Feature: Diaspora as dilemma

‘Developmentalising’ the African Union’s sixth region?

By Mbongeni Ngulube

Ban with AU lady boss

In June 2013, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, delivered a lecture [1] in London hosted by the Royal African Society. I noted with interest that within the first seven minutes of her 50-minute speech, she made mention of the important contribution(s) by the African diaspora in Africa’s development under the rubric of Domestic Resource Mobilization; this is in keeping with the recent stance of the African Union towards what is now its Sixth Developmental Region. 

To paraphrase Her Excellency, she made note on how investment in Africa by Africans has doubled, currently making up 17% of all foreign direct investment projects on the continent. She further cited a quote from the International Business Herald of 8 May 2013 which read ‘Surprise! Africa’s fastest growing Foreign Direct Investor is now Africa.’

Indeed, the contribution(s) of Africans in diaspora have become a catch phrase in today’s development jargon. Countless articles by both Africans and other scholars advocate for Africa’s diaspora as the next panacea, or ‘magic bullet’, for solving the development quagmire. More so in the advent of the African Union’s Golden Jubilee, various articles have rehashed the same information in perhaps a slightly different order but mostly outlining what is perhaps already known or even taken for granted. I take no issue with these publications and indeed their information is valuable, however, what has since taken my attention is that many such claims seem to conclude pretty much the same way. Typically they outline the advantages of the African diaspora over donor agencies and conclude by saying that African governments, or the AU or some other supranational body should ensure that the diaspora are taken into account in moving African development into a bright future.

However, none of these have given any real analytical thought to the nuts and bolts of this engagement, nor do they offer any concrete way forward, they seem to chant a nice slogan and leave the reader hanging. For example such claims that ‘the AU’s ‘Sixth Zone’ policy cannot just be something on paper alone… [but the AU must]… rely more on diaspora African remittances to speed up African development in the 21st century.’ [2] No further information is given regarding what steps the AU is expected to take or, more importantly how such remittances are to be accessed. Nor does it elucidate what an African in diaspora should do next once they get all charged up and passionate about African development.

This paper attempts to open up this subject which is a continuation of an older debate by coming to grips with, and trying to understand the details of what the AU is dealing with in its ‘Sixth Region’. My aim here is not to be prescriptive, exhaustive or overly informative, rather I wish to push forward a debate that, to me, seems to have come to an impasse; what I will call here, ‘the diaspora as dilemma’. The article will attempt to understand this dilemma by first understanding the nature of this Sixth Region; then the internal problems which I believe are at the root of engaging the diaspora, and which perhaps have a far more reaching consequence than the magnitude of the sums of remittance flows that are sent to Africa; followed finally by a discussion of two ways of addressing this issue, primarily as a way to hopefully start a deeper debate concerning the “how” aspect of the diaspora / institutional engagement.

WHAT DEBATE?

To most professionals in the development field, 2009 was a watershed year for not only African, but ‘Southern’ development when Dambisa Moyo published her highly influential book, Dead Aid (Moyo, 2009). She was further named one of the most influential people in the world by Time Magazine that same year, so she obviously struck a nerve. What was striking about Dead Aid is that many aspects of the argument were actually not new, but they had simply not be put together in a way that simplified and basically ‘undressed’ the development industry and offered a way forward. Alternative approaches to development have since become a preoccupation of many Africans who become vocal in the debate because they could finally give words to their discomfort and frustrations. This understanding gave a clear framework by which the African diaspora can engage development. However, since then, while the message has gone viral, it has also found itself in a cul-de-sac as Africans seem to simply chant how much better the diaspora are at development than foreign agents, so let us begin there.

The diaspora have become a new fad in development since the turn of the millennium, though they existed for ages and remittances have always been channelled to Africa and other developing countries such as Mexico, (where remittances make up the highest contribution to the country’s GDP); yet the diaspora had no real ‘presence’. Meanwhile, in 2002, the World Bank released a report outlining that remittances from relatively poor migrant workers in rich countries (the diaspora) were much higher than the combined total of government aid, private bank lending and International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank aid and assistance (World Bank, 2002). Since then, there has been much interest in the diaspora due to the high figures they remit even in the face of the global economic and financial crisis; in fact, it has been observed that remittances are even higher in the context of crises. The following year, 2003, the African Union (AU) amended Article 3 of their constitution and essentially identified the African diaspora as its sixth regional block (Davies, 2007). The African Union recently held their ‘first ever Global African Diaspora Summit…in South Africa…attended by the Heads of State and representatives from 54 African nations’ (AU, 2012) as an official bid to engage the African diaspora as highlighted in Dr Zuma’s recent lecture in London. These progressions of euphoric institutional interest to capture the diaspora for development have provided ‘visibility’ for the diaspora, many of whom have responded by ‘getting organised’ to take advantage of this limelight. Yet there has been no clear path from the diaspora regarding what concrete partnership they want, beyond chanting mantras and slogans, and perhaps this is a telling point. While there is a clear willingness by both parties to engage, the devil seems to lie in the details; how does this engagement take place and in what form? To get to grips with this, it is helpful to understand first of all who the diaspora is (are).

DIASPORA AS DILEMMA

‘Diaspora’ was originally used to denote populations that were forcibly removed from a homeland and though they settled elsewhere, still orientate their lives, and plans to returning to such a homeland as in the case of the Jews and recently the Palestinians. It then made its way into public discourse by including any group that either moves across national borders yet retains strong ties to their homeland, or in some cases, national borders move over people producing the same effect. In its current use it also includes a means to evoke, mobilise, or create support for a project (political or otherwise) in the service of a homeland (Faist, 2010). Without going into detail, there is a raging debate underway regarding the use of the word and its recent ‘expansion’ which some thinkers believe dilutes its meaning. Here, I argue that this is not so relevant, what is important is that the word has been captured by institutions, people with a historic heritage in Africa, as well as recent migrants to create a sense of homogeneity, or construct a constituency through which they are able to make collective social claims. For example, migrants (as diaspora) now advocate for better incorporation in their host countries, though ironically, if they were to assimilate to their hosts, they would stop being ‘diaspora’. It is for this reason that to remain relevant, the ‘diaspora’ must remain a ‘dilemma’ with both feet placed firmly across two borders or continents as the case may be. Therefore, what matters most is not what the word ‘means’ but what it ‘does’, the proverbial rose by any other name.

In other words, by successfully fusing various forms of migration and cross boarder processes (or transnational processes), ‘diaspora’ has effectively ‘brought migrants ‘back in’ as important social agents’ (Faist, 2010). Effectively, the diaspora can be defined as ‘the exemplary communities of the transnational moment’ (Tölölyan, 1991). So, all this means that ‘diaspora’ has become a confusing term which can mean very different groups of people, for example, ‘expatriates’, ‘migrants’, ‘ exiles’, ‘historic communities’ and ‘refugees’ even and in fact it forms this unruly collection with many groups jostling for very different agendas under the same heading. This is a large component of why diaspora engagement is such a difficult undertaking for any institution on a practical level, because to engage this group, one has to effectively ‘invent’ it from above. The AU for examples has done this by defining African diaspora as ‘peoples of African origin living outside the continent [of Africa], irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the Continent and the building of the African Union’. Immediately one can question if ‘inactive’ migrants or others are not diaspora, or what of ‘national diasporas’, those who move within Africa itself, and want to support their country of origin while living in another, and so forth. While ‘diaspora is a necessary way to ‘group’ a constituency, its inclusiveness makes it equally unworkable, taken practically, if the AU wishes to sign an agreement with the diaspora, for example, whose signature would be on the agreement? This practicality infuses every engagement, bearing in mind that the primary reason for institutional euphoria in the diaspora is financial, in the form of remittances, investment and other financial flows. Quantifying these amounts effectively made the diaspora visible, yet there aren’t too many practical ways to ‘operationalise’ that money institutionally. Yet in reality, it doesn’t matter if remittances or other investments can be captured or not, their presence has opened up a space for those outside Africa to reengage with institutions, politically, or for development or any other cause. It can be argued that due to its lack of homogeneity, the Sixth Region is only useful as an ‘instrument’, where institutions can only speak and act on its behalf without any scope for the diaspora to meaningfully engage, simply on practical considerations alone. So, in light of this, and instead of voicing what the AU hasn’t done, or ought to do, let’s consider what options exist for creating a meaningful engagement with its Sixth Region.

THE DILEMMA OF LEADERSHIP

I would like to take a practical example to portray this aspect of my monologue. There are two diaspora organisations in the UK that I am involved with, since I don’t have their permission, I will name them Organisation ‘A’ and ‘B’. The first has been in operation for many years and is considered a leading authority on African diaspora and development issues and is currently recognised by both diaspora and institutions alike. The second is fairly new and was formed by various individual organisations to engage government institutions in the UK as a way of providing a platform for a ‘single voice’ for its constituency in the diaspora.

Organisation ‘B’ has experienced a myriad of problems in trying to consolidate and represent its constituency in the diaspora, effectively for the reasons highlighted above. Due to acute heterogeneity, as soon as anyone stands up to say they are taking leadership of the diaspora, they are attacked almost immediately…By the diaspora themselves. Questions run along their source of legitimacy to lead over others. A spokesperson of the group was cited saying ‘we represent our constituency even if they are not aware of it’. Most complain that there has not been any consultation and no one has voted in this group or that individual and so forth.

Therefore as an institution such as the AU, engaging those who claim such leadership lands the AU in the middle of a mine field. In this case, the crisis of representation [3] (the democratic approach) has created more splinters than unions. Therefore if this constituency called the Sixth Region be formally grouped together, organised, led or governed, what hope is there for the African Union and indeed any other institution to engage meaningfully with these diaspora? These groups who seem to have no agenda of their own and only scuffle and fight for relevance in this newly created visible space for engagement?

A second approach, something I have called elsewhere, ‘Beyond the Engagement Impasse, Leadership without Representation’, is exemplified here by organisation ‘A’. Let’s first consider how this attention on the diaspora is mirrored in examples like the NGO experience. In the early 1980s, the developing states had been the main driver of development and the primary recipients of donor aid. At that time, donors underwent serious fatigue and blamed state corruption for the failure of development. NGOs then stepped in as a means to sidestep state corruption, but for all their advantages of being flexible, on the ground and ‘uncorrupt’, NGOs have come to resemble the very same states they had replaced. Currently, the NGOs are viewed as the problem in development and the diaspora are in pole position to occupy that space. However, with the problems above, it appears that to remain relevant and effective, the diaspora must work within their strength and learn from the NGO experience. They must remain a ‘dilemma’ and operate in a ‘different’ way from all other actors in the development field. As in the case where leadership in the diaspora cannot be by ‘representation’ rather, it must be by example. The effectiveness of simply doing the job without making claims has been the basis of power for organisation ‘A’, ironically, no one challenges that legitimacy in the diaspora nor in any institution. It may seem ironic that though operating in the West within the ‘confines’ of democracy, this organisation has emerged through; let’s call it an African form of leadership – by strength and good example, not by rhetoric. I argue here that perhaps this formation is a clue that the AU can take forward to policy implementation.

CONCLUSION: A NEW APPROACH?

           

As highlighted above, since diaspora now includes just about anyone outside their national border, it now includes migrants and historic populations who circulate back and forth and not simply people who are “stuck” in place and long for home. As a result, those mobile agents (who weren’t previously included in the diaspora definition) have emerged as the most effective members, though they make up the elite portion of the diaspora. These elites (as well as institutions) actually ‘negotiate and constitute what one may call disaporaness’. This means that not only are these groups acutely heterogeneous and difficult to engage, they are also a moving target which are ‘formed’ and ‘unformed’ rather rapidly. Yet even in the face of these challenges, there are already various formations in place through which the diaspora can engage with the AU such as: the African Diaspora Investment Fund [4] for channelling remittances, African Diaspora Volunteers Corps, as through African Parliamentarians in the Diaspora who could hold annual parliamentary meetings, AU-Diaspora Foundation/Trust to support the AU-Diaspora Initiative to name a few initiatives.

While this article does not seek to answer every question, it aimed to bring to light the different difficulties that may be faced by the AU in its diasporic engagement and seeks to suggest a direction for such engagement. In our work at The Global Native [5], for instance, we have approached remittances as a form of alternative development finance which I will provisionally name ‘Diaspora Direct Investment’ not to be ‘accessed’ or ‘captured’ by institutions, rather to be ‘partnered’ with. This conclusion developed from questioning that since remittances were there all along (in addition to development aid), why then does everyone seem to think remittances alone can now solve the problem which both forms of finance did not? In other words, this ‘visibility’ on its own does not turn remittances by magic into the panacea that is longed for by every development practitioner. However, by thinking practically through a simple form of community shares, remittances can be turned from consumption to investment and remain essentially ‘informal” flexible funds that the everyday migrant is familiar with. Such practical approaches must form the cornerstone for the AU’s future effort to ‘developmentalise’ its Sixth Region.

REFERENCES

AU. (2012). Communique: Global African Diaspora Summit. JOhannesburg: African Union.

Böhning, R. (2009). Getting a Handle on Migration Rights-Development Nexus. IMR Volume 43 Number 3, 652-670.

Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2011). David and Goliath: Diaspora Organisations as Partners in the Development Industry. Public Admin. Dev. 31, 37-49.

Davies, R. (2007). Reconceptualising the Migration-Development Nexus: Diasporas, Globalisation and the Politics of Exclusion. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 1, 59-76.

De Haas, H. (2005). International Migration, Remittances and Development: Myths and Facts. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 8 , 1269-1284.

Escobar, A. (1995). Encountering Development: The making and unmaking of the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Faist, T. (2010). Diaspora and transnationalism: What kind of dance partners? In R. Bauböck, & T. Faist (Eds.), Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods (pp. 9-34). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

McGregor, J., & Pasura, D. (2010). Diasporic Repositioning and the Politics of Re-engagement: Developmentalising Zimbabwe's Diaspora . The Round Table, 99:411, 687-703.

Moyo, D. (2009). Dead Aid: Why Aid is not Working and How There is Another Way for Africa. London: Penguin Books.

Ngulube, M. (2011). Development and the Dependency Cycle: The [re]production of poverty in SubSaharan Africa. In C. Mendoza Arroyo, M. Ngulube, & R. Colacios Parra (Eds.), Reflections on Development and Cooperation (pp. 19-32). Barcelona: Universitat Internacional de Catalunya.

Tölölyan, K. (1991). Myths of homeland and return.

ENDNOTES

[1] Lecture by Her Excellency, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma is available online on the following link: http://www.royalafricansociety.org/event/royal-african-societysannual-lecture2013
[2] Adams Bodomo: African Diaspora Remittances and Better than Foreign Aid Funds. Published in Modern Ghana News, March 4 2013. http://www.modernghana.com/news/449528/1/african-diaspora-remittances-are-better-than-forei.html accessed on 20 June 2013.
[3] The challenge of Representation: was an analytical angle developed in a seminar with students of the Master of Cultures and Development Studies (CADES) at the University of Leuven. I wish to acknowledge the students who worked on this assignment titled “The New Diaspora in the Migration-Development Nexus”, which I developed and taught
[4] Belinda Otas: Why the AU is courting the Diaspora http://www.newafricanmagazine.com/special-reports/other-reports/10-years-of-the-au/why-the-au-is-courting-the-diaspora accessed 20 June 2013
[5] The Global Native is a Zimbabwean, development Think Tank based in Leeds, UK. www.theglobalnative.org

Somalia may face new conflicts: UN

"These inconsistencies, unless resolved, may lead to increased political conflict between federal and regional governments that risk exacerbating clan divisions and therefore threaten peace and security," the experts group said.

Western commercial Oil exploration in disputed areas of Somalia and discrepancies over which authorities can issue licenses to companies could spark further conflict in the African nation, U.N. monitors warned in a confidential report.

In the U.N. Monitoring Group's latest annual report to the Security Council's sanctions committee on Somalia and Eritrea, the experts said the Somali constitution gives considerable autonomy to regional governments to enter commercial Oil deals.

But a petroleum law that has not yet been adopted by the country's parliament but is being invoked by federal officials in the capital Mogadishu says that the central government can distribute natural resources.

"These inconsistencies, unless resolved, may lead to increased political conflict between federal and regional governments that risk exacerbating clan divisions and therefore threaten peace and security," the experts group said in an annex to its annual report, which was seen by Reuters.

The overthrow of a dictator in 1991 plunged Somalia into two decades of violent turmoil, first at the hands of clan warlords, while two semi-autonomous regions - Puntland and Somaliland - have cropped up in northern Somalia.

Around a dozen companies, including many multinational Oil and gas majors, had licenses to explore Somalia before 1991, but since then Somaliland and Puntland and other regional authorities have granted their own licences for the same blocks.

In some cases Somaliland and Puntland have awarded licenses for blocks that overlap. The experts said one such case involves Norwegian Oil firm DNO and Canadian-listed Africa Oil Corp.

"Potentially, it means that exploration operations in these blocks, conducted by both DNO and Africa Oil under the protection of regional security forces, its allied militia or private forces, could generate new conflict between Somaliland and Puntland," the report said.

"It is alarming that regional security forces and armed groups may clash to protect and further Western-based Oil companies interests," it said.

"In this case, the involvement of a Norwegian company on one side and of a Swedish-owned/Canada-based company on the other, is even more disturbing, considering the long-standing implication of Norway and Sweden in promoting peace and dialogue in Somalia," the experts said.

Bjorn Dale, DNO's acting president/managing director and general counsel, said he was not familiar with the U.N. experts' recent report but said that the company would never engage in activities that threatened peace in Somaliland.

Africa Oil was not immediately available for comment.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST?

Somalia is struggling to rebuild after decades of conflict and a U.N.-backed African Union peacekeeping force is trying to drive out al Shabaab. Piracy off the Somali coast is also a problem.

The U.N. experts also expressed concern about a clash between a longstanding bid by Norway to urge Somalia to implement an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) off its coast with commercial interests by a Norwegian Oil company.

Under the U.N. Convention of the Law of the Sea, an EEZ would allow Somalia 12 nautical miles of territorial control with claim to sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage natural resources that exist within 200 nautical miles.

The U.N. convention then requires Somalia to negotiate a maritime boundary with Kenya, which the U.N. experts said could lead to several disputed Oil exploration blocks being deemed to be in Kenyan waters.

The U.N. report said late last year that Kenya had suspended StatOil's license for block L26 because the Norwegian company did not want to spend money on exploration while there was the legal uncertainty over the maritime border with Somalia.

A Kenyan government official told the U.N. experts that StatOil had expressed an interest to develop the area should a boundary be agreed with Somalia and the L26 block was deemed to be in Kenyan waters.

"Efforts by Norway to lobby Somali officials to adopt the EEZ now coincide with current Norwegian interest in the fate of L26 as well as with Norwegian involvement in the application of a Special Financing Facility donor fund of $30 million which has been allocated under the management of (Somali government) officials with a track record of corruption," the report said.

The experts suggested that Norway's development assistance to Somalia could be used "as a cover for its commercial interests there," a claim it said Norwegian International Development Minister Heikki Eidsvoll Holmas has denied.

Norway's U.N. mission did not immediately respond to a request for further comment.

Source: worldbulletin.net

Warbaahinta Caalamka oo si Weyn Wax uga Qortay Heshiiskii Dhawaan ay Kala Saxiixdeen Somaliland/Soomaaliya

HARGEYSA - War-baahinta caalamka ayaa maalmahan dambe si mug leh u faaqidayey go’aamadii ka soo baxay wada hadalladii u dambeeyey ee dawladaha Somaliland iyo Soomaaliya ay ku yeesheen magaalada Istanbuul ee dalka Turkiga. Waxaanay sheegeen in qodobo ka mid ah go’aamadaasi ay yihiin kuwo Somaliland u horseedaya aqoonsi caalami ah oo ay mustaqbalka dhow ka hesho wadamada dunida qaarkood.

Telefishinka wadanka Cumaan oo ka mid ah war-baahinta arrintaas sida xooga leh uga hadashay ayaa galabnimadii Isniinta ee 15k-ii bishan July waxa uu baahiyey barnaamij aad u xiiso badanaa oo uu mawduucaas ka diyaariyey, kaas oo uu Telefhinku ku martiqaaday aqoonyahano waaweyn oo siyaabo kala gedisan oo aad u balaadhan barnaamijkaas ugu fallanqeeyey go’aamadii ka soo baxay wada hadalkii u dambeeyey ee dawladaha Somaliland iyo Soomaaliya ku yeesheen dalka Turkiga.

Gaar ahaan qodobkii ku saabsanaa maamulka hawada ee dalkii la isku odhan jirey Jamhuuriyada Soomaaliya, haatana ah Somaliland iyo Soomaaliya, kaas oo wufuudii wada hadalka u kala metelayey labada dhinac ku heshiiyeen in la sameeyo guddi labada wadan ka socda oo hawada dalkii Soomaaliya la isku odhan jirey maamulkeeda kala wareega hay’adda qaramada midoobay ee ilaa 1991-kii hore gacanta ugu haysay, iyada oo isla markaa wixii dhaqaale ah ee ka soo baxa hawadana ay si siman u qaybsan doonaan labada wadan ee Somaliland iyo Soomaaliya iyada oo xarunta gudigaas wadajirka ahi ku shaqayn doonaana noqonayso caasimada Somaliland ee Hargeysa.

barnaamij aad u xiiso badan oo uu baahiyey galabnimadii Isniinta ee 15kii bishan waxa uu si oo ay mustaqbalka maalmahan dambe siyaabo kala gedisan dalka cumaan ayaa maanta si mug leh uga hadashay wadahadaladii dhawaan somalilnd iyo somaliya ugu soo gaba gabobay dalka Turkiga.

Barnaamijkaas oo loogu magac daray dal laba wadan noqonaya iyo dal cusub oo qaaradda Afrika ku so biraya, ayaa ugu horayn waxa hadal aad u kulul ku furay aqoonyahan u dhashay dalka Yaman oo lagu magacaabo Cabdinaasir, kaas oo si xoog leh uga soo horjeeday qodobka maamulka hawada ee ku jirey go’aamadii ay ku heshiiyeen Somaliland iyo Soomaaliya ayaa waxa uu ku dooday in uu qodobkaasi khatar ku yahay midnimada iyo jiritaanka wadanka Soomaaliya, isla markaana uu dan u yahay Somaliland oo uu sheegay in ay ka helayso faa’iido dhaqaale iyo aqoonsi caalami ah oo ay dunida ka hesho. Sidaas daraadeed waxa uu madaxweynaha Soomaaliya ugu baaqay in uu ka noqdo heshiiskii uu qodobkaasi ku jirey.

Cabdinaasir isaga oo arrimahaas ka hadlayana waxa uu yidhi “ Soomaaliya waa dal daalay oo u baahan in la taageero oo wax lala qabto, waxa uu u baahan yahay dib u heshiisiin culus in lagu sameeyo waayo 23 sano ayuu bur bur iyo qallalaase ku soo jiray, maantana waxaan arkayaa in burburkii ugu waynaa ku soo fool leeyahay, waayo laba dal ayaa iminkaba jira oo uu caalamku u kala yaqanaa Soomaaliya iyo Somalilnd. Waxaan la socday wada hadalo Somaliland iyo Soomaaliya mudooyinkan dambe uga socday.dalalka Imaaraadka Carabta, Ingiriiska iyo Turkiga oo kulankii ugu danbeeyay iminka lagu soo gebo-gebeeyey, isla markaana laga soo saaray qodob aan anigu u arko mid Soomaaliya lagu kala goynayo, waayo hawadii dalka oo ah halbawlihii ugu weynaa ee dhaqaalaha iyo wax kastaaba dalka ka soo geli lahaayeen, ayay dawlada tamarta yare ee Soomaaliya ka dhisani taladiisii iyo maamulkiisiiba gacanta u gelisay maamul aan ogolayn oo ku doodaya in uu Soomaaliya ka go’ay”.

Isaga oo hadalkiisa sii watana waxa uu yidhi ”taasna waxaan u arkaa burbur hor leh oo ku habsaday Soomaaliya, sidaas daraadeed waxaan tallo ahaan ugu soo jeedin lahaa Madaxweynaha Soomaaliya in uu arinkaas dib uga laabto, hadii uu doonayo in uu Somaliland aqoonsi siiyona uu sidiisa u siiyo, balse aanu cid kale u ogolaanin in ay maamusho hawadii dalkiisa, sababtoo ah rikoodhka iyo xogta hawada oo dhan waxaa la dhigayaa meesha laga maamulayo oo ah Somaliland, taasina waxay keeni kartaa in ay Somaliland yeelato saaxiibo badan oo caalamka ka tirsan, waayo rikoodhka hawada iyo magaceeduba waxay noqonayaan halka laga maamulayo magaceeda arimahaasna waxay Somalilnd ka heli kartaa taageero dhaqaale iyo in diyaaradaha kala duwan ee hawadeeda marayaa ay dalkeeda xarumo ka samaystaan, taasina waxay u horseedaysaa in ay saaxiibo farabadan dunida ku yeelato ka dibna ay aqoonsi buuxa ka hesho saaxiibadaas iyo dawladahoodaba”.

Waxaa intaasi ka dib hadalka la wareegay aqoonyahan ku xeel dheer arrimaha siyasada qaarada afrika oo u dhashay dalka Cumaan oo magaciisa la yidhaahdo Shariif Caadiya, waxaanu si mugleh uga waramay taariikhda Somalilnd oo uu sheegay in ay Somaliland ahayd dal jiray wakhti hore bal se ku biiray Soomaaliya ka dib markii ay xorimadeeda ka qaadatay dalka Ingiriiska sanadkii 1960-kii, waxaanu intaasi raaciyay in Somaliland ay wakhtigaasi aqoonsadeen lix iyo sodon dawladood oo caalamka ka tirsan.

Aqoon yahan Shariif Caadiya ayaa sidoo kale waxa uu ka waramay qodobka maamulka hawada ee ay dhawaan ku heshiiyeen Somaliland iyo Soomaaliya oo uu ku tilmaamay in uu yahay mid labada dhinacba wax tar wayn u leh oo ay dhaqalaha ka soo baxa hawada si siman u qaybsanayaan maadaama oo ay hore u ahaayeen laba dawladood oo caalamka ka jira. Waxaanu u soo jeediyay dawlada Soomaaliya iyo wadamada afrikaba in ay aqoon sadaan Somaliland oo uu sheegay in ay ku taalo gobol xasaasi ah.

Isaga oo arrimahaas ka ahdlayana waxaa hadaladiisii ka mid ahaa oo uu yidhi “Somaliland dhawr iyo sodon dawladood ayaa aqoonsaday markii ay xornimada ka qaadatay dalka ingiriiska.waxaan talo siinlahaa anigu dawlada Soomaaliya iyo wadsamada qaarada Africa in ya aqoonsadaan Somaliland, maxaa yeelay qof iyo dawladba waa lagu abaal mariyaa wuxuu qabsado ee horumar ah, markaa in ay aqoonsi ku abaal mariyaan ayaa fiican Somaliland waayo waxay ku taalaa Somaliland mandaqad xaasasiya oo macno wayn ugu fadhida qaarada afrika iyo waliba Carbta, markaa in la soo dhaweeyo way wacnaan lahayd. maanta waynu ognahay dagaal qadhaadh ayaa ka soo dhex guuxaya dalka Masar iyo Itoobiya muranka ka taagan webiga niil-ka, haddii Somaliland aqoonsi ka hesho dalka Itobiya waxaa xaqiiqa in ay Somaliland dhabarka ka jabinayso dawladaha Carabta iyo dawlada Soomaaliya, waayo muddo dheer ayay aqoonsi ka sugayeen carabta iyo dawlada Soomaaliya oo ay is hayaan. Qodobkii ka mid ahaa heshiiskii ay Somaliland iyo Soomaaliya ku kala saxeexdeen dalka Turkiga ee ahaa in maamulka hawada Somaliland iyo Soomaaliya laga maamulo Hargaysa ay dawlado badani u arkaan in uu guul u yahay Somaliland isla markaana uu yahay dariiqa ay ku heli karto aqoonsi caalami ah iyo saaxiibo badan oo caalamka ah.

Xigasho: WARGEYSKA DAWAN

Debating reform of Somaliland’s House of Elders

Photo: Tristam Sparks/Flickr

Need for reform in a rapidly modernizing society (file photo)

NAIROBI (IRIN) – Over the past 20 years, clan elders in Somaliland’s Guurti, the upper house of parliament, have negotiated inter-clan disputes and kept the peace, carefully steering the self-declared republic away from the fate of south-central Somalia, which lapsed into a long, bloody civil war after the 1991 fall of the government of President Siyad Barre.

In 2001, Somaliland passed a constitution that installed the Guurti, a body of traditional elders, in the upper house, giving them legislative authority. But they have never been elected, and their constitutionally mandated six-year term limits have effectively been ignored. Now, leaders across Somaliland are in serious discussions about how best to reform the body to avoid a constitutional crisis.

What is the Guurti?

“The Guurti is a traditional forum for elders for mediation,” Edward Paice, director at the Africa Research Institute in London, told IRIN. “Since time immemorial it has been a way of settling disputes.”

Elders used to convene under an acacia tree to arbitrate rows, using a customary legal process known in Somali as ‘xeer’. Disputing parties would bring their concerns to the elders, and the proceedings would continue until a resolution was achieved.

Leading up to the fall of Somali president Mohamed Siyad Barre in 1991, Somaliland engaged in a brutal secession war with Somalia. In May 1991, Somaliland declared independence as Somalia dissolved into civil strife and eventual state failure. When Somaliland was torn apart by violence, the Guurti stepped in.

“This was one of the key institutions that was functioning at the time,” said Mohamed Farah Hersi, a researcher at the Academy for Peace and Development in Somaliland’s capital, Hargeisa, speaking at an event in Nairobi, Kenya.

Clan elders came together for a number of peace conferences in the early-1990s, the most prominent of which was the Elders Conference at Borama in 1993. This led to the creation of the 82-member Guurti, which formalized the mediation system as a parliamentary body. In Borama, the Guurti also elected Somaliland’s president and vice president.

“They were peacemakers for Somaliland,” acknowledged Markus Hoehne, a strong critic of the contemporary Guurti system and a research fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. “Those guys put their lives on the line. They went to different conflict zones, often at great personal risk.”

Hoehne believes that in the early 1990s, the Guurti was instrumental in rebuilding the country, but says that now the role and composition of the body is outdated.

The Guurti was responsible for drafting Somaliland’s constitution, which was passed in a 2001 referendum by an overwhelming majority.

According the constitution, the Guurti “shall have special responsibility for passing laws relating to religion, traditions (culture) and security”, in addition to reviewing legislation passed by the House of Representatives.

“They are the centre of gravity. They are the cornerstone,” Adam Haji-Ali Ahmed, director at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Hargeisa, told IRIN. “One hundred percent of people in Somaliland trust the Guurti. They preach about peace.”

Why was the Guurti so effective?

Somaliland has a large number of clans and sub-clans, each of which has its own structure of authority. Because its 3.85 million people are spread out over a large area – 55 percent of people are nomadic – governing from a central administration is tricky.

“We have a highly divided, fragmented society,” said Asmahan Abdelsalam Hassan of the NAGAAD Network, Somaliland’s umbrella organization for women’s rights groups, at an event in Nairobi. In many areas of Somaliland, customary law is the most effective and often the only way to mediate and address disputes.

To negotiate between warring factions, Somaliland turned to their elders, who were in charge of each group.

“They got their authority from customary law, from the clans,” said Ahmed.

“They built on traditional mechanisms – there was no one from outside telling them what to do,” said Paice.

“There is a tradition that no Somali meeting ends until a consensus has been achieved.”

The 1993 Borama Conference lasted four months, but it resulted in a comprehensive framework and roadmap for a way forward. A charter with five guiding principles was drawn up, and was used as a temporary governing structure until a constitution was drafted.

Because many of the conference participants had strong ties to the Somali National Movement – the secessionist movement that was key to the formation of Somaliland – they were very effective at coordinating the demobilization and disarmament of rebel groups. This was a crucial step to achieving peace.

"Tradition is very important for peace-building, but not for state-building"

“These elders from the different clans want the welfare of their children, and their children after that, to be preserved,” Jean-Paul Azam, professor of economics at France’s Toulouse School of Economics, told IRIN. “For them, what matters is the collective evolution, what happens to the clan.”

Minorities also have significant representation within the Guurti. “One of the main [principles] of the Guurti is inclusivity, that all clans should be included,” said Hersi. It is the only decision-making body that rests fundamentally on power-sharing between all groups.

The House of Representatives tends to be dominated by the larger clans, so the Guurti is a crucial mechanism to engage all of Somaliland society. However, since 1993 clan alliances have shifted and clans themselves are no longer drawn along the same lines. This means that the composition of the Guurti will need to change if it is to reflect all of Somaliland.

So, what’s the problem?

The Guurti has never been elected. If a clan elder dies or retires, the seat is passed down to one of his descendants. This, many feel, is undermining the legitimacy of the body.

“Many of the experienced people and the old people have died,” said Ahmed. “The young people are coming who know nothing about the culture, about customary law, about the history of Somaliland.”

The constitution provides no direction on how Guurti members should be chosen, saying simply that “the members of the House of Elders shall be elected in a manner to be determined by law.” A law governing this decision has yet to be drafted.

“We believe that Somaliland’s democratization has made tremendous progress.  But there are many challenges ahead with the Guurti,” said Mohamed A. Mohamoud, executive director of the Somaliland Non-State Actors Forum (SONSAF).

There are also accusations that the Guurti has lost independence and now bows to pressure from the president. Its unilateral decision to postpone presidential elections in 2008 was viewed by many as a sign that their impartiality had been compromised.

“A lot of the descendants of the original members see it as a business opportunity. That’s not in keeping with the original ethos,” Paice told IRIN. Traditionally, elders were not paid for their services on peace-keeping and arbitration.

In addition, many consider the Guurti ill-equipped to handle some of their legislative responsibilities. “There is by no means universal literacy in the Guurti,” Paice added. “If it’s a 450-page finance bill, this is problematic.”

“Tradition is very important for peace-building, but not for state-building,” noted Hersi. “Elders can build peace, but they cannot build a state.”

Some analysts say the Guurti needs to be more gender-inclusive in its representation. Traditionally, women are not appointed clan elders, and the first House of Elders after Borama was an all-male body. Since then, a few women have inherited seats from their husbands, but they still represent a very small minority.

“Cultural and religious misperceptions undermine women’s political participation,” said the NAGAAD Network’s Hassan. She argues that while women play an important mediation role in within Somaliland society, they are significantly underrepresented in terms of political participation. She also points out that because women were not included in the drafting of the constitution, no special protections for them exist within the current legislative framework.

Photo: Charles Roffey/Flickr

Need for gender inclusivity in the Guurti (file photo)

NAGAAD and other civil society organizations lobbied for a bill in parliament that introduced the idea of reserved quotas for women and minorities for elected positions. Although the proposed legislation had the support of the current president, it was thrown out by the House of Representatives.

How can the Guurti be reformed?

“The dilemma of the Guurti is that their legitimacy has been decreasing over time, but ultimately they are the the only recourse that Somaliland has for these kinds of issues,” said Matt Bryden, former coordinator of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea and director of Sahan Research, a think-tank focused on the Horn of Africa, told IRIN. “It’s very risky for Somaliland to close their eyes and hope for the best.”

There is much debate over how to reform Somaliland’s House of Elders, if at all, and what mechanism should be used to select its members. Essentially, there are three broad viable methods for choosing them: through election, selection by quotas or nomination by clan.

Azam holds that electing the Guurti would destroy the effectiveness of the body. “The legitimacy of these people is due precisely to the fact that they are not elected,” he said. “Their legitimacy is due to their traditional base.”

He points to the fact that the Guurti have been very organized in collecting taxes and controlling violence. “The basic idea, when you build a new country, is you have to have basic fiscal revenues,” he said. In a research paper, he examines the role of the Guurti system in collecting taxes from the population. He believes that, at least for the next 10 to 15 years, the Guurti can informally negotiate a power-sharing solution and does not need major reform.

Hoehne strongly disagrees, and says proper governance demands more professional, elected legislators, not clan elders. “If you want to regulate you need to have an official system – otherwise you’re just ignoring the contradictions,” he told IRIN. “I would recommend just doing away with the Guurti and establishing legal pluralism.”

Still, Hoehne acknowledged that the symbolic attachment of the Guurti to Somaliland society would mean that it is highly unlikely that they will choose to simply do away with the system. “You would have to develop a face-saving strategy [for the Guurti]. You have to offer them a nice way out. Or it will lead to very unpleasant results,” he said.

SONSAF’s Mohamed asks: “If the Guurti were to be elected, what’s the difference between the House of Guurti and the House of Representatives?”

One solution would be to create a criterion for selecting elders, based upon the notion of inclusivity among disenfranchised groups. “I see the Guurti acting essentially as a senate. My personal view would be to lean to regional representation, with equal representation for all regions,” said Bryden. He also feels that such a system would open up the eventual possibility of including quotas for women and the youth within the Guurti.

But before any decision regarding the method of selection to the Guurti can be made, Ahmed argues that the process for becoming a clan elder needs to be standardized. “We have to organize the elders system first. We have to regulate it – there should be law,” he said. “Then we have to think about and explore a way to make the House of Guurti a very competitive, equal-opportunity house.”

The other question revolves around what the role of the Guurti should be, and whether they are qualified to take a legislative role. “To have a traditional house would be quite useful,” said Paice. “There could still be a national council of elders, but who are wholly impartial and outside the system.”

But Paice feels that whatever the solution, it needs to be one that is home-grown.

“The right answer is that it’s for them to decide,” he said. “These things are difficult, but I think that they have to be solved by the locals with their hands to the pulse.”

Source: IRIN