The Horn of Africa: International influence as the basis for never ending violence

The Horn of Africa is one of the most restless African regions. The countries in the Horn, namely Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, are suffering from internal conflicts among different communities and are involved in border conflicts among each other. A common feature of the Horn countries is high militarisation of its inhabitants,(2) which is a basis for continued violent conflicts. These include human rights atrocities, child conscription and the collapse of state infrastructure. There is almost no conversation among the states, nor is there accountability, flexibility, legitimacy and stability in the region.(3)

Analysts suggest that there are several internal and external factors that stimulate continued conflicts in the African Horn. These are geophysical conditions, resource scarcity, poverty, socio-economic inequalities and ethnic divisions, militarisation, competition for state power, and also the legacies of the colonial and Cold War policies.(4)

This paper focuses on the last two factors, namely the legacies of the colonial and Cold War policies. First, it describes the external interventions in the region during the colonial era and analyses their consequences. The paper continues by analysing the Cold War superpowers’ influence in the Horn, which used the region as one of their battlefields. The wars that took place in the region, and the United States of America (USA or US) and Soviet Union’s politics of searching for allies are further described. 

In the last section, the paper analyses recent conflicts and wars in the African Horn and the international presence and support. They serve as proof that international interventions are not decreasing the tensions in the region, nor are they working towards changing the legacy of colonialism and the Cold War era.

Colonial era and bringing the European patterns to the African Horn

The colonial era, despite its relatively short duration of less than 100 years, set the basis for today’s chaotic situation in the African Horn. The region was partitioned among Britain, France and Italy. Today’s Somalia was divided between Britain and Italy. Italy also occupied a part of Ethiopia and established Eritrea as a colonial entity, while France occupied Djibouti.(5)

It seemed that colonialism brought progress, established civil service and judicial systems and brought peace and stability to the region. Yet, the reality was different. The main aim of colonial powers was the exploitation of natural resources and cheap labour force, which only brought suffering to the local inhabitants. Civil service and judicial systems were established, but were intended to serve colonial interests and not the interests of independent states. 

The inhabitants of the Horn lost their right to govern themselves. Indigenous people could not even learn how to lead a country since they were considered and treated as subordinated people throughout the colonial time. They were humiliated, persecuted, tortured and deprived of their basic rights and civil liberties. 

Their silence was interpreted as peace and stability, which was only superficial. Moreover, colonialists created a new geo-political setup. Many states at that time were artificially created. New boundaries cut across pre-existing ethnic groups, states and kingdoms and united different cultures, languages and traditions. This caused, on the one hand, unrest within newly created countries and, on the other hand, border disputes and demands for unification of dispersed ethnic groups.(6)

Already colonial powers waged border wars in order to get more strategically important territory. The British demarcated their borders between 1932 and 1934, which could not be claimed for the Italians, who were not satisfied with the colonised territory. They launched an invasion against Ethiopia and successfully annexed the grazing area of the Ogaden to Somalia. The region was later returned to Ethiopia, but the border became a barrier to nomadic migrations and only triggered further disputes between those two countries.(7)

Colonial powers left the African Horn in bad shape. States were culturally and economically weakened and a crisis of the leadership appeared.(8) Newly independent states had to establish new governance. They used the patterns they knew from the colonial era. It often happened that the power was in the hands of ethnic or ideological oligarchies. For example, Amharas and Tigreanes dominated resources in Ethiopia.(9) Different kinds of oppressive regimes appeared, such as the communist juntas, dictatorships, rivalling militias, warlords and clan leaders. Fights for power triggered several internal violent conflicts.(10) An important legacy of the colonialist era was also expansionism. It was apparent in the Somali irredentism, Ethiopia’s annexation of Eritrea, claims of French-protected Djibouti and various other border disputes.(11)

The Cold War: African Horn as a competitive scene for the superpowers 

Due to its strategic importance, the Horn of Africa was very interesting for the Cold War superpowers, the USA and the Soviet Union. The Horn is located directly at the southern end of the Red Sea, across the Arabian Peninsula, which makes it a neighbour to the major oil lines. Both superpowers tried to get allies in the Horn in order to supervise the oil lines and prevent access to the lines to the other superpower.(12) The USA and Soviet Union started attracting their potential allies on the Horn by militarising them heavily. Consequently, the countries in the region grew in number of armed forces, escalated their defence expenditures, increased their propensity for internal and external war and military dominance of a civil society appeared.(13)

The USA and the Soviet Union’s relationship with various regimes in the region evolved according to their perceived importance within an East-West framework.(14) The USA first found its ally in Ethiopia, where, in the late 1960s, it established the largest embassy in Sub-Saharan Africa.(15) At that time, Ethiopia was a part of a worldwide telecommunications network directed against the Soviet Union.(16) The country received the largest economic and military programme from the USA. When Ethiopia was threatened by Somali irredentism or Eritrean separatism, the USA strongly backed the Haile Selassie Government.(17) Yet, after the Ethiopian revolution, which lasted from 1974 to 1977, a Soviet-backed regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam came to power in Ethiopia. The USA took away its support and backed the Somali regime of the dictator Mohamed Siad Barre. Somalia became an access country from which the USA could militarily counter any perceived Soviet threat to the Middle Eastern oil fields.(18)

According to the relationship between the superpowers, the relationship between Somalia and Ethiopia largely depended on the game between the USA and the Soviet Union and the external aid and support they were receiving from them. Especially Somalia, which was already unstable due to the internal fights for power, became a match-ball between the USA and the Soviet Union due to its geo-strategic position, which served as a base for further actions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region.(19) One of the most violent consequences of those two countries’ militarisation was a destructive war for the Ogaden region in 1963 and 1964 and then again in 1977 and 1978.(20) It was one of the actions with which Somalia wanted to fulfil its idea of Greater Somalia and re-unite Somali people that were divided among Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya during the colonial times.(21)

The Cold War was losing its power, as were the regimes backed by the superpowers. In 1988, Somalia and Ethiopia concluded a peace agreement, mostly with the aim to defuse conflictual external relations in order to effectively deal with the internal regime-threatening guerrilla insurgencies. In Somalia it was the Somali National Movement and in Ethiopia the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front. In 1991, both governing regimes were overthrown by guerrilla insurgencies.(22) The end of superpower competition in the Horn left a political vacuum and the competition for power started again.(23) Moreover, major changes happened. Ethiopia had been reconstructed with the independence of Eritrea, Somalia was bankrupted and Djibouti was about to enter civil war(24) and the former British Somaliland territory declared sovereignty.(25)

Post Cold War era: New era, same old patterns

The violent history and the patterns that the inhabitants of the Horn region learned during the colonial era and the Cold War were a bad basis for the stabilisation of the region. Contrary to stabilisation, Somalia has been at the top of the Failed States Index for four years in a row.(26) In 2012, Ethiopia ranked 17th, Eritrea 23rd and Djibouti 53rd.(27) In comparison with the last two years, they have been scaling up the list.(28)

Border disputes among the neighbouring countries in the Horn did not end. In 1993, Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia after a long guerrilla war, yet the border was not strictly demarcated.(29) Ethiopia refused to recognise and implement the borders agreed to in the 2000 Algiers Agreement, which gave the town of Badme to Eritrea. Ethiopia even blocked the United Nations technical team, which wanted to demarcate the border. Five years later, the war over the border started again. 

The war took the form of a proxy war since both countries amassed their troops in neighbouring Somalia. Somali Islamists demanded that Ethiopian troops withdraw from the country and several clashes started throughout the country.(30) The USA got involved and backed Ethiopia with the excuse that the Eritrean regime supported transnational terrorism and needed to be stopped. The war officially ended in 2000, but tensions remained.(31) The United Nations sent its troops to the border, but due to the extreme danger posed to its personnel, the United Nations Security Council unanimously voted to withdraw its troops from the region.(32) Moreover, Eritrea was also involved in border conflicts with Djibouti. Eritrea ignored the United Nations Security Council resolution, which demanded its withdrawal from Djibouti, which led to deadly clashes in 2008.(33)

The biggest problem in the region represents Somalia, which has the best strategic position and was massively misused during the Cold War. It is still involved in a border dispute with Ethiopia. War-torn Somalia continues to be a subject of the African Union’s peacekeeping interventions. At the end of 2011, troops from Djibouti arrived in Somalia to join forces from Burundi and Uganda, which have been present in Somalia for the last two years as part of the African Union peace mission to combat the militants. Moreover, the US aerial attack drones and French naval firepower have coordinated with the Kenyan ground assault.(34)

The USA is still intervening in the internal affairs of these countries. The former American General, William Ward, pledged continued support to Somalia’s Transitional 

Federal Government and condemned Somali rebels, who were accused of supporting the Government of Eritrea in its border conflict with Djibouti.(35) But the USA again changed allies and Ethiopia is now a close Washington ally. In 2006, the USA gave a green light to Ethiopia to invade Somalia, where the Islamic Courts Union was in power.(36) In 2011, military sources confirmed that the Obama administration was engaged in a new war in a famine-hit African Horn. It supported Kenya in its fight against Somalia in its anti-terrorism war. And the French joined them, too.(37)

Today the USA and its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies do not only support the countries of the Horn, but are also physically present in the region. They lay the groundwork for increased naval, air and ground operations in the Horn of Africa. 

The British Prime Minister described Somalia as the country to which special attention should be given. The USA also entered Djibouti and established the Pentagon’s first permanent base in Africa with 2,500 personnel. Djibouti is also the headquarters of the US Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF – HOA), which was set up in 2001. Its responsibilities include all countries of this region and some other countries as well.(38) Djibouti is still a base for France’s largest military base on the continent, and the USA has more than 1,200 troops there as a part of its anti-terrorism task force in the Horn of Africa.(39) Troops, warplanes and armoured vehicles under the flag of NATO, the European Union (EU), France and the USA have intervened in all of the Horn countries and some others, too. Starting in 2008, NATO commenced its war against the pirates on the coast of Somalia. The NATO and EU deployments in the Gulf of Aden are the first such naval operations in both organisations’ history and the EU’s first in African coastal waters.(40)

Conclusion

Countries in the Horn of Africa hardly promote any communication among each other. Their relationship is still characterised by mistrust and suspicion; consequently, they are not able to solve problems constructively. If they agree to negotiations, those mostly bring mutual accusations. There have been examples when neutral regional third parties offered good offices by providing a neutral territory for negotiations, but with little success. As noted earlier, international interventions even fuelled further conflicts in the region.(41) International actors are regularly present in the region. In the past they admitted that they were attracted by the strategic position of the Horn. Today, they are allegedly trying to solve the conflicts that happen due to the power struggles and unresolved border issues. Yet, it appears that their interest in local conflict solutions is still subordinated to the strategic importance of the region and the USA’s commitment to fight global terrorism. 

The two most important reasons for violence in Africa are “perceptions of mistreatment by a population, and no legal channel for that population to address that perceived injustice,” said Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.(42) That implies that the USA and other Western powers should start helping the region in a manner they should have done a century ago: by teaching the countries/Governments how to establish democracy and communicate with each other in a peaceful manner, and not to further militarise the already over-militarised region just to keep the control over a strategically important region.

NOTES:

(1) Contact Petra Pavšič through Consultancy Africa Intelligence's Conflict and Terrorism Unit ( conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com).
(2) Wasara, S.S., 2002. Conflict and state security in the Horn of Africa: Militarisation of civilian groups. African Association of Political Science, 7(2), pp. 39-60.
(3) Elmore, E.K., 2010. The Horn of Africa: Critical analysis of conflict management and startegies for success in the Horn's future. Student Pulse, 2(6), http://www.studentpulse.com.
(4) 'Costs and Causes of the Conflict in the Great Horn of Africa', Conflict Prevention, http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com.
(5) Degu, W.A., 'The State, the crisis of state institutions and refugee migration in the Horn of Africa: The cases of Ethiopa, Sudan and Somalia', 2002, http://dare.uva.nl.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Elmore, E.K., 2010. The Horn of Africa: Critical nalysis of conflict management and startegies for success in the Horn's future. Student Pulse, 2(6), http://www.studentpulse.com
(8) 'Costs and Causes of the Conflict in the Great Horn of Africa', Conflict Prevention, http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com.
(9) Wasara, S.S., 2002. Conflict and state security in the Horn of Africa: Militarisation of civilian groups. African Association of Political Science, 7(2), pp. 39-60.
(10) Elmore, E.K., 2010. The Horn of Africa: Critical Analysis of Conflict Management and Startegies for Success in the Horn's Future. Student Pulse, 2(6), http://www.studentpulse.com.
(11) 'Costs and Causes of the Conflict in the Great Horn of Africa', Conflict Prevention, http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com.
(12) Schulz, P., 2011. The Horn of Africa in a bipolar world - The Cold War as the origin of the Somalia crisis. Undergraduate Research Journal for the Human Sciences, 10, http://urc.kon.org.
(13) Agyeman-Duah, B., 1996. The Horn of Africa: Conflict, demilitarisation and reconstruction. The Journal of Conflict Studies, 16(2), http://journals.hil.unb.ca.
(14) Schraeder, P.J., 1992. The Horn of Africa: The US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment. Middle East Journal, 46(4), pp. 571-593.
(15) Shinn, D.H., 'US Policy towards the Horn of Africa', International Policy Digest, 2012, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org. 
(16) Schraeder, P.J., 1992. The Horn of Africa: The US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment. Middle East Journal, 46(4), pp. 571-593.
(17) Shinn, D.H., 'US Policy towards the Horn of Africa', International Policy Digest, 2012, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org.
(18) Schraeder, P.J., 1992. The Horn of Africa: The US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment. Middle East Journal, 46(4), pp. 571-593.
(19) Schulz, P., 2011. The Horn of Africa in a bipolar World -  The Cold War as the origin of the Somalia crisis. Undergraduate Research Journal for the Human Sciences, 10,  http://urc.kon.org.
(20) Agyeman-Duah, B., 1996. The Horn of Africa: Conflict, demilitarisation and reconstruction. The Journal of Conflict Studies, 16(2),  http://journals.hil.unb.ca.
(21) Wasara, S.S., 2002. Conflict and state security in the Horn of Africa: Militarisation of civilian groups. African Association of Political Science, 7(2), pp. 39-60.
(22) Schraeder, P.J., 1992. The Horn of Africa: The US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment. Middle East Journal, 46(4), pp. 571-593.
(23) Wasara, S.S., 2002. Conflict and state security in the Horn of Africa: Militarisation of civilian groups. African Association of Political Science, 7(2), pp. 39-60.
(24) Agyeman-Duah, B., 1996. The Horn of Africa: Conflict, demilitarisation and reconstruction. The Journal of Conflict Studies, 16(2), http://journals.hil.unb.ca.
(25) Schraeder, P.J., 1992. The Horn of Africa: The US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment. Middle East Journal, 46(4), pp. 571-593.
(26) 'The Failed States Index 2011', Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com.
(27) 'The Failed States: The Rankings 2012', Foreign Policy,http://www.foreignpolicy.com. 
(28) 'The Failed States Index 2010', Foreign Policy,http://www.foreignpolicy.com; 'The Failed States Index 2011', Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com.
(29) 'Ethiopia/Eritrea War', Global Security,org, http://www.globalsecurity.org.
(30) Hanson, S., 'Proxy War in Africa's Horn.' Council on Foreign Relations,20 December 2006, http://www.cfr.org; Woldemariam, Y. and Yohannes, O., ‘War Clouds in the Horn of Africa’, Sudan Tribune, 10 November 2007, http://www.sudantribune.com.
(31) Wasara, S.S., 2002. Conflict and state security in the Horn of Africa: Militarisation of civilian groups. African Association of Political Science, 7(2), pp. 39-60.
(32) 'UN ends African Horn peace force', BBC News, 30 July 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
(33) 'Eritrea 'ignored' UN resolution', BBC News, 8 April 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk. 
(34) Cunningham, F., 'Horn of Africa: Proxy War in Somalia Veers Towards Regional Conflicts', Global Research,1 January 2012, http://www.globalresearch.ca. 
(35) Rozoff, R., 'U.S., NATO Expand Afghan War To Horn of Africa And Indian Ocean', Global Research, 8 January 2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca.
(36) Cunningham, F., 'Horn of Africa: Proxy War in Somalia Veers Towards Regional Conflicts', Global Research,1 January 2012, http://www.globalresearch.ca.
(37) Cunningham, F., 'America's War in the Horn of Africa: “Drone Alley” – a Harbinger of Western Power across the African Continent’, Global Research, 29 October 2011, http://www.globalresearch.ca.  
(38) Rozoff, R., 'U.S., NATO Expand Afghan War To Horn of Africa And Indian Ocean', Global Research, 8 January 2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca.
(39) 'Eritrea 'ignored' UN resolution', BBC News, 8 April 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
(40) Rozoff, R., 'U.S., NATO Expand Afghan War To Horn of Africa And Indian Ocean', Global Research, 8 January 2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca.
(41) Elmore, E.K., 2010. The Horn of Africa: Critical analysis of conflict management and strategies for success in the Horn's future. Student Pulse, 2(6), http://www.studentpulse.com
(42) 'Costs and Causes of the Conflict in the Great Horn of Africa,' Conflict Prevention, http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com.

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Written on Friday, 16 November 2012 08:12 by Petra Pavšič (1)

Meles Zenawi's legacy for the Horn of Africa - Opinion - Al Jazeera English

Meles Zenawi's legacy for the Horn of Africa - Opinion - Al Jazeera English

 Zenawi's regime will be remembered for holding Ethiopia together as one country even under the centripetal ethnic order.

Last Modified: 17 Nov 2012 17:13

There is little doubt that Meles Zenawi's political architecture gave modest advantages to most ethnic groups in the country who were the subjects of the empire [EPA]

Any recent visitor to Ethiopia would be struck by the ubiquitous billboards commemorating the late Prime Minister's life, two months after his demise. Meles Zenawi's photo form the backdrop to the TV screens and adorns the streets of all the major towns and villages.

These sights were supplemented by the chorus of Africa leaders that attended the PM's funeral and who lavished praise on this "dedicated son of African soil". He was depicted as the untiring leader who toiled for the upliftment of the indigent peoples of Ethiopia and Africa.

Among this choir were African presidents and prime ministers whose own policies have degraded the lives of their people. The least distinguished of these visitors were the former President and Prime Minister of Somalia whose tenure in power was marred by their total subservience to the Ethiopia regime.

One wonders if this orchestrated and well managed public love of the late Zenawi reflects the thoughts and feeling of the peoples of Ethiopia and the neighbouring states where the PM's policies had the greatest footprint.

Putting aside the propaganda of the Ethiopian governing party, the admiration of his cohort of political friends and partisan Ethiopian critics, most objective analysts would agree that, unlike the visiting African leaders, Zenawi left behind a record that deserves critical scrutiny.

Zenawi's legacy

Zenawi's legacy can be viewed through two analytical lenses: a) his domestic footprint; (b) and his regional impact.

To assess the PM's legacy, we need to understand the political and economic context of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa when Zenawi and his party, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), came to power in 1991.

First, Ethiopia was devastated by a brutal military dictatorship that massacred hundreds of thousands of people, while it also presided over the catastrophic famine of 1984 that devastated several regions of the country.

Additionally, the military regime wasted Ethiopia's meagre and precious resources to oppress the legitimate struggle of the Eritrean people, as well as others inside Ethiopia, such as Tigray, Somali and the Oromos, to mention a few. War, famine and oppression were the hallmark of Ethiopia in 1990, and the regime was exhausted and had run out of ideas and energy to move the country beyond multiple calamities.

Then came the last drive of the Eritrean resistance against the regime since they already controlled the entire countryside and surrounded the capital Asmara. Their ally in Ethiopia (TPLF) then pushed towards Addis Ababa and within a couple of months, it became clear that the regime's days were numbered.

Given the ethnic character of the TPLF, it was not clear whether its takeover of the capital will induce a new civil war with the Oromo liberation Front and other communities. Concerned about the possibility of having another failed state in the region, with all the attendant problems such as a tidal wave of refugees, the United States brokered an agreement between the regime and the TPLF. This pact allowed for a "peaceful" takeover of the capital and Mengistu's departure for exile.

The TPLF brought with it a client group of ethnic political parties, the so-called PDOs (People's Democratic Organisations), who jointly formed what became known as EPRDF. But there has never been any doubt that TPLF controlled the levers of power in the country.

The junior partners of the "coalition" were supposed to provide national legitimacy for the new ethnic authority, however, the Ethiopian public largely considered the PDOs as lackeys. The independent Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which initially joined the ruling coalition, failed to understand TPLF's militarist agenda and paid the ultimate price as the latter swiftly destroyed its military base.

After this defeat, OLF went underground where it has virtually become inconsequential. Establishing the new order and consolidating TPLF's power took nearly a decade after which the regime turned more of its attention to other matters.

After 21 years in power, we can emphatically state that Zenawi's regime has been a Janus-faced order. Its political rhetoric exuded democracy, peace, national harmony and development, but behind that façade was a determined security apparatus that crushed even the most democratic attempts to challenge its authority.

This rhetoric proved seductive enough for outsiders, but all indications are that it has failed to sway a majority of the population. It is these two faces of the regime that the remaining section of this brief will focus on.

But I must first provide an explanatory note about the nationalist character of the regime. I can categorically state that the late Premier Zenawi was an Ethiopian nationalist, despite the claims of some of the opponents that he was building Tigray for an eventual secession, if needs be.

Many critics of the TPLF regime claim that it exploited the resources of most regions in Ethiopia to develop its home province. There is a grain of truth to this assertion, but I would suggest that to be a nationalist does not exclude a regime from internally differentiating regions by privileging some over others.

Most critics do not understand that there are two kinds of nationalists: civic and sectarian nationalists. Civic nationalists genuinely try to treat all regions and citizens alike and fairly. In contrast, sectarian nationalists protect the territorial integrity of the country but also establish a hierarchy of power which privileges certain groups and political factions.

Zenawi and his regime represented the latter version of nationalism and are not alone in this regard in the developing world.

Domestic footprint

Zenawi's group and those they invited to take part in the political conference in the early 1990s produced a constitution which nominally privileged ethnic identity. They subsequently divided the country into ethnic provinces.

There is little doubt that this political architecture gave modest advantages to most ethnic groups in the country who were the subjects of the empire, but such gains belied the fact that Addis Ababa remained the decisive power centre of the country.

More critically, a small group of TPLF cadre and the security establishment they strategically controlled have had the final say about all the major issues. Even when the affiliates of the TPLF became senior ministers, they remained pliant cadre without a backbone.

I have witnessed the humiliation that comes with such status. The absence of any degree of autonomy on the part of those affiliates manifestly demonstrates that belonging to EPRDF has been like George Orwell's Animal Farm where "All animals are created equal, but some animals are created more equal than others".

Despite cowering their partners and most of the population, Zenawi and his regime can legitimately claim several major accomplishments. First, the regime has created a physical infrastructure for the country that is better than what was left behind by all the previous regimes combined. The road network that spans to most regions of the country can facilitate national integration and development if progressively used.

Second, the number of public universities has increased substantially over the last decade and this has allowed many young Ethiopians to gain access to some form of higher education.

Third, the electrically grid of the country has been expanded and more hydroelectric dams have been built or are under construction and this has expanded the country's energy supply. Some of these dams were initiated illegally because other riparian countries that have a stake in the rivers were not consulted and no agreements were reached to satisfy all parties. Despite such illegal and unethical preemptions, the growth in electric production bodes well for the country's economic growth.

Fourth, an intensive regime of mineral exploration has been put in place which could deliver dividends for the country in the long run.

Fifth, Zenawi and his team have not ameliorated the population's vulnerability to famine, but fortunately the country has avoided the catastrophic famines that used to take hundreds of thousands of lives.

Finally, there has been an increase in the volume of foreign investment in the country and the rate of economic growth has been substantial despite starting from a very low base.

The regime's liabilities are also numerous, but here is a sample of the major ones. First, in spite of the seemingly smooth transfer of authority to the Deputy Prime Minister, power is still wielded by individuals without legitimate institutional anchors. As such, authority in Ethiopia is extremely concentrated in two nodes that completely overlap: the TPLF core and the security establishment.

The ultimate anchor of power is the security apparatus which has been loyal to the TPLF rather than the country and the constitution. Such concentration of power has enfeebled all other institutions and has created a political culture and society deeply marooned in fear rather than genuine loyalty and respect for national institutions. The political and social consequences of this republic of fear are far reaching.

Second, although the economic sphere has been somewhat more liberalised, loyalty to the regime is still central to an entrepreneur's ability to succeed. In many instances, party connections are essential to start a major business, and important sectors of the economy are dominated by the party and its friends. 

Third, the republic of fear has suffocated the entire political spectrum through its unwillingness to tolerate even a minor political opposition. By claiming to win over 95 per cent of the votes in the last election, the regime has created a make-believe world where it is adored by all.

Fourth, in some parts of the developing world, academics are not free to present their ideas/work regarding their countries' ailments, and Ethiopia appears to be the model of academic unfreedom. This has been accomplished through the elimination of tenure or long-term contracts for faculty and the appointment of political loyalists to top academic positions.

If a professor indulges in critical analysis of the political and development affairs of the country, there is little chance that his or her contract will be renewed. Fear is the life blood of this system and compels productive academics to either leave the country if they can, or languish in the margins, or simply become sycophants of the regime to maintain their livelihoods. Nevertheless, there are a few courageous scholars who have stayed true to the ethos of the academy and still remain in the country against incredible odds.

Fifth, poor people dominate the landscape of Ethiopian cities and towns, and the UN has reported that over 80 per cent of the building structures of the capital are of slum quality.

Mindful of this image, the regime has embarked on urban renewal that will ultimately remove most of the poor from the city and allocate the "freed" spaces to shopping malls and investors. It intends to house the indigents removed from those areas in apartments built on the outskirts of the city without examining alternative schemes that will keep these residents in their neighbourhoods.

Finally, the collective effect of these liabilities is that public institutions in the country are beholden to the individuals in power rather that embodying national ethos. The shameless use of the security forces to retain power or intimidate the political opposition, and the culture of fear this engenders means that Premier Zenawi and his regime reinforced institutions the public fears but they have failed to create legitimacy for the post-1991institutions.

Without legitimate institutions that are autonomous from particular leaders, the country remains in danger of fully sliding into an ethnic political strife.

The regional impact

The "winds of change" in the Horn of Africa in 1990/1991 created opportunities which could have produced a bright future for all. Post-1991, Eritrean and Ethiopian leaders were cut from the same political cloth since they closely collaborated in the battle field to dislodge the Mengistu regime.

Nevertheless, one major factor separated the two movements: one was mainly a national liberation movement while the other was primarily an ethnic liberation project. On the Eastern front, Somalia provided material and diplomatic support for the leadership of both the Eritrean and Ethiopian liberation fronts, and the Somali people keenly followed the advances of the two fronts against Mengisu's military while they also hoped for the fall of the Somali dictator.

I remember visiting the border regions of Ethiopia and Somalia after the fall of Siyaad and Mengistu where I saw the population relish their new freedoms on either side of the border. The hope was that a new and more progressive political chapter for the region was in the offing.

But the new lords of Ethiopia were steeped in a sanitised imperial orthodoxy. During the first decade in power, Zenawi and his subordinates adopted the same ethnic political logic, tested in Ethiopia's ethnic provinces, to manipulate Somali affairs in the old Republic.

The authorities in Addis Ababa made no effort to reach out to Somali civics, but instead chose warlords and sectarian political actors as their best collaborators. Once the Somali people realised Ethiopia's new strategy of "divide and rule", old animosities resurfaced and the Ethiopian occupation of parts of the Somali Republic and its invasion of their country and capital in 2006-08 dashed the last residue of good well. Nearly all Somali civic nationalists now see Ethiopia as an enduring enemy.

In the north, the Ethiopian and Eritrean leaders who claimed to be the best of friends slowly drifted towards conflict and imposed a horrible, costly and unnecessary war on the population. The goodwill which has been nurtured in the battlefield of liberation vanished.

After a devastating war which wasted over 100,000 lives, the two regimes consented to arbitration. An international boundary commission was set and both governments guaranteed to accept the commission's findings.

Eritrea immediately embraced the findings once the commission rendered its verdict. Unfortunately, Ethiopia is yet to honour its commitment as it introduced new conditions to the process and the international community has failed to enforce the commission's ruling. Consequently and unfortunately, the two countries remain in a virtual state of war.

The verdict

There is little doubt that history will judge Premier Zenawi as one of the two major leaders in Ethiopian history. His regime will be remembered for holding Ethiopia together as one country even under the centripetal ethnic order which his regime officially introduced.

"There is little doubt that history will judge Premier Zenawi as one of the two major leaders in Ethiopian history."

Second, Ethiopian nationalists will celebrate him as the man who invaded Somalia and occupied Mogadishu. Third, his government will be regarded for developing the country's physical and educational infrastructure, and for refreshingly having the ambition of becoming a developmental state.

What Ethiopian democrats will not forgive is the regime's failing to establish a political order and national institutions that have earned the loyalty and respect of the people. The conflation of the regime's interests with the national cause and the use of the security forces to domesticate the population is not a sustainable strategy if Ethiopia is to ever evolve into a vibrant democracy. The republic of fear must give way to the rule of law to thwart a more foreboding future.

On the regional front, posterity will not be kind to the Zenawi regime as it has totally squandered the opportunity to forge a more peaceful and collaborative relations with Eritrea and Somalia given the goodwill of these two peoples.

Allowing Somalis the opportunity to rebuild their government and society in a democratic fashion would have eliminated traditional hostilities between the two countries and boosted their mutuality. Further, this approach would have shifted hundreds of millions of dollars from the war machine to development which is desperately needed.

Instead of building on that goodwill, the regime embarked on a reign of terror to destabilise Eritrea and keep Somalia in its catastrophic condition. Sadly, the attempt to impose regional tyranny will ricochet on Ethiopia and shall perpetuate the misery of all the peoples in the region.  It is not too late to change course and anchor developments on the significant and positive elements of the last two decades, but will there be the wisdom and the will in Addis Ababa?

Abdi Ismail Samatar is professor of geography at the University of Minnesota and a research fellow at the University of Pretoria, South Africa.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.

Warbixin: XUKUUMADA SOMALILAND OO KA DHIGTAY SOMALILAND DALKA AANAY KA DHICI KARIN DOORASHO XOR AH OO XALAAL AHI

Office Telephone: 252 2 4429552. Email: hornwatch@yahoo.com

Head Office Hargeisa, Somaliland

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HORNWATCH Index:   S/land 120/1/12

Ku:       H. E. Axmed Maxamed Maxamuud ‘Siilaanyo’

Madaxwaynaha JSL

            Xarunta Madaxtooyada Somaliland

            Hargeisa, Somaliland

Ku:       Komishanka Doorashooyinka Qaranka Somaliland

            Xarunta Komishanka Doorashooyinka

            Hargeisa, Somaliland

Ku:       Gudida Ilaalinta Anshaxa iyo Habsami u Socodka Doorashada

            Xarunta Gudida

            Hargeisa, Somaliland

Og:      Xisbiyada iyo Ururada Siyaasada Somaliland

Og:      Qaadhaan bixiyayaasha doorashooyinka Somaliland

Og:      British, US, Denmark, Norway, Holland Embassies & EU, AU, IGAD regional offices in Ethiopia, Kenya

Og:      Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, East & Horn of African Human Rights Defenders Network in Kampala, Uganda

Og:      National Endowment of Democracy, DANIDA, UN Somalia/Somaliland Political Office,  UN Independent Monitoring Committee on Somalia and Eritrea embargo

 

Og:      Warbaahinta Gudo iyo Dibad

Public Statement                                                                                                                                             Released Today: 16 Nov. 2012

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UJEEDO:          XUKUUMADA SOMALILAND OO KA DHIGTAY SOMALILAND DALKA AANAY KA DHICI KARIN DOORASHO XOR AH OO XALAAL AHI

Iyadoo ay haatan ka hadhsan tahay in ka yar 2 wiig maalinta ay dalka Somaliland ka dhacayso doorashadii sanadaha faraha badan mudo dhaaftay ee golayaasha deegaanku, ayaa marka loo dhabogalo aanay wakhtigan xaadirka ah Somaliland ka jirin shuruudahii aasaaska u ahaa in ay dalka doorasho xor ah oo xalaal ahi ka dhacdo.

Xog ururu si taxadar badan ay u sameeyeen Gudiga Ilaalada Xuquuqda Aadamiga Geeska Afrika ee Horn Watch ayaa daaha ka rogaysa habdhaqan ka baxsan nidaamka dimuquraadiga oo ay ku dhaqmayso xukuumada Madaxwayne Siilaanyo, xilgudashada xubnaha Komishanka Doorashooyinka qaranka oo madmadow farobadani ku gadaaman yahay, xadgudubyada xuquuqda aadamiga iyo xoriyadaha aasaasiga ah ee hay’adaha sharcifulinta Somaliland ay sida joogtada ah ugu hayaan shacbiga dalka, maamulxumo iyo musuqmaasuq ka soo burqanaya xafiiska madaxwayne Siilaanyo, iyadoo haatan dadwaynuhu arkayaan hantidii umada oo madaxwaynuhu ku naasnuujinayo xubno ka tirsan qoyskiisa, dhaqaalihii dalkana ay xukuumadu gacanta u galisay maalqabeeno ka soo jeeda gobolada uu ka soo jeedo Madaxwaynahu. Duruufahan haatan ka jira Somaliland ee aanay doorasho xor ah oo xalaal ahi u dhici karin waxa kamid ah:

Xeerka Sirdoonka Qaranka oo ay ka Dhalanayaan Dunuub Caalami ah iyo qaar heer dal ahi:

Difaacayaasha Xuquuqda Aadamiga Somaliland iyo Dhaqdhaqaaqyada Dimuquraadiyad Doonka ahi waxay sida fiinta uga qaylinayaan xeerka Sirdoonka Qaranka oo qodobo ku jiraa ay dhabarjabinayaan xoriyada cabiraada iyo ra’yi dhiibashada iyo xoriyaadka aasaasiga ee dastuurka Somaliland damaano qaaday, Baaqa Caalamiga ah ee Xuquuqda Aadamaha (UDHR). Sidaasi darteed waxay Difaacayaasha Xuquuqda Aadamiga Somaliland codkooda ku xoojinayaan dhawaaqyada iyo codsiyada ay Suxufiyiinta Somaliland u gudbinayaan Madaxwaynaha dalka. Xeerkan oo hay’adaha sharci dajinta Somaliland ay dhawaan meelmariyeen ayaa gabi ahaanba saaxada ka saaraya xoriyada saxaafada xorta ah iyo xaqa ra’yi dhiibashada iyo cabiraada oo ay Somaliland ku soo naaloonaysay 20kii  sanadood ee ugu dambeeyay.

Difaacayaasha Xuquuqda Aadamiga Somaliland waxay uga digayaan Madaxwaynaha dalka Mud. Axmed Maxamed Maxamuud in uu dhaqan galiyo xeerkan Sirdoonka Qaranka oo  ay ka dhalanayso dhaqangalkiisa tacadiyo xuquuqda aadamaha iyo xoriyadaha aasaasigu, Maadaama Mudane Madaxwayne aad tahay Madaxwayne ay si xor ah oo dimuquraadi ah shacabkiisu u soo doorteen, waxa ay Difaacayaasha Xuquuqda Aadamiga Somaliland kaa codsanaynaa in aanad dhaqan galin xeerkan, taasi bedelkeedana in aad ka saarto qodobada xakamaynaya xoriyada ra’yi dhiibashada iyo saxaafada kadibna dib ugu celiso Golayaasha sharci-dajinta.

Gafafka Xukuumadu ku Hayso Ururada Siyaasada ee Mucaaridka ah: 

Weeraro xukuumada Madaxwayne Siilaanyo ku kala furfurayso musharaxiinta ka sharaxan ururada mucaaridka ah iyadoo ku qalqaalinaysa in ay iska casilaan musharxnimada, weerarada noocan ah ayaa si wayn dibada ugu soo baxay wiigii labaad iyo kii seddexaad ee ololaha doorashada, isagoo gaadhay heer musharaxiinta mucaaridka la horkeeno Madaxwaynaha Qaranka Mudane Axmed Maxamed Maxamuud ‘Siilaanyo’ si uu musharaxiintaasi ugu qanciyo in ay ka tanaasulaan tartanka, waxa aanay xataa talaabooyinka noocan ahi saameeyeen oo xilalkoodii iska cusilay madax sarsare oo ka tirsanaa ururada siyaasada ee mucaaridka ah qaarkood.

Iyadoo xeerka doorashooyinka Dawladaha Hoose ee Somaliland dhigayo “in aan la xidhi karin Musharaxiinta u tartamaya doorashooyinka golayaasha deegaanka Somaliland oo ay leeyihiin dhawrsanaanta la mid ah ta ay haystaan Xildhibaanada la doortay, haddii aanay danbi xukunkiisu ka badan yahay sadex sano aanay gacanta kula jirin”. Af-hayeenka Komishanka Doorashooyinka Qaranka Mud. Maxamed Xirsi Geelle ayaa maanta ka markhaati kacay in Xukuumadda Somaliland tacadiyo iyo xadhig kula kacday musharixiin ka tirsan ururada Siyaasadda ee Tartamaya. Difaacayaasha Xuquuqda Aadamiga Somaliland waxay xogogaal u noqdeen qaar ka mid ah musharxiinta ururka UMADDA oo ay xukuumadu la la bartilmaameedsatay xadhiga iyo tacadiyada kale waxa ka mid ah: 

1. C/risaaq Faarax Xuseen   114 Burco, 2.Maxamed Jaamac Dubad  105  Hargeysa, 3.C/raxmaan Mire Gurxan   106 Caynaba, 4.Maxamed Ciise Ducaale  109 Burco, 5. Maxamed Yuusuf Cabdille Balay-gubadle, 6.Jaamac Maxamed Cabdi Guddoomiyaha Caynaba ee Umadda.

Waxa la yaab leh iyadoo Boolisku musharaxinta bartilmaameedsadaan oo xabsiga u taxaabaan, maalamaha ururadoodu uu leeyihiin Ololaha Doorashada, si aanay taageeryaashooda la hadlin. Sidoo kale waxay xukuumada Somaliland qaaday falal ay ku kala furfurayso musharaxiinta Xisbiga New UCID, iyadoo siinaysa lacag aad u tiro badan uguna balanqaadaysa shaqooyin ayay xukuumadu ku qalqaalisay musharaxiin tiro badan oo ka tirsan Xisbiga NEW UCID in ay ka hadhaan tartarka musharaxnimada.

Sanadkan sii dhamaanaya ee 2012 ayaa noqday sanadkii ugu xumaa dhinaca xuquuqda aadamaha ee soo mara Somaliland tan iyo markii lagu dhawaaqay la soo noqoshada madaxbanaanideeda 1991, sababtoo ah sanadkan waxa dalka ka dhacay gabood falada iyo tacadiyadii ugu tirada badnaa ee xukuumadu u gaysato shacbiga waxana ka mid ah.

Xadgudbyada Xukuumada ee Qaxootiga iyo Magangalyodoonka:

Waxa ay Xukuumada Madaxwayne Siilaanyo si khasab ah dalka uga saartay tiradii ugu badnayd ee dad qaxooti iyo  magangalyo doon ah oo ay gacanta u galisay hay’adaha amaanka ee dalka Ethiopia oo ay markii hore ka soo qaxeen tirada ay xukuumadu dhiibtay ee noo diiwaangashani waxay kor u dhaafaysaa 250 ruux oo isugu jira rag, dumar iyo caruur.

Gaboodfalada Xukuumada ee Suxufiyiinta Somaliland:

Sanadkani tiraddii ugu badnayd ee suxufiyiinta Somaliland ee ka hawlgala warbaahinta madaxabanaan  ayay Xukuumada Madaxwayne Siilaanyo xabsiga u taxaabtay, jidhdil u gaysatay iyadoo khasaarana u gaysatay qaar ka mid ah agabkii ay ku hawlgalayeen suxufiyiintu. tiradii ugu badanayd ee dacwado lid ku ah suxufiyiinta madaxa banaan ayay xukuumada Siilaanyo u gudbisay hay’adaha garsoorka dalka, dacwadahaasi oo markii loo dhabogalay Masuuliyiinta sarsare ee xukuumadu ay kaga aargoosanayeen Saxaafada madaxabanaan kadib markii ay qortay xogo iyo warar iyaga khuseeya.

Xadhiga Sharcidarada ah ee Muwaadiniinta:

Xadhiga sharcidarada ah (arbitrary detentions) iyo jidhdil (torture) iyo sidoo kale xabsi ku hayn qaanuunka ka baxsan ayaa inta la og yahay 18, ruux oo isugu jira 12 muwaadiniin ah 2 u dhashay Somalia iyo hal Ethiopian ah ay haatan mudo bil ah ku xidhan yihiin Xabsiga Mandheera. Dadkaasi oo habo yaraatee aan wax maxkamada ah la horgaynin ayaa waxa laga soo qabqabtay magaalo xuduudeeda Lawyacado iyadoo nasiibdarada kale ee dhacday markii maalintii 3aad ee xadhigooda la keenay laguna xibisay xabsi qarsoodi ah oo ku dhex taal xerada ciidamada ee Birjeex ay  madaxda ciidamadu ay sii daayeen 2 maxbuus oo ka soo jeeda beesha dhexe ee Somaliland halka maxaabiistii kale oo badankoodu ka soo kala jeeday gobolada Awdal iyo Selel loo gudbiyay dhinaca xabsiga Mandheera oo ay haatan la iska-hayayaal ku yihiin

Tabashooyinka Tirada Goobaha Codbixinta:

Waxa kale oo warwarkooda leh Komishanka Doorashooyinka Qaranka oo tirada goobaha codbixinta ee dalka deegaanada qaar yareeyay halka deegaano kalana ay kordhiyeen, iyagoo aan soo bandhigin sababta ay taasi u sameeyeen. Waxana ay talaabadani sababtay qaylo dhaan ka soo yeedhay deegaanada ay Komishanku ka yareen tirada goobihii ay hore uga codayn jireen, Difaacayaasha Xuquuqda Aadamiga Somaliland waxay xogogaal u noqdeen in Gobolka Togdheer deegaanada Komishanka Doorashooyinku aad u kordhiyay tirada goobaha laga codaynayo ay u badan yihiin deegaanada galbeedka Burco oo uu ah deegaanada uu ka soo jeedo madaxwayne Siilaanyo, halka deegaanada galbeedka Burcana tiradii goobaha codbixinta uu aad u yareeyay. Tan waa talaabo cadaan ah oo Komishanka Doorashooyinku ku soo saarayaan xisbiga talada haya.

Marka arimahan lagu daro maamul xumada ku dhisan eexda iyo qaraabo-kiilka ee ka soo fatahaysa xafiiska Madaxwayne Siilaanyo, iyo musuqmaasuqa hantida qaranka ee madaxtooyadu ku naasnuujinayo xubno ka tirsan qoyska Madaxwaynaha, iyo iyadoo aan xukuumada madaxwayne Siilaanyo uu dhisay ahayn mid loo dhan yahay, dhinaca saami qaybsiga oo beelo dhismaha qaranka halbawle u ah aanu siinin saamigii ay xaqa u lahaayeen.

Aargoosiga  Siyaasadeed ee Xukuumada: 

Xukuumadda Madaxwayne Siilaanyo  ayaa markii ay talada dalka la wareegtay qaaday olole balaadhan oo aargoosi siyaasadeed ah shaqaalahii dawlada gaar ahaan kuwa ka soo jeeda gobolada Awdal, Saaxil iyo Oodwayne. Dhawaana dadwaynaha Somaliland ayaa si xoog ah u dareemay Madaxwaynaha iyo qoyskiisa oo si gaar ah u bartilmaameedsanaya shaqaale dawladeed oo ka soo jeeda gobolka Awdal, waxana ay u adeegsadeen Hantidhawrka Qaranka si uu dambi aan jirin ugu sameeyo.

Dhaqamada noocan ah ee ka soo fulaya xafiiskii Madaxwaynaha dalka Mudane Ahmed Maxamed Maxamuud ‘Siilaanyo’ ayaa ah qaar si xun u naafaynaya oo dhantaalaya midnimada, wadajirka iyo isku kalsamaanta guud ahaan shacbiga Somaliland, sidoo kale waxay dilayaan nidaamkii iyo kala dambayntii iyo kalsoonida shacabku ku qabo maamulka duwaliga ah.

Ifafaalaha haatan ka aloosan Somaliland ee Xukuumada Madaxwayne Siilaanyo dalka ka wadaa waxay keenaysaa:

1.      In ay ku shubato xukuumadu doorashooyinka dawladaha hoose, sidoo kale waxay qaabkan kushubashada ku soo saari kartaa ururada siyaasada ee xukuumadu wadato

2.      Dhinaca kale waxa muuqta in ay ku soo socoto nabadgalyo xumo iyo dagaalo sokeeye oo ka dhaca dalka, iyadoo ay u muuqdaan hay’adihii qaran ee xasarad dajinta u xilsaaraana in ay jeebada xukuumada ku jiraan. Hawlgabnimada Golaha Guurtida ayaa lagu macnaynkaraa in ay sabab u tahay Gudoomiyaha Golaha Guurtida oo dhalasho ahaan ka soo jeeda beesha Madaxwaynuhu ka soo jeedo.

3.      Jawigan kakan ee ay dalka ka abuurtay xukuumada Somaliland kaasi oo ah mid aanay sinaba uga dhici karin doorasho xor ah oo xalaal ahi waxa uu keeni karaa in ay ururada siyaasada qaarkood qaadacaan ka qaybgalka tartanka doorashada Golayaasha Deegaanka

Talo-soojeedimo:

Ø  Waxanu ugu baaqaynaa guud ahaan jilayaasha doorashooyinka Somaliland in si wadajir ah isugu yimaadaan si ay cod midaysan ugu gudbiyaan xukuumada Somaliland si ay dib ugu soo celiso dalka jawi ay ku dhici karaan doorasho xor ah oo xalaal ahi.

Ø    Difaacayaasha Xuquuqda Aadamiga Somaliland iyo Dhaqdhaqaaqyada Dimuquraadiyad Doonka ahi waxay ugu baaqayaan Dalalka la saaxiibka ah dalka Somaliland, taageerayaasha Doorashooyinka Somaliland, iyo Bulshada Caalamka in ay Xukuumada Madaxwayne Siilaanyo culays caalami ah ku saaraan sidii uu dalka ugu soo celin lahaa jawi ay doorasho xor ah oo xalaal ahi uga dhici lahayd.

Difaacayaasha Xuquuqda Aadamiga Somaliland waxay Madaxwaynaha Somaliland u soo jeedinayaan talooyinkan hoos ku qoran:

1.     Maadaama dhaqan-galkiisa xeerka Sirdoonka Qaranka gaar ahaan qodobkiisa 7^aad farqadiisa 11^aad kaas oo awood u siinaya hay’ada Sirdoonka Qaranka inay faafreeb ku sameeyaan wax soo saarka warbaahinta una dhigan sidan. “La socodka qalabyada warbaahinta,qoraalada iyo meel kasta oo ay ku wajahanyihiin iyo in la hubiyo ujeedooyinka ay  xanbaarsanyihiin iyo waxkasta oo ku duugan (publication press and propaganda” ay ka dhalanayaan dunuub dhinaca xuquuqda iyo xoriyadaha aasaasiga ah isla markaasina uu burinayo xaqii cabiraada iyo ra’yi dhiibashadm waxa aanu Mud. Madaxwayne kaa codsanaynaa in aanad dhaqan-galin, adigoo ka hor doorashada golalaha deegaanka inta aanay dhicin sidaasi ficil ku muujinaya;

2.     Mud. Madaxwayne waa in xukuumadaadu sida uqu dhaqsaha badan u joojiso gafafka ku hayso asxaabta mucaaridka ah ee tartamaysa gaar ahaan xadhiga, bahdilaada iyo ku khasabka musharixiinta ururada  UMADDA iyo NEW UCID xukuumadaadu ku hayso iyo sidoo kale waa in aad sida ugu dhaqsaha badan wax uga qabataa saraakiisha jabisay Anshaxa Ololaha Doorashada ee ay magacyadooda kuu soo gudbiyeen hay’adaha qaranka ugu xilsaaran ilaalinta Anshaxa Doorshada.

3.     Waa in Xukuumada Somaliland joojisaa mastaafurinta joogtada ah sida joogtada ah ay ugu fuliso dadka  qaxootiga iyo magangalyodoonka ah ee dalka sifada sharciga ah ku jooga.

4.     Waxanu ugu baaqaynaa in xukuumada Somaliland gabi ahaanba joojiso tacadiga iyo gaboodfalada ay sida joogtada ah ugu hayso Suxufiyiinta Somaliland.

5.     Mud. Madaxwayne waxa aanu kuugu baaqaynaa in sida ugu dhaqsaha badan oo bilaa shuruud ah aad xoriyadooda ugu soo celiso dhamaan muwaadiniinta rayidka ah ee la haya-yaasha ku ah xabsiyada dalka, waana in aanay xukuumadaadu dhaqan ka dhigan in ay muwaadiniinta iska xidho iyadoo aan sifo sharci ah u marin, dhamaan dadka la xidho ama lagu soo eedeeyo danbi waa in 48 sacadood gudahood lagu horgeeyo maxkamad awood u leh. Difaacayaasha Xuquuqda Aadamiga Somaliland waxay xogogaal u yihiin 12 ruux oo ciidamada qaranku ka soo qabteen Lawyacado, labo ruux oo Somali ah iyo hal Ethiopian ah oo iyadoo maxkamad aan la horgaynin ku xidhan xabsiga dhexe ee Mandheera. Haddii ay dambi galeen waa in maxkamada awooda u leh ee ku taala deegaankii ay danbiga ku galeen la horgeeyaa, ruuxana waa dambi laawe ka hor inta aanu dambi ka hor cadaan maxkamad caadil ah horteed. 

6.     Xukuumada Somaliland waa in ay gabi ahaanba joojiso aargoosiga  Siyaasadeed ee lidka ku ah shaqaalaha dawladda, maadaama oo ay xaq u leeyihiin in ay taageeraan urur siyaasadeedka ay doonayaan.

Komishanka Doorashooyinka Somaliland: 

7.     Difaacayaasha Xuquuqda Aadamiga Somaliland waxa aanu ugu baaqayaan Komishanka Doorashooyinka Somaliland in sida ugu dhaqsaha badan u xaliyaan tabashooyinka tirada goobaha codbixinta ee ka soo yeedhayo deegaano kala duwan oo dalka ah.

8.     Sidoo kale waxanu Komishanka Doorashooyinka Somaliland la socodsiinaynaa in ay xaq u leeyihiin dadka naafada ah ee Somaliland in la gaadhsiiyo wacyigalinta doorashada iyo sida ay u codayn lahaayeen. Ka reebida aad haatan ka reebteen wacyigalinta muwaadiniinta naafada ah oo ay ku jiraan dhagoolayaal indhoolayaal waxay xadgudub ku tahay doorashada xorta ah ee xalaasha ah.

ILAAHAY AYAA MAHADI U SUGNAATAY

Suleiman Ismail Bolaleh

Gudoomiyaha

Gudiga Ilaalada Xuquuqda Aadamiga Geeska Afrika ee Horn Watch

ahna Afhayeenka Difaacayaasha Xuquuqda Aadamiga Somaliland

Komishanka Doorashooyinka Qaranka Somaliland oo Qorsheeyey Falal Budhcad Codeednimo ah & Codbixiyayaasha Doorashada oo Fashiliyey.

November 17, 2012 

Komishanka Doorashooyinka Qaranka JSL ayaa qorsheeyey falal Budhcad Codeednimo ah oo aan hore loogu arag Somaliland kuwaas oo Codbixiyayaasha, Tartamayaasha iyo Daneeyayaasha Doorashada qaarkood ay fashiliyeen horaantii bishan aynu ku jirno ee Nov 2012. Falalka Budhcad Codeednimada Casriyeysan ee KDQ qorsheeyey ee sida weyn looga biyo diiday waxaa ka mid ah Talaabooyin cadaalad darro iyo nin jeclaysi ah, kuna salaysan Cunsuriyad iyo U kala-Eexasho Codbixiyayaasha, Tartamayaasha, Goobaha Codbixinta iyo Degmooyinka JSL kuwaas oo laba waji oo foolxun oo iska soo horjeeda lagu saleeyey hirgalintooda waxaanay kala yihiin:

1. In Goobo Codbixineed oo hore u jiray Degaanada qaarkood laga tirtiro si loo yareeyo tirada Sanaaduuqda iyo Waraaqaha Codbixinta ee loo gudbinayo Deegamadaas. Wajigan oo ah Xatooyo Xaq Doorasho waxaa loogu talo galay in lagu yareeyo tirada Codbixiyayaasha Degmooyin si gaar ah loo calaamadsaday. Talaabadani waxay saamayn taban ku yeelanaysa Musharaxiinta iyo Ururada codka ka doonaya Deegaamadaas. Qorshahan waxaa loogu talo galay Deegaamada Codbixiyaasha ku nooli ay taageeradooda u muujiyeen Musharaxiin KDQ doonayaan in aanay soo bixin oo Xildhibaano noqonin iyo Ururada aan la rabin inay guulaystaan ama noqdaan saddexda Xisbi Qaran ee soo baxaya. Qorshahan Fulaynimada iyo farsamo xumada ah waxaa lagu saleeyey fikiro qaldan iyo fariimo aan la hubin oo la ururiyey intii lagu jiray geedi socodka Doorashadan Golayaasha Deegaanka ee Olalaheeda lagu gudo jiro iyo tii Madaxtooyada ee 2010.

2. In Goobo Codbixineed oo aan hore u Jirin Deegaamada qaarkood loo sameeyo si loo kordhiyo tirada Sanaaduuqda iyo Waraaqaha Codbixinta ee loo gudbinayo Deegamadaas. Wajigan oo ah Sad-bursiimo Xaaraan ah waxaa loogu talo galay in lagu kordhiyo tirada Codbixiyayaasha Degmooyinkaas sida gaar ah loo calaamadiyey. Talaabani waxay saamayn togan ku yeelanaysaa Musharaxiintii iyo Ururadii codka ka doonayey Deegaanadaas. Qorshahanna waxaa loogu talo galay Deegaamada Codbixiyaasha ku nooli ay taageeradooda u muujiyeen Musharaxiin la doonayo inay soo baxaan oo Xildhibaano noqdaan iyo Ururada la doonayn inay guulaystaan kana mid noqdaan saddexda Xisbi Qaran ee soo baxaya.

Markiiba arrintani waxay ku keentay KDQ inay lumiyaan kalsoonidii Shacabka waxaana la soo gaadhsiiyey Cabashooyin, Canaan iyo Canbaarayn xoog leh oo ka timi qaybo ka mid ah Codbixiyayaasha, Musharixiinta, Masuuliyiin ka tirsan Urarada tartamaya, Madax Dhaqameed, Gudiyada Beelaha iyo Daneeyayaasha kale ee Doorashada Golayaasha Deegaanka ee 28 November 2012. Codbixiyayaasha, Tartamayaasha iyo Daneeyayaasha Doorshada Qaarkood ayaa waxa ay Fagaarayaal, Shirar Jaraa’id oo aay qabteen, Qoraallo iyo Qalabka Warbaahintaba kaga digeen cawaaqib xumada ka dhalan karta Natiijada Doorsho aan Xor iyo Xalaal ahayn.

Waxa kale oo qaybahan Bulshadu caddeeyeen in ay qaadacayaan Doorashada haddii KDQ aanu ka noqon Qorshahan.

Qorshahan ama Mu’aamaraadkan Maxalliga ah ee lagu Duudsiyayo Xuquuqda Doorasho ee Dastuurku siiyey Muwaadiniinta JSL isla markaana Sumcaddii wanaagsanayd ee Doorashooyinka Somaliland lagu xumaynayo ilaa hadda ma jiraan wax talaabo ah oo KDQ ama Dawladuba ka qaaday Ciddii ka dambaysay. Jawaabta kaliya ee laga hayo KDQ waa inay tix galinayaan Cabashooyinka soo gaadhay dib u eegisna ku samaynayaan qorshahan sidaana waxa wiigan Warbaahinta u sheegay Af hayeenka KDQ mudane Maxamed Axmed Xirsi(Geelle).

Hadaba su’aasha dad badani is weydiinayaan ayaa waxa ay tahay ma ku filan tahay Jawaabtaasi oo ma soo celin kartaa Aaminaaddii iyo Kalsoonidii shacabka.

Jawaabtu waa maya oo ma kafayso, Ummadda Somalilandna ku qanci maayaan hadalkaas Afhayeenka KDQ oo qudha laakiinse waxaa looga fadhiyaa KDQ iyo Xukuumadda JSL ee uu hogaamiyo Madaxweynaha JSL Mudane Axmed Maxamed Maxamud Siilaanyo inay la yimaadaan soona bandhigaan qaorshe buuxa oo muujinaya in Goobaha codbixinta, Sanaaduuqda iyo waraaqaha codbixintaba ee
Deegaamada kala duwan ee JSL ay helayaan lagu saleeyo Tirada dadka ama codbixiyaasha ku nool Goballada, Degmooyinka iyo Tuulooyinka JSL.

Qorshahan lagu bedalayo kii hore ee fashilmay waa inuu noqdaa mid Cusub oo Codbixiyayaasha Somaliland dhamaantood ama inta ugu badan ee suurto gal ah ay kaga qayb qaadan karaan Doorashada Golayaasha Deegaanka maadaam oo Bilaa-Diiwaan galin lagu footaaynaayo doorkan.Tusaalahan hoose ee aan soo diyaariyey waa mid ku salaysan Xaqiiqada ka jirta Somaliland, Qorshihii la diiday ee KDQ kana uga dhow xagga Caddaaladda iyo Dhowrista Xuquuqda Doorasho ee Muwaadiniinta JSL. Faahfaahinta Tusaalahanina waa:

1. Tirada dadka Somaliland waxa lagu qiyaasay ilaa 3.5 Malyuun.

2. Tirada Codbixiyayaasha Somaliland waxay noqon karaan ilaa 2,000,000 – 2,200,000( 2 Malyuun ilaa 2 Malyuun iyo laba boqol oo kun) Qof. Inta soo hadhay waxay noqon karaan dad aan gaadhin Da’dii lagu codaynayey, dad ka maqan dalka iwm.

3. Tirada Waraaqaha Codbixinta ee loo baahan yahay waxay waxoogaa ka badan tahay Tirada Codbixiyayaasha kore (2,000,000 – 2,200,000). Inta dheeraadka ahina waa waraaqaha Xumaanaya iwm.

4. Tirada Sanaaduuqda loo baahan yahay waa 2 kun oo Sanduuq oo midkiiba loogu talo galay 1000 waraaqood ama 4 kun oo sanduuq oo midkiiba loogu talo galay shan boqol oo waraaqo codbixineed.

5. Tirada Goobaha Codbixinta ee loo baahan yahay waa 6000 – 6500(Lix kun ilaa lix kun iyo shan boqol) kuwaas oo tirada codbixiyayaasha kor ku xusani ka codayn karaan maalinta codbixinta.

6. Tirada Codbixiyayaasha ka codayn kara Goob kasta waxay noqonayaan marka laysku celceliyo 350 – 360 oo Qof. Waxaan ku saleeyey in qof kastaaba qaadan karo 2 Daqiiqadood si uu u codeeyo maalintaas.

7. Tirada Saacaddiiba Codayn karaana waxay noqonayaan 30 Qof. Sidaa darteed 12 ka Saacadood ee maalinta codbixinta waxaa goob kasta ka codayn kara 360 oo Qof.

8. Tirada guud ahaan lixda kun ee Goobood Codkooda ka dhiibanayaana waxay noqonayaan Codbixiyayaal dhan 2,160,000(laba Malyuun, boqol iyo Lixdan kun) .

Waxaan ku soo Gebagebaynayaa qoraalkan maaha markii ugu horaysay ee KDQ kasbadaan Fadeexad ee waxaa jiray qaar hore oo dul hoganaya kana raacay ficilo hore iyo farsamooyin qalad ah oo ay ikhtiraaceen sida tirtiriddii Calaamadaha iyo Sawiradii Codbixiyayaashu ku kala garan jireen tartamayaasha Doorashooyinkii hore. Nidaamkan cusub ee KDQ soo dejiyey waxa uu Cunsuriyad iyo Cunaqabatayn ku yahay Codbixiyayaasha tirada badan ee aan waxna Qorin waxna Akhriyin.

Nidaamkani waxa kale oo uu ku khasbayaa codbixiyaasha inay Calaamadda 100% dul dhigaan Shaxanka iyo Xariijimaha isku dhowdhow ee ku hor qoran lambarka ay dooranayaan.(haddii ay lambarka gartaanba). Haddii kale Codkooda waxa la qorayaa inuu xumaaday inkasta oo ay Codbixiyayaashaasu dedaaleen.

Komishanka Doorashooyinka Qaranka waxa kale oo loo aanaynayaa in ay door laxaad leh ka qaateen Maadaama oo ay Doorshada ku dhawaaqeen ka hor intaan Maxkamadda Dastuuriga ahi go’aan ka gaadhin Dacwadiii Ururadii Siyaasadda ee wareegii hore la reebay. Waxa kale oo si weyn waxa looga saarayaa Burburka ku dhacay Xisbigii UDUB ee keenay Gudoomiyaha KDQ mudane Ciise Yuusuf Xamari iyo laba Xubnood oo kale oo ka mid ah 7 Xubnood ee KDQ ka kooban yahay.

Dhinaca kale waxa dad badani aaminsan yihiin in KDQ aanu awood u lahayn uu wax kaga qabto caddaalad darooyinka ay ka mid yihiin Xadhiga iyo caga juglaynta lagu samaynayo Musharaxiinta iyo Ururada Qaarkood iyo waliba Gabood falka ay samaynayaan Xisbul Xaakimka iyo Xukuumadda oo Masuuliyiin ka tirsani ku milmeen kana qabqaadanayaan Ololaha Doorashada Deegaanka ee 28 November 2012.
 
Waa Mahadsan tihiin
Axmed Naasir Xirsi Maxamed
ahmedlibaah@gmail.com

Articles by Wuerth and from Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law cited in Fourth Circuit Court decision in Samantar

Release Date: Nov 14, 2012

An article dealing with foreign state immunity published in the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law and an article by Ingrid Wuerth, who directs Vanderbilt’s International Legal Studies Program, published in the Virginia Journal of International Law were both cited in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decision in Yousuf v. Samantar, handed down November 2.

“Although other courts have deferred to the State Department's immunity determinations, I’ve argued in my scholarship that those determinations are not binding on the courts,” Wuerth said. “The Fourth Circuit partially accepted that position in this case. In addition, the court denied immunity to Mr. Samantar because the complaint alleged that he engaged in torture and summary executions, which violate peremptory norms of international law. This basis for denying immunity is inconsistent with some other court decisions from around the world and arguably conflicts with the international law of immunity. In this case, however, I believe the court reached the right result, because Somalia has no recognized government, and only governments—not individuals—may invoke the kind of immunity to which Mr. Samantar was arguably entitled."

The decision in Samantar addressed the question of whether Mohamed Ali Samantar, a former prime minister of Somalia, is immune from civil actions brought in U.S. courts under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991and the Alien Tort Statute.

The opinion cited Lewis S. Yelin’s article, “Head of State Immunity as Sole Executive Lawmaking" (44 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 911, 2011), in a discussion of the relationship between sovereign immunity and head-of-state immunity. Yelin, an attorney at the U.S. State Department, originally presented his paper at a February 2011 symposium, Foreign State Immunity at Home and Abroad, organized and hosted by the Journal of Transnational Law. The conference featured a keynote address by Harold Hongju Koh, legal advisor of the U.S. State Department, and a panel discussion of Samantar's impact on immunity cases during which former U.S. State Department legal advisor John Bellinger III presented a paper.

Wuerth’s article, “Foreign Official Immunity Determination in U.S. Courts: The Case Against the State Department” (51 Virginia Journal of International Law 915, 2011) was cited in a discussion of how U.S. courts had applied foreign sovereign immunity throughout the country’s history.

Samantar served as Somalia’s minister of defense as well as its prime minister during the military regime of General Mohamed Barre. After the Barre regime collapsed in 1991, Samantar fled Somalia for the United States, where he is now a legal resident.

The plaintiffs, also Somali natives, brought a civil action against Samantar in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging that they or members of their families were subjected to “torture, arbitrary detention and extrajudicial killing” by agents acting under Samantar’s command and control. Two of the plaintiffs also live in the U.S. as naturalized citizens.

The plaintiffs sued Samantar under both the Torture Victim Protection Act and the Alien Tort statute. Samantar claimed that he was immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), and the district court dismissed the case. The plaintiffs appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court, which reversed the district court’s decision, concluding that the FSIA applies to sovereign states, but not to individual agents of foreign governments.

However, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to consider whether Samantar could “successfully invoke an immunity doctrine arising under pre-FSIA common law.”

Samantar appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s decision that the FSIA, based on its text, purpose and history, governs only foreign state immunity and not the immunity of individual officials.

When the case was remanded to the district court, Samantar renewed his motion to dismiss the claims against him based on two common-law immunity doctrines. First, he claimed he was entitled to head-of-state immunity because some of the alleged wrongdoing occurred while he was prime minister. Second, he sought foreign official immunity on the basis that any actions for which the plaintiffs sought to hold him responsible were taken in the course of scope of his official duties.

The district court requested that the State Department respond to Samantar’s immunity claims. The opinion noted that the State Department "had remained silent" during Samantar’s original appeal, but on the second appeal, took a position “expressly opposing immunity for Samantar” based on two factors. First, Samantar’s claim for immunity was undermined by the fact that he was a former official of a state with no currently recognized government to request immunity on his behalf or to take a position as to whether the acts in question were taken in an official capacity. Second, as a permanent legal resident of the U.S., Samantar not only enjoys the protection of U.S. law but should also be subject to the jurisdiction of its courts, particularly when sued by other U.S. residents.

In its November 2 decision, the Fourth Circuit Court affirmed the district court’s denial of head-of-state and foreign immunity to Samantar.