This is where you can follow the important socio-economic, geopolitical and security developments, going inside the Republic of Somaliland and Horn of Africa region
Strasbourg
(France)- February 1, 2014 (SPS) -Rapporteur of the Committee for Political and Democratic Affairs of the
Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly Liliane Maury Pasquier presented on
Wednesday, at the headquarters of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, its
first report on Western Sahara before the Committee for Political and
Democratic Affairs, entitled "Contribution of the Council of Europe to a
solution to the Western Sahara conflict."
Appointed
by the Council of Europe to prepare a report on the situation in Western
Sahara, Maury Pasquier paid two visits to the occupied territories and the
Sahrawi refugee camps in May and October to discuss how Europe could contribute
to resolve the conflict in Western Sahara.
Representatives
of the Saharawi civil society including human rights defenders, Mtou Ahnini
Mostafa, member of the Association of Parents of Saharawis prisoners and
disappeared and Ghalia Adjimi representing the Sahrawi Association of Victims
of human rights violations committed by the Moroccan State were invited to
testify.
Ghalia
Adjimi seized the opportunity to "refute Morocco’s allegations" on
democratic development in the territory of Western Sahara and to discuss the
ongoing violations against the fundamental freedoms of the Saharawi people.
(SPS)
We’d like to think that we’ve gained
a little expertise about baby-making since our teenage years. After all, we no
longer think you can’t get pregnant your first time or that birth control ruins
your future chances of having a baby. But apparently most women still have a ton of misconceptions about their fertility,
according to a recent study in the journal Fertility & Sterility.
And while having the wrong info in high school was embarrassing, believing
these myths now can really screw with your chances of getting pregnant. Check
out some of the most common myths the study uncovered, and get the facts behind
each one.
Myth #1: Your Weird Period Won’t
Affect Your Chances of Getting Pregnant
If your time of the month is wildly
unpredictable, it can definitely impact how long it takes you to get pregnant.
If you have only a few periods a year, you’re automatically reducing your
probability of conceiving, says study author Lubna Pal, M.S., F.A.C.O.G.,
associate professor of obstetrics, gynecology, and reproductive sciences at
Yale School of Medicine. And if your cycle varies in duration from month to
month, it’ll be harder to pinpoint exactly when you’re ovulating.
Myth #2: Having Sex More Than Once a
Day Will Up Your Odds of Getting Pregnant
Half of women falsely believe this
myth, and while it almost seems probable, it’s definitely not true. “Unlike a
woman, who releases one egg each cycle, in an ejaculate there are millions of
sperm, and only one sperm is needed to do the job,” says Pal. Plus, every time
your guy ejaculates, the volume of it goes down, as well as the number of sperm
released. “Having intercourse more than once does not enhance the ability for
that one sperm to get where it needs to be,” says Pal. Of course, that doesn’t
mean you shouldn’t get it on multiple times if you just want to for fun.
Myth #3: That STD You Had in Your 20s
Probably Didn’t Affect Your Fertility
More than one-quarter of women don’t
know the impact that STDs can have on fertility. Unfortunately, many STDs like
chlamydia, gonorrhea, and pelvic inflammatory disease can result in damage to
your fallopian tubes, says Pal. And when your tubes are blocked, the chances of
sperm and egg meeting are decreased. Even if they do meet, your odds of having
an ectopic pregnancy increase with tubal damage. That’s why it’s crucial to
diagnose and treat STDs as soon as possible, says Pal. And if you’ve had a
history of STDs, consult your physician as soon as you’re ready to get pregnant
in order to identify any damage and improve your odds of conceiving.
Myth #4: Getting Older Doesn’t Have
a Huge Impact on Fertility—Tons of Women Have Babies in Their 40s!
Shockingly, one-fifth of women are
unaware of the effects of aging on fertility. While it certainly seems like
many women are getting pregnant later in life, that doesn’t mean it’s easy
to get knocked up past your mid-30s. In general, it’s around age 36-37 when you
see a change in your ability to conceive, says Pal. “It takes longer to get
pregnant, you’re more likely to miscarry, and more likely to have a child with
genetic abnormalities such as Down syndrome.” Of course, that doesn’t mean that
every woman follows the same trajectory—how quickly you get pregnant will vary,
depending on various factors (like if you’re a smoker or if your mother
conceived much later in life). “Advancing age is detrimental to egg quantity
and quality, but that concept needs to be individualized to the woman,” says
Pal.
Myth #5: Certain Sex Positions
Increase Your Chance of Getting Pregnant
No, gravity doesn’t play a role in
getting you knocked up, though more than one-third of women think specific
positions could work better than others. Even though this is totally false,
it’s not exactly a harmful myth to believe, says Pal. That is, it won’t negatively
impact your chances of getting pregnant. So if you want to tell your guy that
girl-on-top has a way better success rate, we won’t tell.
Myth #6: When You’re Trying to Get
Pregnant, You Should Wait Until Ovulation Occurs or Just After It Occurs to
Have Sex
Only 10 percent of women in the
study knew that sex should happen before ovulation in order to get pregnant. If
you’re using an at-home ovulation test, that will tell you when you get the
surge of hormones right before ovulation, which means ovulation may be
24-48 hours away, says Pal. That means you should start having sex pronto
because sperm can live in your body and fertilize an egg up to three to five
days after you have sex. So if you wait until ovulation begins, you’re
essentially missing your window, says Pal.
Myth #7: Your Gyno Will Let You Know
If You Have Any Problems With Fertility
Only 50 percent of women reported
ever having discussed their reproductive health with their doctors. That’s huge
because when you go in for your annual gyno visit, your doctor is usually only
focused on what’s going on that day. They’re probably not going to talk to you
about your chances of getting pregnant and what factors can help or hinder your
odds—unless you bring it up first, says Pal. Her advice: Make a point of
discussing your fertility—and be sure to take notes!
Waxa ay aheyd subax Isniineed, 30kii January 1984. Xilligu waa jiilaal, dhulka oogadiisa oo dhan waxa ku shaqlanaa dhedo iyo ciiro ay soo jiiteen buuraha dhaadheer ee magaalada ku xeeran. Dadku nabad ayey ku waabariisteen intooda badanina waxa ay ku foofeen hawl maalmoodkoodii, ganacsatadu waxa ay fureen irridihii meheradahooda, dadkuna waxa ay bilaabeen wax kala iibsi .Waxay aheyd goor ay bulshadii miyigu iyagoo wada waxyaabihii noloshooda iyo magaaladaba lagama maarmaanka u ahaa sida: Subagga, Caanaha, qoryaha (xaabada), dhuxusha iyo xoolahaba ay ku soo beegnaayeen badhtamaha suuqa Waxay aheyd wakhti intii safreysay iyo intii sagootineysayba ay is lahaayeen tusan iyo macasalaama. Wakhtigaas ardeyda iyo macalimiintuba waxay ku hawlanayeen dhigita iyo dhageysiga casharada dugsiga.
Cidina ma fileen wax dareen colaadeed oo ku soo fool leh. Hase yeeshee waqti ay saacadu aheyd tobankii subaxnimo ayaa dadka qaarkii ay maqleen guux ,dareen weyn baa galay dadka ,hase yeeshee samada waxba lagama arkeyn oo dhedo iyo ciiro ayaa weli ku shaqlaneyd buuraha figtooda. Guuxii waa uu soo dhawaaday dadkii oo dhamina sakati iyo werwer ayey dhagaha la taageen, cidise ma haleelin dhaqaaq ka badan dhowr talaabo. waxa markaliya isha lagu dhuftay oo soo kulay dadkii raxan diyaaradaha dagaalka oo ka soo dhex baxay ceeryaantii kuwasoo soo laalaadiyey gantaalihii iyo bombooyinkii ay xambaarsanayeen. Magaaladii oo dhan waxa qariyey siigo, olol onkod iyo dayaan is wata oo dadkii oo dhan ku riday argagax naf iyo noloba ka quusiyey.
Isla maalintaa isniineed saacaddu markay aheyd 2:15 (labadii iyo rubuc )ayaa Radio muqdisho warkiisii dhurnimo lagu sheegay in dayuuradaha dagaalka ee maamulkii Mingistu ee Ethiopia ay weerar ku soo qaadeen degmada Borama iyo tuulada Goraya Cawl oo ka tirsan degaanka gobolka Awdal . Weerarkaas bahalnimada waxa geystay lix dayuuradood oo ah ku dagaalka oo noocoodu ahaa miig 21 iyo miig 23. Isugeyntii dadkii ku dhintay weerarkaas waxa ay gaadheen 70 qof oo 37 ka mid ah ay ahaayeen ardeydii dugsiyada hoose ee degmada Borama.. kuawsoo da,adoodu udhaxeysay 6-14 jir iyo afar macallin oo shaqo qaran ahaa. Waxa kaloo ku dhaawacmay 110 kale oo iskugu jira arday iyo shacbiga ba.,iyadoo isla markaana ay burburiyeen 70 guri iyo afar dugsi oo hoose /dhexe iyo xaruuntii xanaanada caruurta (MCH)
Intayadii warkaas dhageysatay ee xamar ku nooleyd waxan la istaagnay naxdin iyo argagax iyadoo qofwalba oo reer Awdal ahi ka fakarayey sidii war intaas ka faahfaasan loo heli lahaa . Waxan dabadeed tagnay boostii Xamar ee Telefoonada halkasoo reer Awdal ay saf ugu jireen . waxa noo suura gashay in ogaano in adeerkay oo aan guri wada daganeyn oo la yiraahdo Maxamed Cabdilaahi mixile nasiib daro ay walaashii oo sadexani ku jirtay dadka ku geeriyooday weerarka . waxay ilmaheeda ka soo kaxeysay xarunta xanaada caruurta midna dhabarka ayey ku siday markii weerarku haleelay , halkaas ayaa saddexdoodiiba ay ku dhinteen(alaa yarxama).waxan usoo baxnay Arbacadii socdaal aniga iyo mixile iyadoo dayaaradan ay saarnaayeen dad reer Awdal oo sidoo kale qoyskoodii geeridu ku dhacday. waxan nimid Hargeysa oo aan markiiba dhaafnay si aan tacsida ugaarno .Dhamaan baabuurta Hargeysa ka baxeysay waxay sideen dad gurmad oo ka kala yimid gobolada dalka .
Dadka magaalada waxa ka muuqatay jawi geeri, argagax iyo naxdin ,inteeda badanna waxa magaalada qariyey teendheeyooyin laga dhisay guryaha hortooda oo lagu qabanayey tacsida.waxa se la isku gubabinayey in samir iyo dulqaadka lagu dadaalo.Sarkaal ka tirsan bangiga degmada boorama ayaa ii sheegay in weli uu naxsan yahay waxa uu yidhi “waxa ku jiray bangiga mar qudha ayaa albaabadii iyo daaqadihii ay soo dhaceen gantaal nagu dhacayna ma jirin”.
Waxa magaalada yimid wufuud badan oo ka tirsanaa xukuumadda iyo ku shisheeha oo ka kala socday safaaradaha Masar, Mareykanka , Shiinaha, Ingiriiska, Faransiiska iyo kiiniya kuwasoo tagay oo booqday xabaal wadereedii (mass grave) lagu aasay dadka. iyagoo weliba ubax dhigay taalo loo qoondeeyey in lagu xasuustoo xasuuqaasi bahalnimada ah . waxa kaloo yimid weriyaal isku jira soomali iyo ajnabi ah . Gabadh ka tirsaneyd wariyaasha oo ka socotay tvga magaalada Henlay oo ay Borama mataano yihiin ayaa ii sheegtay “inay ilmeysay markii ay cusbitaalka boorama ku booqatay dhawacii oo ku jirtay gabadh yar oo sideed jir ah oo ku indho beeshay weerarkaas”.
Gudoomiyaha golaha degaanka degmada Borama Sh Cabdillaahi Sh. Cali Jowhar ayaa ii sheegay”in weerarkan lala beegsaday dad caruur iyo maato ah oo aan waxba geysan (soft target) ka soo ka baxsan aadaminimada, waxanu urajeeyey in samir iy iimaan ka siiyo dadka reer Borama intii dhimateyna ilaahay unaxariisto “
The 33rd Spanish Air Forces Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA) crew joins the EU Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia Operation Atalanta. The 32nd and 33rd crew rotations performed their hand over in Djibouti on 23 January 2014.
Spanish MPRA detachment is composed of 44 people. The aircrew and maintenance members usually join the mission for a two months period.
During the last two months with the EU’s counter-piracy Operation Atalanta, the outgoing personnel of the 32nd rotation, usually based in Palma de Mallorca with the Spanish Air Forces Wing 48, has flown 25 night and day sorties.
With more than 200 flying hours, they have flown over 26.000 nautical miles. This comes up to at least one trip all around the world.
Spanish detachment of the EU Naval Force MPRA “Orion” has been able to fly without cancelling any tasked mission since June 2012. Their contribution to the EU’s counter piracy operation has been of enormous value, and their achievements are based on their outstanding willingness and enthusiasm.
On Saturday 18 January 2014, the French EU Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia Operation Atalanta flagship FS Siroco in cooperation with Japanese assets released the crew of a Dhow that was suspected to have been used as pirate mother-ship. The flagship apprehended 5 suspected pirates believed to be responsible for an attack on an oil tanker in the Gulf of Aden a day earlier.
The oil tanker issued a distress call to the UK Maritime Trade Operation (UKMTO) on the evening of Friday, 17 January, reporting to be under attack. According to the reports, the attack was repelled by a private armed security team embarked on board the oil tanker. The skiff then headed to a dhow which lingered nearby.
The EU Naval Force, in cooperation with other Counter Piracy Forces, reacted quickly to this incident. A Japanese Maritime Patrol Aircraft and a helicopter from the Japanese vessel JS Samidare, in associated support to theCombined Maritime Forces (CMF/CTF 151),initially located the dhow. The EU NAVFOR flagship FS Siroco was then able to close distance to the dhow and launch their helicopter and boarding team.
Upon nearing the dhow, the helicopter crew and boarding team observed that people on board the dhow were throwing equipment over board, deepening the suspicion that the dhow was indeed the reported pirate mother-ship.
Once the Siroco’s team boarded the dhow, 5 Somali suspect pirates surrendered and were separated from the dhow’s crew and transferred to FS Siroco for further investigation. As always, the EU Naval Force seeks, if possible, a legal finish with the prosecution of the suspected pirates.
The master’s initial statement supported the suspicion that his dhow has been pirated and his crew taken hostage several days ago off the coast of Somalia. He also stated that the suspect pirates were responsible for the attack on the oil tanker the day before.
EU Naval Force deters, prevents and represses acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia. EU Naval Force ships protect World Food Programme vessels delivering aid to Somalia and AMISOM shipping. EU Naval Force ships also contribute to the monitoring of fishing activity off the Somali Coast.
The EU chairs in 2014 the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). The EU is keen to mobilise international support to eradicate Somali piracy once and for all, not only by addressing the symptoms at sea but also by addressing the root causes of piracy ashore.
After a power struggle between South Sudanese President
Salva Kiir and his former vice president, Riek Machar, plunged the world's
newest state into crisis in mid-December, the international community dutifully
mobilized to bring the warring parties to the negotiating table. Right now, as
South Sudan slides toward open civil war, representatives from both sides are
engaged in direct, face-to-face talks in Addis Ababa. Unfortunately, however,
the international community is misleading Africa yet again. The track record
for face-to-face negotiation in post-colonial Africa -- and in Sudan itself --
is abysmal. Instead of trudging down the same, well-worn path toward failure,
South Sudan should look to traditional modes of conflict resolution to end the
current standoff.
More than 40 wars have been fought on the continent since
1970. Year after year, one African country after another has imploded with
deafening staccato, scattering refugees in all directions: Sudan erupted in
1972, Angola and Mozambique in 1975, and Ethiopia in 1985. Then came Liberia
(1992), Somalia (1993), Rwanda (1994), Zaire (1996), Sierra Leone (1997), Congo
(1998), Ethiopia/Eritrea (1998), Guinea (1999, 2010), Ivory Coast (2001, 2005,
2010), Libya (2011), Mali (2012), and now the Central African Republic and
South Sudan.
Almost without exception, attempts to reach peace accords
have ended in failure. The most common modality has been the direct,
face-to-face negotiation between the warring factions -- a Western approach
often pushed by a well-intentioned international community. But this has seldom
worked in Africa.
Face-to-face negotiations only succeed when factional
leaders want peace or are forced to pay a price for the mayhem they wreak --
conditions that have rarely been met in Africa. More often than not, conflict
becomes profitable for warlords because it provides them with opportunities to
rape, pillage, and plunder natural resources. For rebel soldiers, their weapons
are often their livelihoods. Likewise, government soldiers sometimes live by
looting, since they are routinely unpaid by their cash-strapped governments.
Countless examples can be drawn from the wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Conflict also gives national governments
a ready-made excuse -- "national security" -- to suspend development
projects, halt provision of social services, and keep their defense budgets
secret, thereby shielding corrupt dealings from scrutiny.
Face-to-face negotiations often reinforce these wartime
patterns by failing to dole out punishment for combatants. Often, militant
leaders are actually rewarded at the negotiating table, gaining the
respectability and influence that comes with international recognition. Back in
1993, the late Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed was transported in U.S.
military aircraft to Addis Ababa to take part in peace negotiations. The
spectacle raised Aideed's stature and bolstered his confidence in becoming
Somalia's next president -- only months before his forces killed 18 U.S.
Rangers in Mogadishu. In a similarly outrageous arrangement brokered by the
international community, the head of the notorious Revolutionary United Front
(RUF) -- which chopped off the limbs of everyone, including women and children,
who stood in their way -- was made Sierra Leone's minister of lands and mines
in 1999.
A related problem with direct, face-to-face negotiations
is that they often lead to the establishment of what are invariably termed
"governments of national unity" -- clumsy attempts to forge
power-sharing agreements between warring factions that have only just agreed to
put their weapons down. This, of course, defies common sense. How are mortal
enemies expected to cast all suspicion aside and blithely work together for the
benefit of all? Most of the time they don't, and conflict breaks out again
(See: Angola in 1992, Congo in 1999, Sierra Leone in 2000, and Ivory Coast in
January 2003). But it's not just that unity governments are destined to fail;
it's that when they succeed, they amount to blueprints for the joint-plunder of
the state. Ministerial and governmental positions are divvied up between
government and rebel leaders -- invariably igniting bitter squabbles in the
process -- and then the rent-seeking begins.
Making matters worse, African leaders seldom honor
agreements they append their names to, much less implement them in good faith.
During the Ivoirian crisis in 2003, for example, a peace accord was signed in
Ghana establishing a power-sharing deal between the government of President
Laurent Gbagbo, which controlled the southern half of the country, and rebel
groups that controlled the north and much of the west. But conflict soon
erupted over the distribution of cabinet posts, and Gbagbo flouted the accord
by refusing to spell out the powers he would cede to the opposition and only
funding the government ministries he controlled. Predictably, fighting broke
out again, threatening to reignite the civil war.
A similar script played out in Liberia during the civil
war that saw tens of thousands slaughtered, raped, and maimed between 1999 and
2003. At peace talks in Ghana in June 2003, President Charles Taylor, who had
been indicted for war crimes by a U.N-Sierra Leone court, pledged to step down
under a cease-fire his government signed with two of the rebel groups battling
his regime. The agreement called for Taylor's resignation and the formation of
a transitional government, composed of the government, rebels, and political
parties, among others. But within hours of signing the accord, Taylor's
government was backtracking on the question of his resignation. In the end, it
was only after an intense bombardment of Monrovia -- coupled with heightened
international pressure and an offer of political asylum in Nigeria -- that
Taylor finally resigned in August 2003.
More than 30 such peace accords have been brokered in
Africa since the 1970s -- and the track record has been appalling. Only
Mozambique's 1991 peace accord has endured, and even now it appears shaky as
clashes between the government and the rebel group Renamo have flared recently
over implementation. Elsewhere, peace accords were shredded like confetti even
before the ink on them was dry. The most spectacular failures occurred in
Angola (1991 and 1994), Burundi (1993), Rwanda (1993), Sierra Leone (1999),
Democratic Republic of Congo (1999), and Ivory Coast (2003). All collapsed
because face-to-face talks were marred by brinkmanship and broken promises.
Even where peace accords are successfully concluded and
unity governments are established, they are almost always short-lived. Angola's
unity government failed after six months in 1992. Congo's 2003 unity government
created four vice presidents but did not bring peace to the eastern part of the
country. Burundi's civil war flared up again in August 2003, despite the
establishment of a unity government brokered by former South African President
Nelson Mandela and Ivory Coast's 2003 unity government has proceeded in fits
and starts. Kenya's unity government has floundered since 2008; Zimbabwe's
since 2009.
Given this record, it is difficult to be optimistic about
South Sudan's current peace talks in Addis Ababa. Add to this the fact that the
South's 2005 power-sharing agreement with Sudanese President Omar Bashir failed
miserably and that Kiir and Machar have already tried a unity government, and
the third time looks even less likely to be the charm. Another unity government
simply doesn't make sense. Rebel leader Machar almost certainly won't agree to
a deal in which Kiir remains president, and Kiir is unlikely to resign. Nor is
there a clear military solution -- a bitter lesson from the post-colonial era
is that no African government has successfully put down a rebel insurgency.
But perhaps Africa's own indigenous conflict resolution
mechanism can offer a way out of the conundrum. The key ingredient in the
African method -- missing in the Western approach -- is engagement with civil
society. "When two elephants fight, the grass gets trampled upon and
hurt," goes the African proverb. African conflict resolution, then,
requires four parties: the two elephants, an arbiter, and the "grass"
(composed of all those affected by the conflict.) Just as it takes a village to
raise a child, so too does it take one to resolve a conflict.
In most traditional African societies, when two people
cannot resolve their differences by themselves, their case is taken to a
village chief's court for adjudication. The court is open and anyone affected
by the dispute can participate. Both parties are invited to make their case.
Next, anybody else who has something to say may do so. After all the arguments
have been heard, the chief renders a decision. The guilty party may be fined,
say, three goats. By default, his or her family is held liable. The injured
party receives one goat, the chief is given a goat for his services, and the
final goat is slaughtered for a village feast for all to enjoy.
The latter social event is derived from the African
belief that frayed social relations need to be healed -- the "grass"
restored. More importantly, the interests of the community supersede those of
the disputants. If they adopt intransigent positions, they can be sidelined by
the will of the community and fined for disturbing social peace. In extreme
cases, they can be expelled from the village. In other words, there is a price
to be paid for intransigence and for wreaking social mayhem -- a price exacted
by the victims. The current system of internationally-mediated peace talks, by
contrast, imposes no such punishment on the combatants.
Already, there is limited evidence that traditional
dispute-resolution mechanisms can work on a much larger scale. Indeed,
following the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1989, African traditional
methods were revived to sweep dictators out of power and transition to a
democratic order. In 1989, after unpaid civil servants went on strike and
demanded the resignation of Benin's military dictator, Mathieu Kerekou, a
sovereign national conference was called representing various political,
religious, trade union, and other groups encompassing the broad spectrum of
Beninois society. The conference, chaired by Father Isidore de Souza, held
sovereign power and its decisions were binding on all, including the
government. It stripped Kerekou of power and scheduled multiparty elections
that ended 17 years of autocratic Marxist rule. Similar inclusive national
conferences in Congo and Niger (both in 1991) brought dictatorships to an end
and set the stage for free and fair elections.
In South Africa, the vehicle used to make the difficult
but peaceful transition to a multiracial democratic society was the Convention
for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). It began deliberations in July 1991,
with 228 delegates drawn from about 25 political parties and various
anti-apartheid groups. The government of F.W. de Klerk made no effort to
control the composition of CODESA. Political parties were not excluded, not
even ultra right-wing political groups, although they chose to boycott its
deliberations. CODESA strove to reach a "working consensus" on an
interim constitution and set a date for the 1994 elections. It established the
composition of an interim or transitional government that would rule until the
elections were held. Most importantly, CODESA's decisions were binding. De
Klerk could not abrogate any decision made by the convention -- just as the
African chief could not disregard any decision arrived at the village meeting.
Instead of facilitating direct negotiations in Addis
Ababa, the African Union should serve as an arbiter between South Sudanese
civil society organizations, and political and religious groups. An interim
government should be set up -- headed by neither Kiir nor Machar -- and a date
set for elections. If the two leaders remain recalcitrant, they should be fined
proverbial goats for disturbing the social peace. By default, they should be
expelled from the "village" and handed over to the ICC for prosecution
for crimes against humanity. And just as the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) did to Mali when Gen. Amadou Sanogo seized power in March 2012,
the African Union should close all borders with South Sudan and impose an
economic blockade. When elephants have trampled the grass, they should not be
rewarded with additional stomping grounds.
