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Saturday, April 12, 2014

Record Absence in U.S. Drone Strikes





By Mark Pomerleau | The Deal With Politics 


Ninety-six days.  That is how long it has been since a US drone strike in Pakistan.  Is this a signal that there is a change in policy among those in the Obama administration, or is it simply diplomatic restraint?  What has the US done in other regions where it has waged recent strikes?  Did the election in Afghanistan last week play any role?
Pakistan had asked the United States to cease its drone activity within their borders while they conducted peace talks with the Taliban.  The United States has listened and subsequently, there was a ceasefire between the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) and the Pakistani government.  However, this ceasefire has recently been broken but, nonetheless, the United States has complied with the request.  It appears as if Pakistan is trying to take steps to better their standing within the region and the international community.  In fact, US commander for Afghan forces, Marine General Joseph Dunford stated last month in an appearance before Congress, that Pakistan has taken steps to reach out to Afghanistan, a once rancorous regional rival, and offered to mend the broken relationship.
Many on the ground have reported that US drone strikes in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, and elsewhere contribute to violent furor directed at the United States.  The United Nations has especially ramped up rhetoric towards the US for their drone campaign.  There have been independent reports published and submitted to the UN as well as a resolution drafted by 26 members of the UN Human Rights Council calling for greater transparency.  Most notable about the resolution is the sponsorship of Yemen.  The United States has shared very warm relations with Yemen regarding terrorism policy and the two nations have very closely coordinated military action within the Yemen border.
Is it possible that the United States is being isolated for its drone campaign?  Another conjecture is the virtual uncertainty of the future of drones.  There are reports that several nations have begun to develop drone programs for military and non-military use.  Additionally, terrorist factions have also begun to gain access to drone technology, which is a frightening realization.  International human rights organizations are calling for international regulation regarding drones but drafting and enforcing such regulations could be futile.
Within the United States, legislation has recently been introduced to provide transparency to the covert drone program.  The Targeted Lethal Force Transparency Act, introduced by Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA) this month, seeks to “make publicly available an annual report on the use of targeted lethal force by remotely-piloted aircraft.”  Among the disclosures, the legislation would require the president to report annually on the total number of combatants, civilians, and persons killed or injured by US drone strikes.  Schiff’s bill has already been hailed by several human rights groups who wish to bring to light the destruction caused by drones.
Elsewhere, it seems as though alternate forms of antiterrorism are working to push back hostile groups.  In Africa, UN groups achieved a victory in pushing back al-Shaabob in Somalia.  In a regional effort, African Horn countries, including Ethiopia and Kenya, have reclaimed key towns formally occupied by al-Shaabob.  Additionally, the United States had not conducted any drone strikes in Somalia last month, a signal that UN peacekeeping forces and US trained Ugandan troops may be achieving significant gains.
Afghanistan held elections last week to elect a new president.  This is an important event for the future of Afghanistan for two reasons: 1) each of the eight candidates running have assured they will sign a bilateral security agreement (BSA) allowing a residual US force to remain in the country after the 2014 troop withdrawal (something current Afghan President Hamid Karzai has not done) and 2) anticipation of Taliban disruption at the polls would serve as an indicator regarding their influence in the nation.  So far, the election is being hailed as a success with little Taliban interference and substantial voter turnout.  However, as Marvin Weinbaum, resident scholar at the Middle East Institute (a Washington think tank), stated at a policy roundtable, “we shouldn’t take for granted that this is a credible election,” implying that there are still areas and flaws to be addressed.

While Taliban disruption was limited this time around, experts, such as Omar Samad – former ambassador and fellow at the New America Foundation – believe the second round of elections could be opportune for the Taliban to play a larger role.  In fact, Afghan Taliban members have established amicable relations with Pakistani Taliban who have supplied training and materials.  According to a recent report, “in recent weeks the two groups [TTP and Afghan Taliban] have secretly agreed to work together, with Pakistani militants announcing a ceasefire with their government in order to preserve militant bases used to stage cross-border attacks.”
To some, this development could provide evidence that the drone campaign was successful in deterring such groups from colluding and collaborating.  However, a more optimistic outlook suggests that, in reference to the African model, proper troop training and oversight from international organizations can be effective and can create longer term stability as indigenous forces eventually become self-sufficient.  This very reason is why the United States is so adamant in signing the BSA.  The administration believes the work in Afghanistan is not done and they want to ensure that Afghan forces can adequately quell terrorist groups independently after the impending US departure.
It is too early to tell if there is a change in policy from the Obama administration but certainly, there are other options on the table and this issue is not going away.



Friday, April 11, 2014

Operators eyeing new opportunities in Somalia must also weigh risks



Alex Msimang & Jessica Cull

by Alex Msimang & Jessica Cull - Vinson & Elkins LLP

Following huge East Africa discoveries offshore Mozambique and Tanzania, attention is creeping further north to Somalia, which may have geology similar to Yemen, a country with proved reserves of 2.7 Bbbl of oil. Somalia will be a challenging country in which to operate, and operators interested in Somalia should pay close attention to the recent experiences of Tanzania, Mozambique, Kenya, and Uganda in anticipating some of the likely challenges ahead. However, Somalia has its own unique set of issues, including a dangerous political and security situation, a maritime boundary dispute, disputes between regional authorities and the federal government, virtually no infrastructure, and a currency system in need of urgent reform. Oil companies considering entering the country to share a potentially huge prize will need to be focused on mitigating the risks involved.

Exploration in Somalia began in 1945, but to date, only six wells have been drilled offshore. The country has changed significantly since 1991, when IOCs claimed force majeure following the overthrow of President Mohamed Siad Barre by warlords; since 2012, a federal government has controlled most of the country, with the exception of a few pockets under Al-Shabaab control. The government is encouraging the IOCs that exited the country in 1991 to return, and has entered into its first agreement with Soma Oil & Gas, a UK company solely focused on Somalia. Soma has agreed to carry out $20 million of seismic exploration work in return for the right to explore up to 12 blocks of its choice.

Unlike their East African neighbor, Tanzania, Mozambique, Kenya, and Uganda have significant recent experience in agreements with IOCs. All are either in the process of – or have recently completed – updating their petroleum legislation to accommodate potential discoveries and future development.

A petroleum law was passed in Somalia by the transitional federal government in 2008, and the constitution provides that this will continue to apply. However, there are plans to update the law to reflect the new government structure and to clarify rules regarding the issuance of oil and gas contracts by certain regions within Somalia. In particular, the semi-autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland have signed agreements with IOCs including Ophir, Genel, and DNO International.

The situation echoes the position between Kurdistan and the federal government of Iraq, as the federal government has warned foreign companies that contracting with regional governments could block any future engagement in Somalia.

If companies decide that the opportunities in an individual region are better than those offered by the federal government, companies should be mindful of claims that regional boundaries have been re-drawn to place highly prospective blocks within those boundaries. There is a risk that such boundaries are not permanently fixed and may be re-drawn in the future. To add to the mix, maritime boundaries with Kenya and Yemen are yet to be delineated, and Somalia is disputing the boundary location with Kenya.

Companies interested in entering (or reentering) Somalia will want to pay close attention to some of the other issues that operators have encountered over the last few years in the rest of East Africa, including:

Government oil and gas expertise. Although exploration began in 1945, very little drilling has taken place in Somalia and none since the late 1980s. Much of the previous government knowledge and experience is now out of date or has disappeared entirely. It will take time for the government to develop staff that understand the industry and the new PSCs that they will be executing. Companies will need to be prepared to be open in government dealings and share their own knowledge, and PSCs are likely to include a requirement to train, or to fund the training of, government officials.

Anti-bribery and corruption. Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries in descending order from 100 (public sector perceived as very clean) to zero (perceived as highly corrupt).

Somalia ranks last on that index, tied with Afghanistan and North Korea with a score of eight. In addition, unlike Tanzania and Mozambique, Somalia has not yet adopted the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Companies will therefore need to put adequate procedures in place to avoid the risk of breaching the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 or the UK Bribery Act of 2010. Companies will need carefully to screen local partners and contractors, build enough time into project schedules to avoid demands for facilitation payments, and scrupulously maintain their books and records.

Somalia also presents other unique challenges to operators. The political and security situation is viewed as the most dangerous in East Africa, and the UK ambassador has described the current relative peace as very fragile. Adequate security for personnel, operations, and infrastructure will be critical. Moreover, the nation has virtually no funds to begin the task of rebuilding the country following 20 years of civil war. And although the International Monetary Fund has now resumed relations with Somalia, it will not yet provide loans to speed up this process. There is little infrastructure in place, including rail and road links, electricity, and ports.

The currency system also urgently requires reform; no official bank notes have been printed by the Central Bank of Somalia since the 1990s, and many bank notes in circulation have been issued by Somali warlords.
All of these factors make an interesting mix for any IOC considering entering or reentering Somalia. Current reports suggest that a bidding round for oil and gas blocks may take place toward the end of 2014 or in 2015, so now may be a good time for interested companies to begin due diligence, and to start understanding the legal and practical challenges that lie ahead.

alt   Alexander Msimang, partner, and Jessica Cull, associate, are members of the Energy Transactions and Projects Group at the global law firm Vinson & Elkins LLP.   alt

Source: offshore-mag.com

Muqdisho oo Somaliland ka hor heshay adeega Internetka Bada Hoosteeda Mara (Fibre Optic): Somalia in high speed internet 'culture shock'



People use computers at an internet cafe in the Hodan area of Mogadishu, 9 October 2013
Internet cafes are popular in the capital, Mogadishu
  
Some residents of Somalia's capital have been experiencing a form of "culture shock" since fibre optic services launched over the last week, an internet provider has told the BBC.

"Any video or site just pops up... they're very excited about the speed," Somalia Wireless's Liban Egal says.
Until now access to the internet has been via dial-up or satellite links.

Earlier this year, 3G mobile phone services were cut off because of a threat from Islamist militants.

The al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabab group issued a directive in January ordering all internet services to be stopped, saying those who did not comply would be seen as "working with the enemy" and dealt with according to Islamic law.

Al-Shabab was driven out of the capital, Mogadishu, in August 2011, but still controls many smaller towns and rural areas in the south and centre of the country where they have imposed a strict version of Sharia.

Following their threat, 3G networks nationwide were turned off but the project to launch fibre optic cable services continued in the capital, the BBC's Moalimu Mohammed reports from Mogadishu.

'Day and night' He says the fibre optic connections, which have been rolled out over the last week by several internet providers, are only available in Mogadishu

People have been flocking to hotels and internet cafes to try out the fast service - some seeing video platforms like YouTube and social networking sites for the first time, our correspondent says.

Mr Egal said the difference in speed was like the difference between "day and night".

For those residents who have recently returned from the diaspora the development was a relief, he said.
It was "almost a culture shock" for those who have never left Somalia, he added.

He said the move would be a huge boost for the country, which is recovering from more than two decades of civil war.

"Every time a fibre optic cable is connected to a country they see their GDP [gross domestic product] going up because their communication costs go down," Mr Egal said.

"All life will be affected - businesses, the government, universities - they all will see the benefits."
Our reporter says the current security situation will limit the rollout of fibre optic services to the rest of the country.

Since 1991 Somalia has seen clan-based warlords, rival politicians and Islamist militants battle for control - a situation that has allowed lawlessness to flourish.

An African Union force has been helping the UN-backed government fight al-Shabab, which wants to create an Islamic state in Somalia.

Somalia Recolonized With African Help

"Washington’s actions have been calculated to ensure that a strong Somali state never rise again.”....Glen Ford 
 

Since at least 2006, Somalia has been the focus of the United States’ drive for military domination of Africa, with other African states lining up to join in the bloody, neocolonial feast. Sierra Leone is the latest. “Sierra Leone’s soldiers have become cogs in the imperial reconquest of Africa, with Somalia as ground zero.”


 
With great fanfare from the international corporate media, the West African nation of Sierra Leone has committed 850 soldiers to the African Union’s forces in Somalia. In reality, Sierra Leone’s soldiers have become cogs in the imperial reconquest of Africa, with Somalia as ground zero.

Following the U.S.-backed invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia, in 2006, Washington and its European allies, including the old colonial rulers, Italy and Britain, propped up a puppet government in the capital city, Mogadishu, while simultaneously encouraging the breakaway regions of Puntland and Somaliland. The capital is occupied by AMISOM, the African Union’s military force in Somalia, which is paid for by United Nations and, for all practical purposes, an extension of U.S. foreign policy on the continent. AMISOM’s largest contingents are from the U.S. client states Uganda and Burundi, and the force is commanded by a Ugandan. Another contingent hails from Somalia’s neighbor to the north, Djibouti, a tiny country that is little more than a military base for the United States and France. Djibouti is the main center of operations for AFRICOM, the U.S. Africa Command.

Although the Americans pay constant lip service to the idea of a permanent national Somali government and to the territorial integrity of country, Washington’s actions have been calculated to ensure that a strong Somali state never rise again. Vast areas of the country have been occupied by Somalia’s historical enemies, Ethiopia and Kenya. The Ogaden region of Ethiopia is populated mainly by people of Somali origin, against whom Ethiopia’s military regime has waged a brutal counterinsurgency war. Parts of northern Kenya are largely inhabited by ethnic Somalis. Both Ethiopia and Kenya view an intact and unified Somalia as against their national interests. Yet these are the countries, along with Uganda, to which the U.S. has, in the words of one Somali analyst, “subcontracted” the war against the Islamist Shabaab – which the U.S. claims is part of its war on terror.

Oil companies also have an interest in a weak Somali government, and have already begun operations in the secessionist regions of Puntland and Somaliland.”

Kenya and Ethiopia can be expected to pursue what they consider to be their own national interests, bringing large parts of Somalia under their direct or indirect control, while fulfilling their obligations to the U.S. master. Ethiopia, especially, has exhibited the utmost contempt for Somali civilians under their control, arming and financing their own warlords and criminal gangs. Somalis widely believe that Kenya wants their oil.
But the truth is, the people that will ultimately get the oil are the multinational energy corporations favored by the United States and its European allies. These oil companies also have an interest in a weak Somali government, and have already begun operations in the secessionist regions of Puntland and Somaliland. In the national capital at Mogadishu, the international community – meaning, the United States and its allies – is overseeing the writing of a new Somali Constitution, one that effectively partitions the country into three territories: Puntland, Somaliland, and South Central Somalia. These same international overseers have warned that any “spoilers” that oppose the new order will be dealt with, harshly. Thus, we see that the recolonization of Africa is well underway – with the enthusiastic collaboration of other Africans.
Contact Glen Ford at Glen.Ford@BlackAgendaReport.com.

The deployment of Sierra Leonean soldiers in Somalia is wrong. – PACM

The Pan-Afrikan Community Movement (PACM), a community based movement of youths, students, women, employed and unemployed workers in urban and rural Sierra Leone, have called upon the government of the President Ernest Bai Koroma with a blunt message: the deployment of Sierra Leonean soldiers in Somalia is wrong. PACM maintains that “imperialist forces are behind the deployment of African soldiers in Somalia. In this respect, we oppose the use of Africans fighting Africans, an old imperialist strategy in Africa.”

According to a statement issued by the group, this follows an announcement by Seirra Leonean government that it will sending, as promised late last year, a contingent of nearly 1,000 troops to join Rwanda and Uganda “under the guise of AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) to fight Al-Shabaab militants in Somalia.”

Apart from Rwanda and Ugandan, Kenya and Ethiopia have also sent troops in Somalia, to fight the Al- Shabaab. The PACM, explained their opposition to Seirra Leonean participation by declaring,
“PACM holds the view that the deployment of Sierra Leonean soldiers in Somalia is wrong. We believe that the problem in Somalia cannot be resolved by military action. The deployment of Sierra Leonean forces there will only be seen by the people of Somalia as an attempt by the rulers of Sierra Leone to be part of the greater conspiracy, sponsored by western imperialist forces to dominate and further the long suffering of the people of Somalia and deepen the conflict. The deployment might also endanger Sierra Leonean citizens, as Al-Shabaab has already threatened to do.

We do not oppose the involvement of Sierra Leonean soldiers in other African problems, but we believe that, in this case, the “solution” is driven by outside forces. It is no coincidence, that over US$ 50 million have been provided so far by US for the procurement of military equipment of the Sierra Leonean military for what will only be a war of Africans killing other Africans.”

PACM also wondered how “Sierra Leonean soldiers can use military force to bring peace in Somalia where US forces have failed in 1993, Ethiopian troops and now Kenyan forces are failing since their invasion into Somalia, at the behest of US and imperialist forces earlier this year.”

PACM also condemned the use of violence by all sides in the conflict expressing its equal opposition to “all forms of violence including Al-Shabaab’s use of terrorist tactics of killing innocent people in their so-called war to institute sharia law in Somalia.”

“The war in Somalia is a PROXY WAR,” the statement went on, “with the US and other imperialist forces behind it. The objective is to ensure control of the horn of Africa for military, economic and political gains. This is also the reason for establishment of AFRICOM – The US military’s Africa Command. This militarisation of Africa is not unconnected with the discovery of oil and the rise of China as a major economic power in Africa. In short, the militarisation of Africa is part of the grand plan to control African mineral (including oil) resources.”

“Consequently,” the statement concluded, “PACM holds the view that the attempt to send Salone troops to Somalia under the guise of AMISOM, is not to help the people of Somalia, but to support Imperialist Proxy-wars in Africa. In that respect, PACM wish to join the progressive chorus of African peace campaigners, to oppose the new vigour of imperialism in Africa and call on the Government of Sierra Leone, led by Ernest Bai Koroma, a seemingly willing puppet of Western imperialism and neo-colonialism, to reverse the decision of sending troops to Somalia. Instead we call on the government, to pursue a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Somalia which can only be addressed by the Somali people themselves.”

Mohamed Koroma; +232 (0) 88 878 273 Email: pacm1898@yahoo.com

PACM STATEMENT ON THE PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT OF SALONE TROOPS TO SOMALIA
Freetown: 20th April, 2012 – The Pan-Afrikan Community Movement (PACM) is a newly formed grassroots Pan-Africanist, community based movement of youths, students, women, employed and unemployed workers in urban and rural Sierra Leone. We stand for the self-emancipation and self determination of the oppressed and exploited Afrikan masses at home and abroad. We are opposed to privatisation, racism, sexism, neo-colonialism, and imperialist proxy wars in Africa. We are part of the worldwide resistance to globalisation and the struggle for global social justice.

ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF SIERRA LEONE TROOPS IN SOMALIA

Few weeks ago the government of Ernest Bai Koroma, announced that it will send, as promised late last year, a contingent of nearly 1,000 troops to join Rwanda and Uganda under the guise of AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) to fight Al-Shabaab militants in Somalia. Apart from Rwanda and Ugandan, Kenya and Ethiopia have also sent troops in Somalia, to fight the Al- Shabaab.

PACM holds the view that the deployment of Sierra Leonean soldiers in Somalia is wrong. We believe that the problem in Somalia cannot be resolved by military action. The deployment of Sierra Leonean forces there will only be seen by the people of Somalia as an attempt by the rulers of Sierra Leone to be part of the greater conspiracy, sponsored by western imperialist forces to dominate and further the long suffering of the people of Somalia and deepen the conflict. The deployment might also endanger Sierra Leonean citizens, as Al-Shabaab has already threatened to do.

We do not oppose the involvement of Sierra Leonean soldiers in other African problems, but we believe that, in this case, the “solution” is driven by outside forces. It is no coincidence, that over US$ 50 million have been provided so far by US for the procurement of military equipment of the Sierra Leonean military for what will only be a war of Africans killing other Africans.

PACM wonders how Sierra Leonean soldiers can use military force to bring peace in Somalia where US forces have failed in 1993, Ethiopian troops and now Kenyan forces are failing since their invasion into Somalia, at the behest of US and imperialist forces earlier this year.

PACM maintains that imperialist forces are behind the deployment of African soldiers in Somalia. In this respect, we oppose the use of Africans fighting Africans, an old imperialist strategy in Africa.

PACM wises to state that we equally oppose all forms of violence including Al-Shabaab’s use of terrorist tactics of killing innocent people in their so-called war to institute sharia law in Somalia.

The war in Somalia, is a PROXY WAR, with the US and other imperialist forces behind it. The objective is to ensure control of the horn of Africa for military, economic and political gains. This is also the reason for establishment of AFRICOM – The US military’s Africa Command.

This militarisation of Africa is not unconnected with the discovery of oil and the rise of China as a major economic power in Africa. In short, the militarisation of Africa is part of the grand plan to control African mineral (including oil) resources.

Consequently, PACM holds the view that the attempt to send Salone troops to Somalia under the guise of AMISOM, is not to help the people of Somalia, but to support Imperialist Proxy-wars in Africa. In that respect, PACM wish to join the progressive chorus of African peace campaigners, to oppose the new vigour of imperialism in Africa and call on the Government of Sierra Leone, led by Ernest Bai Koroma, a seemingly willing puppet of Western imperialism and neo-colonialism, to reverse the decision of sending troops to Somalia. Instead we call on the government, to pursue a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Somalia which can only be addressed by the Somali people themselves.

For more information or media Interviews, please call: Mohamed Koroma = 232 (0) 88 878 273 Email: pacm1898@yahoo.com

Stop the War, Hands Off Somalia!

End Imperialist Proxy Wars in Africa Now!!

Workers United Will Never Be Defeated!!!

Missing the Target: Why the US Has Not Defeated al Qaeda


A Yemeni graffiti artist paints faces of victims of an al-Qaida militant attack on a wall during an 'anti-terrorism' campaign on March 6, 2014 in Sanaa. The victims were killed when a suicide bomber rammed an explosives-packed car into Yemen's defence ministry on December 5, 2013. (Mohammed Huwais/AFP/Getty Images)

All conditions are set for a series of significant terrorist attacks against the US and its allies over the next few years. But that’s not the worst news. Conditions are also set for state collapse in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and possibly Jordan. Saudi Arabia, facing a complex succession soon, is likely to acquire nuclear weapons shortly, if it has not already done so. Turkey and Egypt confront major crises. Almost all of Northern and Equatorial Africa is violent, unstable, and facing a growing al Qaeda threat. And Vladimir Putin’s assault on Ukraine is likely to empower al Qaeda-aligned jihadists in Crimea and in Russia itself. That eventuality is, of course, less worrisome than the prospect of conventional and partisan war on the European continent, likely threatening NATO allies. The international order and global stability are collapsing in a way we have not seen since the 1930s. There is little prospect of this trend reversing of its own accord, and managing it will require massive efforts by the US and its allies over a generation or more.

This distressing context is essential for considering the al Qaeda threat today. 
On the one hand, it makes that threat look small. The long-term effects of global chaos and conflict among hundreds of millions of people across Europe, Africa, and the Middle East on US security, interests, and way of life are surely greater than any damage al Qaeda is likely to do to us in the immediate future. Yet the two threats feed each other powerfully. Disorder and conflict in the Muslim world breed support for al Qaeda, which is starting to look like the strong horse in Iraq and even in Syria. Al Qaeda groups and their allies, on the other hand, powerfully contribute to the collapse of state structures and the emergence of horrific violence and Hobbesian chaos wherever they operate. They are benefiting greatly from the regional sectarian war they intentionally triggered (the destruction of the Samarra Mosque in 2006 was only the most spectacular of a long series of efforts by al Qaeda in Iraq to goad Iraq’s Shi’a into sectarian conflict, for which some Shi’a militants, to be sure, were already preparing)-and have been continuing to fuel. Al Qaeda is like a virulent pathogen that opportunistically attacks bodies weakened by internal strife and poor governance, but that further weakens those bodies and infects others that would not otherwise have been susceptible to the disease. The problem of al Qaeda cannot be separated from the other crises of our age, nor can it be quarantined or rendered harmless through targeted therapies that ignore the larger problems.
Yet that is precisely how the Obama administration has been trying to deal with al Qaeda. Neither the White House nor the intelligence community has offered anything approaching a clear definition of al Qaeda, as a forthcoming paper by Mary Habeck from AEI’s Critical Threats Project (CTP) shows in detail. But such statements as the Administration has made-and its actions and inactions, which speak louder than its words-make the scope of its definition pretty clear. This White House, like its predecessor, focuses on al Qaeda as a terrorist group aiming to attack the US homeland. It appears to have narrowed the scope of what it considers to be al Qaeda even more than did the Bush Administration, by observing an extremely limited and legalistic reading of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) resolution that requires individuals and groups to have been al Qaeda members on 9/11/2001. There are several problems with this approach that ensure that it will be ineffective against al Qaeda in the long run.
To begin with, this administration is compounding an important mistake made by the Bush White House by seeing al Qaeda as a terrorist group. It certainly is that, of course, but that is not its main focus. As my fellow panelists and many other colleagues have shown, al Qaeda never conceived of itself as a terrorist group and has long devoted the lion’s share of its global resources to what it regards as its main effort-seizing and governing terrain and populations in the Muslim world. Al Qaeda has always seen itself as a global insurgency that uses terrorism, and its ability to field small irregular armies in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere demonstrates the seriousness with which it takes that self-conception.
Mis-defining al Qaeda as a US-focused terrorist group has important ramifications for US policy. It encourages the belief that the “real” threat from the “real” al Qaeda-that is the portion of the group actively planning and preparing for further attacks on the US-is very small and susceptible to attrition and disruption by targeted strikes. The corollary is that the much larger, more organizationally-sophisticated, better-equipped, and wealthier “franchises” such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or the erstwhile al Qaeda in Iraq are either not “real” al Qaeda groups or are part of the network in a way that means that the US can largely disregard them as threats apart from isolated individuals within them, who can be removed as needed.
Since al Qaeda does not define itself in this way, it should be no surprise that it has not behaved as expected in the face of the massive attrition of its “core group” largely in Pakistan. The killing of Osama bin Laden certainly warranted a victory lap, although not one as grandiose and full of leaks of highly-sensitive details as this White House took. But the sequel highlights the falsity of the narrow conception of the threat. If al Qaeda really were a small group of extremists hiding out in the mountains-or villas-of Pakistan and dreaming of flying planes into more American buildings, then the death of bin Laden and the deaths of most of the leaders who were active in 2001 should have demoralized the group and its supporters. Al Qaeda’s failure, despite repeated efforts, to carry off any other mass-casualty attacks in the US should also have been devastating to group cohesion, support, morale, and activity. Above all, it should have damaged the al Qaeda brand severely. Al Qaeda supporters are fanatics, and in some cases, willing to die (although not the leaders, interestingly, who take great pains to avoid the martyrdom toward which they encourage their followers), but they don’t like losing any more than normal people do. On the contrary, Islam has a very strong tradition of seeing divine blessing or curse manifested in this-worldly success or failure.
Yet the brand is spreading like wildfire, the groups affiliating themselves with it control more fighters, land, and wealth than they ever have, and they are opening up new fronts. The Syrian civil war-and the refusal of this White House and the West generally to support the moderate Sunni opposition materially and meaningfully early on, has allowed and encouraged the emergence of a new al Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra (JN), alongside al Qaeda in Iraq, which precociously and mutinously now calls itself the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS; al Sham refers to the land that is now both Syria and Lebanon). African Union forces drove affiliate al Shabaab from many of its strongholds in Somalia, although it is fighting to defend those it still has and to regain some of the ground it has lost. But al Shabaab has also metastasized throughout the region, activating and expanding cells in Kenya (such as the one that conducted the Westgate Mall attack), in Burundi, and in Uganda.
AQIM has seen the most dramatic expansion of its capabilities and operating area of any al Qaeda franchise in recent years. Not long ago, AQIM was little more than a small terrorist cell sitting atop a large kidnap-for-ransom and smuggling apparatus. Now it is a fighting force organized into “battalions” and “brigades” that operate in Algeria, Tunisia, Mali, and Libya. AQIM has excelled at putting sub-components through branding bankruptcy periodically, presenting a bewildering array of group names. But as a recent product by CTP’s Andreas Hagen shows, the human networks have remained the same despite multiple rebrandings.
AQIM, ISIS, JN, AQAP (al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula), al Shabaab, the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus, and the rest of the al Qaeda alphabet soup, are primarily engaged in regional conflicts to which they devote the overwhelming proportion of their resources. The Obama administration has consistently indicated that it does not see those “locally-focused” groups as major threats to the US or even, depending on the briefer, part of the “real” al Qaeda. Katherine Zimmerman, Senior Analyst and al Qaeda Team Lead at the Critical Threats Project, has shown the degree to which such a parsing of the networks is simply wrong. The very fact that all of these groups retain their formal al Qaeda affiliations and branding speaks volumes.
Jihadist leaders are evil and, by our standards, insane. That does not mean they are stupid. They are well aware that any individual or group claiming to be part of al Qaeda is considerably more likely to be targeted by the US and many other states. They have even discussed such things-bin Laden opposed formally recognizing al Shabaab as an affiliate for fear of attracting attention to it. But the group continued to clamor for al Qaeda recognition, which bin Laden’s successor, Ayman al Zawahiri, granted shortly after taking power. Jabhat al Nusra in Syria tried for some time to obfuscate its relationship with al Qaeda in order to portray itself as a Syrian nationalist group. Its leadership (and Zawahiri) was incensed when ISIS declared itself the single al Qaeda franchise in both Iraq and Syria, forcing JN to publicly accept or repudiate its al Qaeda affiliate status. JN not only affirmed its status, but also appealed to Zawahiri rather publicly to mediate the dispute with ISIS-which he did, ineffectively, ultimately “expelling” ISIS from al Qaeda, although the effects of that “expulsion” remain unclear.
The Syria case put sharply the issue of al Qaeda membership. JN recognized that al Qaeda is regarded throughout the Muslim world not simply as a radical Sunni fighting force, but also as an ideology with regional and global aspirations. All al Qaeda affiliates know that membership in the group antagonizes other local fighting groups and some local populations (there have been anti-ISIS popular uprisings in Syria, in fact), as well as exposing them to Western attack. Yet they fight-literally in the case of Syria-to retain the affiliation and reaffirm it when publicly challenged. Why?
None of the possible answers support the current Administration assessments of al Qaeda or the current strategy. Affiliates are certainly not fighting to join and stay with a group and brand they believe is “on its last legs” or losing or about to lose. Neither are they driven by any local imperatives, since those imperatives drive the other way. They surely are not taking risks and paying a price to be part of a group whose networks, leadership, shared resources, and cooperation are as tenuous and limited as some analysts have suggested. We should be comfortable with the idea that their motivations seem crazy to us, but not with the idea that they are just plain dumb.
There are two major reasons that make sense for groups to show this degree of loyalty to al Qaeda, and they are not mutually-exclusive: the affiliates get something from membership and/or they really believe in the ideology. The something they get is likely money in the form of donations from wealthy Gulfis who believe in and value the brand and the human networks that control it. Flows of “foreign fighters” from around the Muslim world are directed in part by the al Qaeda networks in ways that can favor or disadvantage particular local groups. Those fighters bring zeal, expertise, money, and, frequently, either the desire for martyrdom or the psychological weaknesses upon which skilled handlers can play to produce suicide bombers. But the affiliates seem also to seek some form of group governance that leads groups like JN to imagine that Zawahiri can and will mediate on their behalf with other affiliates. All these benefits suggest a network and leadership that is real enough to be worth risking life and group success to be part of.
We should also seriously consider the possibility that they really believe in the ideology, and, specifically in the part that is most dangerous to us. The global (and anti-US) objectives that lead to efforts to attack the US and Europe are precisely the things that distinguish the al Qaeda brand of Sunni violent extremism from all others. If you’re just a takfiri who wants to make all women wear burqas, stop people from smoking, and implement a distorted and draconian interpretation of something you call Shari’a law, you do not need to join al Qaeda. Plenty of extremist groups have those goals, and some, like the Afghan Taliban, explicitly reject al Qaeda’s global aims (without, however, repudiating its ties to al Qaeda in the Taliban’s case). The ideological reason for joining al Qaeda is precisely because you believe in global jihad at some point, even if you are currently caught up in local struggles. Sound threat assessment therefore requires assuming that affiliates that have consciously chosen to adhere to this global objective do, in fact, intend to attack the US and its allies at some point or at least to support such attacks. From which it follows that the capabilities those groups are developing may be used in the future to facilitate such attacks.
And that is the most worrying thing of all, since multiple affiliates have shown the ability to plan and execute year-long campaigns at the operational level of war integrating improvised explosive devices (IEDs), car bombs, suicide attacks, light infantry operations, crew-served weapons, and even, on limited occasions, armored vehicles. Nothing would please the US military more, of course, than the fielding of an al Qaeda armored division, which we could easily destroy even after the foolish decision to retire the A-10 without replacement. Nor will al Qaeda find it easy to set up vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) cells or infantry training centers in the US. The skills they have shown in planning, logistics, communications, direction and control of operations, training, and adaptability, however, are all transferable. The transfer has, in fact, already begun as fighters from Syria, Iraq, and the Maghreb have started to return to their homes in Europe, Ukraine, and Russia-and the U.S. The U.S. intelligence community has put the number of foreign fighters in Syria at around 7,000. What will happen when a lot of them start going home? The good news is that the al Qaeda of 2001 is gone; the bad news is that Son of al Qaeda is a lot more lethal.
No discussion of the al Qaeda threat these days can be complete without considering the nature of our defenses. Here conditions are parlous and getting worse. I will not get into the merits of the debate over civil liberties, what the NSA is or is not doing, how complete or accurate is the Senate report on CIA interrogations, or what should be done about any of these important issues. Torture is bad and should be forbidden, and we can have a sensible conversation about where to draw the line. Civil liberties are vital to the American way of life and must be protected, even at the cost of greater risk to life and limb. Again, we can and must have a sensible discussion about how to draw the balance.
But NSA operations are already being curtailed by White House fiat even before we have completed that national discussion, and the CIA bids fair to become the “Central Self-Defense Agency” in the face of this Senate report. So the guardians on whom we rely to see and understand the minute changes in intent that alone distinguish potential from actual threats posed by al Qaeda groups with expanding capabilities will be distracted by internal debates, attacks, and requirements just as the danger grows most acute. And they will be further distracted by dramatic budget reductions that also constrain their abilities to keep up with the evolving threats. That is why I began this statement by saying that all conditions are set for future attacks. The threat is growing in size and capability while we are dismantling our defenses. Surely we should consider other approaches, and soon.
____________________
Notes:
[1] Andreas Hagen, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Leaders and their Networks,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, March 27, 2014.
[2] Katherine Zimmerman, “The al Qaeda Network: A New Framework for Defining the Enemy,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, September 10, 2013.
____________________
Frederick W. Kagan, author of the 2007 report “Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq“, is one of the intellectual architects of the successful “surge” strategy in Iraq. He is the director of AEI’s Critical Threats Project and a former professor of military history at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. His books range from “Lessons for a Long War” (AEI Press, 2010), coauthored with Thomas Donnelly, to the “End of the Old Order: Napoleon and Europe, 1801-1805” (Da Capo, 2006). This article was originally published at the American Enterprise Institute.

2 INJURED AFTER ATTACK ON TURKISH EMBASSY IN SOMALIA




 by Arif Söztutan

MOGADISHU, Somalia — After a missile attack on the Turkish Embassy that is under construction in the capital of Somalia, Mogadishu, two Turkish workmen were badly injured. The Turkish workers are to be brought to Turkey for treatment with an ambulance aircraft.

A rocket hit a container near where Turkish workers were resting and caught fire. The 2 Turkish workers were severely wounded in the incident.

ETHIOPIA DETAINS ARTICLE 19 STAFF



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Ethiopian immigration officials detained a member of staff from ARTICLE 19’s East Africa office on 3 April for 29 hours without any access to legal advice or consular support. Fortunately, Patrick Mutahi, a trainer in protection, reacted according to strict ARTICLE 19 security protocols, notifying Ethiopian contacts of his detainment before his mobile phone was confiscated.
Following a rapid campaign for his release, Mutahi was deported back to Kenya on 4 April, and was warned that he would face jail if he returned.
ARTICLE 19 is one of the last remaining international human rights organisations working in Ethiopia and providing independent information to the UN Human Rights Council, and we are therefore concerned that the situation will only deteriorate further.
We urge the government to publicly withdraw their threat to jail Patrick Mutahi, and to respect fundamental human rights, including the right to freedom of expression.
We also call upon the UN to address increasing threats towards human rights defenders who provide a source of independent information without which the UN cannot fulfil their mandate, specifically by urgently establishing the mechanism agreed in Human Rights Council Resolution 24/24.
“Patrick’s detention is a chilling indictment of the state of freedom of expression in Ethiopia. Over the past five years we’ve witnessed growing hostility towards journalists, civil society groups and political opposition. That hostility is now being extended to those that support these groups’ exercise of their right to freedom of expression,” said Henry Maina, Director of ARTICLE 19 Eastern Africa. 
“We have worked in Ethiopia to provide support to journalists, so that that they can continue to professionally conduct their important work to keep people informed and facilitate open debate about matters of public importance. Restricting our work shows the utter contempt the Ethiopian authorities hold for free speech, press freedom and fundamental human rights.”

DENIAL OF ENTRY, DETENTION AND DEPORTATION

On 3 April 2014, Patrick Mutahi flew from Nairobi, Kenya to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, where he was due to deliver a security and safety training for journalists and media workers. Upon landing in Addis Ababa’s Bole International Airport at 12pm, he was detained by immigration officials, who confiscated his passport and mobile telephone and told him that he would not be permitted to enter the country. Security officials stated that ARTICLE 19 had not sought permission from the Ethiopian government to conduct trainings of journalists.
Officials told Patrick that he was not allowed to speak to anyone and was refused legal advice. Mutahi had however already anticipated the potential risk and following ARTICLE 19 security protocol, had notified Ethiopian contacts that he was being held.
During the period of detention, it became apparent that the authorities were familiar with Patrick’s movements during previous trips to the country. Security officials made clear they knew details about who he had met with, as well as where and when those meetings had taken place.
At approximately 2pm on 4 April, 26 hours after being detained and as a result of a global reaction for his release, Patrick was told he would be deported and warned that he would face jail if he returned. At 5pm the same day, Patrick’s passport was stamped “deported” and he was placed on a flight back to Kenya. 

AN ATTEMPT TO UNDERMINE THE UNITED NATIONS

We are also concerned that this response by the Ethiopian government is an attempt to stop ARTICLE 19 from continuing to provide an independent source of information about human rights violations in Ethiopia to the United Nations.
As well as training journalists, Patrick was due to work with Ethiopian civil society to provide information to the UN’s Universal Periodic Review, a four-yearly assessment of the human rights situation in every country, conducted in front of all UN member states in Geneva.
ARTICLE 19 routinely works with civil society in countries worldwide to give detailed and independent information and recommendations about the state of freedom of expression in countries under review.
Unfortunately, there is a growing trend for governments to harass civil society to stop them passing information to the UN and its various mechanisms. The UN’s Human Rights Council adopted a resolution recently in September 2013, committing states to prevent “intimidation or reprisals against individuals and groups who cooperate or have cooperated with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights.” The resolution calls upon the UN Secretary General to create a senior focal point within the UN to coordinate an international response on the issues of reprisals, to increase protections for human rights defenders, and to ensure perpetrators of attacks against defenders are held accountable.
Ethiopia, a member of the Council, abstained in the resolution’s September vote and in December, the African Group of States at the UN General Assembly voted to delay the appointment of the senior focal point on reprisals.
“Detaining Patrick, a human rights defender, obstructs civil society’s ability to communicate human rights abuses to the UN and other international bodies responsible for holding states accountable for their human rights violations, such as the Universal Periodic Review,” added Maina.
Source: article19.org

Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Fund Raising High Profle Event held in Hargeisa the capital of Somaliland Repbulic


Amb. Brigadier Tesfaye (C) the Ethiopian Consul General at the Meeting

The multibillion-dollar Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam which is currently 30% complete has not received a penny in external funding thence solely financed by Addis Ababa based central coffers and contributions from Ethiopians in the Diaspora and citizens of neighbouring African countries.
The Ethiopian Consul General in Somaliland Brigadier General Berhe Tesfaye informed this at a meeting where local citizens and Ethiopians residing in Somaliland were in congregation in hotel in Hargeisa where he also revealed that his country is now in a position to supply a sufficient Electricity Somaliland.

"For use by Somaliland citizens the Ethiopian government has availed 60 megawatts of electricity at the Togwajale border town for the sole purpose of supply to somaliland and us by citizens" Said Brig Tesfaye

The diplomat, to whom the conducive relations prevalent between his country and Somaliland are attributed to, urged both local and foreign investors wishing to facilitate the power supply from the Ethiopian side will be accommodated once relevant authorization is availed from the Hargeisa based authorities.

On the benefits of the Renaissance Dam to Ethiopia Brigadier Tesfaye said that it is expected upon completion that the Ethiopian economy shall shift from one driven by Agriculture to an industrial based one a move anticipated to alleviate poverty thus pep-up economic growth.

Informing that over six countries as far apart as Burundi, Tanzania and Kenya have already requested electricity supply once the Dam is completed Brig Tesfaye also revealed to participants of the Ethio-Somaliland meeting that if Somaliland takes advantage of the 60 megawatts already in Togwajale town it will Djibouti and Sudan (North) currently supplied.

Stressing on the importance the Ethiopian government places on successful completion of the multi-billion dam project and the attendant benefits to be accrued not only by Ethiopians but citizens of the 10 Riparian stats that include Egypt which is in disfavor, the Ethiopian Consul General said that financial support is required from Ethiopian at home and in the diaspora as well as other friendly citizens like Somalilanders.

Said he, "We are undertaking a multi-billion project ingle handedly thus urging for contributions of any amount big or small"

Saying that a project in which ordinary citizens take ownership pride in, is that which is implemented from the people's little donations be it a Shilling, Birr or Dollar rather than from huge contributions in their millions that unfortunately come with attached strings.

Buoyed by the words of Brigadier General Berhe Tesfaye, the participants who had come for deliberations thence unprepared for a fundraiser dipped into their pockets and at the end of the meeting thousands of Dollars in cash had been contributed while thousands were pledged.

According to the Ethiopian consulate in Hargeisa those wishing to contribute towards construction of the Renaissance Dam can do so through the purchase of bonds as cheap as $50 while others can chip in directly through an account at the Commercial branch of the Somaliland Central Bank in Hargeisa.
For more information kindly contact the officeof the Ethiopian Consul General office in Hargeisa

A citizen contributes towards the Renaissance dam during the Hargeisa meet

A citizen contributes towards the Renaissance dam during the Hargeisa meet
Similar meetings brainstorming issues of importance for Ethiopians resident in Somaliland those in relation to local citizens as well as, geared towards fostering relations are an ongoing program organized by the Hargeisa based Consul General.

Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam , formerly known as the Millennium Dam and sometimes referred to as Hidase Dam, is a gravity dam on the Blue Nile River in Ethiopia currently under construction. It is in the Benishangul-Gumuz Region of Ethiopia, about 40 km (25 mi) east of the border with Sudan. At 6,000 MW, the dam will be the largest hydroelectric power plant in Africa when completed, as well as the 8th largest in the world sharing the spot with Krasnoyarskaya.The reservoir at 63 billion cubic meters will be one of the continent's largest. According to the Ethiopian government, as of February 2014, the dam is 30% complete.For full Dam details 



The Dead Horse Theory: Cartoon explain itself

The unfailing productivity study for govenments




























The tribal wisdom of the Plains Indians, passed on from generation to generation, says that: "When you discover that you are riding a dead horse, the best strategy is to dismount." However, in government more advanced strategies are often employed, such as:

1. Buying a stronger whip. 
2. Changing riders. 
3. Appointing a committee to study the horse. 
4. Arranging to visit other countries to see how other cultures ride dead horses. 5. Lowering the standards so that dead horses can be included. 
6. Reclassifying the dead horse as living-impaired. 
7. Hiring outside contractors to ride the dead horse. 
8. Harnessing several dead horses together to increase speed. 
9. Providing additional funding and/or training to increase the dead horse's performance.
10. Doing a productivity study to see if lighter riders would improve the dead horse's performance. 
11. Declaring that as the dead horse does not have to be fed, it is less costly, carries lower overhead and therefore contributes substantially more to the bottom line of the economy than do some other horses. 
12. Rewriting the expected performance requirements for all horses. And, of course... 
13. Promoting the dead horse to a supervisory position.