War Journalism needs to be free

Should be monitored. The government's investigation proposal endangers investigative war and foreign reporting, writing tryckfirhetsexperten Nils Funcke. Photo: Defense

Should it be prohibited to disclose information about abuse and mistakes that occur in the context of international military operations in which Sweden participates? Should it be a crime to publish information about secret prisons, torture, and the consequences for the civilian population, for example in Afghanistan?

The questions appear on reading the Espionage and other illegal intelligence (SOU 2012:95).

Government investigators want to introduce two new offenses, foreign espionage and aggravated espionage abroad. As the specimen was Counsellor Ella Nystrom spent the provisions of espionage against Sweden.

The provisions relating to foreign intelligence would be applicable in international military operations such as ISAF in Afghanistan and KFOR in Kosovo. It plays unlike spying not matter if we are formally at war or not.

Just as in the case of espionage directed specifically against Sweden breaks the constitution regulated protection for whistleblowers in foreign espionage. But beyond the restriction of informant protection is also suggested that the so-called crimes directory of TF expression constitutions and YGL expanded.

It will be a crime to go to a foreign power or organization, as "warlords in Afghanistan", provided by publishing information the "revelation" can cause "serious harm" for a military operation in which Sweden participates. But even in cases where the purpose is to build opinion against or engage in news reporting about an operation shall be an offense to publish a statement "concerning any fact of a secret nature."

Obviously, it means a "serious but" if the information may risk soldiers' lives are in circulation, such as elective surgery and armament. Such data deserves strong protection but probably already covered by a qualified confidentiality.

But the publication of a task "means that the operation is weakened, for example by a participant ... can only attend to a lesser degree" is under investigation constitute a serious but. This also applies to things that are not directly related to the operation, such as "information of a more general and political nature, such as concerns national peer relationships or future cooperation." However, it should be possible to publish information that leads to a "limited undermining" of the operation. But what is meant by "limited" is not clear.

Inquiry balance between the interest in protecting military operations and to critically examine the stakes are superficial. Any discussion of how the proposal would affect the news agency and public opinion are not made. The investigator is content frankly to explain that the proposal will have "negative impacts" of expression and freedom of information, but may be considered acceptable.

The investigation took lightly speech interest is also reflected in several other ways.

According to the report "it is difficult to assess the practical need" of new press and speech crimes. The need would usually be given a decisive role in the introduction of rules especially if they affect fundamental rights. The inquiry has not even made an attempt to estimate demand.

According to the report, it is "not unlikely that a foreign power or organization" could use constitutional protection to overcome the "information covered by the proposed criminalization". The reasoning is incomprehensible in terms of the introduction of new speech crimes.

The investigation has not nearly been considering whether it might be enough to expand and possibly tighten the confidentiality of certain information in order to achieve the same goals as the introduction of the crime of international espionage with their penalties.

The study appearing and seeking legitimacy for their proposals by writing that the "consultation with the Committee of Freedom of Speech." Any documented consultation in the sense that Freedom Committee had to give their views on the Committee's proposal has not happened.

The investigation does not affect the expansion of Sweden's obligation to provide legal assistance to other countries resulting from the proposal. With the new offenses, other countries have the right to expect that Swedish authorities including after graduate and holding interviews with informants in Sweden, which has provided information about the other country units and soldiers' conduct in an international military intervention.

The question of what impact the proposal will have on the possibility of using coercive measures, such as phone tapping and covert raid against editors, are not affected.

The Committee's proposals endanger an Examining war and foreign reporting. Such journalism requires sometimes that even information that could constitute "serious harm" for the operation or future cooperation dragged into the light.

NILS Funcke is a freelance journalist and press freedom expert. He is a former secretary of Yttrandefrihetskommitén-chief of the Riksdag & Departement.