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Friday, November 23, 2012

Musharaxa Cabdiraxman Cali Giire oo Taageerayaashiisu Ruxeen Suuqyadda Caasimada Iyo Qorshayaasha uu reer Hargeysa u Hayo



Lambarka Codaynta 307

Tirada taageerayaasha Musharax  Cabdiraxman Cali Giire ayaa ruxay dariiqyada waaweyn ee caasimada Hargeisa iyagoo ka qayb galaya maalintii ugu dambaysay ee xisbiga Kulimiye u lahaa ololaha doorashada musharaxa oo beerta xoriyada kula hadlayay taageerayaashiisa iyo kuwa musharaxiinta xisbiga Kulmiye waxa uu daboolka ka qaaday qorshayaasha uu hirgalindoono haddii ay isaga codkooda siiyaan qorshayaasha musharax Giira uu u soo bandhigay guud ahaan muwaadiniinta ku nool caasimada dalka ee Hargeysa waxay kala yihiin:

1.       Cashuurta D/Hoose waxa la galin doonaa habka casriga oo Computerized ah kaasi oo mehered kasta guri kasta cashuurtii ay bixiyeen cadadkeeda iyo magacoodaba ay ka akhrisan doonaan Website loo samayn doono D/Hoose gaar ahaan qaybtiisa Waaxda Dakhliga Cashuuraha. Sidoo kale cashuurta dadwaynaha laga ururiyo halka aya ku baxdo iyana Website-kaasi ayay kala socon doonaa!!!!!;

2.       Dhamaan Degmooyinka Caasimada waxa D/Hoose ee Hargeysi ka hirgalin doontaa Xarumo Caafimaad oo habeenkii heegan ah ayna ka hawlgalaan xirfadlayaal caafimaad oo aqoon la hubiyay lehi!!!!!;

3.       Taxi-yada Caasimada waxa lagu buufin doonaa midab gaar ah oo lagu aqoonsado sida caasimadaha dunida oo kale!!!!!;

4.       D/Hoose ee caasimada qaabdhismeedkeeda waxa lagu soo kordhin doonaa Waaxda Waxbarashada iyadoo la siin doono dhamaan dugsiyada Hoose, Dhexe iyo Sare ee xukuumada miisaaniyad kabniin ah oo Wasaarada Waxbarashadana lagala shaqayn doono si loo tayeeyo waxbarashada ubadkeena. Waaxdani waxay si joogto ah u kormeeri doonta dhamaan dugsiyada dawlada iyo kuwa gaarka loo leeyahay ee ku yaal Caasimada Hargeysa si loola socodo waxa la barayo ubadkeena!!!!!;

5.       Gudiyo Dadwayne ayaa laga samayn doonaa dhamaan degmooyinka iyo xaafadaha caasimada gudiyadaasi oo Golaha Deegaanka Hargeysa kala talin doona arimaha nabadgalyada iyo amaanka khuseeya iyo baahiyaha haysta dadwaynaha ku nool degmooyinka iyo xaafadaha caasimada!!!!!;

6.       D/Hoose ee Caasimadu waxay iyadoo kala shaqaynaysa Wasaarada Caafimaadka ee Xukuumada Somaliland daraasad ku samayn doontaa dhamaan xarumaha Cilaajyada loo yaqaano oo ay dadwaynuhu u doontaa caafimaad, daraasadan ayaa diirada saari doonta tayada adeegyada caafimaad ee ay bixiyaan xarumaha Cilaajyadu iyo hawlwadeenada ka hawl gala goobahaasi, gabogabada daraasadan waxa ka soo bixi doonta siyaasad iyo shuruuc lagu dhaqo xarumaha Cilaajyada iyo adeegyada ay bixiyaan taasi oo D/hoose ee Hargeysi ay hirgalin doonto!!!!!;

7.       Sanadka Koowaad waxa D/hoose oo kaashanaysa Haya’adaha Qaramada Midoobay kuwa Caalamiga ah iyo Xukuumada Somaliland la gaadhsiin doonaa dhamaan degmooyinka iyo xaafadaha Caasimadda Biyaha oo aasaasi u ah nolosha codbixiyayaasha muwaadiniinta ah.

Hadaba Muwaadin si qorshayaashaasi uu u hirgaliyo u hur oo u codee Musharax Cabdiraxmaan Cali Giire oo lambarkiisa codayntu yahay 307

Increased educational opportunities in Somaliland lead to greater professionalism



November 20, 2012

Unlike her older siblings, Amran Yonis, a 22-year-old business administration student at Golis University in Hargeisa, said she had plenty of options available to her when she was looking to enrol in higher education in 2008

"My elder siblings who finished before me had to wait three years because there was only one institute of higher learning, the University of Hargeisa," she told Sabahi.

Yonis is part of a rising generation of Somali students eager and able to further their education.

Technical Veterinary School students take part in a field activity April 18th in the Somaliland town of Sheikh
Saeed Ahmed Hassan, president of Golis University, said enrolment at his university has increased dramatically. "Three years ago, we had 500 students, but now there are 3,000," he told Sabahi. "In 2012 alone, we admitted 1,200 students."

He added that business administration, engineering, sharia law and medicine are among the most popular programmes.
 According to the Somaliland Higher Education Board, more than 60% of college students in Hargeisa are women.

To accommodate the influx of new students, the school has rented three additional buildings and constructed a fourth. In addition, the need for more qualified teachers has prompted the university to recruit from Kenya.

The impact of war

The protracted civil war that began in 1991 and the lack of strong government institutions able to uniformly regulate schools mean that degrees from local universities are often not recognised internationally, according to Mohammed Nur, a retired school administrator who consults with the government on education matters.

"The requirement to open colleges or universities is minimal," he told Sabahi. "Important things such as facilities are not checked and [universities] admit students regardless of what they scored in secondary school."

Addressing these concerns, the government says it began implementing measures to regulate higher education when it set up the Higher Education Board in 2010.

According to Khadar Ahmed Diriye, the board's director, 16 universities have been established across Somaliland in the past 20 years.

"We found most [universities] were easily registered previously without proper procedure," Diriye told Sabahi. To establish a regional standard, the board recently required all universities to re-register and issued them with temporary charters while their credentials are reviewed.

Diriye said the government brought in senior officials from Kenya's Higher Education Commission to help re-organise the education sector in Somaliland.

Partnering with universities in neighbouring countries

Universities in neighbouring countries are partnering with local colleges on a wide range of specialised programmes.

For example, thanks to a partnership with Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology in Nairobi, Golis University now offers a master's in business administration.

In addition, Ethiopia's Admas and Alpha Universities, and Uganda's Fairland University have opened campuses in the region.

Hassan of Golis University said these collaborations provide local universities with the opportunity to adopt best practices in management and curricula development, strengthening Somali universities' capabilities and credibility.

Challenges and opportunities ahead

University graduates are expected to boost the highly depleted employment pool in Somaliland, said Mohamed Dahir, a manager at Somaliland Civil Service, the recruitment arm of the regional administration.

College graduates hired by the administration in the past two years have already helped transform government institutions, he told Sabahi. He said these professionally trained employees have helped streamline the administration's revenue collection system and improve efficiency at airports and other ports of entry.

"We have employed trained accountants, clerks and immigration officers, among others, who are technology savvy," he said. "We have recently witnessed very good results. Previously, virtually all our personnel lacked proper education or training, which affected service delivery."

Wednesday, November 21, 2012

US judge rules former Somali security colonel Abdi Aden Magan who lived in Ohio responsible for Somali human rights attorney’s torture



By Associated Press, 

COLUMBUS, Ohio — A former military colonel with a Somali security force dubbed the “Gestapo of Somalia” by its critics was responsible for the torture of a human rights advocate in the 1980s, a federal judge ruled Tuesday in a decision that opens the door for a hearing on potential financial damages.

Abdi Aden Magan, who lived for several years in Ohio, did not present any evidence to dispute the allegations that he directed subordinates in carrying out human rights abuses under the regime of former dictator Siad Barre, U.S. District Judge George Smith said in Columbus.

Abukar Hassan Ahmed, a lawyer and human rights advocate now dividing his time between London and Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital, alleged in a 2010 lawsuit that the three months of torture he endured make it painful for him to sit and injured his bladder to the point that he is incontinent.

Ahmed says the torture occurred when Magan served as investigations chief of the National Security Service of Somalia, a force dubbed the “Black SS” or the “Gestapo of Somalia” because of techniques used to gain confessions from detainees.

Magan “has not come forth with any evidence demonstrating that he took steps to prevent abuses from occurring or to punish his subordinates for engaging in human rights abuses,” Smith wrote.

Magan’s attorney had not seen Tuesday’s ruling and could not immediately comment. Magan declined to comment to The Associated Press when the lawsuit was first filed. He fought the allegations in court filings for a while, but he has since left the U.S. for Kenya and has not responded to additional court motions.

Initially, Magan argued the lawsuit was filed in the wrong country and too long after the alleged abuse. He also said he was immune from prosecution as long as he was acting within his official capacity and on behalf of the government.

The fact that Magan left the U.S. makes it uncertain whether Ahmed could ever receive financial damages, but the judge will have a hearing where Ahmed can testify about what happened to him, said Kathy Roberts, staff attorney at the San Francisco-based Center for Justice and Accountability, which brought the lawsuit.
She said the case has never been about the money.

“Today’s decision is important not only because it acknowledges Col. Magan’s crimes against Professor Ahmed, but it’s also important because it sheds light on the role of the security services in suppressing dissent against the Barre regime.”

In August, a federal judge in Virginia ordered the former prime minister of Somalia, Mohamed Ali Samantar, to pay $21 million in compensatory and punitive damages to several members of the minority Isaaq clan, who said they suffered brutal repression — including torture and mass killings — under the Barre regime.
___
Andrew Welsh-Huggins can be reached at http://twitter.com/awhcolumbus.
Copyright 2012 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

Tuesday, November 20, 2012

Somali livestock trade booming despite war

Amidst the chaos that has characterised life in conflict-ravaged Somalia, the animal trade has survived — and even managed to prosper./ AFP

HARGEISA, Somalia, Nov 20 – At Hargeisa’s dusty livestock market two men quietly size each other up, haggling over animal prices by placing fingers on their chequered headscarfs to indicate how much they would pay.
“If I press one finger, it means 100 shillings, the whole hand, 500, a bit of a finger, 90 shillings…we want to hide negotiations from other traders,” said animal trader Mohammed Iid, explaining the reasoning behind the silent barter.

Amidst the chaos that has characterised life in conflict-ravaged Somalia, the animal trade has survived — and even managed to prosper.

Traders in the northern Somali city — capital of the self-declared independent nation of Somaliland — rake in healthy profits, with sales spiking during Islamic festivals.

The symbolic sacrifice of sheep in accordance with Islam sees orders increase from neighbouring countries such as Yemen, some 200 kilometres (125 miles) across the Gulf of Aden.

Up to $250 million is generated from the export of goats, sheep and camels, although the lucrative trade was crippled when Saudi Arabia — one of the biggest consumers of animals from the Horn of Africa — imposed a nine-year ban on imports amid fears of an outbreak of Rift Valley Fever.

After the import ban was lifted in 2010, Somalia exported 4.3 million animals to Saudi Arabia and 4.7 million the following year, even though Somalia was experiencing one of its worst droughts on record.

Animals are exported through the ports of Berbera in Somaliland and Bossaso in Puntland. Both have established relative stability compared to the two decades of civil war that has ravaged southern and central Somalia.

From behind a pair of glasses, 78-year-old Mohamed Aden offers an insight into what the livestock trade means to the average Somali.
Up to $250 million is generated from the export of goats, sheep and camels.
“Animal rearing is our life,” he said, an animal trader for 21 years. “They are the source of our resources, our work and a source of tax for the government.”

The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) says Somaliland’s animal industry provides 40 percent of the country’s gross domestic product, employs 65 percent of the workforce and is responsible for up to 80 percent of foreign exchange.

Over two thirds of Somaliland’s rocky and bushy scrubland are given over to the animals.
“They are free range animals, they are organic,” said Ali Gulu, chief veterinary officer for the key port of Berbera.

Berbera, constructed by Russia during the Cold War, has already exported three million animals this year.

“The port is our main source of revenue…it funds up to 80 percent of the country’s budget,” said Omer Abokor Jama, the port’s deputy manager, noting the port earned $120 million in revenues last year.
“They are free range animals, they are organic,” said Ali Gulu, chief veterinary officer for the key port of Berbera.
While the lucrative business may be making enormous profits today, its foundation lies in long-standing ancestral ties between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian peninsula.

“It is easy for us to do business with them… they have always been our traditional business partners,” said Dhamac Barud, one of the most prosperous traders, earning over $1 million a year from exports to Saudi Arabia.

Britain’s seizure of Somaliland in 1888 was driven partly by the wish to secure regular livestock exports to fuel its growing empire, including the major Yemeni port of Aden, and that link is maintained today.

Britain supports the FAO’s efforts to develop the livestock industry, encouraging the growth of other related industries.

In Hargeisa, women extract marrow from the bones of slaughtered camels, mixing it with incense and soda ash to create soap, undercutting imported bars from surrounding nations.

Sunday, November 18, 2012

Somaliland:Electoral Ethics Monitoring Body Accuse Sahil Politician’s of Violating Electoral Code of Conduct

The Electoral Ethics Monitoring body spokesperson Mr. Ahmed  Mohamed Cadaad speaking to the press today during a press conference today revealed that some candidates Sahil region have opened offices in Hargeisa in a bid to lure the electorates contrary to electoral code of conduct.

The Three Sahil politicians have opened the office in anticipation of the upcoming local election which is due soon, but the real motive of opening these offices is to buy of voters so as to crucial votes.
Prominent among those Sahil politicians accused of been in breach of the electoral code of conduct is the current Mayor of Berbera Municipality Mr. Abdale Mohamed Arab has already opened three offices in

Hargeisa in a bid to recruit potential voters in anticipation of the upcoming elections.
The fourth round and also the final round of electioneering campaigns just around the corner, some of the current Aspirants running for political offices are turning to crude means to attain their goals

Source: Hadhwanaagnews .com

Somaliland elections: Everything is fine (except when it is not)



Somalilanders are great optimists and at our many meetings we are being constantly assured that everything in the electoral process is going to be OK. Sometimes we look at each other and ask ‘It’s quiet Carruthers?’ ‘Yes… too quiet’. But largely speaking even the opposition associations/parties are happy. Except… up in Toghdeer region not far from the Ethiopian border there are some problems, unsurprisingly enough related to clan (dis)advantage.
 

So we left the hothouse of Hargeisa and headed to the coast and up the mountains to find out what the problem was. Given we are all non-Londoners, we thought this was a good opportunity anyway to get the view from outside Hargeisa – since capital cities generally take little notice of what happens elsewhere.

Giant tortoises

So after the ritual search for our armed protection unit and a little negotiation, we went through the scrubland, desert and savannah, reminiscent of being high up of the fynbos (natural shrubland) of the Western Cape. Rocky terrain, camels and goats among the still green trees, but also baboons, ground squirrels, warthogs, dikdiks and the odd raptor above. Giant tortoises crossed the road – best to treat them as a roundabout.

As we left Hargeisa the blue plastic bags flowering in the acacias lessened. The termite mounds were impressive, the thin tall ones resembling cloaked statues and the big ones, Moores or Hepworths in the Yorkshire Sculpture Park, although the latter rarely have acacias growing out of them. The lunarscapes of the desert would have had Sergio Leone frantically whistling up his camera crew.

Frontier town

We called in on the regional electoral commission in the coastal town of Berbera where the temperature was down to a pleasant autumnal 36 degrees (high summer sees 45-50) and again all was fine – including a good meal of fish accompanied by a chorus of local cats (bit off if you don’t like light opera while eating).

Burao, spelt Burao, has the feel of a frontier town (Dodge City? Gretna Green?) despite being 100 miles from the Somalia border, as it is where two historically opposed clans meet – depending on whose mythology you trust. But then again as in most places, this rivalry is overlaid by the Diaspora experience – the hotel keeper was a Blades supporter from Sheffield, his deputy was from Tottenham and the governor of the region was a long time Brummie (bloke from Birmingham to our international readers).

Clan interests

Given that sub clan interests and desire for unity trumps all, there had been complaints from one (Habr Younis) that the western, southern and northern parts of the city only had around 80 polling stations while the other clan in the east – Habr Jeclo – had around 150.

The reason for this was simple and based on returns from the 2010 presidential election. In that contest the incumbent from Somaliland’s west was being challenged by the eventual winner ‘Silanyo’, who is Habr Jeclo, and another contender in whom Habr Younis had an equal lack of interest. Therefore they didn’t bother turning out to vote. NEC (Somaliland National Electoral Commission) relying on the computer-generated figures from last time therefore gave them fewer stations. Technically correct of course, but seasoned hands reckon better safe than sorry – always better to consult the parties, elders etc and head off a problem.

Anyway we sat under a tree (possibly giving us the spurious air of wise elders) and listened to the complaints of the relevant parties (not all turned up and some came mob-handed). We promised to forward their concerns while rejecting the idea that we should rectify this problem directly. Meetings are going on in Hargeisa on this issue as we write, with important folk flying in to try and solve it. Several solutions occur to us, but we will see what compromises emerge from the no doubt lengthy discussions. Anyone with a deep interest in this exciting interface between psephological science and clan dynamics can get in touch with Michael for further details no doubt.

Code of conduct

Now (Thursday 15 November) back in Hargeisa it is the Islamic New Year’s Day of 1434 and a public holiday although naturally meetings continue. As well as the Burao issue, we are tracking a number of issues. One is implementation of the code of conduct that all the parties signed (and one immediately denounced). Second, accusations that the governing party is using state resources for party purposes – something they vigorously deny. Party campaigning in public places has been suspended for the middle two of the four campaign weeks. This means that the colourful convoys with young women endangering life and limb by leaning out of bus windows waving flags, and young men doing the same from the tops of the buses, has at least diminished if not entirely disappeared. Big blow for photographers everywhere…

The naughty step

We are also enquiring about the effectiveness of voter education programmes as well as training for polling station and party agent staff – there are lots of initiatives including those run by Progressio partners like the women’s network NAGAAD and the NGO coordinating body SONSAF, but it’s a bit of a fitful picture overall.

The yellow weaver birds and red-chested finches are out in force in the Maansoor Hotel garden, although the giant tortoises of beloved memory have gone. The tame-ish gazelles are still in evidence. One with sawn-off horns (in retrospect that should have been a clue) took a shine to Steph – if you interpret that as running up from behind and prodding her with his horns. After a few occurrences we saw he had been put in the naughty step – the fenced off bit of the garden. The coordination team has now been joined by media mogul Conrad, number cruncher Aly and photographer Kate.

10 days to go…

Next week a learned exegesis on how the seven political parties get whittled down to the three allowed for in the constitution, plus what the UN is doing, how the Burao problem sorted itself out and much more. 10 days to go…

- Progressio

The Horn of Africa: International influence as the basis for never ending violence


The Horn of Africa is one of the most restless African regions. The countries in the Horn, namely Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, are suffering from internal conflicts among different communities and are involved in border conflicts among each other. A common feature of the Horn countries is high militarisation of its inhabitants,(2) which is a basis for continued violent conflicts. These include human rights atrocities, child conscription and the collapse of state infrastructure. There is almost no conversation among the states, nor is there accountability, flexibility, legitimacy and stability in the region.(3)

Analysts suggest that there are several internal and external factors that stimulate continued conflicts in the African Horn. These are geophysical conditions, resource scarcity, poverty, socio-economic inequalities and ethnic divisions, militarisation, competition for state power, and also the legacies of the colonial and Cold War policies.(4)

This paper focuses on the last two factors, namely the legacies of the colonial and Cold War policies. First, it describes the external interventions in the region during the colonial era and analyses their consequences. The paper continues by analysing the Cold War superpowers’ influence in the Horn, which used the region as one of their battlefields. The wars that took place in the region, and the United States of America (USA or US) and Soviet Union’s politics of searching for allies are further described. 
In the last section, the paper analyses recent conflicts and wars in the African Horn and the international presence and support. They serve as proof that international interventions are not decreasing the tensions in the region, nor are they working towards changing the legacy of colonialism and the Cold War era.

Colonial era and bringing the European patterns to the African Horn

The colonial era, despite its relatively short duration of less than 100 years, set the basis for today’s chaotic situation in the African Horn. The region was partitioned among Britain, France and Italy. Today’s Somalia was divided between Britain and Italy. Italy also occupied a part of Ethiopia and established Eritrea as a colonial entity, while France occupied Djibouti.(5)

It seemed that colonialism brought progress, established civil service and judicial systems and brought peace and stability to the region. Yet, the reality was different. The main aim of colonial powers was the exploitation of natural resources and cheap labour force, which only brought suffering to the local inhabitants. Civil service and judicial systems were established, but were intended to serve colonial interests and not the interests of independent states. 

The inhabitants of the Horn lost their right to govern themselves. Indigenous people could not even learn how to lead a country since they were considered and treated as subordinated people throughout the colonial time. They were humiliated, persecuted, tortured and deprived of their basic rights and civil liberties. 

Their silence was interpreted as peace and stability, which was only superficial. Moreover, colonialists created a new geo-political setup. Many states at that time were artificially created. New boundaries cut across pre-existing ethnic groups, states and kingdoms and united different cultures, languages and traditions. This caused, on the one hand, unrest within newly created countries and, on the other hand, border disputes and demands for unification of dispersed ethnic groups.(6)

Already colonial powers waged border wars in order to get more strategically important territory. The British demarcated their borders between 1932 and 1934, which could not be claimed for the Italians, who were not satisfied with the colonised territory. They launched an invasion against Ethiopia and successfully annexed the grazing area of the Ogaden to Somalia. The region was later returned to Ethiopia, but the border became a barrier to nomadic migrations and only triggered further disputes between those two countries.(7)

Colonial powers left the African Horn in bad shape. States were culturally and economically weakened and a crisis of the leadership appeared.(8) Newly independent states had to establish new governance. They used the patterns they knew from the colonial era. It often happened that the power was in the hands of ethnic or ideological oligarchies. For example, Amharas and Tigreanes dominated resources in Ethiopia.(9) Different kinds of oppressive regimes appeared, such as the communist juntas, dictatorships, rivalling militias, warlords and clan leaders. Fights for power triggered several internal violent conflicts.(10) An important legacy of the colonialist era was also expansionism. It was apparent in the Somali irredentism, Ethiopia’s annexation of Eritrea, claims of French-protected Djibouti and various other border disputes.(11)

The Cold War: African Horn as a competitive scene for the superpowers 

Due to its strategic importance, the Horn of Africa was very interesting for the Cold War superpowers, the USA and the Soviet Union. The Horn is located directly at the southern end of the Red Sea, across the Arabian Peninsula, which makes it a neighbour to the major oil lines. Both superpowers tried to get allies in the Horn in order to supervise the oil lines and prevent access to the lines to the other superpower.(12) The USA and Soviet Union started attracting their potential allies on the Horn by militarising them heavily. Consequently, the countries in the region grew in number of armed forces, escalated their defence expenditures, increased their propensity for internal and external war and military dominance of a civil society appeared.(13)

The USA and the Soviet Union’s relationship with various regimes in the region evolved according to their perceived importance within an East-West framework.(14) The USA first found its ally in Ethiopia, where, in the late 1960s, it established the largest embassy in Sub-Saharan Africa.(15) At that time, Ethiopia was a part of a worldwide telecommunications network directed against the Soviet Union.(16) The country received the largest economic and military programme from the USA. When Ethiopia was threatened by Somali irredentism or Eritrean separatism, the USA strongly backed the Haile Selassie Government.(17) Yet, after the Ethiopian revolution, which lasted from 1974 to 1977, a Soviet-backed regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam came to power in Ethiopia. The USA took away its support and backed the Somali regime of the dictator Mohamed Siad Barre. Somalia became an access country from which the USA could militarily counter any perceived Soviet threat to the Middle Eastern oil fields.(18)

According to the relationship between the superpowers, the relationship between Somalia and Ethiopia largely depended on the game between the USA and the Soviet Union and the external aid and support they were receiving from them. Especially Somalia, which was already unstable due to the internal fights for power, became a match-ball between the USA and the Soviet Union due to its geo-strategic position, which served as a base for further actions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region.(19) One of the most violent consequences of those two countries’ militarisation was a destructive war for the Ogaden region in 1963 and 1964 and then again in 1977 and 1978.(20) It was one of the actions with which Somalia wanted to fulfil its idea of Greater Somalia and re-unite Somali people that were divided among Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya during the colonial times.(21)

The Cold War was losing its power, as were the regimes backed by the superpowers. In 1988, Somalia and Ethiopia concluded a peace agreement, mostly with the aim to defuse conflictual external relations in order to effectively deal with the internal regime-threatening guerrilla insurgencies. In Somalia it was the Somali National Movement and in Ethiopia the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front. In 1991, both governing regimes were overthrown by guerrilla insurgencies.(22) The end of superpower competition in the Horn left a political vacuum and the competition for power started again.(23) Moreover, major changes happened. Ethiopia had been reconstructed with the independence of Eritrea, Somalia was bankrupted and Djibouti was about to enter civil war(24) and the former British Somaliland territory declared sovereignty.(25)

Post Cold War era: New era, same old patterns

The violent history and the patterns that the inhabitants of the Horn region learned during the colonial era and the Cold War were a bad basis for the stabilisation of the region. Contrary to stabilisation, Somalia has been at the top of the Failed States Index for four years in a row.(26) In 2012, Ethiopia ranked 17th, Eritrea 23rd and Djibouti 53rd.(27) In comparison with the last two years, they have been scaling up the list.(28)

Border disputes among the neighbouring countries in the Horn did not end. In 1993, Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia after a long guerrilla war, yet the border was not strictly demarcated.(29) Ethiopia refused to recognise and implement the borders agreed to in the 2000 Algiers Agreement, which gave the town of Badme to Eritrea. Ethiopia even blocked the United Nations technical team, which wanted to demarcate the border. Five years later, the war over the border started again. 

The war took the form of a proxy war since both countries amassed their troops in neighbouring Somalia. Somali Islamists demanded that Ethiopian troops withdraw from the country and several clashes started throughout the country.(30) The USA got involved and backed Ethiopia with the excuse that the Eritrean regime supported transnational terrorism and needed to be stopped. The war officially ended in 2000, but tensions remained.(31) The United Nations sent its troops to the border, but due to the extreme danger posed to its personnel, the United Nations Security Council unanimously voted to withdraw its troops from the region.(32) Moreover, Eritrea was also involved in border conflicts with Djibouti. Eritrea ignored the United Nations Security Council resolution, which demanded its withdrawal from Djibouti, which led to deadly clashes in 2008.(33)

The biggest problem in the region represents Somalia, which has the best strategic position and was massively misused during the Cold War. It is still involved in a border dispute with Ethiopia. War-torn Somalia continues to be a subject of the African Union’s peacekeeping interventions. At the end of 2011, troops from Djibouti arrived in Somalia to join forces from Burundi and Uganda, which have been present in Somalia for the last two years as part of the African Union peace mission to combat the militants. Moreover, the US aerial attack drones and French naval firepower have coordinated with the Kenyan ground assault.(34)

The USA is still intervening in the internal affairs of these countries. The former American General, William Ward, pledged continued support to Somalia’s Transitional 
Federal Government and condemned Somali rebels, who were accused of supporting the Government of Eritrea in its border conflict with Djibouti.(35) But the USA again changed allies and Ethiopia is now a close Washington ally. In 2006, the USA gave a green light to Ethiopia to invade Somalia, where the Islamic Courts Union was in power.(36) In 2011, military sources confirmed that the Obama administration was engaged in a new war in a famine-hit African Horn. It supported Kenya in its fight against Somalia in its anti-terrorism war. And the French joined them, too.(37)

Today the USA and its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies do not only support the countries of the Horn, but are also physically present in the region. They lay the groundwork for increased naval, air and ground operations in the Horn of Africa. 

The British Prime Minister described Somalia as the country to which special attention should be given. The USA also entered Djibouti and established the Pentagon’s first permanent base in Africa with 2,500 personnel. Djibouti is also the headquarters of the US Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF – HOA), which was set up in 2001. Its responsibilities include all countries of this region and some other countries as well.(38) Djibouti is still a base for France’s largest military base on the continent, and the USA has more than 1,200 troops there as a part of its anti-terrorism task force in the Horn of Africa.(39) Troops, warplanes and armoured vehicles under the flag of NATO, the European Union (EU), France and the USA have intervened in all of the Horn countries and some others, too. Starting in 2008, NATO commenced its war against the pirates on the coast of Somalia. The NATO and EU deployments in the Gulf of Aden are the first such naval operations in both organisations’ history and the EU’s first in African coastal waters.(40)

Conclusion

Countries in the Horn of Africa hardly promote any communication among each other. Their relationship is still characterised by mistrust and suspicion; consequently, they are not able to solve problems constructively. If they agree to negotiations, those mostly bring mutual accusations. There have been examples when neutral regional third parties offered good offices by providing a neutral territory for negotiations, but with little success. As noted earlier, international interventions even fuelled further conflicts in the region.(41) International actors are regularly present in the region. In the past they admitted that they were attracted by the strategic position of the Horn. Today, they are allegedly trying to solve the conflicts that happen due to the power struggles and unresolved border issues. Yet, it appears that their interest in local conflict solutions is still subordinated to the strategic importance of the region and the USA’s commitment to fight global terrorism. 

The two most important reasons for violence in Africa are “perceptions of mistreatment by a population, and no legal channel for that population to address that perceived injustice,” said Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.(42) That implies that the USA and other Western powers should start helping the region in a manner they should have done a century ago: by teaching the countries/Governments how to establish democracy and communicate with each other in a peaceful manner, and not to further militarise the already over-militarised region just to keep the control over a strategically important region.

NOTES:

(1) Contact Petra Pavšič through Consultancy Africa Intelligence's Conflict and Terrorism Unit ( conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com).
(2) Wasara, S.S., 2002. Conflict and state security in the Horn of Africa: Militarisation of civilian groups. African Association of Political Science, 7(2), pp. 39-60.
(3) Elmore, E.K., 2010. The Horn of Africa: Critical analysis of conflict management and startegies for success in the Horn's future. Student Pulse, 2(6), http://www.studentpulse.com.
(4) 'Costs and Causes of the Conflict in the Great Horn of Africa', Conflict Prevention, http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com.
(5) Degu, W.A., 'The State, the crisis of state institutions and refugee migration in the Horn of Africa: The cases of Ethiopa, Sudan and Somalia', 2002, http://dare.uva.nl.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Elmore, E.K., 2010. The Horn of Africa: Critical nalysis of conflict management and startegies for success in the Horn's future. Student Pulse, 2(6), http://www.studentpulse.com
(8) 'Costs and Causes of the Conflict in the Great Horn of Africa', Conflict Prevention, http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com.
(9) Wasara, S.S., 2002. Conflict and state security in the Horn of Africa: Militarisation of civilian groups. African Association of Political Science, 7(2), pp. 39-60.
(10) Elmore, E.K., 2010. The Horn of Africa: Critical Analysis of Conflict Management and Startegies for Success in the Horn's Future. Student Pulse, 2(6), http://www.studentpulse.com.
(11) 'Costs and Causes of the Conflict in the Great Horn of Africa', Conflict Prevention, http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com.
(12) Schulz, P., 2011. The Horn of Africa in a bipolar world - The Cold War as the origin of the Somalia crisis. Undergraduate Research Journal for the Human Sciences, 10, http://urc.kon.org.
(13) Agyeman-Duah, B., 1996. The Horn of Africa: Conflict, demilitarisation and reconstruction. The Journal of Conflict Studies, 16(2), http://journals.hil.unb.ca.
(14) Schraeder, P.J., 1992. The Horn of Africa: The US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment. Middle East Journal, 46(4), pp. 571-593.
(15) Shinn, D.H., 'US Policy towards the Horn of Africa', International Policy Digest, 2012, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org
(16) Schraeder, P.J., 1992. The Horn of Africa: The US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment. Middle East Journal, 46(4), pp. 571-593.
(17) Shinn, D.H., 'US Policy towards the Horn of Africa', International Policy Digest, 2012, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org.
(18) Schraeder, P.J., 1992. The Horn of Africa: The US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment. Middle East Journal, 46(4), pp. 571-593.
(19) Schulz, P., 2011. The Horn of Africa in a bipolar World -  The Cold War as the origin of the Somalia crisis. Undergraduate Research Journal for the Human Sciences, 10,  http://urc.kon.org.
(20) Agyeman-Duah, B., 1996. The Horn of Africa: Conflict, demilitarisation and reconstruction. The Journal of Conflict Studies, 16(2),  http://journals.hil.unb.ca.
(21) Wasara, S.S., 2002. Conflict and state security in the Horn of Africa: Militarisation of civilian groups. African Association of Political Science, 7(2), pp. 39-60.
(22) Schraeder, P.J., 1992. The Horn of Africa: The US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment. Middle East Journal, 46(4), pp. 571-593.
(23) Wasara, S.S., 2002. Conflict and state security in the Horn of Africa: Militarisation of civilian groups. African Association of Political Science, 7(2), pp. 39-60.
(24) Agyeman-Duah, B., 1996. The Horn of Africa: Conflict, demilitarisation and reconstruction. The Journal of Conflict Studies, 16(2), http://journals.hil.unb.ca.
(25) Schraeder, P.J., 1992. The Horn of Africa: The US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment. Middle East Journal, 46(4), pp. 571-593.
(26) 'The Failed States Index 2011', Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com.
(27) 'The Failed States: The Rankings 2012', Foreign Policy,http://www.foreignpolicy.com
(28) 'The Failed States Index 2010', Foreign Policy,http://www.foreignpolicy.com; 'The Failed States Index 2011', Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com.
(29) 'Ethiopia/Eritrea War', Global Security,org, http://www.globalsecurity.org.
(30) Hanson, S., 'Proxy War in Africa's Horn.' Council on Foreign Relations,20 December 2006, http://www.cfr.org; Woldemariam, Y. and Yohannes, O., ‘War Clouds in the Horn of Africa’, Sudan Tribune, 10 November 2007, http://www.sudantribune.com.
(31) Wasara, S.S., 2002. Conflict and state security in the Horn of Africa: Militarisation of civilian groups. African Association of Political Science, 7(2), pp. 39-60.
(32) 'UN ends African Horn peace force', BBC News, 30 July 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
(33) 'Eritrea 'ignored' UN resolution', BBC News, 8 April 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk
(34) Cunningham, F., 'Horn of Africa: Proxy War in Somalia Veers Towards Regional Conflicts', Global Research,1 January 2012, http://www.globalresearch.ca
(35) Rozoff, R., 'U.S., NATO Expand Afghan War To Horn of Africa And Indian Ocean', Global Research, 8 January 2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca.
(36) Cunningham, F., 'Horn of Africa: Proxy War in Somalia Veers Towards Regional Conflicts', Global Research,1 January 2012, http://www.globalresearch.ca.
(37) Cunningham, F., 'America's War in the Horn of Africa: “Drone Alley” – a Harbinger of Western Power across the African Continent’, Global Research, 29 October 2011, http://www.globalresearch.ca.  
(38) Rozoff, R., 'U.S., NATO Expand Afghan War To Horn of Africa And Indian Ocean', Global Research, 8 January 2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca.
(39) 'Eritrea 'ignored' UN resolution', BBC News, 8 April 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
(40) Rozoff, R., 'U.S., NATO Expand Afghan War To Horn of Africa And Indian Ocean', Global Research, 8 January 2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca.
(41) Elmore, E.K., 2010. The Horn of Africa: Critical analysis of conflict management and strategies for success in the Horn's future. Student Pulse, 2(6), http://www.studentpulse.com
(42) 'Costs and Causes of the Conflict in the Great Horn of Africa,' Conflict Prevention, http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com.

Written on Friday, 16 November 2012 08:12 by Petra Pavšič (1)