By Mark Kinver
Environment reporter, BBC News
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Despite early warnings, donors seem reluctant to intervene |
Famine
early warning systems have a good track record of predicting food shortages but
are poor at triggering early action, a report has concluded.
The
study said the opportunity for early action was being missed by governments and
humanitarian agencies.
It
said the "disconnect" was starkly apparent in Somalia where no action
was taken despite 11 months of warnings.
Up
to two million people are estimated to have died in drought-related emergencies
since 1970.
The
report by UK think-tank Chatham House, Managing Famine Risk: Linking Early
Warning to Early Action, looked at the issue of drought-related emergencies on
a global scale but focused on the Horn of Africa and the Sahel regions.
"The
regions are quite unique in a way because you have these droughts, where there
are normally successive failed rains; then you have a process whereby you have
subsequent harvest failures then people adopt coping strategies," explained
report author Rob Bailey.
"They
start selling off assets, running down food reserves, taking on credit - they
get themselves into an increasingly desperate situation."
Mr
Bailey, a senior research fellow at Chatham House, said that after a period of time
the coping strategies became exhausted, triggering a famine.
"But
the whole process can take 11 months from start to finish, and that is why
there is an opportunity to intervene early," he told BBC News.
"Yet
despite this very significant opportunity and despite analysis showing that
when you do intervene early it costs less and you save more lives, it does not
happen."
Gambling
with lives
The
main reason, he observed, why there was a delay, was a result of perceived
political risk by governments.
"Ultimately,
early action requires government action," he added.
"It
requires donor governments - like the UK and US - to write a cheque early on
before the crisis is at its worse phase, and that is a big ask for governments
to do because governments are primarily concerned with managing the political
risks to themselves.
"They
see political risks in funding these sorts of things because budgets are tight
and public support for aid spending is less than it used to be, so it is seen
as a particularly risky endeavour at the moment."
If
the early action by donor governments prevented the crisis, that could also
cause problems as well because it could be argued that there was not a crisis
waiting to happen in the first place.
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Unstable political systems can complicate aid efforts to help starving people during famines |
Mr
Bailey cited the 2011 famine in Somalia as an example where the issue of
political risk shaped the global response to the humanitarian emergency.
"That
was not a result of early warning information - it was probably the single most
documented and monitored evolution of famine in history," he explained.
"But
still no early action happened and probably the main reason for that is because
the areas of Somalia that were at most risk where under control of a Jihadist
militia, which the US and other western donor nations categorise as a terrorist
organisation."
He
added that there was concern among donor nations that carrying out humanitarian
missions in those areas could strengthen the position of the militia,
especially if aid ended up in the hands of the group.
Counting
the cost
Early
warning systems were first introduced in the Sahel and Horn of Africa regions
in the early 1980s when it was first realised that it was possible to track the
"chronology of famine".
"Since
then, things have got a lot more sophisticated so now there are early warning
systems that use satellite to estimate harvests more effectively, how much
pasture is available. We have more much more sophisticated weather forecasting
models." Mr Bailey said.
"They
also use a lot more household-gathered data, where infants are weighed and
malnutrition is quantified. Also, it is monitored whether certain coping
strategies, that are recognised as pre-famine indicators, are becoming
established."
He
explained that a full-blown emergency response was very expensive, so there was
a strong financial argument to act sooner rather than later.
"When
you are at the situation where malnutrition rates are very high and people are
dying then you need to be moving very large amounts of food, medicines and
healthcare products through pipelines to areas where access is often very poor.
"Humanitarian
agencies have often said that early intervention is cheaper. There was a study
carried out recently that looked at the potential savings of acting sooner
rather than later.
"This
involved a range of initiatives, such as pre-positioning of food and medicine
supplies so agencies are able to source them earlier, perhaps when prices were
lower."
A
recent study looked at intervention costs in Kenya and southern Ethiopia over
two decades. It found that, on average, early intervention resulted in a saving
of US$1,000 per person.
"This
is serious money when multiplied by the number of people affected in these
situations," Mr Bailey calculated. An estimated 18 million people were
affected during the Sahel crisis last year, he added.
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It is estimated that earlier intervention saves aid budgets about $1,000 per person affected by famine |
Drought-related
emergencies, particularly in the Horn of Africa and Sahel regions, were
unlikely to go away in the future, projected scenarios showed.
"I
think there is a very strong case to be made that the agricultural trends, the
demographic trends and the climatic trends are pointing towards a rapidly
deteriorating risk outlook," Mr Bailey said.
"The
key message is that early warning systems give us a real opportunity to manage
that risk really effectively.
"It
is very rare that you can have a risk that can be so well understood and
predicted, and give us such an opportunity to intervene and mitigate it."