The
Horn of Africa is one of the most restless African regions. The countries in
the Horn, namely Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, are suffering from internal
conflicts among different communities and are involved in border conflicts
among each other. A common feature of the Horn countries is high militarisation
of its inhabitants,(2) which is a basis for continued violent conflicts. These
include human rights atrocities, child conscription and the collapse of state
infrastructure. There is almost no conversation among the states, nor is there
accountability, flexibility, legitimacy and stability in the region.(3)
Analysts
suggest that there are several internal and external factors that stimulate
continued conflicts in the African Horn. These are geophysical conditions,
resource scarcity, poverty, socio-economic inequalities and ethnic divisions,
militarisation, competition for state power, and also the legacies of the
colonial and Cold War policies.(4)
This
paper focuses on the last two factors, namely the legacies of the colonial and
Cold War policies. First, it describes the external interventions in the region
during the colonial era and analyses their consequences. The paper continues by
analysing the Cold War superpowers’ influence in the Horn, which used the
region as one of their battlefields. The wars that took place in the region,
and the United States of America (USA or US) and Soviet Union’s politics of
searching for allies are further described.
In the last section, the paper
analyses recent conflicts and wars in the African Horn and the international
presence and support. They serve as proof that international interventions are
not decreasing the tensions in the region, nor are they working towards
changing the legacy of colonialism and the Cold War era.
Colonial era and bringing the European patterns to the
African Horn
The
colonial era, despite its relatively short duration of less than 100 years, set
the basis for today’s chaotic situation in the African Horn. The region was
partitioned among Britain, France and Italy. Today’s Somalia was divided
between Britain and Italy. Italy also occupied a part of Ethiopia and
established Eritrea as a colonial entity, while France occupied Djibouti.(5)
It
seemed that colonialism brought progress, established civil service and
judicial systems and brought peace and stability to the region. Yet, the
reality was different. The main aim of colonial powers was the exploitation of
natural resources and cheap labour force, which only brought suffering to the
local inhabitants. Civil service and judicial systems were established, but
were intended to serve colonial interests and not the interests of independent states.
The inhabitants of the Horn lost their right to govern themselves. Indigenous
people could not even learn how to lead a country since they were considered
and treated as subordinated people throughout the colonial time. They were
humiliated, persecuted, tortured and deprived of their basic rights and civil
liberties.
Their silence was interpreted as peace and stability, which was only
superficial. Moreover, colonialists created a new geo-political setup. Many
states at that time were artificially created. New boundaries cut across
pre-existing ethnic groups, states and kingdoms and united different cultures,
languages and traditions. This caused, on the one hand, unrest within newly
created countries and, on the other hand, border disputes and demands for
unification of dispersed ethnic groups.(6)
Already
colonial powers waged border wars in order to get more strategically important
territory. The British demarcated their borders between 1932 and 1934, which
could not be claimed for the Italians, who were not satisfied with the
colonised territory. They launched an invasion against Ethiopia and
successfully annexed the grazing area of the Ogaden to Somalia. The region was
later returned to Ethiopia, but the border became a barrier to nomadic migrations
and only triggered further disputes between those two countries.(7)
Colonial
powers left the African Horn in bad shape. States were culturally and
economically weakened and a crisis of the leadership appeared.(8) Newly
independent states had to establish new governance. They used the patterns they
knew from the colonial era. It often happened that the power was in the hands
of ethnic or ideological oligarchies. For example, Amharas and Tigreanes
dominated resources in Ethiopia.(9) Different kinds of oppressive regimes
appeared, such as the communist juntas, dictatorships, rivalling militias,
warlords and clan leaders. Fights for power triggered several internal violent
conflicts.(10) An important legacy of the colonialist era was also
expansionism. It was apparent in the Somali irredentism, Ethiopia’s annexation
of Eritrea, claims of French-protected Djibouti and various other border
disputes.(11)
The Cold War: African Horn as a competitive scene for the
superpowers
Due
to its strategic importance, the Horn of Africa was very interesting for the
Cold War superpowers, the USA and the Soviet Union. The Horn is located
directly at the southern end of the Red Sea, across the Arabian Peninsula,
which makes it a neighbour to the major oil lines. Both superpowers tried to
get allies in the Horn in order to supervise the oil lines and prevent access
to the lines to the other superpower.(12) The USA and Soviet Union started
attracting their potential allies on the Horn by militarising them heavily.
Consequently, the countries in the region grew in number of armed forces,
escalated their defence expenditures, increased their propensity for internal
and external war and military dominance of a civil society appeared.(13)
The
USA and the Soviet Union’s relationship with various regimes in the region
evolved according to their perceived importance within an East-West
framework.(14) The USA first found its ally in Ethiopia, where, in the late
1960s, it established the largest embassy in Sub-Saharan Africa.(15) At that
time, Ethiopia was a part of a worldwide telecommunications network directed
against the Soviet Union.(16) The country received the largest economic and
military programme from the USA. When Ethiopia was threatened by Somali
irredentism or Eritrean separatism, the USA strongly backed the Haile Selassie
Government.(17) Yet, after the Ethiopian revolution, which lasted from 1974 to
1977, a Soviet-backed regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam came to power in
Ethiopia. The USA took away its support and backed the Somali regime of the
dictator Mohamed Siad Barre. Somalia became an access country from which the
USA could militarily counter any perceived Soviet threat to the Middle Eastern
oil fields.(18)
According
to the relationship between the superpowers, the relationship between Somalia
and Ethiopia largely depended on the game between the USA and the Soviet Union
and the external aid and support they were receiving from them. Especially
Somalia, which was already unstable due to the internal fights for power,
became a match-ball between the USA and the Soviet Union due to its
geo-strategic position, which served as a base for further actions in the
Middle East and Persian Gulf region.(19) One of the most violent consequences
of those two countries’ militarisation was a destructive war for the Ogaden
region in 1963 and 1964 and then again in 1977 and 1978.(20) It was one of the
actions with which Somalia wanted to fulfil its idea of Greater Somalia and
re-unite Somali people that were divided among Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya
during the colonial times.(21)
The
Cold War was losing its power, as were the regimes backed by the superpowers.
In 1988, Somalia and Ethiopia concluded a peace agreement, mostly with the aim
to defuse conflictual external relations in order to effectively deal with the
internal regime-threatening guerrilla insurgencies. In Somalia it was the
Somali National Movement and in Ethiopia the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary
Democratic Front. In 1991, both governing regimes were overthrown by guerrilla
insurgencies.(22) The end of superpower competition in the Horn left a
political vacuum and the competition for power started again.(23) Moreover,
major changes happened. Ethiopia had been reconstructed with the independence
of Eritrea, Somalia was bankrupted and Djibouti was about to enter civil
war(24) and the former British Somaliland territory declared sovereignty.(25)
Post Cold War era: New era, same old patterns
The
violent history and the patterns that the inhabitants of the Horn region
learned during the colonial era and the Cold War were a bad basis for the
stabilisation of the region. Contrary to stabilisation, Somalia has been at the
top of the Failed States Index for four years in a row.(26) In 2012, Ethiopia
ranked 17th, Eritrea 23rd and Djibouti 53rd.(27) In comparison with the last
two years, they have been scaling up the list.(28)
Border
disputes among the neighbouring countries in the Horn did not end. In 1993,
Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia after a long guerrilla war, yet the
border was not strictly demarcated.(29) Ethiopia refused to recognise and
implement the borders agreed to in the 2000 Algiers Agreement, which gave the
town of Badme to Eritrea. Ethiopia even blocked the United Nations technical
team, which wanted to demarcate the border. Five years later, the war over the
border started again.
The war took the form of a proxy war since both countries
amassed their troops in neighbouring Somalia. Somali Islamists demanded that
Ethiopian troops withdraw from the country and several clashes started
throughout the country.(30) The USA got involved and backed Ethiopia with the
excuse that the Eritrean regime supported transnational terrorism and needed to
be stopped. The war officially ended in 2000, but tensions remained.(31) The
United Nations sent its troops to the border, but due to the extreme danger
posed to its personnel, the United Nations Security Council unanimously voted
to withdraw its troops from the region.(32) Moreover, Eritrea was also involved
in border conflicts with Djibouti. Eritrea ignored the United Nations Security
Council resolution, which demanded its withdrawal from Djibouti, which led to
deadly clashes in 2008.(33)
The
biggest problem in the region represents Somalia, which has the best strategic position
and was massively misused during the Cold War. It is still involved in a border
dispute with Ethiopia. War-torn Somalia continues to be a subject of the
African Union’s peacekeeping interventions. At the end of 2011, troops from
Djibouti arrived in Somalia to join forces from Burundi and Uganda, which have
been present in Somalia for the last two years as part of the African Union
peace mission to combat the militants. Moreover, the US aerial attack drones
and French naval firepower have coordinated with the Kenyan ground assault.(34)
The
USA is still intervening in the internal affairs of these countries. The former
American General, William Ward, pledged continued support to Somalia’s
Transitional
Federal
Government and condemned Somali rebels, who were accused of supporting the
Government of Eritrea in its border conflict with Djibouti.(35) But the USA
again changed allies and Ethiopia is now a close Washington ally. In 2006, the
USA gave a green light to Ethiopia to invade Somalia, where the Islamic Courts
Union was in power.(36) In 2011, military sources confirmed that the Obama
administration was engaged in a new war in a famine-hit African Horn. It
supported Kenya in its fight against Somalia in its anti-terrorism war. And the
French joined them, too.(37)
Today
the USA and its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies do not only
support the countries of the Horn, but are also physically present in the
region. They lay the groundwork for increased naval, air and ground operations
in the Horn of Africa.
The
British Prime Minister described Somalia as the country to which special
attention should be given. The USA also entered Djibouti and established the
Pentagon’s first permanent base in Africa with 2,500 personnel. Djibouti is also
the headquarters of the US Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF –
HOA), which was set up in 2001. Its responsibilities include all countries of
this region and some other countries as well.(38) Djibouti is still a base for
France’s largest military base on the continent, and the USA has more than
1,200 troops there as a part of its anti-terrorism task force in the Horn of
Africa.(39) Troops, warplanes and armoured vehicles under the flag of NATO, the
European Union (EU), France and the USA have intervened in all of the Horn
countries and some others, too. Starting in 2008, NATO commenced its war
against the pirates on the coast of Somalia. The NATO and EU deployments in the
Gulf of Aden are the first such naval operations in both organisations’ history
and the EU’s first in African coastal waters.(40)
Conclusion
Countries
in the Horn of Africa hardly promote any communication among each other. Their
relationship is still characterised by mistrust and suspicion; consequently,
they are not able to solve problems constructively. If they agree to
negotiations, those mostly bring mutual accusations. There have been examples
when neutral regional third parties offered good offices by providing a neutral
territory for negotiations, but with little success. As noted earlier,
international interventions even fuelled further conflicts in the region.(41)
International actors are regularly present in the region. In the past they
admitted that they were attracted by the strategic position of the Horn. Today,
they are allegedly trying to solve the conflicts that happen due to the power
struggles and unresolved border issues. Yet, it appears that their interest in
local conflict solutions is still subordinated to the strategic importance of
the region and the USA’s commitment to fight global terrorism.
The
two most important reasons for violence in Africa are “perceptions of
mistreatment by a population, and no legal channel for that population to
address that perceived injustice,” said Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles
Zenawi.(42) That implies that the USA and other Western powers should start
helping the region in a manner they should have done a century ago: by teaching
the countries/Governments how to establish democracy and communicate with each
other in a peaceful manner, and not to further militarise the already
over-militarised region just to keep the control over a strategically important
region.
NOTES:
(1) Contact Petra Pavšič through
Consultancy Africa Intelligence's Conflict and Terrorism Unit ( conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com).
(2) Wasara, S.S., 2002. Conflict and state security in the Horn of Africa: Militarisation of civilian groups. African Association of Political Science, 7(2), pp. 39-60.
(3) Elmore, E.K., 2010. The Horn of Africa: Critical analysis of conflict management and startegies for success in the Horn's future. Student Pulse, 2(6), http://www.studentpulse.com.
(4) 'Costs and Causes of the Conflict in the Great Horn of Africa', Conflict Prevention, http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com.
(5) Degu, W.A., 'The State, the crisis of state institutions and refugee migration in the Horn of Africa: The cases of Ethiopa, Sudan and Somalia', 2002, http://dare.uva.nl.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Elmore, E.K., 2010. The Horn of Africa: Critical nalysis of conflict management and startegies for success in the Horn's future. Student Pulse, 2(6), http://www.studentpulse.com
(8) 'Costs and Causes of the Conflict in the Great Horn of Africa', Conflict Prevention, http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com.
(9) Wasara, S.S., 2002. Conflict and state security in the Horn of Africa: Militarisation of civilian groups. African Association of Political Science, 7(2), pp. 39-60.
(10) Elmore, E.K., 2010. The Horn of Africa: Critical Analysis of Conflict Management and Startegies for Success in the Horn's Future. Student Pulse, 2(6), http://www.studentpulse.com.
(11) 'Costs and Causes of the Conflict in the Great Horn of Africa', Conflict Prevention, http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com.
(12) Schulz, P., 2011. The Horn of Africa in a bipolar world - The Cold War as the origin of the Somalia crisis. Undergraduate Research Journal for the Human Sciences, 10, http://urc.kon.org.
(13) Agyeman-Duah, B., 1996. The Horn of Africa: Conflict, demilitarisation and reconstruction. The Journal of Conflict Studies, 16(2), http://journals.hil.unb.ca.
(14) Schraeder, P.J., 1992. The Horn of Africa: The US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment. Middle East Journal, 46(4), pp. 571-593.
(15) Shinn, D.H., 'US Policy towards the Horn of Africa', International Policy Digest, 2012, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org.
(16) Schraeder, P.J., 1992. The Horn of Africa: The US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment. Middle East Journal, 46(4), pp. 571-593.
(17) Shinn, D.H., 'US Policy towards the Horn of Africa', International Policy Digest, 2012, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org.
(18) Schraeder, P.J., 1992. The Horn of Africa: The US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment. Middle East Journal, 46(4), pp. 571-593.
(19) Schulz, P., 2011. The Horn of Africa in a bipolar World - The Cold War as the origin of the Somalia crisis. Undergraduate Research Journal for the Human Sciences, 10, http://urc.kon.org.
(20) Agyeman-Duah, B., 1996. The Horn of Africa: Conflict, demilitarisation and reconstruction. The Journal of Conflict Studies, 16(2), http://journals.hil.unb.ca.
(21) Wasara, S.S., 2002. Conflict and state security in the Horn of Africa: Militarisation of civilian groups. African Association of Political Science, 7(2), pp. 39-60.
(22) Schraeder, P.J., 1992. The Horn of Africa: The US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment. Middle East Journal, 46(4), pp. 571-593.
(23) Wasara, S.S., 2002. Conflict and state security in the Horn of Africa: Militarisation of civilian groups. African Association of Political Science, 7(2), pp. 39-60.
(24) Agyeman-Duah, B., 1996. The Horn of Africa: Conflict, demilitarisation and reconstruction. The Journal of Conflict Studies, 16(2), http://journals.hil.unb.ca.
(25) Schraeder, P.J., 1992. The Horn of Africa: The US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment. Middle East Journal, 46(4), pp. 571-593.
(26) 'The Failed States Index 2011', Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com.
(27) 'The Failed States: The Rankings 2012', Foreign Policy,http://www.foreignpolicy.com.
(28) 'The Failed States Index 2010', Foreign Policy,http://www.foreignpolicy.com; 'The Failed States Index 2011', Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com.
(29) 'Ethiopia/Eritrea War', Global Security,org, http://www.globalsecurity.org.
(30) Hanson, S., 'Proxy War in Africa's Horn.' Council on Foreign Relations,20 December 2006, http://www.cfr.org; Woldemariam, Y. and Yohannes, O., ‘War Clouds in the Horn of Africa’, Sudan Tribune, 10 November 2007, http://www.sudantribune.com.
(31) Wasara, S.S., 2002. Conflict and state security in the Horn of Africa: Militarisation of civilian groups. African Association of Political Science, 7(2), pp. 39-60.
(32) 'UN ends African Horn peace force', BBC News, 30 July 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
(33) 'Eritrea 'ignored' UN resolution', BBC News, 8 April 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
(34) Cunningham, F., 'Horn of Africa: Proxy War in Somalia Veers Towards Regional Conflicts', Global Research,1 January 2012, http://www.globalresearch.ca.
(35) Rozoff, R., 'U.S., NATO Expand Afghan War To Horn of Africa And Indian Ocean', Global Research, 8 January 2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca.
(36) Cunningham, F., 'Horn of Africa: Proxy War in Somalia Veers Towards Regional Conflicts', Global Research,1 January 2012, http://www.globalresearch.ca.
(37) Cunningham, F., 'America's War in the Horn of Africa: “Drone Alley” – a Harbinger of Western Power across the African Continent’, Global Research, 29 October 2011, http://www.globalresearch.ca.
(38) Rozoff, R., 'U.S., NATO Expand Afghan War To Horn of Africa And Indian Ocean', Global Research, 8 January 2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca.
(39) 'Eritrea 'ignored' UN resolution', BBC News, 8 April 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
(40) Rozoff, R., 'U.S., NATO Expand Afghan War To Horn of Africa And Indian Ocean', Global Research, 8 January 2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca.
(41) Elmore, E.K., 2010. The Horn of Africa: Critical analysis of conflict management and strategies for success in the Horn's future. Student Pulse, 2(6), http://www.studentpulse.com
(42) 'Costs and Causes of the Conflict in the Great Horn of Africa,' Conflict Prevention, http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com.
(2) Wasara, S.S., 2002. Conflict and state security in the Horn of Africa: Militarisation of civilian groups. African Association of Political Science, 7(2), pp. 39-60.
(3) Elmore, E.K., 2010. The Horn of Africa: Critical analysis of conflict management and startegies for success in the Horn's future. Student Pulse, 2(6), http://www.studentpulse.com.
(4) 'Costs and Causes of the Conflict in the Great Horn of Africa', Conflict Prevention, http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com.
(5) Degu, W.A., 'The State, the crisis of state institutions and refugee migration in the Horn of Africa: The cases of Ethiopa, Sudan and Somalia', 2002, http://dare.uva.nl.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Elmore, E.K., 2010. The Horn of Africa: Critical nalysis of conflict management and startegies for success in the Horn's future. Student Pulse, 2(6), http://www.studentpulse.com
(8) 'Costs and Causes of the Conflict in the Great Horn of Africa', Conflict Prevention, http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com.
(9) Wasara, S.S., 2002. Conflict and state security in the Horn of Africa: Militarisation of civilian groups. African Association of Political Science, 7(2), pp. 39-60.
(10) Elmore, E.K., 2010. The Horn of Africa: Critical Analysis of Conflict Management and Startegies for Success in the Horn's Future. Student Pulse, 2(6), http://www.studentpulse.com.
(11) 'Costs and Causes of the Conflict in the Great Horn of Africa', Conflict Prevention, http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com.
(12) Schulz, P., 2011. The Horn of Africa in a bipolar world - The Cold War as the origin of the Somalia crisis. Undergraduate Research Journal for the Human Sciences, 10, http://urc.kon.org.
(13) Agyeman-Duah, B., 1996. The Horn of Africa: Conflict, demilitarisation and reconstruction. The Journal of Conflict Studies, 16(2), http://journals.hil.unb.ca.
(14) Schraeder, P.J., 1992. The Horn of Africa: The US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment. Middle East Journal, 46(4), pp. 571-593.
(15) Shinn, D.H., 'US Policy towards the Horn of Africa', International Policy Digest, 2012, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org.
(16) Schraeder, P.J., 1992. The Horn of Africa: The US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment. Middle East Journal, 46(4), pp. 571-593.
(17) Shinn, D.H., 'US Policy towards the Horn of Africa', International Policy Digest, 2012, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org.
(18) Schraeder, P.J., 1992. The Horn of Africa: The US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment. Middle East Journal, 46(4), pp. 571-593.
(19) Schulz, P., 2011. The Horn of Africa in a bipolar World - The Cold War as the origin of the Somalia crisis. Undergraduate Research Journal for the Human Sciences, 10, http://urc.kon.org.
(20) Agyeman-Duah, B., 1996. The Horn of Africa: Conflict, demilitarisation and reconstruction. The Journal of Conflict Studies, 16(2), http://journals.hil.unb.ca.
(21) Wasara, S.S., 2002. Conflict and state security in the Horn of Africa: Militarisation of civilian groups. African Association of Political Science, 7(2), pp. 39-60.
(22) Schraeder, P.J., 1992. The Horn of Africa: The US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment. Middle East Journal, 46(4), pp. 571-593.
(23) Wasara, S.S., 2002. Conflict and state security in the Horn of Africa: Militarisation of civilian groups. African Association of Political Science, 7(2), pp. 39-60.
(24) Agyeman-Duah, B., 1996. The Horn of Africa: Conflict, demilitarisation and reconstruction. The Journal of Conflict Studies, 16(2), http://journals.hil.unb.ca.
(25) Schraeder, P.J., 1992. The Horn of Africa: The US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment. Middle East Journal, 46(4), pp. 571-593.
(26) 'The Failed States Index 2011', Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com.
(27) 'The Failed States: The Rankings 2012', Foreign Policy,http://www.foreignpolicy.com.
(28) 'The Failed States Index 2010', Foreign Policy,http://www.foreignpolicy.com; 'The Failed States Index 2011', Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com.
(29) 'Ethiopia/Eritrea War', Global Security,org, http://www.globalsecurity.org.
(30) Hanson, S., 'Proxy War in Africa's Horn.' Council on Foreign Relations,20 December 2006, http://www.cfr.org; Woldemariam, Y. and Yohannes, O., ‘War Clouds in the Horn of Africa’, Sudan Tribune, 10 November 2007, http://www.sudantribune.com.
(31) Wasara, S.S., 2002. Conflict and state security in the Horn of Africa: Militarisation of civilian groups. African Association of Political Science, 7(2), pp. 39-60.
(32) 'UN ends African Horn peace force', BBC News, 30 July 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
(33) 'Eritrea 'ignored' UN resolution', BBC News, 8 April 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
(34) Cunningham, F., 'Horn of Africa: Proxy War in Somalia Veers Towards Regional Conflicts', Global Research,1 January 2012, http://www.globalresearch.ca.
(35) Rozoff, R., 'U.S., NATO Expand Afghan War To Horn of Africa And Indian Ocean', Global Research, 8 January 2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca.
(36) Cunningham, F., 'Horn of Africa: Proxy War in Somalia Veers Towards Regional Conflicts', Global Research,1 January 2012, http://www.globalresearch.ca.
(37) Cunningham, F., 'America's War in the Horn of Africa: “Drone Alley” – a Harbinger of Western Power across the African Continent’, Global Research, 29 October 2011, http://www.globalresearch.ca.
(38) Rozoff, R., 'U.S., NATO Expand Afghan War To Horn of Africa And Indian Ocean', Global Research, 8 January 2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca.
(39) 'Eritrea 'ignored' UN resolution', BBC News, 8 April 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
(40) Rozoff, R., 'U.S., NATO Expand Afghan War To Horn of Africa And Indian Ocean', Global Research, 8 January 2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca.
(41) Elmore, E.K., 2010. The Horn of Africa: Critical analysis of conflict management and strategies for success in the Horn's future. Student Pulse, 2(6), http://www.studentpulse.com
(42) 'Costs and Causes of the Conflict in the Great Horn of Africa,' Conflict Prevention, http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com.
Written on Friday, 16 November 2012
08:12 by Petra Pavšič (1)
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