 |
|
Experts,
fear that with the integrated mission, striking a balance between
military and humanitarian operations might be a challenge
|
NAIROBI, 10 May 2013 (IRIN) - Following the unanimous adoption of a UN Security Council (UNSC)
resolution
setting up an integrated mission in Somalia, the UN Assistance Mission
in Somalia (UNSOM) will be set up for an initial one-year period
beginning on 3 June; it will be based in the capital Mogadishu.
The UN defines an integrated mission as one in which there is a shared vision among all the UN actors at country level.
“This strategic objective is the result of a deliberate effort by all
elements of the UN system to achieve a shared understanding of the
mandates and functions of the various elements of the UN presence at
country level and to use this understanding to maximize
UN effectiveness,
efficiency, and impact in all aspects of its work,” say the Integrated
Mission Planning Guidelines endorsed in 2006 by the Secretary-General.
According to the resolution, the mission is intended to help Somalia
build on the political gains made over the past year; assist the country
to develop a federal system of government; review its constitution and
hold a constitutional referendum; and facilitate preparations for
presidential and parliamentary elections in 2016.
In addition, UNSOM will “promote respect for human rights and women's
empowerment, promote child protection, prevent conflict-related sexual
and gender-based violence, and strengthen justice institutions.”
UN agencies working in Somalia are expected to move there. Many are currently based in Nairobi, the Kenyan capital.
In this briefing, IRIN looks at what an integrated approach means for Somalia.
What is the political, humanitarian situation in Somalia?
Somalia has recently made progress towards stability. In 2012, the
country set up a functioning federal government under the leadership of
President Sheikh Hassan Mohamud, the first such administration since
1990.
However, there continue to be huge political and humanitarian
challenges. Insurgents, who still control parts of the country, continue
to launch deadly attacks regularly, while more than one million Somalis
are displaced due to conflict and drought. One million more have
crossed into neighbouring countries, mainly Kenya and Ethiopia.
A 2013 report published by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) revealed that over
250,000 Somalis,
many of them children under five, died as a result of famine between
October 2010 and April 2012. They were unable to receive any
humanitarian assistance, in part, due to insecurity.
What is UNSOM’s role?
On 6 March 2013 the Security Council had, while partially lifting a 20-year-old
arms embargo
on Somalia and extending the mandate of the African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM), for another year, agreed with the UN Secretary-General
that the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) had “fulfilled its
obligation” and needed to be replaced by an integrated mission to give
the Somali administration “a single door to knock on”.
“It looks like an ambitious plan and is probably the most significant engagement in Somalia by the UN in decades,”
The new mission, to be headed by a special representative of the
Secretary-General would include, “the provision of policy advice to the
Federal Government and AMISOM on peace-building and state-building in
the areas of governance, security sector reform and rule of law
(including the disengagement of combatants); development of a federal
system (including preparations for elections in 2016); and coordination
of international donor support.”
All the UN country teams, both political and humanitarian in Somalia,
would be expected, with immediate effect, to coordinate all their
activities with the head of the newly established mission.
The office of the UN humanitarian coordinator for Somalia is expected to
fall under the office of the special representative from the beginning
January 2014.
What now for UNPOS and AMISOM?
With the creation of an integrated mission, UNPOS ceases to exist.
Established in 1995 and headed by a special representative of the
Secretary-General, UNPOS’s role was mainly political, facilitating
political dialogue and peace-building activities. In his
letter
to the UNSC seeking the establishment of an integrated mission in
Somalia, the Secretary-General said UNPOS had fulfilled its mandate and
should “be dissolved and replaced by a new expanded special political
mission as soon as possible”.
The Somalia Federal Government is largely propped up by the 18,000-strong AMISOM force.
A
technical assistance mission
to Somalia by the Secretary-General recommended in its report “use of
local UN-contracted and trained security guards, the impending
deployment of an AMISOM guard force in Mogadishu, and reliance on Somali
National Security Forces (SNSF). If these are deemed insufficient, UN
Guard Units or international private security companies could be
utilized.”
AMISOM has always been involved in limited
humanitarian assistance but it is not clear if this will continue with UNSOM.
The UNSC in its resolution, urges the newly appointed special
representative to align closely with other stakeholders in Somalia,
including UN country teams, the federal government, AMISOM, the
Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), the European Union
and “other regional, bilateral and multilateral partners”.
Experts, say the success of UNSOM will depend on whether it aligns its
operations with the different actors in Somalia, some of whom may have
qualms about sharing their areas of expertise and/or influence.
“The number of pivotal actors dealing with Somalia has increased as of
late, not least as new donors have come in and stepped up their support.
Hence, if the international community is serious about UNSOM and would
like to see it fulfil its mandate, actors need to be aligned behind
UNSOM,” Dominik Balthasar, an expert on Somalia at Chatham House, told
IRIN. “Yet, this might possibly be a hard bullet to bite for other
actors such as AMISOM or IGAD, as the participation of UNSOM is likely
to restrict the roles they have played thus far.”
Abdi Aynte, executive director of the
Heritage Institute for Policy Studies
(HIPS), a Mogadishu-based think tank, said: “With respect to its
relations with AMISOM, the hope is that they become mutually reinforcing
[and] not mutually exclusive [since] AMISOM is widely viewed
positively.”
What are the merits of UNSOM?
UNSOM will merge the UN’s humanitarian and political operations in
Somalia, providing an opportunity to harness the operational capacities
of the many agencies into a single mission.
“It looks like an ambitious plan and is probably the most significant
engagement in Somalia by the UN in decades,” Cedric Barnes, director,
Horn of Africa programmes at the International Crisis Group, told IRIN.
HIPS’s Aynte said the integrated mission will provide a single
international community narrative on Somalia, something he says the
Somalis have wanted for a long time.
A unification of the development and humanitarian pillars in Somalia,
others have argued, would help marshal the much-needed international
funding to remedy the situation in Somalia while also “creating
coherence and unifying strategies”.
Elmi Ahmed Duale, Somalia’s ambassador to the UN, described the
resolution as important and said it had ensured “there was only “one
door” to knock on, “as opposed to fragmented approaches in coordinating
assistance”.
According to ICG’s Barnes, this will be dependent on how much the government is willing to cede in the new engagement.
“It would be interesting to see how this will play out with a government
that might want to assert authority while at the same time fronting the
issue of sovereignty,” Barnes added.
The fact that Al Shabab is listed as a terrorist group has made it
difficult for many humanitarian agencies to have an engagement with it,
at least for the purposes of offering humanitarian assistance in areas
still under the group’s control.
Why the dissenting voices against UNSOM?
Humanitarians have voiced their concerns against merging humanitarian
operations with political and military activities, arguing it would make
their work in Somalia difficult as it runs the risk of delegitimizing
humanitarian actors.
 |
|
In Somalia, 2.7 million are in need of humanitarian assistance
|
“As many Somalis continue to struggle to obtain the basic necessities
for survival, such as food, health care, and protection from violence,
humanitarian assistance must remain a priority and it must remain
completely independent of any political agenda,” Jerome Oberreit,
secretary-general of Médecins Sans Frontières, said in a
statement.
“The humanitarian aid system must not be co-opted as an implementing
partner of counter-insurgency or stabilization efforts in Somalia,” he
added.
In March,
InterAction,
The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) and Voluntary
Organizations in Cooperation in Emergencies (VOICE), said in a joint
statement that the decision risked jeopardizing the delivery of
impartial humanitarian assistance in the country: “By requiring UN
humanitarian coordination to fall under the political mandate of the new
UN peace-building mission in Somalia, the neutrality, impartiality and
independence of humanitarian action will be compromised.”
Russel Geekie, public information officer at the UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Somalia office, said: “The
integration should not hamper the delivery of aid. In its most recent
resolution on Somalia (SC resolution 2102, which follows up on 2093),
the Security Council reiterated that impartial, neutral and independent
humanitarian assistance must be ensured, wherever those in need are.”
According Chatham House’s Balthasar, integrating humanitarian operations
into the broader politico-military stabilization plans “runs the risk
of constraining humanitarian space, but that this does not necessarily
need to be the case. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that
humanitarian aid has always been political and that it has frequently
been instrumentalized by a wide variety of actors - not least by those
who oppose the government.” With an eye towards the dynamics surrounding
humanitarian space in Somalia, he added that ever since Al Shabab had
been put on the back foot, humanitarian actors who had become accustomed
to negotiating with the insurgents to deliver humanitarian aid lacked
clarity over who was in control and how to safely deliver aid.
“Basically, the political situation on the ground appears to have become
more, rather than less, complicated. In this situation, devising an
integrated mission might not be the worst of all options for the sake of
prioritizing stability and the establishment of functioning structures
of governance,” he added.