My SMS relationship with al-Shabab

By Mary Harper - BBC News

Al-Shabab, the militant Islamist group operating in Somalia and Kenya, likes to communicate with journalists by SMS. But receiving their text messages and talking to them on the phone can be an unnerving, and at times surreal, experience.

The other morning I woke up to a text message and missed call from al-Shabab.

As always, the message was written in perfect English. It informed me about a film al-Shabab has made called Beyond the Shadows. It said the film gave an "accurate portrayal" of what happened when French commandoes last year tried - and failed - to rescue a suspected French intelligence agent held hostage by the group.

A few days later I got another call from al-Shabab. The clear, relaxed voice on the other end of the phone told me I was about to receive a text message about the group's role in the killing of a senior police official in Somalia earlier that day.

Sure enough, a few seconds later the text message arrived. Then came a second call to confirm I had indeed received the message.

This is the usual pattern. A call, a text message, then another call to check the message - or the SMS press release, as al-Shabab calls it - has arrived.

Scrolling through these messages on my phone, I can chart the history of al-Shabab attacks.

Many of the recent ones are in Kenya. One five-part message, written in the style of a news agency report, claims responsibility for anattack on a restaurant in Djibouti popular with foreigners (or, as al-Shabab calls them, "Western crusaders").

I have seen al-Shabab's violence at close hand.

Earlier this year, I was just a few buildings down from the Jazeera Palace Hotel in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, when it was attacked, first by one suicide car bomber, then another, who waited for the emergency services to arrive before driving his vehicle into them and the hotel to ensure maximum casualties.

The blasts from the exploding cars were huge. Bullets cracked down the street as the security forces tried to beat back al-Shabab fighters who had come - in a minibus, I was told - to try and storm the hotel. In the middle of all this, the main target of the attack - a senior security official - came with his entourage to the place where I was. We set up a circle of chairs for them, and they sat there like statues, in stunned, stony silence.

I sometimes find it difficult to relate these acts of extreme and terrifying violence to the calm, measured voice of the al-Shabab official on the other end of the phone - to the precise, clinical wording of those text messages.

What started as brief calls about particular attacks have over time developed into longer, wider discussions about the movement's practices and philosophies.

 

Two women mourn a relative killed in an al-Shabab bomb attack earlier this month

Sometimes there is room for debate. But when I ask about certain subjects - the treatment of spies or adulterers for example - the tone of voice changes. It becomes cold and mechanical, as if the words are learned by rote.

I had the conversation about spies one lazy Sunday morning when I was still in bed.

I got a call from al-Shabab, and as I sat in my safe, comfortable bedroom, I heard the voice say: "If you are found guilty of spying, there is only one punishment. You will face the firing squad in a public place. Everybody must witness the killing of a spy. The spy must receive three, four or five bullets to the head."

But perhaps the strangest conversation I had was one sunny day outside the Houses of Parliament in London.

I was due to attend an event there but as I was early, I was sitting in a park outside, in the shade of those grand buildings. My phone rang. I saw the words al-Shabab flash on to my screen. What started as an update on the latest attack on the Kenyan coast ended up as a lecture about my faith.

"Have you thought about the afterlife?" asked the official. "You know, Mary, you won't be around in 20, 30, 40 years' time. I seriously recommend you consider converting to Islam," he added. This man seemed genuinely concerned, as he urged me in a gentle voice to take up the Muslim faith.

All the time, images of people I know or have known, who have been caught up in al-Shabab attacks, flashed before my eyes.

Some of them are now dead. Others have suffered horrific physical injuries, like a politician I met whose body was ripped apart in an explosion. His black skin is now mottled with raw, angry, bright pink scars. He can't hear anything now because of the damage the blast did to his ears.

Others don't bear any physical scars but jump every time they hear a bang, even if it's just a door. They shudder when they walk past a parked car in Mogadishu, afraid it might explode. Their hearts miss a beat whenever someone they don't know approaches them for fear they might be a suicide bomber.

They, like me, have received texts from al-Shabab, only the nature of the messages is very different, as they often contain death threats.

I never quite know when I am going to receive the next message from al-Shabab.

I might be on holiday with family, having supper with friends, when all of a sudden, a text message will burst on to my screen, bringing two very different worlds into sharp collision.

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Handmaiden to Africa's Generals

By ALEX DE WAAL and ABDUL MOHAMMED

SOMERVILLE, Mass. — Security is a core concern of the American government’s Africa policy. This was made clear in May when President Obama proposed a $5 billion Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund to supplement programs the Pentagon already has in 35 countries. And it was made clear again at the recent U.S.-Africa summit in Washington, when Mr. Obama announced $110 million a year for an African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership, a program to train and equip six African armies for peacekeeping operations.

Because Mr. Obama is committed to scaling back the deployment of United States troops to combat terrorism, America’s security strategy in Africa translates largely into training and equipping African armies. Although this approach rightly gives African governments the lead in tackling their own security problems, it is misguided nonetheless. It is, in effect, providing foreign tutelage to the militarization of Africa’s politics, which undermines peace and democracy throughout the continent. America’s diplomacy is becoming a handmaiden to Africa’s generals.

Consider two countries riven by different kinds of conflict and ask yourself what they have in common. On the one hand, there is South Sudan. By African standards, it is not a poor country. It has vast oil resources, and as soon it became independent from Sudan, three years ago, government spending per capita was about $350, four times the average for East African states. It also received the most generous international aid package of any country in East Africa — the equivalent of another $100 per capita. But the government spent about half of its budget on its huge army. And many of its 745 generals proceeded to make fortunes thanks to payroll fraud and procurement scams.

According to President Salva Kiir of South Sudan, $4 billion in public funds were plundered by government ministers. When Mr. Kiir shut out his political rivals from the club of kleptocrats, fighting broke out. Various commanders and party bosses then mobilized supporters through ethnic militias, bringing a sectarian dimension to a conflict that was inherently about the distribution of public resources.

Then there is Nigeria. Its political leaders, generals and businessmen — who are often all those things at once — have grown wealthy on oil money, while much of the population lives in deep poverty. Health and education services are inadequate, and the government faces widespread outrage about corruption. Small wonder that the Islamist militants of Boko Haram, who espouse austere forms of Shariah justice, are able to recruit disaffected young men and that the Nigerian army struggles to find combat-ready units to counter them.

One thing South Sudan and Nigeria have in common is systemic corruption and a military elite that controls politics and business. The civil strife in South Sudan and the jihadist insurgency in Nigeria are largely symptoms of those deeper governance problems. Another thing South Sudan and Nigeria have in common is vast American support. In 2006-2013, the United States government spent up to $300 million to support the South Sudanese army. Nigeria has long been one of Washington’s biggest defense-cooperation partners.

Even as conventional military threats have declined throughout Africa, overall military spending on the continent has grown faster than anywhere else in the world. And these military budgets often hide big black holes. In Uganda, according to local journalists, some funds officially dedicated to the salary of army personnel who turned out not to exist have been used by President Yoweri Museveni to reward generals loyal to him.

When political crises occur, the American government’s response is to privilege military measures, and local governments know it. For example, the ongoing peace talks in South Sudan have focused more on dispatching Ethiopian, Kenyan and Rwandan troops under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, a regional organization, and less on addressing the root causes of the conflict. In the absence of a durable political solution to the underlying crisis, this is a high-risk move; it could suck the whole of northeast Africa into South Sudan’s war.

The overall approach violates the first principle of peacekeeping: Never send a peace mission where there is no peace to keep. The risks of getting embroiled are especially high when the troops deployed come from a neighboring country. What’s more, the very governments that propose to serve as mediators may have a conflict of interest: They stand to gain from dispatching their soldiers, especially if the mission is funded by contributions from United Nations members.

Counterterrorism assistance has a better track record reinforcing bad government than rooting out extremists. Repression by dictators like Idriss Déby in Chad or Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso has been tolerated because their governments have supplied combat troops for operations against jihadists in the Sahara. Meanwhile, Kenya has experienced more terrorist attacks since its army moved into Somalia in 2011 to fight the radical Islamist group Al Shabab. After the attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi last year, Kenya’s army and police indiscriminately targeted Muslim communities — generating resentment among those groups and potentially more recruits for the militants.

Fifteen years ago, when African leaders set up their own peace and security system within what later became the African Union, they tried to balance diplomacy and armed enforcement. In case of a conflict, they would hold negotiations with all parties; sending in peacekeeping troops would only be a fallback option. But Western countries like the United States and France have tended to favor military approaches instead. During the civil war in Libya in 2011, a panel of five African presidents, established by the African Union and chaired by Jacob Zuma of South Africa, proposed letting Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi go into exile in an African country and then setting up an interim government. But the plan was spurned by NATO, which preferred regime change by way of foreign intervention.

The Obama administration is aware of the dangers of supporting armed forces in Africa. At the U.S.-Africa summit in Washington, Mr. Obama announced a new Security Governance Initiative to help professionalize six African militaries and promote their being subjected to civilian oversight. This is a step in the right direction, but it is a very small step. Only $65 million has been earmarked for that program, compared with $5 billion for counterterrorism cooperation.

Washington has the means to do much more. A single aircraft carrier has a crew as large as the entire American diplomatic service posted abroad. The cost of developing the fleet of F-35 stealth fighter planes could fund the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development and all United Nations peacekeeping operations for nearly 20 years. Security in Africa will not be achieved by giving more power and money to African military forces. It will be achieved by supporting diplomacy, democracy and development.

Alex de Waal is the executive director of the World Peace Foundation at Tufts University. Abdul Mohammed is the chairman of InterAfrica Group, an Ethiopian civil society organization.

Handmaiden to Africa's Generals

By ALEX DE WAAL and ABDUL MOHAMMED

SOMERVILLE, Mass. — Security is a core concern of the American government’s Africa policy. This was made clear in May when President Obama proposed a $5 billion Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund to supplement programs the Pentagon already has in 35 countries. And it was made clear again at the recent U.S.-Africa summit in Washington, when Mr. Obama announced $110 million a year for an African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership, a program to train and equip six African armies for peacekeeping operations.

Because Mr. Obama is committed to scaling back the deployment of United States troops to combat terrorism, America’s security strategy in Africa translates largely into training and equipping African armies. Although this approach rightly gives African governments the lead in tackling their own security problems, it is misguided nonetheless. It is, in effect, providing foreign tutelage to the militarization of Africa’s politics, which undermines peace and democracy throughout the continent. America’s diplomacy is becoming a handmaiden to Africa’s generals.

Consider two countries riven by different kinds of conflict and ask yourself what they have in common. On the one hand, there is South Sudan. By African standards, it is not a poor country. It has vast oil resources, and as soon it became independent from Sudan, three years ago, government spending per capita was about $350, four times the average for East African states. It also received the most generous international aid package of any country in East Africa — the equivalent of another $100 per capita. But the government spent about half of its budget on its huge army. And many of its 745 generals proceeded to make fortunes thanks to payroll fraud and procurement scams.

According to President Salva Kiir of South Sudan, $4 billion in public funds were plundered by government ministers. When Mr. Kiir shut out his political rivals from the club of kleptocrats, fighting broke out. Various commanders and party bosses then mobilized supporters through ethnic militias, bringing a sectarian dimension to a conflict that was inherently about the distribution of public resources.

Then there is Nigeria. Its political leaders, generals and businessmen — who are often all those things at once — have grown wealthy on oil money, while much of the population lives in deep poverty. Health and education services are inadequate, and the government faces widespread outrage about corruption. Small wonder that the Islamist militants of Boko Haram, who espouse austere forms of Shariah justice, are able to recruit disaffected young men and that the Nigerian army struggles to find combat-ready units to counter them.

One thing South Sudan and Nigeria have in common is systemic corruption and a military elite that controls politics and business. The civil strife in South Sudan and the jihadist insurgency in Nigeria are largely symptoms of those deeper governance problems. Another thing South Sudan and Nigeria have in common is vast American support. In 2006-2013, the United States government spent up to $300 million to support the South Sudanese army. Nigeria has long been one of Washington’s biggest defense-cooperation partners.

Even as conventional military threats have declined throughout Africa, overall military spending on the continent has grown faster than anywhere else in the world. And these military budgets often hide big black holes. In Uganda, according to local journalists, some funds officially dedicated to the salary of army personnel who turned out not to exist have been used by President Yoweri Museveni to reward generals loyal to him.

When political crises occur, the American government’s response is to privilege military measures, and local governments know it. For example, the ongoing peace talks in South Sudan have focused more on dispatching Ethiopian, Kenyan and Rwandan troops under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, a regional organization, and less on addressing the root causes of the conflict. In the absence of a durable political solution to the underlying crisis, this is a high-risk move; it could suck the whole of northeast Africa into South Sudan’s war.

The overall approach violates the first principle of peacekeeping: Never send a peace mission where there is no peace to keep. The risks of getting embroiled are especially high when the troops deployed come from a neighboring country. What’s more, the very governments that propose to serve as mediators may have a conflict of interest: They stand to gain from dispatching their soldiers, especially if the mission is funded by contributions from United Nations members.

Counterterrorism assistance has a better track record reinforcing bad government than rooting out extremists. Repression by dictators like Idriss Déby in Chad or Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso has been tolerated because their governments have supplied combat troops for operations against jihadists in the Sahara. Meanwhile, Kenya has experienced more terrorist attacks since its army moved into Somalia in 2011 to fight the radical Islamist group Al Shabab. After the attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi last year, Kenya’s army and police indiscriminately targeted Muslim communities — generating resentment among those groups and potentially more recruits for the militants.

Fifteen years ago, when African leaders set up their own peace and security system within what later became the African Union, they tried to balance diplomacy and armed enforcement. In case of a conflict, they would hold negotiations with all parties; sending in peacekeeping troops would only be a fallback option. But Western countries like the United States and France have tended to favor military approaches instead. During the civil war in Libya in 2011, a panel of five African presidents, established by the African Union and chaired by Jacob Zuma of South Africa, proposed letting Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi go into exile in an African country and then setting up an interim government. But the plan was spurned by NATO, which preferred regime change by way of foreign intervention.

The Obama administration is aware of the dangers of supporting armed forces in Africa. At the U.S.-Africa summit in Washington, Mr. Obama announced a new Security Governance Initiative to help professionalize six African militaries and promote their being subjected to civilian oversight. This is a step in the right direction, but it is a very small step. Only $65 million has been earmarked for that program, compared with $5 billion for counterterrorism cooperation.

Washington has the means to do much more. A single aircraft carrier has a crew as large as the entire American diplomatic service posted abroad. The cost of developing the fleet of F-35 stealth fighter planes could fund the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development and all United Nations peacekeeping operations for nearly 20 years. Security in Africa will not be achieved by giving more power and money to African military forces. It will be achieved by supporting diplomacy, democracy and development.

Alex de Waal is the executive director of the World Peace Foundation at Tufts University. Abdul Mohammed is the chairman of InterAfrica Group, an Ethiopian civil society organization.

Good News For Somalis: Canadian Somali Appointed Chief of UN children’s fund UNICEF

New York - United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon today announced the appointment of Omar Abdi, a Canadian national born in Somalia, as Deputy Executive Director of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).

A Somali Canadian Omar Abdi  is currently serving as UNICEF’s Comptroller. Prior to that role, he served as UNICEF Deputy Executive Director, Management (2007-2010), Regional Director for Middle East and North Africa (2006-2007), and UNICEF Representative in several countries.

Omar Abdi brings a deep understanding of UNICEF’s programmes and operations. Additionally, he has helped pioneer streamlining systems to strengthen results on the ground.

Omar Abdi has a doctorate degree in development economics and a masters in international development, both from Cornell University, as well as a bachelor’s degree (magna cum laude) in civil engineering from the Somali National University.

Profile,  Omar Abdi:

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has named Somali-Canadian Omar Abdi as Deputy Executive Director of the United Nation’s Children’s Fund (UNICEF).

An Ottawa resident, Omar Abdi currently serves as Director of UNICEF’s regional office for the Middle East and North Africa in Amman Jordan.

Mr. Abdi is a native of Somalia and served for seven years in the Government of Somalia before joining UNICEF in 1992. He has served as UNICEF Representative in Liberia, Ghana and in Pakistan, and in other positions prior to becoming the Regional Director.

As UNICEF Representative in Pakistan, Mr. Abdi led the organization’s response to the October 2005 South Asia earthquake, which saw more than three-million people – half of whom were children – displaced in the northern regions of Pakistan. UNICEF led the UN’s initial response in the areas of water and sanitation, education, nutrition and protection, and launched a US$150 million “build-back-better” recovery plan.

“We are delighted to have a Canadian with such extraordinary experience serve in the highest levels of UNICEF,” UNICEF Canada President & CEO Nigel Fisher said from New York, where he is attending a two-day meeting of the UNICEF Executive Board. “Time and again Omar Abdi has demonstrated his unwavering commitment to providing the best possible results for children.”

Mr. Abdi succeeds Mr. Toshi Niwa, who was appointed in March 2004. 

The post has responsibility for the overall direction of Finance and Management, Human Resources, Management, and Information Technology. Mr. Abdi will also oversee UNICEF’s inter-governmental work and UN relations, as well as UNICEF’s office in Tokyo. 

This is the highest ranking position achieved by a Canadian in UNICEF. 

Stephen Lewis also served as UNICEF Deputy Executive Director from 1995 to 1999.

Source: geeskaafrika.com

XOGHAYIHII HORE EE ARRIMAHA DIBEDDA UCID, YUSUF BUDLE OO KA HADLAY XUDUUDA DJIBOUTI EE MAANTA LA XIDHAY IYO MADAXDA SOMALILAND EE XUDUUDA DHOOBAN EE LOO DIIDAY IN AY GALAAN DJIBOUTI.

Yusuf Budle: Dalkii 60,000 oo qof u dhinteen in lagu bedesho 60 baasboor waa nasiib darro.

Yusuf Budle ayaa maanta soo dhigay barta uu ku leeyahay Face-book-ga qoraal uu kaga hadlayo aragtidiisa ku salaysan xuduuda mar labaad maanta la xidhay iyo weliba madaxda badan ee loo diiday in ay galaan Djibouti iyaga oo marka hore si rasmi ah loo casumay.

Qoraalkiisa waxa uu ku bilaabay Yusuf sidatan:

 Xidhida mar kale la xidhay xuduuda u dhaxaysa S/land iyo Djibouti ma aha mid xaqiiqada ku salaysan ee waa mid xukuumadda Ismaaciil Cumar Geele ugu talo gashay in ay ku fuliso laba ujeedo oo kala ah

1-       In ay aduunweynaha usii buunbuuniso in ayna S/land nabad ahayn, record-kana ay gasho inta goor ee dalalka deriska ahi ka xidheen xuduudahooda S/land

2-       In ay si fool xun ugu bahdisho madaxda isdaba yaacaya ee ka kala socda xukuumadda S/land iyo xisbiyada qarankaba.

Su’aasha aan dadka reer Somaliland weydiinayaa waxa ay tahay: Cidda rabta in ay Djibouti wax ka riddo ama qarxiso, waxa ay si dhib yar uga soo wareegi kartaa dhinaca xuduuda u daxaysa Djibouti iyo Ethiopia. Haddii ay dhab tahay ilaalinta nabadgelyadu maxaa loo wada xidhi waayay dhamaanba xuduudaha Djibouti ay la leedahay dalalka deriska ah? Jawaabteedu waa ay cadahay waana labada arrimood ee aan kor kusoo sheegay.

Waxa aynu ognahay in xataa haddii xuduuda la xidhay, bal iskaba dheh’e, aanay adkaateen in xuduuda Lawya-Caddo si gaar ah albaabada looga soo furo dadka madax ku sheega ah ee ka socda S/land ee sida gaarka ah loogu soo diray casumaada gaarka ah. Goorma ayaa sarkaal ama madax qaran oo lagu casumay meher yar ay jid bacaad ah u mari jireen, hadana albaabada (imika aan idhaahee xuduudaha) laga xidhan jiray, weliba kasii darane inta ay iskaga soo noqon lahaayeen ay bacaadka u jiifaan laba maalmood iyo habeen si ay u dhawraan bal in mar’uun laga furo. Bahdilaada ka weyn ee lagu samayn lahaa S/land maxay tahay?

Ugu dambayn, waxa aan u sheegayaa dadweynaha reer Somaliland meel kasta oo ay joogaan iyo xisbi kasta oo ay taageersan yihiinba in loo baahan yahay in laga dagaalamo bahdilaada joogtada ah ee lagu hayo qarannimada S/land. Waa in aan la xisaabtanaa dhamaanba xukuumadda iyo xisbiyada qaranka ee arrinkan u suurto gelinaya xukuumadda macangaga ah ee uu ka taliyo Ismaaciil Cumar Geele. Goorma ayaynu ogolaanay in dalkii ay u nafwaayeen 60,000 (lixdan kun oo qof) oo reer Somaliland ah lagu bedesho 600 baasboor oo weliba si gaar ah loo siiyay shaqsiyaadka ugu ladan ama ugu awooda badan Somaliland? Waxa kale oo aanay dadka inta badani ogayn in ay baasbooradanu ahayn dhalasho Djiboutian ah ee ay yihiin oo keliya baasboor ku dhaca 5 sanadood oo aan dibna loo cuboonaysiin Karin, markii la doonana lagaga qaadi karo airport-ka siddii marar badan hore u dhacday.

Waxa aanan anigu fahmin shaqsiyan oo aan jeclaan lahaa in bal la iiga jawaabo danta S/land ugu jirta xidhiidhka Djibouti? Sida aynu wada ognahay waxa uu aduunweynaha Ismaciil Cumar Geele u cadeeyay in:

1- Somaliland wax la yidhaa aanu ogolayn/ ogolaana doonin.

2- Waxa uu ciidamo nabad ilaalin ah u diray Somaliya isaga oo ku xumaynaya S/land kana shaqaynaya wixii la odhan jiray Somali weyn.

3- Hadeerto waxa uu wadaa qorshe kii hore kasii daran oo lagu rabo in aduunweynuhu ku ogolaado in ciidamo la keeno xuduudaha S/land (dhinaca bariga iyo dhinaca galbeedkaba).

Taariikh ahaan haddii aan u noqdana: Xukuumaddii Djibouti waa xukuumaddii hir gelisay heshiiskii Mingiste iyo Siyaad Barre ee aakhirkii keenay in SNM lagaga soo saaro Ethiopia. Waxa aynu ognahay oo aanay sir ahayn in haddii aan u furno dekedda Berbera in ay dadka iyo dawladda Ethiopia si xor ah wax ugala soo degaan uu dakhliga cashuurta ee kasoo gelidoona Somalilan dekedda Berbera oo keli ahi yahay 1.2 Billion Dollars (yes, I mean Billion US Dollars).

Bal marka waxa aan jeclaan lahaa in la iga jaahil tiro meesha ay salaadu ka xidhmi laadahay? Mise waxaas oo dhan waxa ka muhiimsan 600 baasboor oo Djiboutian ah iyo woxogaaga lacagta xaqal jeebka ah ee la siiyo shaqsiyaadka gaarka ah?

Waxa kale oo aan weydiinayaa madaxda xukuumadda hadda jirta iyo weliba madaxda xisbiyada mucaaridka ee rajaynaya in ay berri dalkan hogaamiyaan: Muxuu yahay qorshaha inooga yaala Djibouti. Iyada warkeedu wuu cadyahee, muxuu yahay qorshahau.