Are we returning to the Cold War?

Ukrainian men help pull one another out of a stampede as a flag of Crimea is seen during clashes at rallies held by ethnic Russians and Crimean Tatars near the Crimean parliament building in Simferopol on Wednesday.

By Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times columnist

With Russia growling over the downfall of its ally running Ukraine and still protecting its murderous ally running Syria, there is much talk that we're returning to the Cold War - and that the Obama team is not up to defending our interests or friends. I beg to differ.

I don't think the Cold War is back; today's geopolitics are actually so much more interesting than that. And I also don't think President Barack Obama's caution is entirely misplaced.

The Cold War was a unique event that pitted two global ideologies, two global superpowers, each with globe-spanning nuclear arsenals and broad alliances behind them. Indeed, the world was divided into a chessboard of red and black, and who controlled each square mattered to each side's sense of security, well-being and power. It was also a zero-sum game, in which every gain for the Soviet Union and its allies was a loss for the West and NATO, and vice versa.

That game is over. We won. What we have today is the combination of an older game and a newer game. The biggest geopolitical divide in the world today "is between those countries who want their states to be powerful and those countries who want their people to be prosperous," argues Michael Mandelbaum, professor of foreign policy at Johns Hopkins.

The first category would be countries like Russia, Iran and North Korea, whose leaders are focused on building their authority, dignity and influence through powerful states. And because the first two have oil and the last has nukes that it can trade for food, their leaders can defy the global system and survive, if not thrive - all while playing an old, traditional game of power politics to dominate their respective regions.

The second category, countries focused on building their dignity and influence through prosperous people, includes all the countries in NAFTA, the European Union, and the MERCOSUR trade bloc in Latin America and ASEAN in Asia. These countries understand that the biggest trend in the world today is not a new Cold War but the merger of globalization and the information technology revolution. They are focused on putting in place the right schools, infrastructure, bandwidth, trade regimes, investment openings and economic management so more of their people can thrive in a world in which every middle-class job will require more skill and the ability to constantly innovate will determine their standard of living. (The true source of sustainable power.)

But there is also now a third and growing category of countries, which can't project power or build prosperity. They constitute the world of "disorder." They are actually power and prosperity sinks because they are consumed in internal fights over primal questions like: Who are we? What are our boundaries? Who owns which olive tree? These countries include Syria, Libya, Iraq, Sudan, Somalia, Congo and other hot spots. While those nations focused on state power do play in some of these countries - Russia and Iran both play in Syria - the states that are more focused on building prosperity are trying to avoid getting too involved in the world of disorder. Though ready to help mitigate humanitarian tragedies there, they know that when you "win" one of these countries in today's geopolitical game, all you win is a bill.

Ukraine actually straddles all three of these trends. The revolution there happened because the government was induced by Russia, which wants to keep Ukraine in its sphere of influence, into pulling out of a trade agreement with the European Union - an agreement favored by the many Ukrainians focused on building a prosperous people. This split has also triggered talk of separatism by the more Russian-speaking and Russian-oriented eastern part of Ukraine.

So what do we do? The world is learning that the bar for U.S. intervention abroad is being set much higher. This is due to a confluence of the end of the Soviet Union's existential threat, the experience of investing too many lives and $2 trillion in Iraq and Afghanistan to little lasting impact, America's rising energy independence, our intelligence successes in preventing another 9/11 and the realization that to fix what ails the most troubled countries in the world of disorder is often beyond our skill set, resources or patience.

In the Cold War, policy-making was straightforward. We had "containment." It told us what to do and at almost any price. Today, Obama's critics say he must do "something" about Syria. I get it. Chaos there can come around to bite us. If there is a policy that would fix Syria, or even just stop the killing there, in a way that was self-sustaining, at a cost we could tolerate and not detract from all the things we need to do at home to secure our own future, I'm for it.

But we should have learned some lessons from our recent experience in the Middle East: First, how little we understand about the social and political complexities of the countries there; second, that we can - at considerable cost - stop bad things from happening in these countries but cannot, by ourselves, make good things happen; and third, that when we try to make good things happen we run the risk of assuming the responsibility for solving their problems, a responsibility that truly belongs to them.

Thomas L. Friedman is a columnist for The New York Times.

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Turkish Senior Opposition Submits Parliamentary Question on Turkey's Foreign Aid

Left Turkey Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. Right CHP deputy Osman Korutürk 

A deputy from the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) has submitted a parliamentary question directed at Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu about Turkey's provision of financial aid to foreign countries.

CHP deputy Osman Korutürk submitted the parliamentary question asking Davutoğlu to provide details of Turkey's financial aid to foreign countries and whether that aid has achieved its purpose and was received by the countries concerned.

Korutürk asked Davutoğlu for a written response. The question also noted that “the concealing of the yearly audit reports prepared by the Court of Accounts from the opposition during the discussions on the 2014 budget in Parliament and the Dec. 17 corruption scandal in which four ministers were involved have raised questions about foreign aid provided by the government under the name of public expenditure.

“There are serious doubts about whether the financial aid has been received by Somalia, where accountability of the government is doubtful and where the financial transaction does not work due to the lack of banking and auditing mechanisms and where a corruption scandal took place in 2013.”

Korutürk referred to a Reuters report published in mid-February stating that Turkish and Somali government officials said financial assistance to Somalia had ceased at the end of 2013 and that there were no immediate plans to resume it.

After the report, Turkey pledged to maintain direct budgetary support this year for the war-ravaged East African country. It is not clear how much money Turkey donated to Somalia in 2013.

“The report states that the Turkish government has provided a substantial amount of aid to Somalia and that due to the lack of banking mechanisms in the country this aid was provided in the form of direct cash, and that Turkey cut off this aid at the end of 2013 without presenting any reason. It also stated that it was not clear how much cash Turkey donated to Somalia in 2013, when the government's budget totaled $110 million. However, the report also says that Somalia's former central bank chief, Abdusalam Omer, noted that during his seven-month tenure the support amounted to $4.5 million per month, which he said was paid in cash to the central bank,” stated Korutürk's parliamentary question.

The questions Korutürk addressed to Davutoğlu were as follows: “What is the total amount of direct budgetary aid to Somalia? How much of this amount was delivered by hand in cash? How was the aid that was provided to a country in which the banking system does not work recorded? Does the Somali government provide an account to Turkey with details on how it has used that aid? Is this aid controlled by the Court of Accounts?”

The last question that Korutürk addressed to Davutoğlu was whether the ceasing of aid to Somalia had any link to the al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabaab, which carried out a bombing attack on the Turkish mission in Mogadishu last July?

Turkey is a key ally of the Somali government. Its vast humanitarian aid effort at the height of the 2011 famine endeared the country to many Somalis, especially as Ankara continued to build hospitals and dispatch aid across the East African nation.

(Cihan/Today's Zaman)

Jihad At Sea - Al Qaeda’s Maritime Front in Yemen

BY MAREX

Niklas Anzinger, a graduate assistant at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs in Syracuse, NY, takes a close look at Yemen and Al Qaeda.

Yemen’s state weakness due to fragmentation and ongoing conflicts allowed Al Qaeda and affiliates to take and hold territory, possibly enabling them to seize the Port of Aden. If Al Qaeda establishes safe havens in the southern Abyan province, supported by local Yemeni inhabitants, attacks at sea or in near by ports similar to the “USS Cole bombing” in 2000 could become a threat, increasing the danger to Red Sea shipping. Yet Al Qaeda is of secondary concern for the Yemeni government, with secessionist insurgencies in the north and the south threatening the state’s unity. Only a stable Yemen can effectively deny Al Qaeda a stable base in the long run.

In recent years, international shippers taking the Red Sea route have been primarily concerned with attacks by Somali pirates. Those attacks went down from 237 in 2011 to 15 in 2013 due to the Somali governments’ increased ability to fight and deter piracy, among other causes. However, another threat to international shipping in the Gulf of Aden looms. Yemen’s southern coastline is on the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb which links the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, a critical maritime choke point where roughly 8.2% of global oil supply passed through in 2009. Its oil exports, accounting for 70% of Yemeni government revenue, make the country highly dependent on its declining reserves. Yemen is an Al Qaeda stronghold, second only to Pakistan (and possibly Syria more recently). It was a target of the U.S. “drone campaign,” with 94 strikes between 2002 and 2013 (Pakistan: 368). Al Qaeda aims to enforce rigid Islamic legislation in Muslim countries and establish a global Islamic Caliphate. According to its 20-year plan, Al Qaeda aims to subdue “apostate” Muslim regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen. It hosts a franchise in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), establishing safe havens in the governorates of Al Bayda’, Ma’rib, Shabwah, Lahji and Abyan, where it exerts considerable influence.

Yemen’s weak central state

Yet the Yemeni government, headed by Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi since February 2012 after the 33-year rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh came to an end, has to deal with more than Al Qaeda. In 1990, the Yemen Arab Republic in the north united with the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south. United in name, Yemen, however, remained a fragmented entity rife with internal divisions. In 1994, a civil war between Saleh’s north and the secessionist south broke out. In 1997, a group called “Ansar Allah”, emerging from a Zaidi Shia religious organization, confronted the Yemeni government leading to armed uprisings and several rounds of fighting between 2004 and 2010. In late March 2011, the defection of General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, the chief military commander in north Yemen, led to a security vacuum in the northwest that Ansar Allah seized to take control of Saada city where it continues fighting Sunni-Salafist tribes. His defection may, however, only be a symptom of the Yemeni state’s retreat to Sana’a, neglecting the north and the south. As a consequence, Hadi has to cope with internal struggles and two rebel movements, constraining his ability to fight AQAP.

Al Qaeda’s terrorism at sea

Al Qaeda’s terrorism at sea emanating from Yemen has a tradition and method. Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, an eminent jihadi strategist, defined several choke points as a target and outlined methods for disruption: blocking the passages using mines or sinking ships in them, threatening movement at sea through piracy, martyrdom operations and weapons.

On the Earth, there are five (5) important straits, four of them are in the countries of the Arabs and the Muslims. The fifth one is in America, and it is the Panama Canal. These straits are: 1. The Strait of Hormuz, the oil gate in the Persian Gulf. 2. The Suez Canal in Egypt. 3. The Bab el Mandib between Yemen and the African continent. 4. The Gibraltar Strait in Morocco. Most of the Western world’s economy, in terms of trade and oil, passes through these sea passages. Also passing through them are the military fleets, aircraft carriers and the deadly missiles hitting our women and children … It is necessary to shut these passages until the invader campaigns have left our countries. […]. — Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, “The Global Islamic Resistance Call”.

On January 3, 2000, members of Al Qaeda attempted an attack on the USS The Sullivans (DDG-68), an Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyer, while in the Port of Aden. Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, a Saudi of Yemeni descent, called “the Prince of the Sea”, was its mastermind. He learned boat-handling and other skills from seafarers in western Yemen, adopted the tactics of the LTTE Sea Tigers, an Islamist insurgency in Sri Lanka, and developed plans to attack in the choke points of the Straits of Hormuz and Gibraltar. He discussed the idea to attack U.S. vessels with Osama bin Laden who sent him to Aden in southern Yemen where he organized the attack on USS The Sullivans. A small group loaded a boat with explosives near USS The Sullivans, however overloading the boat so that it sank, before it could launch the attack. Nine days later on October 12, Al Qaeda avoided mistakes, successfully bombing the USS Cole. The USS Cole (DDG-67), same model as USS The Sullivans, was being refueled in the harbor at Aden when it was attacked, killing 17 sailors and injuring 39. On October 6, 2002, the same tactic worked again. A small suicide vessel rammed the MV Limburg, a French 157,000-ton crude oil tanker, in the Arabian Sea near the southern Yemeni coastal town of Al-Mukalla. On November 22, 2002, al-Nashiri was captured, and he has been held in Guantanamo ever since. Nevertheless, Al Qaeda-aligned groups remain able to attack ships. In July 2010, the “Abdullah Azzam Brigade” launched a suicide attack against the Japanese oil tanker MV M. Star in the Strait of Hormuz, injuring a crew member.

Al Qaeda’s resurgence through soft power

In January 2009, AQAP dramatically increased in strength by merging its Saudi and Yemeni franchises. It has proclaimed Islamic Emirates in the cities of Shaqra, Jaar, Azzan and Zinjibar since 2011, and controls checkpoints in the south. An autonomous enclave, established by AQAP insurgents in the southern province of Abyan in 2011, was overrun by the military in June 2012, although some militants were reportedly displaced to other areas. Hadi was able to recapture Abyan in 2012 and restore limited control over the coastal city of Zinjibar. Abyan could, however, become a staging ground for operations to seize Aden, should the Yemeni military fail to defeat AQAP (sometimes referred to as “Ansar al Sharia”, an alias) in Zinjibar. AQAP’s leadership has recently adopted a “soft power” strategy to take and hold territory. Is has been the frequent goal of AQAP in the south to establish an Islamic state; however, in early 2011, Osama bin Laden opposed the idea in a letter to leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi due to “lack of popular support on the ground”. In April 2011, Adil al-Abab, Al Qaeda’s chief cleric, expressed the need to provide social services such as food and water, as part of the strategy to hold territory. He stated “first Zanjibar then Aden”. Later in May 2, 2011, bin Laden was killed by a US Navy SEAL team in his mansion in Abbottabad, Pakistan, but Wuhayshi continued with his strategy and made an “unprecedented” effort to develop and provide social services such as water and electricity in Jaar and Zanjibar. Even though President Hadi has been confident in his success ridding Abyan of AQAP, the fighting continues to the present date.

Aden’s centrality and the U.S. approach

Indeed, Aden would be a vital strategic asset for Al Qaeda, providing a secure base for attacks in the Gulf of Aden, Bab el-Mandeb, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. Aden had been a prosperous maritime hub under the British as shipments through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal became an important part of world trade. Yet Aden declined over the last two decades. Because it was mismanaged by corrupt politicians, and Al Qaeda’s attacks on the USS Cole and the MV Limburg drove up the price of marine insurance, international shippers have neglected Aden since in favor of Jeddah, in Saudi Arabia, Port Sudan and Djibouti. Instead of prospering, Aden could remain a “Cinderella of the East”, so argues author Victoria Clark. The U.S. follows a three-fold strategy in Yemen: combating AQAP, development assistance and international support for stabilization. It has repeatedly targeted and eliminated high-profile targets in Yemen, using UAVs, military-led airstrikes and CIA operations.

Yet the U.S. counter-strategy depends on the Yemeni state’s ability to maintain national unity. Yemen’s armed forces, including the navy and the air force, are poorly equipped, insufficiently trained and lack morale, limiting the government’s ability to exert control outside of the capital and ensure territorial sovereignty on land or at sea. Al Qaeda’s new soft power strategy requires a different approach in supporting the Sana’a government: assistance to local administrations, building forces to protect local communities and developing basic services. Al Qaeda might be of primary concern for the U.S., but it is only one of many threats to the Yemeni state. Hadi has, however, concentrated his security forces to fight AQAP and neglected demands of the north and the south. As a result, the national dialogue conference is in risk of failure, increasing the secessionist threat. In turn, U.S. support should not primarily focus on combating AQAP but the ability to unite Yemen as a whole, decreasing the group’s attractiveness as an alternative to the central government.

This article originally appeared at CIMSEC and was republished by permission.

Chinese defence delegation visits Djibouti

China's Minister of Defence Chang Wanquan and a delegation of top Chinese military officials arrived in Djibouti on Monday (February 24th), where they are expected to sign an agreement on bilateral military co-operation, the Djiboutian Information Agency reported.

China's Minister of Defence Chang Wanquan and a delegation of top Chinese military officials arrived in Djibouti on Monday (February 24th), where they are expected to sign an agreement on bilateral military co-operation, the Djiboutian Information Agency reported.

War Deg Deg: Diyaarad Aan Duuliye Wadin Oo Weerarka Ku qaaday Degmada Baraawe Kuna Dishay Sheekh Cali Dheere Af Hayeenkii Al Shabaab

Wararka Maanta Naga soo gaaraya Degmada Baraawe Ee Gobolka Sh Hoose ayaa waxaa ay sheegayaan in Diyaarado dagaal ay Duqeyn ka geesteen magaalada halkaa oo la soo sheegayo in uu Jiro Khasaare Kala duwan .

Diyaarad Nuuca Aan Duuliyaha Lahayn  ah ay Duqeysay Guryaha Xubno ka Tirsan Hugaanka sare Ee Al shabaab  Wararka qaar ayaa sheegaya in uu ka mid yahay Raga la weeraray Afhayeen Ururka Cali Maxamuud Raage cali Dheere {Cali Dheere} Warar kala duwan ayaana ka soo baxaya Duqeynta .

Warar Qaar Ayaa Waxaa ay sheegayaan in Ciidan soo dagay ay qaateen maydka sarkaal sare oo Al Shabaab ka Tirsanaa in Kastoo aan la Ogeyn Somali iyo Ajaanib Cida uu Yahay Waxaana dadka ku dhaqan magaalada qaarkood oo Aan la Hadalnay ay Xaqiijiyeen Duqayntaan Xoogan.

Wali Ma jirto Cid Al Shabaab ka Tirsan oo ka hadashay Duqeynta loo Geestay Guryaha saraakiisha  iyo Khasaaraha ka soo gaaray intaba Waxaa kaloo aan Jirin War ka soo baxay Dowladda Somalia iyo dowladdaha taageera oo ay uga hadleen Duqeynta Cid Sheegatay in ay Iyadu ka dambeysay Ma Jirto waxaase Dhowr mar ooh ore Soo laa laabatay Duqeynta Saraakiisha Al Shabaab loogu Geysanayo Degmada baraawe iyo Tuulooyin Hoos Yimada.

Iyadoo  duqeyntii ugu dambeysay Dhawaan loogu Geestay Deegaanka Hoos Taga baraawe lagu dilay Sarkaalkii dhanka caafimaadka ugu sareyay Al Shabaab oo lagu Magacaabi Jiray Cabdul qaadir Camuu isku dhuuq Al Shabaabna iyaga oo ka cabsi qaba Duqeymaha ku sii badanaya Goobaha ay Joogaan saraakishoodu ayay Mamnuuceen barnaamijka Mobile Internetka Ee Shirkadaha is gaarsiinta .

AYAN OSMAN: DHAAWACYADII ARGAGAXA LAHAA EE KA SOO GAADHAY XASUUQII DAWLADII SIYAAD BARE OO HESHAY GARGAAR CAAFIMAAD OO CAALAMI AH

QALIINKII AYAAN CISMAAN IYO XAALADEEDA CAAFIMAAD

Melbourne, Australia: Waxaan ugu horeyn aan halkan ka salaamayaa dhamaanba macaamiisha gaarka ah ee ku soo aroorta Shabakada wararka ee caalamiga ah ee Hadhwanaagnews.com. Meel kasta iyo goob kasta oo aad joogtaanba waxaanu akhyaarey aan dhamaantiinba idin leenahay subax, galab iyo dabcan habeen wacan oo wanaagsan. Hadaba anigoo ku hadlaaya magaca ururka Somaliland-Australian Friendship Foundation. oo tixraaciisuna yahay  www.somalilandfoundation.com. Waxa maanta farxad weyn noo ah in aanu saaka cusbitaalka guud ee Wesley Hospital in aanu  ku soo booqanay Ayaan

Dhanka kale waxa aanu shalay subax ka qayb galnay shir jaraayid oo ay wada qabteen Dr Edna Adan Ismail iyo dhakhaatiirta cusbitaalka Wesley hospital oo ay warbixin ku siinayeen saxaafada dalkan Australia, gaar ahaan dhanka joornaalada iyo Telefeeshinada oo goobta ku sugnaa. Sida Chanel Seven, Chanel Nine iyo Chanel Ten.

Waxa kale oo iyaguna goobtaas ku sugnaa waa Telefeeshinka weyn ee caalamiga ah ee HCTV oo ay gadhwadeen ka ahaayeen labada suxufi ee ruug cadaaga ah ee kala ah Ahmed Hassan Awke iyo Abdisalan Ibrahim Mohamed (Hereri) Waxaanay halkaasi waraysi dheer kula yeesheen Dr Edna Adan Ismail, oo ka warbixisay xaalada guud ee Ayaan Cismaan, hada ku sugan tahay iyo dabcan sidii qiimaha lahayd ee halkaas loogu soo dhaweeyey intaba.

intaas ka dib, waxa hadaba labadan suxufi ay soo booqdeen isla markaasna su'aalo soo waydiiyeen Ayaan Osman oo ku jirta dhanka Waadhka ee loo yaqaano INTENSIVE CARE UNIT. Hadaba waraysigan oo uu qaaday suxufiga weyn ee Abdisalaan Hereri iyo dabcan dhamaanba barnaamijyada kale ee xiisaha badan ee labadan suxufi ee ka tirsan Telefeeshinka caalamiga ah ee HCTV ay idiinka soo diyaariyeen dalweynaha Australia. waxaad iyagoo dhamaystiran aad daawan ka daawan doontaan telefeeshinka caalamaiga ah ee HCTV, hadii Allaha awooda badani uu ogolaado. 

Waxaan hadaba aan jeclahay in aan mar labaad idin soo gaadhsiiyo in lagu guulaystay qaliinkii aadka u cuslaa ee ay ka hawl galeen ku dhawaad 23ka dhakhtar oo nooc kastaba iskugu jiray. Waxaanu aaminsanahay in Ayaan Osman Mohamed oo dhawaan soo gaadhay magaalada Brisbane ee dalweynaha Australia, aanay fursadan dahabiga ah ka hesheen meel kale oo ku taala Afrika amaba dunida muslimka intaba. waana wax ilaahay lagu mahadiyo oo loogu xamdi naqo.

Waxa kale oo aan si gaar ah iyo si guud ahaaneedba ugu mahad naqayaa Dr Edna Adan Ismail oo suurto gelisay in Ayaan Cismaan ay maanta hesho fursadan qaaliga ah oo ay halkan ku marto qaliin casri ah nooci ugu danbeeyey aduunka. "The latest and most sophisticated technology which was in fully operational." Waxaana hawshaas qaliinkeeda ka qayb qaatay in ka badan sadex iyo labaatan dhakhtar oo ku kala takhasusay cilmiga kala duwan ee loo yaqaano, Maxillofacial surgeon, Plastic surgeon, consultant Anesthetists and surgical surgeons. Waxaana qaliinkaasi socday in ka badan ilaa 11 saacadod oo is daba joog ah. Waana wax ilaahay lagu mahadiyo hawshaas culus ee ka qabsoontay cusbitaalka guud ee magaalada Brisbane.

Waxaad si joogto ah u filataan warbixino kale oo ku saabsan xaalada caafimaad ee ay hada ku sugantahay Ayaan Cismaan iyo socdaalka labada suxufi ee Cawke iyo Hereri iyo dabcan Dr Edna Adan Ismail. oo xaqiiqatan ah shaqsi aan la heli karin una qalanta, xaqna ay u leedahay in maanta iyadoo nool taalo loo dhiso.

Waxa kale oo aan u mahadnaqayaa Deeq Muuse oo qayb libaax ka qaatay isla markaasna isku soo duba riday abaabulka jaaliyada iyo sidii meel loogu heli lahaa ay Ayaan Cismaan hadhaw ku noolaato markay cusbitaalka ka soo baxdo. Waxa kale oo aan aad ugu mahad naqayaa jaaliyada reer Somaliland qaybaheeda kala duwan rag iyo dumarba  ee magaaladan Brisbane oo iyaguna hawshan gacan weyn ka geystay iyo dabcan umada kale ee Soomaaliyeed ee aanu walaalaha nahay ee gacanta weyn ka geystay arinta Ayaan Cismaan. Dhamaantiin waad mahadsan tihiin.

Waxaanan ugu danbayntii aan dhamaantiinba aan idinka codsanayaa meel kasta oo aad aduunka ka joogtaanba in aad ilaahay u baridaan in u Ayaan siiyo caafimaad degdeg ah... Hadaba Wixii kale ee akhbaar ah had iyo jeer fadlan isha ku haya oo haka ag dheeraan Hadhwanaagnews.com.

Drones Argument: This Debate Has Been Redacted

A new report details the awful civilian casualties inflicted by American drones, but the arguments over the weapons' use have begun to feel grimly familiar.

BY Sarah Knuckey

We are at an impasse in the debate over America's use of drones and so-called "targeted killings." It is an impasse that the U.S. government can, and should, resolve.

The debate has come to follow a depressingly predictable pattern. Initial reports about a drone strike quote anonymous officials claiming that a number of militants were targeted. Journalists and human rights investigators then get word that local residents say civilians were killed. More detailed investigations are carried out. Witness testimony and other evidence, such as photos or videos of the victims and fragments of the missile, are gathered. Then, long reports are published alleging that the strikes killed or injured innocent men, women or children. Supporters of current U.S. practices critique these reports of civilian casualties, questioning their biases, evidence, or methods. In response, drone program critics dispute the relevance or validity of those reviews.

Officially, the U.S. government does not respond, or simply states that all strikes are investigated and comply with the law. Anonymous officials provide additional details to a select group of journalists. Those outside the government pore over these fragments of information, attempting to extract some nugget of truth. People on all sides of the debate often demand more transparency, although they are often seeking different kinds of information for very different reasons.  

At this point, it almost feels scripted.

And, so, on Thursday, Human Rights Watch (HRW) released the most detailed account yet of one of the most controversial drone strikes of President Barack Obama's time in office: a widely reported December 2013 strike on a Yemeni wedding convoy that killed at least 12 and injured 15 more. The report concluded that while the United States may have intended to target suspected members of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the evidence suggests that "some, if not all of those killed and wounded were civilians." (Earlier journalistic accounts reached similar conclusions.)

HRW's findings demand an official response from the U.S. government -- and not just the platitudes officials and spokespersons have parroted for the past year.

HRW's findings demand an official response from the U.S. government -- and not just the platitudes officials and spokespersons have parroted for the past year. The government needs to explain this strike and respond to the evidence of civilian deaths.

HRW presents evidence of civilian harm caused by this strike, but its legal and policy conclusions are delicately couched. The group ultimately does not say definitely whether the strike violated applicable law or policy, instead stating that the strike "may have" violated the laws of war, and that it "raises serious questions" about whether policies were followed. And HRW acknowledges at various points that more information is needed to make firm conclusions.

With this careful language, HRW's latest report also brings to the fore the fundamental problem in attempting to assess U.S. strikes. There is an asymmetry of information that is virtually insurmountable: key information remains in the sole possession of the U.S. government.

The laws of war state that, in cases of doubt, individuals should be presumed civilian. But in U.S. public discussion, those killed in drone strikes de facto begin as militants. Injured victims and family members must provide evidence of their own civilian status. If the criticisms of NGOs are to have any impact in the U.S. debate, those groups must gather significant amounts of testimony, as well as additional corroborative evidence.

But how does one definitively prove civilian status? Or prove that no members of al-Qaeda were near the strike at the time it occurred, thereby countering the argument that the civilian harm was lawful and proportionate? And how can outside actors know if any nearby al-Qaeda operatives constituted high-value targets? How can outside actors assess whether the U.S. took reasonable precautions prior to the attack?

Alleged victims or NGOs can provide evidence documenting civilian deaths, but it may be possible that some other, publicly unknown information could indicate that a strike was legal or justifiable. Many cases are simply irresolvable without detailed information from Washington.  

And so the American public and the international community are left concerned and ultimately guessing, repeatedly asking the same questions about the specific legal, policy, and factual basis for strikes.

The reported impact of civilian casualties in America's drone war extend beyond the immediate deaths, with significant consequences for individual Yemenis and U.S. efforts to win over their hearts and minds.

HRW's report includes gruesome details, often absent from media accounts of strikes, on the wounds allegedly suffered by survivors. One man lost an eye, another his genitals.

HRW's report includes gruesome details, often absent from media accounts of strikes, on the wounds allegedly suffered by survivors. One man lost an eye, another his genitals. The report also highlights the broader, secondary impacts on family members. One of those allegedly killed left behind a blind father, a wife, and seven children, including a newborn. The groom in the convoy is quoted as saying that his wedding "became a funeral." A local sheikh who says he witnessed the strike says that the United States "turned many kids into orphans, many wives into widows." Other relatives and tribesman are said to have denounced the United States and Yemen, temporarily blocked a main road in protest, and demanded an international investigation.  

Yet the U.S. government refuses to meaningfully engage on the issues surrounding strikes like the one on the wedding convoy and refuses to explain its legal interpretations, specific policies, or conduct. In October 2013, HRW and Amnesty International released major reports detailing evidence of civilian deaths resulting from U.S. strikes, alleging that certain strikes between 2009 and 2013 violated international law and U.S. policy. The government responded to those reports by stating that it had not violated the law and claiming that it carefully examines whether any strike caused civilian deaths. No specific evidence refuting the reports was offered.

Government officials also referred to a May 2013 speech in which Obama publicly addressed drone strikes and released a summarized version of new policies governing targeted killings, which promulgated new restrictions on such strikes. The president stated that a strike would not be launched unless there was a "near-certainty" that no civilians would be hurt or killed and only where a target posed a "continuing and imminent threat" and could not be feasibly captured. Shortly thereafter, Secretary of State John Kerry stated, "We do not fire when we know there are children or collateral [damage]....We just don't."

U.S. officials have repeatedly leaned on these kinds of assurances. They did so once more on Thursday in responding to HRW's new report. A Pentagon spokesman refused to comment on specifics, referring the Associated Press to Yemeni government statements that the targets were members of  AQAP. The National Security Council's spokeswoman, Caitlin Hayden, provided the Washington Post and Al Jazeera the same response she has offered journalists many times in the past: She would not comment on specifics, said the United States takes extraordinary care in its use of drones, and emphasized that civilian casualty claims are thoroughly investigated. The State Department seems to have not responded at all.

Meanwhile, anonymous U.S. officials "leaked" to the AP that two government investigations "concluded that only members of al-Qaida were killed" in the strike. How do they know this? What investigations were undertaken?

In the past, officials have stated that they "harness" their "relevant intelligence capabilities," gathering information from a "myriad" of sources. But it is has never been clear what kinds of investigations the government actually conducts. Indeed, the author of this latest HRW report, Letta Tayler, the organization's senior terrorism and counterterrorism researcher, told me that she found no evidence that the United States had interviewed alleged witnesses of the wedding strike. And, on Thursday, Cori Crider, a lawyer at the NGO Reprieve, which investigates and has conducted advocacy against U.S. targeted killings practices, stated that the group wrote directly to the National Security Council about the strike "offering to connect them to witnesses and were ignored." In addition, two senior Yemeni officials told HRW that their sources said civilians were among the dead. But we still don't know what steps the United States took to determine that all those killed were al Qaeda.

U.S. lawmakers who had apparently watched a video of the wedding strike told the AP that the video "showed three trucks in the convoy were hit, all carrying armed men." But it is widely known that carrying guns in this region of Yemen is common and hardly indicative on its own of militancy. Surely, U.S. investigations and congressional oversight are based on far more than simply reviewing video in the aftermath of a strike, especially in a case like this.  But we don't know, because the government won't explain investigation outcomes or processes.

After Obama's May 2013 speech, criticism of U.S. drone strikes significantly abated. Many critics of the administration were apparently satisfied that the targeting rules were restrictive and that real reform on improved transparency was near. But Thursday's careful, detailed HRW report indicates that much, much more needs to be done to assure the public of the legality, ethics, and strategic effectiveness of the U.S. targeted killing program -- and to ensure accountability. The U.S. government should take the first necessary step to resolve the impasse over drone strikes by sharing information -- by explaining, on the record, its investigations into the wedding convoy strike and releasing at the very least redacted versions of the results of its investigations. It should do the same for past strikes in which civilian casualties have been credibly alleged, and for future ones.

MOHAMMED HUWAIS/AFP/Getty Images

The $20 Million Case for Morocco

The kingdom is using an army of flacks to keep the illusion of peace and stability.

BY Eliza Barclay , Kristen Chick

AAYOUNE, Morocco — The peculiar form of Western Saharan hospitality, at least as practiced by the Moroccan government, is to watch visitors closely. Upon our arrival last winter to Laayoune, the capital of this disputed territory, as part of a delegation of six female journalists, the first gesture was two pairs of headlights behind us as we drove from the airport to our hotel. We'd been invited by the International Women's Media Foundation (IWMF) to travel to Western Sahara to report on this often forgotten story.

Men in dark sunglasses and leather jackets were ready for our arrival at the hotel, posted on the corners across the street. As our group of six journalists and two IWMF staffers traveled around town in the days to come, the men stayed close, on motorbikes and in dark cars. These men, who looked like the security agents ubiquitous around the Middle East, usually pulled around a nearby corner as we rolled to a stop. When we looked their way, they made feeble attempts to duck around a corner or hide behind a car.

This kind of surveillance, we'd been warned, was standard for foreign visitors to Western Sahara. Even tourists report being followed and watched. We knew that journalists -- and anyone else who might meet with the local activists who seek independence from Morocco -- were subject to special scrutiny and sometimes expelled. Morocco claims Western Sahara as its own and has occupied the territory since 1976, when an indigenous independence movement led by the Algeria-funded Polisario Front began fighting Moroccan troops. Western Sahara is the only territory in Africa still on the United Nations' list of non-self-governing territories -- places that wait in limbo to be decolonized.

Today Western Sahara is one of the world's longest-running unresolved conflicts. Despite the ceasefire signed between Morocco and the Western Sahara liberation movement, called the Polisario, in 1991, the territory's status has to this day never been finally settled. With so many other conflicts today absorbing the international community's attention, the half-peace in Western Sahara means the issue has been relegated to the sidelines of international diplomacy.

As we experienced firsthand, Morocco does not just rely on anonymous security agents -- it also uses press flacks and de facto Washington lobbyists to burnish its image abroad. The day after we arrived, a representative of the Ministry of Communications in Rabat, Mohamed El Bour, showed up to orchestrate our meetings with local officials and focus our attention on Western Sahara's economic promise rather than its political strife. On our third day in Laayoune, he was joined by a woman in a dark suit, stilettos, and sunglasses.

She introduced herself as Fatima-Zohra Rachidi, also with the Ministry of Communications in Rabat. She was in Laayoune with another delegation and had been asked to join us at the last minute, she said in a flawless American accent. The line "I just happened to be here" was one we would also hear from many Rabat-based officials we encountered in Western Sahara, and one we came to doubt. "Let me know if you need anything," she added breezily.

Fatima remained with us the rest our time in Western Sahara, accompanying us to several of our meetings with officials and groups with close ties to the government. (She and the minders did not accompany us when we met opposition activists.) She was mostly quiet during meetings -- but was obviously listening closely, stepping in occasionally to re-translate a salient point about the government's position into English.

On our final day in the territory, as we sat in the departure lounge of the airport, we were summoned to the VIP lounge, where the Moroccan-appointed provincial governor lectured us about being fair in our coverage. And there was Fatima again: She stood among the local officials who flanked the governor, and, because she was there to help the government communicate, interrupted our translator to clarify a few points of the governor's monologue. When he was through, we asked for her card -- she had no more left, she said, but gave us a Gmail address with which to reach her in Rabat. 

We quickly discovered that Fatima was not only a government emissary, but an example of the close ties the kingdom maintains to Washington lobbying shops. After we left Western Sahara, we found Fatima's picture on the website of the Gabriel Company, a Washington lobbying firm headed by former U.S. Ambassador to Morocco Edward Gabriel. On the Gabriel Company's website, she goes by the name Fatima-Zohra Kurtz.

The Gabriel Company has had the Moroccan government as a client since 2002, and during that time has been paid more than $3.7 million, according to records filed under the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA). FARA requires foreign governments and the groups they hire to lobby on their behalf in the United States to file detailed reports of their lobbying activities with the Justice Department.

The Gabriel Company's fees are just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the funds Morocco has lavished on lobbyists to stay on Washington's good side. Since 2007, the kingdom has employed nine U.S. lobbying firms, according to FARA records.

Altogether, since 2007 the kingdom has spent roughly $20 million lobbying policymakers and soliciting sympathetic coverage from journalists in the United States on all issues, including Western Sahara.

Altogether, since 2007 the kingdom has spent roughly $20 million lobbying policymakers and soliciting sympathetic coverage from journalists in the United States on all issues, including Western Sahara. In 2009, it lobbied members of Congress, the executive branch and journalists more than any other Arab country -- more than twice as much as Egypt, according to the Sunlight Foundation, a Washington-based nonprofit that advocates for government accountability and transparency.

Fatima accounted for the difference between what she told us was her surname, and what she goes by with the Gabriel Company, by saying she uses her maiden name, Rachidi, in Morocco and Kurtz, the name of her ex-husband, in the United States.

Whichever name she's using, her career provides a window into the interlocking network of nonprofits and lobbying firms that are tasked with boosting Morocco's image in Washington. In addition to what she called a consulting job with the Ministry of Communications and her vice presidency at the Gabriel Company, Fatima also works for other organizations funded by the kingdom. She heads the Moroccan American Cultural Center, which tries to build cultural ties between the United States and Morocco through events and is one of the three organizations under the umbrella of the Moroccan American Center. The Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP), a registered Washington lobbying firm the Moroccan government relies on heavily, is another organization under the same umbrella. And while it's not listed on the website, a contract filed under FARA revealed that Fatima is also MACP's senior vice president for operations.

Morocco has paid more money to MACP than any other U.S. firm it has hired to influence lawmakers and journalists. According to filings made under FARA, the kingdom has paid more than $13.8 million to MACP since 2007 to contact journalists, congressmen, and State Department officials to advance Morocco's interests.

When contacted at the Gabriel Company office on K Street in Washington, Fatima vehemently denied that she has ever been a lobbyist for the two lobbying firms where she's an executive. She said that from 2003 to 2009, she was registered as a lobbyist with FARA, which requires people engaged in direct lobbying or "quasi political activities" on behalf of a foreign government to disclose the details of those activities. But she said she deregistered in 2009 at the advice of her lawyer, because she "did not participate in lobbying activities." But since U.S. law is vague about what qualifies as "quasi political activities," Fatima seems to operate in a legal gray area where what constitutes lobbying and what doesn't is hard to pinpoint.

* * * 

Since the start of the Arab Spring, Morocco has been keen to project an image of stability in a troubled region.

Since the start of the Arab Spring, Morocco has been keen to project an image of stability in a troubled region. As fellow North African countries like Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt have struggled to follow through on the promise of their revolutions, Morocco has pitched itself as a regional player able to offer the kind of security guarantees Europe and the United States are looking for.

According to FARA records, Western Sahara has consistently been a key topic in Morocco's lobbying of Washington. The kingdom's lobbyists have framed Morocco's struggle for control of the territory as another front in America's war on terror. In April 2013, MACP circulated an editorial by email arguing that the refugee camps in Algeria filled with Western Sahara citizens have "reportedly become a recruiting grounds for al-Qaeda-linked groups," a development that should prompt "active diplomatic action from the United States."

A May 2012 PowerPoint presentation attached to the FARA records submitted by LeClairRyan, another Washington group lobbying for Morocco, warns darkly about the chaos that would follow Morocco's withdrawal from the territory.

"Morocco can never allow -- nor would any other country in its position allow -- [Western Sahara] to become an 'independent state,' because as such it would be incredibly weak, a failed state from Day One, and a magnet for terrorism, drug trafficking, human trafficking and other evils," the presentation warns.

Morocco's millions appear to have been effectively spent, as the United States has never pressured the kingdom to follow through on its pledge to hold a referendum on self-determination in Western Sahara. The 2014 appropriations bill recently passed by Congress mandates, for the first time, that some of the foreign aid to Morocco be used in Western Sahara. The bill specifically stipulates that the State Department develop a plan to "resolve the longstanding dispute over the Western Sahara, based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty." The MACP cheered this development in a press release.

The lack of public attention on Western Sahara may be one reason its lobbying is so successful: Stephen Zunes, a professor at the University of San Francisco, who wrote a book about the conflict, said that because it is relatively unknown to the public, Moroccan lobbying can have a "disproportionate amount of influence" on attitudes in Washington.

"The reason [the U.S.-Moroccan alliance] hasn't been challenged, the reason it's not an issue, is because of the influence the lobby has on Congress," said Zunes.

Of course, the other side lobbies, too. Algeria, a long-time supporter of the Polisario and Western Sahara independence, also retains lobbyists in Washington -- but the funds it spends are dwarfed by Rabat. Between 2007 and 2013, Algeria spent roughly $2.4 million lobbying Capitol Hill, according to FARA -- or slightly more than 10 percent of the funds Morocco has spent. FARA records show that almost all meetings organized by Algiers-funded lobbyists are about Western Sahara. The Polisario hired Independent Diplomat to represent the group in Washington in 2008, and has paid it $42,433 since 2009.

Several congressional offices declined to talk about their meetings with lobbyists, and others did not respond to repeated requests for interviews.

* * * 

So far, Morocco's image consultants seem to blur their association with U.S. lobbying firms. When we contacted Fatima in April, she said she saw no reason to mention her work at the Gabriel Company, the MACP, or MACC when we first met her because it was unrelated to her work in Western Sahara as a consultant for the Ministry of Communications. And though we found a contract she'd signed on behalf of MACP hiring the lobbying firm Western Hemisphere Strategies, headed by former Congressman Lincoln Diaz-Balart, to "positively affect relations between the United States and Morocco," she called her role purely administrative.

Bill Allison, the editorial director of the Sunlight Foundation, an organization dedicated to government transparency, says anyone who attempts to shift the U.S. public debate on behalf of a foreign power should register as a lobbyist. "If you're trying to influence U.S. public opinion, and that would include talking to journalists, you're supposed to be registered [with FARA]," says Allison. "That includes if you're in a role presenting the Moroccan government's views, trying to create a favorable impression. The whole point of FARA is so that you can know who you're talking to, and there is no ambiguity. " (The Justice Department declined to comment on Fatima's unregistered status.)

However they get the job done, Morocco's lobbying efforts still appear capable of influencing American policy. The U.S. mission to the United Nations, for instance, recently proposed adding a human rights mandate to the U.N. mission in Western Sahara -- it is, after all, currently the only U.N. peacekeeping force without one. But the United States dropped the proposal after the government of Morocco and its allies lobbied against it -- and even canceled an annual joint military exercise for U.S. and Moroccan troops in Morocco. The U.S. then reverted to its longstanding position of posing no serious challenge to Morocco's position on Western Sahara.

That non-confrontational attitude looks set to continue. On Nov. 22, President Barack Obama received King Mohammed VI in the Oval Office -- and used the meeting to hug the kingdom even tighter. In a statement following the meeting, Obama and the king also reaffirmed their commitment to working together "to counter the threat of violent extremism in the region." The White House also praised Morocco's plan for the Western Sahara, which is widely rejected by Sahrawi activists, as "serious, realistic, and credible."

Meanwhile, as Morocco continues to spend millions on lobbyists and public relations efforts, the decades-long conflicts drags on with no end in sight.

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