By Mohamud M Uluso

As usual, before and during the Brussels conference, the government of
Ethiopia engaged diplomatic ambushes against the sovereign leadership of
the FGS to demonstrate its supreme authority over Somalia in collusion
with Dr. Abdurahman Mohamed Farole, president of the regional state of
Puntland. Against the protocol of the conference published in advance,
the Ethiopian foreign minister arranged a publicized photo-op between
president Farole and Baroness Catherine Ashton, EU’s High Representative
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, co-chair of the conference. He
also lobbied to get president Farole be seated at the front row of the
conference table rather than being seated behind the president of
Somalia and to deliver a polemic speech, later expunged from the
official record for violating the spirit of the conference and probably
infuriating EU leaders. In strong disapproval, the President of the
European Commission, Jose Manuel D. Barroso said in his closing remarks
that “a country cannot live with two presidents. A country needs rule of
law, of course in democracy, with inclusiveness, integrating all the
parts in the federal structure of your country.”
After one year of consultations, planning sessions, and international
conferences, representatives of the International Community
(Development Partners) and High level delegation led by President Hassan
Sh. Mohamud of the Federal Republic of Somalia (FRS) met at the
headquarter of the European Union (EU) Brussels, Belgium on September
16, 2013 for a conference on a “
New Deal for Somalia”, and jointly endorsed the Somali Compact (SC) based on the “
New Deal Strategy for Engagement in Fragile States”
adopted in Bussan, South Korea in November 2011. On the basis of the
new partnership, the Development Partners (Donors) pledged 2.421 billion
dollars to Somalia to implement fifty eight (58) statebuilding
milestones detailed in the SC over the next three years (2014-2016). EU,
UK, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, USA, Switzerland, Ireland,
Finland, Netherlands, African Development Bank and World Bank
contributed 98.72 % of the pledges. Except Turkey, Arab and Asian
countries didn’t make pledges, while Italy’s contribution was 12.47
million dollars.
Although the new partnership is better than the former abusive
international relationship devised after the collapse of the Somali
State, it is not free from fatal flaws and booby-traps that could cancel
its promising prospect. Professor Michael Weinstein has highlighted
some of the major flaws of the SC in his analysis titled “
Somalia: the political poisoning of the FGS by Belgian Waffles” of September 21, 2013. Similarly, Mary Harper of the BBC cautioned in her report titled “
another conference on Somalia” that “
with
so many challenges, it is possible that the Brussels meeting will
simply be the latest in the long list of expensive conferences on
Somalia that end with ambitious communiqués but have little or no impact
on the development of the country.”
Somalia has been put on a peace and statebuilding path designed,
directed and managed by the international community in concert with
distrusted Somali Partners. Reestablishment of State institutions and
authorities at all levels, the holding of constitutional referendum in
2015, and a political election in 2016 throughout Somalia have been the
central mission of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). It is not
clear if the Development Partners, the Somali elite and people are on
the same page and commit and deploy the efforts and cooperation needed
to accomplish these ambitious but existential goals.
Shameful diplomatic ambushes
As usual, before and during the Brussels conference, the government
of Ethiopia engaged diplomatic ambushes against the sovereign leadership
of the FGS to demonstrate its supreme authority over Somalia in
collusion with Dr. Abdurahman Mohamed Farole, president of the regional
state of Puntland.
Against the protocol of the conference published in
advance, the Ethiopian foreign minister arranged a publicized photo-op
between president Farole and Baroness Catherine Ashton, EU’s High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, co-chair of the
conference. He also lobbied to get president Farole be seated at the
front row of the conference table rather than being seated behind the
president of Somalia and to deliver a polemic speech, later expunged
from the official record for violating the spirit of the conference and
probably infuriating EU leaders. In strong disapproval, the President of
the European Commission, Jose Manuel D. Barroso said in his closing
remarks that “
a country cannot live with two presidents. A country
needs rule of law, of course in democracy, with inclusiveness,
integrating all the parts in the federal structure of your country.”
The Pillars of the SC
The pillars of the SC include a binding and respected social contract
among the Somali people through the Provisional Constitution, the
existence of national (federal) representative government recognized by
the international community, and the consensus that the international
relations (foreign policy) of Somalia is an exclusive realm of the
national (federal) government. Parallel or competitive local governments
in international arenas are incompatible with the New Deal for Somalia.
While the communiqué of the conference reaffirmed the unity,
territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of
Somalia, the SC concedes that the northern regions of Somalia
(Somaliland) enjoy advanced level of peace, democratic process,
development and governance not achieved by the rest of Somalia. However,
Somaliland has agreed to seek international development assistance as
part of Somalia but with separate implementation mechanism until
national integration is completed. Also, Puntland declared its
commitment to contribute to the peaceful, just and productive life for “
the whole of Somalia.”
The South Central Somalia, the seat of the national body responsible
for the representation and protection of the unity and sovereignty of
Somalia, is under the stabilization plan authorized by the UN Security
Council.
The content of the Somali Compact
The SC focuses on three issues: Peace and statebuilding goals in line
with the five goals of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States
(the inclusive politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and
revenue and services); the principles of partnership and the
establishment of Somali Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF);
and the Architecture and Monitoring Arrangement for mutual
accountability and transparency. The SC lists nine principles of
partnership for international assistance. The principles of Somali
ownership and leadership, transparent and predictable aid, sound Public
Financial Management (PFM) systems, and support of institutional
development capacity offer a promising prospect.
Timelines and Constraints
The provisional constitution, the vision 2016, the national
stabilization plan, and the SC, all are setting timelines for the
implementation of overlapping priorities. The federal government agreed
to develop an integrated plan which meets the requirements of an Interim
Poverty Reduction Strategy (IPRS) with financial cost figures before
January 2014. It has also agreed to identify limited number of top
priority flagship programmers in December 2013. In consideration of the
very weak human resource capacity of the FGS, the preparation and
implementation of these multiple plans could take time and protracted or
haphazard negotiations that will quickly dash the expectation of the
Somali people.
Other constraints to the fulfillment of these deadlines include
halted progress in fighting against Al Shabab, general insecurity,
resisted national integration, lack of domestic financial resources,
delayed aid disbursement, weak central leadership, and corruption. The
Federal Government expects to collect less than 50 million dollars per
year as revenue while it needs at least one billion dollars per year to
establish a functioning institutional structure at national, regional
and district levels.
The SC underscores the formation of core public sector capacities as a
precondition for the FGS efforts to support the functioning authorities
at all levels of government. The injection of foreign advisors without
capable and conscious Somali counterparts at all levels will lead to
public discontent and failure.
Fatal flaws in the SC
One major fatal flaw in the SC is the contradictory positions of the
Development Partners. On one hand, they emphasize the sovereign
leadership of the FGS over the Somali affairs while on the other hand,
they practically deal with FGS as a faction that must negotiate with
militias, regions, and self organized opponents, or as a faction
required executing dictated conflicting tasks without strong diplomatic
and financial backup. An urgent resolution of these contradictory
positions is critical.
A second fatal flaw could come from the misinterpretation of claim made in the SC that the
“Somaliland
Special Arrangement (SSA) represents an important element of a larger
shift in approach to development partners’ engagement” and of the claim that “
the people in Somaliland are citizens of Somaliland” or
from the use of the distinct names-Somalia and Somaliland- without
qualification. On September 16, the Foreign Minister of Somaliland,
Mohamed Behi Yonis published a carefully crafted letter in which he
supported the conference and explained Somaliland’s absence. In the same
context, the separate security arrangement of US and UK with Somaliland
without link to the overall national security structure and strategy of
Somalia could trigger new grievances.
A third fatal flaw is related to the confusion surrounding the
question of federalism and the tainted legacy of the UN led constitution
making process. The international community is fully aware that the
issue of the form of federalism in Somalia has not been settled among
the Somali people and therefore, the UN has the responsibility to dispel
immediately the false claims made on the basis of the provisional
constitution in order to avoid protracted controversies. Territory
owned/controlled in the name and spirit of clan is unconstitutional.
The Federal government must operate within the limits of the
provisional constitution and should not be used as a backdoor to settle,
without legitimate process, issues that have been left unresolved
during the constitutional negotiation between the stakeholders of the
Somali National Constituent Assembly (NCA). The legitimate scrutiny of
the FGS actions under and through the agreed conditions and institutions
is different from political manipulations and accusations under false
claims. Somalia needs a strong democratic developmental central
authority with well defined decentralized and accountable system of
governance.
Mr. Mohamud M Uluso mohamuduluso@gmail.com