped back from a confrontation

The Sudanese Professionals' Association (SPA), which has spearheaded the protests, urged supporters to stop efforts to disperse them, calling on demonstrators to "protect your revolution and your accomplishments".

An SPA spokesman told the BBC that the group "completely rejected" the transitional military council leading the country, and said protesters seek the dismantling of state intelligence agencies and the "full dissolution of the deep state".

What has the military said?

Military council spokesman Maj Gen Shams Ad-din Shanto announced a raft of new measures on Sunday, including the end of censorship and new heads of the security forces.

The council has arrested former government members, he said, and will put in place whatever civilian government and whichever prime minister opposition groups agre

But while the council promised not to remove protesters from their sit-in, the major also called on them to stop unauthorised roadblocks and "let normal life resume".

"Taking up arms will not be tolerated," he added.

Kober prison, situated on the east bank of the Blue Nile, was built during Britain's near 60-year colonial rule of Sudan. 

The building, built with bricks and surrounded by towering concrete walls, has the capacity to hold hundreds of prisoners. Space in its tiny cells, however, is said to be scarce. 

Many of the protesters and opposition leaders who took to the streets demanding Mr Bashir's resignation have been detained on its special wing for political prisoners. 

Sudan's feared National Intelligence and Security Service runs this wing, not the police

Sudan analyst Alex de Waal, who has visited the prison, told the BBC its infrastructure has not been updated since it was built. 

"The cells are very rudimentary, it is a very basic form of accommodation, there is no air conditioning or running water," he said. 

Nevertheless, the prison has a reputation for treating the inmates well and not subjecting them to random violence, he added.

A former detainee at the prison told AFP news agency that up to seven prisoners, most of whom are petty criminals, are typically housed in each cell. 

"There is a bathroom in each cell but no beds - only mattresses and mosquitoes," the former inmate, who was jailed there during protests against Mr Bashir's rule in January last year, said.

What's the latest with the protesters?

Demonstrators remain camped out the military headquarters in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum.

Reports on Monday said there had been efforts to disperse a sit-in, but protesters joined hands and troops stepped back from a confrontation.

The Sudanese Professionals' Association (SPA), which has spearheaded the protests, urged supporters to stop efforts to disperse them, calling on demonstrators to "protect your revolution and your accomplishments".

An SPA spokesman told the BBC that the group "completely rejected" the transitional military council leading the country, and said protesters seek the dismantling of state intelligence agencies and the "full dissolution of the deep state".

What has the military said?

Military council spokesman Maj Gen Shams Ad-din Shanto announced a raft of new measures on Sunday, including the end of censorship and new heads of the security forces.

The council has arrested former government members, he said, and will put in place whatever civilian government and whichever prime minister opposition groups agree.

But while the council promised not to remove protesters from their sit-in, the major also called on them to stop unauthorised roadblocks and "let normal life resume".

"Taking up arms will not be tolerated," he added.

Why it's time for an amicable divorce between Somalia and Somaliland

The President of Somaliland (credit: Nasir Yusuf Dahir, Somaliland president media office)

Should other countries recognise Somaliland’s bid to become fully independent? It has a good case, argues Bill Snaddon, but many obstacles remain.

Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991. But the small east-African breakaway nation is still waiting for others to recognise their bold decision. Despite its dogged efforts for international recognition and admission into the club of nations, no other state considers this land of 3.5 million people to be a proper country. Likewise, the African Union and United Nations still view Somaliland as part of Somalia. Officially, at least. Somaliland’s government enters into diplomatic relations with these two bodies, as well as with the Arab League and EU. It also has bilateral relations with several countries.

Since 1991, Somaliland, for the most part, has grown into a functioning democracy. Somalia, on the other hand, remains in a cycle of violence. The Somali civil war, which began in 1991 – bringing an end to Siad Barre’s regime – has never really ended. Barre had ruled Somalia since 1969 when he came to power after a coup. Over the past 30 years, as aid and outside support poured into Somalia, fighting and corruption became entrenched.

Meanwhile, Somaliland — with little help from outsiders and minimal aid — holds regular elections and leaders change without too much fuss. A few scuffles here and there, some serious, and the occasional social media shutdown, but nothing on the scale of what is seen elsewhere. It is a flawed yet promising democracy rather than a fake democracy or dictatorship in waiting. A parliament sits under a Somaliland flag and people buy their goods and services with Somaliland shillings, or by transferring phone credit. One US dollar currently buys around 9,500 shillings. And an army and police force are loyal to Somaliland’s constitution. Hargeisa, the small and lively capital, hosts a yearly international book fair that’s growing in popularity among Africans and others.

Exporting livestock to the Middle East is Somaliland’s main industry, accounting for almost three quarters of jobs. But the economy is not healthy. The ongoing construction of a new port by DP World, a Dubai-based company, in the Somaliland town of Berbera will help. But much more investment is needed if the wanna-be country is to lift its people out of poverty. Youth unemployment is close to 50 percent. Recent figures are hard to find but according to 2012 World Bank numbers, average yearly income is $348 (£267), making it one of the poorest places in the world.

The importance of being stable

Crucially, however, the self-declared and autonomous Somaliland has stability – and confidence in its own destiny to one day become a recognised nation. News articles on Somaliland invariably mention how it is a beacon of peace in a troubled region.

Why then, has it not been recognised as an independent country? And should it be?

Sa’ad Ali Shire, Somaliland’s former foreign minister and current finance minister, tells me that fear is the biggest impediment to outside recognition.

“The fear that the African Union might be upset. The fear that secessionist movements in Africa and elsewhere might be encouraged. The fear that it might be more difficult to fix the Somalia problem if Somaliland was recognized.”

Another stumbling block, indirectly, is Eritrea and South Sudan. These are the two newest countries in Africa. Eritrea, since its modern birth in 1993, has become a repressive backwater; but a recent thawing of tensions with old foe Ethiopia could set it on a more optimistic path. South Sudan, since becoming a country in 2011, has mostly been stuck in civil war; though a peace agreement signed in September 2018 is showing tentative signs of sticking. The failure, so far, of these “new” countries to find lasting peace is often cited as a reason to prevent more new African countries to form.

This hurts Somaliland because without official recognition as a country, it is unable to access assistance from global financial institutions. Some argue, however, that being cut off from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund has helped Somaliland to chart its own course while not becoming dependent on easy lines of credit.

Bordering on recognition

Mr Shire says Somaliland actually wants to restore the colonial border that separated Somalia and Somaliland – the border that was dissolved in 1960 when Somaliland shrugged off British rule and Somalia became free from Italian colonialism.

Leaders in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, believe if Somaliland were to officially become a nation it would further divisions within an already turbulent country. Somalia also wouldn’t want to let go of its northern neighbour owing to the strategic patch of land Somaliland inhabits, nearing the entry to the Red Sea leading up to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel.

Map showing Somaliland (credit: Council for Foreign Relations)

Somaliland’s northern border is 740km of coastline along the Gulf of Aden. Across the water is war-torn Yemen. Ethiopia, which is opening up at a rapid pace, sits on its western border. Puntland, another self-declared autonomous nation inside Somalia, is to Somaliland’s east.

Mogadishu’s argument against Somaliland independence often comes back to unity. Somalia and Somaliland share many things, language and Islam being two big ones. It might persuade some, but won’t budge the minds of many Somalilanders.

In 2001 Somaliland held a referendum that asked its people if they wanted to adopt an independent constitution. The referendum was monitored by the Initiative and Referendum Institute (IRI), a research and educational group attached to the University of Southern California.

“An astonishing 97% voted in favour of the constitution and reaffirmed Somaliland’s restoration of independence in 1991,” says Robleh Mohamud Raghe, an analyst and former consultant in the office of Somaliland’s presidency.

“The result of this poll clearly proved to the international community that the people of Somaliland are content with independence and have no interest in reuniting with Somalia.”

The concluding report, written by referendum monitors IRI, said there was “widespread common sentiment that a ‘Yes’ vote would send a message to the world that Somaliland deserved to be recognized”.

About two thirds the voting age population casted a ballot in the non-compulsory poll.

Fighting against indifference

Joshua Keating, a writer who studied Somaliland for his book Invisible Countries: Journeys to the Edge Nationhood, says Somaliland’s ambition to be recognised as a proper country is held hostage not by fear or ill-will or calls for unity, but by a lack of interest.

“Statehood may be a legal concept, but achieving it is an entirely political process,” says Mr Keating.

“To the degree that foreign officials acknowledge Somaliland at all, they are generally sympathetic to its history and admiring of its recent accomplishments. Somaliland’s main obstacle is not the world’s animosity, but its indifference.”

It’s difficult to disagree with this analysis. When leaders consider the most pressing challenges around the globe, it’s hard to imagine Somaliland’s desire for recognition entering the discussion. Not worsening the situation down south in Somalia is much higher up the list of global importance. To this end, world leaders would be reluctant to grant Somaliland independence for fear of inflaming an already tense region.

That, however, doesn’t make Somaliland’s recognition an unjust cause. Nor will it stop Somaliland from pursuing its goal. They have a good case.

For one, it has reality on its side. The country already exists. Its main institutions are in place and it has the will of the people on its side. All that’s needed is for a country or two to recognise it. A press release followed by a photo op at a fancy Brussels hotel would do the job. Other countries may follow. Or, one day, the African Union or United Nations, providing the votes come in, may declare Somaliland a country.

Finance minister Shire, who spoke to me when was he still foreign minister, is “very optimistic” about Somaliland getting recognition because “justice eventually prevails”.

He doesn’t however think it will be a big power like America or China that recognises Somaliland first.

“The first will come from Africa, probably with a nod or with no objection from a powerhouse, or talks with Somalia will end up in a referendum in which people will vote for independence.”

For now, we wait to see if officialdom will one day catch up with reality in the Horn of Africa.

Bill Snaddon is a freelance journalist and filmmaker who’s been covering Africa since 2009. More on his website billsnaddon.com and on Twitter @billsnaddon

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Turmoil blocks aid as communal conflict rages in gold-seamed Benishangul-Gumuz

Due to insecurity, aid cannot reach more than 50,000 people displaced by conflict that may be related to a long-existing struggle over resources in Benishangul-Gumuz.

Ongoing violence that first flared in late September around the state’s disputed border with Oromia has also led to more than 150,000 Oromo fleeing their homes, who are receiving only limited assistance. Some members of the Gumuz community say they will be killed if they cross the regional boundary.

The critical humanitarian situation is the third on Oromia’s peripheries after similar outbreaks of violence with communities in Somali state and the Gedeo people in the multi-ethnic southern region. That has led to 2.2 million Ethiopians internally displaced by conflict, which included the highest number in the world in the first half of this year.

There are 57,000 mostly indigenous Benishangul-Gumuz people sheltering at camps in Kamashi and Oda zones, which aid groups can’t reach because of instability. “Due to continuing security concerns in Benishangul-Gumuz region, only government, with an armed escort, was able to provide a one-time humanitarian assistance to IDPs in the two zones,” the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said on Nov. 11. “The unprecedented violence that started in Kamashi zone on 26 September and continued through October and November forced the most vulnerable groups (women, children and the elderly) to flee with no personal belongings, including clothing.”

Only government, with an armed escort, was able to provide aid

Although the regional governments reached an agreement to restore peace, clashes are ongoing and the inter-regional road is closed. In recent weeks, witnesses reported that a Gumuz individual and two Oromo were killed in Yaso Woreda and two Gumuz, two Amhara and an unconfirmed number of Oromo died in Belo Jegonfoy Woreda.

The turmoil is centered on Kamashi, which is the southernmost chunk of Benishangul-Gumuz and is surrounded by Oromia on three sides. The regional state is the homeland of the Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha, Komo and Mao, as well as significant populations of native Amharic and Oromo speakers. In a 2007 census in Kamashi, out of a population of 101,000, Gumuz comprised 61,000, Oromo 25,000 and Amhara 11,000.

The territory that is now Kamashi was in Wollega province before Ethiopia was restructured in 1991. It is primarily home to Gumuz who used to live in the Didessa area of Oromia and belong to a fragmented community that has been victims of slave raids for centuries, according to a research paper. The regional border is not properly demarcated and there have been sporadic outbreaks of violence over the last two decades over administrative power and resources such as sand and bamboo, said another academic study.

Golden prospects

The area comprising Benishangul-Gumuz formally became part of Ethiopia under the terms of a Nile-focused 1902 treaty signed by Emperor Menelik II with Great Britain, which ruled Sudan. Under Ethiopia’s 1995 federal constitution, the region is autonomous and administered by locals, which was not the case under the Derg military regime or Emperor Haile Selassie.

Deposits of gold drove expansion into the area in the mid-19th century by the Egyptian rulers of Sudan and by Menelik’s armies in the late 1890s, wrote Ethiopian historian Bahru Zewde in his 1976 doctorate. “Gold was the overriding pre-occupation of the conquerors, and their entire administrative and military machinery was geared towards the speedy acquisition of as much of the precious commodity as possible,” he wrote about the Egyptians.

Australia-based Berta activist Khalid Nasser claims that indigenous people have historically been denied access to ancestral land, which has been settled and farmed by outsiders, and that Ethiopia’s most powerful groups have always had designs on the region. “Historically Benishangul is a Sudanese land that was abandoned due to lack of responsibility and patriotism. Now there is a big rivalry between Amhara, Oromo and Tigray, which is making the people of Benishangul suffer tremendously,” he said.

Berta girl mining alluvial gold; Nov. 2013; Owen Morgan

A researcher who has worked in the area thinks the root cause of the latest unrest might be competition for the rich resources of the area, which includes deposits of marble, coal, emerald, platinum, as well as fertile farmland and large gold reserves. “We need your land not you,” a witness claimed they had heard from Oromo. However, the researcher said much of the agricultural investment in Kamashi is by Gumuz elites.

The promising Tulu Kapi mine operated by Kefi Minerals is in West Wollega, while surveying has shown there are high quality gold deposits in Benishangul-Gumuz. They may amount to more than 400 tons of the precious metal in what is a cost-efficient mining location, said Owen Morgan, the former Chief Operating Officer of GP Resource Mining, which explored a concession in the area from 2011 until 2015. Ethiopia’s annual gold exports are currently around 15 tons. “The Benishangul-Gumuz deposits are not going to put it in the world’s top 10 locations, but they would put it in the top 40. The gold potential in the region is fantastic, and the deposits are shallow, it’s not deep mining,” Morgan said.

The license for Ethiopia’s only commercial gold mine at Lega Dembi in East Guji Zone of Oromia was suspended in May after protests over pollution. The mine is operated by Midroc Gold, which is owned by Ethiopian-born Saudi billionaire Mohamed al-Amoudi, who is thought to be still under house arrest in Riyadh. Midroc Gold has been preparing to mine gold from a concession in the Sudan-bordering Metekel Zone of Benishangul-Gumuz, the location of the troubled Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

Evolving conflict

The first major incident in Benishangul-Gumuz that evolved into the serious violence occurred in Assosa, the regional capital, on June 28. Berta youths demonstrated demanding the release of militia that had been kidnapped weeks before, allegedly by rebels affiliated with the Oromo Liberation Front, a former designated terrorist group that was legalized in June by Ethiopia’s parliament.

After days of Berta protests, which included looting and robbery, others organized against them. Clashes intensified, pitting lighter skinned ‘highlanders’ against darker indigenous people, and several were killed and injured, according to witnesses.

Two weeks later, a senior commander of Benishangul-Gumuz special police from Mao-Komo Special Woreda was shot dead by armed men as he returned back from a public discussion on security issues, and an Ethiopian military colonel was killed, according to Kamashi officials.

Part of the GP Resource Mining concession; 2012; Owen Morgan

Further problems occurred with Oromo youth from Kiltu Kara Woreda of West Wollega Zone. According to witnesses, they raided Benishangul-Gumuz’s Sirba-Abbay Wereda Shawa Kebele and killed the administrator. Residents retaliated and a number of people were injured and killed from both sides.

To try and resolve the problems, Benishangul-Gumuz’s police commissioner and Oromia’s anti-corruption head reportedly met in Asossa from Sep. 24 to Sep. 25. After the meeting, both Kamashi and West Wollega administrators went to Mandi town the next day to discuss with Oromo displaced from Shawa Kebele about returning home, an official said.

Kamashi officials said they agreed on the process for resettling farmers from both sides. As the leaders were returning, they were stopped at a checkpoint on the Kamashi-Ghimbi road near Maqqi Billa. Although they were asked to get out, they initially refused, as there were two armed men by the side of the road. However, zonal police commander Geremew Golja left the car and begged the militia to release them. They refused and fired at them instead. Four died and four escaped by running into the bush, witnesses said.

Villages attacked

Geremew, Matiyos Banda, the Kamashi Woreda chief administrator, and two police officers were killed, a witness said. Geshile Dinbesha, Kamashi Zone deputy chief administrator and Banti Abashu, zone security head, Jermosa Daro and Gashu Sima escaped and were collected by soldiers.

After the incident, Kamashi was said to be calm until Oromo militia reportedly attacked eight villages in Belo Jegonfoy, Yaso, Kamashi and Agalo woredas. Gumuz then retaliated, according to locals.

The number of Oromo deaths is uncertain, but Ethiopia Insight received multiple testimonieslast month from displaced Oromo of systemic attacks by groups of Gumuz youth backed by local officials that forced them from their homes. They said the violence occurred in reaction to the road ambush, not after the alleged Oromo raids. The UN reported last month that at least 20 people reportedly died, without specifying where.

In the week after the Billaa ambush, two Berta soldiers returning home for their break were reportedly executed in Nedjo in West Wollega. More than 40 Gumuz and Berta may have been killed, including 28 from a kebele administered by Sasiga Woreda in East Wollega, according to local sources. Eight Gumuz died in Agalometi, Yaso, and Sedal woredas, they said.

Two Berta soldiers returning home were executed

A researcher who has worked in the area said the road to Kamashi has now been closed for more than a month. OCHA reported that in the second half of October emergency food and medicine had to be helicoptered into the zone. As well as inter-regional fighting, there has also been violence between Oromia’s government and an OLF faction, partly over the fate of its armed wing. There are hopes this will now ease after a Nov. 14 agreement.

Some locals say there has generally been friendly relations between highlanders and lowlanders in Benishangul-Gumuz, strengthened by inter-ethnic marriages and economic and social ties. However, tensions have been heightened in recent years and Gumuz people were afraid to stay in Oromia in 2013 to 2015, according to the researcher. “When I was there in August this year, old ladies and kids threw rocks at our car as we drove through the Oromo communities along the border on the way from Kamashi to Nekemte,” they said.

Ibro Mohammed Abdi, 65, a representative for displaced Oromo at a camp in Kersa Mojo, said he fled a border area after 100 houses were burned by Gumuz around Balo Asir in the latest episode of regular violence.  “They slaughtered many people and now they started burning our houses, killing our people, and displacing us. They always start a fight at harvest time to rob our farms when we run away,” he said.

Query or correction? Email us

‘Mistir Sew’ is based in Assosa

Additional reporting by Ermias Tasfaye

Main photo: People in Uke, Guto Gida Woreda, West Wollega Zone displaced by Kamashi conflict; Nov. 13; Ermias Tasfaye