Somalia: Origin, Development and Future of AMISOM

Published by David Shinn

Formal remarks at a conference in Minneapolis, Minnesota on 19 October 2013 on the origin, development, and future of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Somalia: Origin, Development and Future of AMISOMRemarks Delivered by David H. ShinnAdjunct Professor, Elliott School of International Affairs, GWUAt a Conference on

Somalia: Post-transition Plight and Progress

 Organized by the Institute for Horn of Africa Studies and AffairsUniversity of MinnesotaMinneapolis, Minnesota19 October 2013I will talk about the origin, development and future of the African Union Mission inSomalia, better known as AMISOM.Origin of AMISOMIn 2006, the Islamic Courts controlled Mogadishu and virtually all of south and centralSomalia. While they enacted some highly controversial policies, they did reestablish authorityin the regions under their control and many Somalis welcomed that stability. The TransitionalNational Government (TNG) of Somalia, operating out of Nairobi, and neighboring Ethiopia,which had troops inside the Somali border and especially in Baidoa, perceived the IslamicCourts as a threat. At the end of 2006, the Islamic Courts
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militia made the mistake of attackingthe Ethiopian forces in Baidoa, suffering a major defeat. Ethiopian forces, encouraged by theSomali TNG, then marched to Mogadishu and forced the leaders of the Islamic Courts to flee tothe southern end of Somalia.The presence of Ethiopian forces in Mogadishu was deeply resented by Somalis; theirpresence gave Somali Islamist elements and especially the new organization known as al-Shabaab a rallying cry for removing the Ethiopians. This posed a dilemma for the TNG, whichdid not have a security force capable of confronting al-Shabaab, and the Ethiopians, who had astrong force but were disliked by Somalis. Normally, this would be an occasion for establishinga UN peacekeeping operation, but the UN refused to get involved. This left the problem withthe African Union, which agreed to send a force that became known as AMISOM to Somalia insupport of the TNG.

Development of AMISOM

AMISOM was slow to stand up. Initially only Ugandan troops volunteered for theoperation. They were subsequently joined by a contingent from Burundi. The idea was toreplace the much stronger Ethiopian force, which was drawing the ire of many Somalis. On theother hand, the Ethiopian force did the heavy lifting in combatting al-Shabaab in Mogadishu. Inthe meantime, al-Shabaab was consolidating power in the rest of south and central Somalia.The Ethiopian force finally pulled out of Somalia in January 2009, leaving AMISOM in control of about 40 percent of Mogadishu with al-Shabaab controlling the rest of the capital in addition tomost of south and central Somalia.

AMISOM slowly increased its numbers, eventually adding troop contingents fromDjibouti and Sierra Leone. There were also improvements in Somali government security forces.For its part, al-Shabaab alienated many Somalis with its strict implementation of Sharia and useof suicide bombings against innocent Somalis. By 2011, AMISOM and Somali governmentsecurity forces pushed al-Shabaab out of the greater Mogadishu area.

Also in 2011, Kenyan military forces, following al-Shabaab attacks on foreign touristsand aid personnel in Kenya, entered Jubaland across the Kenyan border as an independentforce to rid the area of al-Shabaab. This force struggled in the beginning but, aligned with theRas Kamboni militia, eventually seized from al-Shabaab the key port city of Kismayo and mostother key towns in Jubaland. In July 2012, AMISOM assumed formal command of the Kenyanforces in southern Somalia.In 2012, Ethiopian forces, which had crossed back into Somalia the previous year, successfully handed over Baidoa to AMISOM’s Burundi forces and Belet Weyne to AMISOM’s Djiboutian contingent. From the beginning, Ethiopia wanted to maintain command and controlover its forces and never put them under the authority of AMISOM.

Since these military successes by AMISOM and the Somali National Army, there hasbeen a military stalemate with al-Shabaab, which continues to hold much of rural south andcentral Somalia and a couple of key towns. Today, AMISOM has just fewer than 18,000uniformed personnel (including police) in Somalia. Troops from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti,Sierra Leone and Kenya are deployed in four sectors in south and central Somalia. Ugandan andBurundian troops are located in Banadir, Lower and Middle Shabelle, and parts of Bay andBakool. Kenyan forces are in Gedo and Lower and Middle Juba. Troops from Sierra Leone are joining them. Djiboutian forces are in Hiraan. AMISOM also works closely with government-affiliated militias, instructing them when and where to report for military operations, but doesso outside any formal organizational structure.

The AMISOM police force is training a Somali police force of 5,000. AMISOM has 363police officers from Nigeria, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Gambia. AMISOM conducts limited maritime operations to act as vessel security for supplying AMISOM and toensure the security of the shoreline around Mogadishu. The European Union is training thesmall AMISOM naval unit. AMISOM does not directly take part in humanitarian operations butfacilitates the efforts of international humanitarian agencies and NGOs by providing security fortheir operations. AMISOM field hospitals do treat the civilian population although their priorityis deployed troops. AMISOM also has a civilian political, developmental and public informationrole. The political unit is responsible for the implementation of political decisions on Somaliataken by the African Union.

Challenges Facing AMISOM 

AMISOM and the international community face some hard decisions. The militarystalemate continues and time may work in favor of al-Shabaab if the Somali FederalGovernment (SFG) and the new Somali National Army (SNA) are unable to win the confidenceof most Somalis and establish security in the country using Somali security forces. For the timebeing, the SFG remains dependent on AMISOM for its survival.

Al-Shabaab, according to the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia’s July 2013 report, hasan estimated 5,000 persons, including at least 300 foreign jihadis, under arms. They are avoiding direct confrontation with AMISOM and SNA forces in order to minimize their own casualties. They conduct suicide bombings, IED attacks and occasional small ambushes against AMISOM. But they are avoiding major conflict and biding their time. In the meantime, they conducted the dramatic terrorist attack against innocent Kenyans at the unprotected Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi.Al-Shabaab has stockpiled arms throughout central and southern Somalia, waiting forn AMISOM to leave when it will then attack the SNA and allied forces. AMISOM and the SFGneed to use this period to break the current stalemate. While al-Shabaab cannot defeat AMISOM, it can wait out their presence in Somalia. It is critical for the SFG to build its own loyal security force and, equally important, begin providing normal services such as health care andeducation to the Somali population in those parts of Somalia controlled by AMISOM and theSFG.

While AMISOM has accomplished a great deal since 2011, it also presents challenges fordefeating al-Shabaab and restoring a viable Somali government. Al-Shabaab uses the presenceof non-Somali troops in Somalia to recruit disaffected Somalis. So long as AMISOM has apresence in Somalia, this will remain a problem. (Of course, al-Shabaab has a foreign jihadicontingent that it tries hard to keep out of public view.)

Since 2011, when AMISOM forced al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu and most key towns insouth and central Somalia, challenges have continued. AMISOM’s relations with the SFG continue to be strained. Progress in building Somali security and intelligence services has beenexcruciatingly slow. AMISOM has received criticism for failing to protect Somali civilians.

The UN Monitoring Group on Somalia concluded that AMISOM control over the KenyanDefense Forces (KDF) in Jubaland has been more theoretical than practical. The KDFcommander in Kismayo reportedly has denied permission to some SFG officials to visit the cityand flouted instructions from President Hassan Sheikh to halt the charcoal trade. Kenyanforces together with the Ras Kamboni militia have not only continued but expanded the illegalexport of charcoal from Kismayo. Even worse, individuals linked to al-Shabaab have exported32 percent of the charcoal consignments since November 2012. According to the UNMonitoring Group, al-Shabaab continues to earn estimated $25 million annually in exports from Kismayo, Baraawe (a port it controls) and from taxes it imposes on land transport of charcoal.In 2013, when Ethiopian forces left Hudur town in Bakool region, Somali government forces and allied militias also left. Al-Shabaab immediately reoccupied Hudur. There was noplan for any AMISOM force to take over. An estimated 2,500 Somalis were displaced as al-Shabaab took control of Hudur.Whither AMISOM in Somalia? So where does AMISOM go from here? At this point, there is no thought of transferring responsibility for peacekeeping in Somalia from the African Union to the UN. On 10 October 2013, the African Union endorsed a recommendation to increase the strength of AMISOM by 6,235 troops and police personnel for a period of 18 to 24 months.

This would bring AMISOM’s authorized strength to just under 24,000 uniformed personnel.UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon subsequently endorsed an increase of as many as4,400 troops and support staff from the African Union for up to two years, and a limitedpackage of nonlethal support—including transportation, food rations and fuel—for 10,000front-line Somali troops. Ban Ki-moon added that a temporary buildup of forces “should ultimately pave the way for the exit of all international forces” and without this additional support “our joint investment is a t risk of being derailed by the indefensible actions of the Al-Shabab insurgency.”

He strongly endorsed a proposal to resume the military campaign againstal-Shabaab.For its part, the United States from FY 2007 through FY 2013 has obligated about $512million in support of AMISOM, in addition to its assessed contributions for the United Nationslogistics support package for AMISOM. During that same period, the United States obligatedmore than $170 million to support the Somali National Army.

My own view is that the time has come when the emphasis must shift from increasingthe size of AMISOM to a focus on building the Somali National Army, Police Force andintelligence service. This requires more training, proper equipment, and regular salaries for thesecurity services. Most important, it means there must be more trust among the existing clan-based Somali militias that need to be integrated into a Somali National Army. Trust is currentlyan endangered commodity. It also means that the SFG must control corruption and begindelivering services such as education and health care to the Somali population so that it willconclude the SFG is a better option than al-Shabaab. While all of this is difficult to accomplish,the fact remains that Somalia once had a proud national military force and an even more highlyrespected police force. If Somalia was able to accomplish this earlier in its independent history,it should be able to do so again.