A proposed canal in Nicaragua, built by China, is a tangible signal that the United States can't set the terms of the world economy forever.
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| Tour boats on the canal in Zhouzhuang, China. (melli1979 / Flickr) |
By Arnie Saiki,
Since it first opened in 1914, the Panama Canal has provided
the primary shipping conduit linking the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans through
the Americas. And in that time, it has also represented U.S. dominance in the
region. Even after the canal passed entirely into Panama’s control in 1999, the
United States has maintained a strong military presence in the region,
establishing its continuity as the region’s key economic and political player.
All that is about to change.
Nicaragua and China have come to an agreement allowing
the construction of a new inter-oceanic canal in Nicaragua, connecting China
with the Caribbean and its Atlantic-American trade partners. This won’t just
increase the flow of goods between China and the Americas. It will also usher
China into the region as a major political force—something that is likely to
raise alarm in Washington, which will regard any Nicaragua-China alliance as a
destabilizing influence in the hemisphere.
China’s role in the development of this canal is partly
about expanding its global trade. But it’s also a way for China to push back
against Washington’s militarized “
Pacific Pivot,” as
well as the U.S. drive to establish a
Trans-Pacific
Strategic Economic Partnership (commonly shortened to Trans-Pacific
Partnership, or TPP) that seeks to contain China’s global economic growth.
Rival Alliances
The TPP is a U.S.-led free trade agreement—a partial
draft version of which WikiLeaks recently
exposed to the public—that
is being devised in secret by 12 Pacific Rim governments and 600 of the world’s
largest corporations. It seeks to define the rules for investment and trade in
the 21
st century.
Unless China is willing to adopt rules that will rewrite
its regulatory and investment laws to conform to the standard of this
agreement—for example, by curtailing its state-owned investments and opening
its state-owned enterprises to Wall Street investment rules—China will remain
outside the TPP.
This is not to say that China needs to submit to this
bullying. For example, China has capitalized its own development fund with the
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) association, and
organized its own economic partnership with ASEAN member countries in Southeast
Asia (many of which are also involved with TPP negotiations) under the auspices
of the Regional Economic Comprehensive Partnership (RCEP).
China’s FDI strategies have surpassed
analysts’
expectations, and last year China became the third largest investor
country, behind the United States and Japan. According to a recent
press release
by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, China’s tremendous
investment in many African countries has driven up FDI in Africa, defying the
global trend. In Nigeria alone, China’s investment rose from $75 million to
$1.2 billion between 2004 and 2010. The United States, while still a much
larger investor, has been unable to match the growth of China’s investment in
resource-rich developing countries.
Due to its increased shipping of resources and goods,
China has emerged as the new center not only for global manufacturing but for
investment as well. To put this in perspective, China’s container traffic
measures over 5,000 transits a year, with hauls exceeding 10,000 gross tonnage
per ship. According to a World Bank Data
chart, China’s
container traffic surpasses that of the United States by a ratio of nearly
three to one.
The TPP—with its current
12-nation
membership, including Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan,
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and
Vietnam—has a combined GDP of more than $27 trillion, representing over a third
of global GDP.
Yet despite its economic power and its military influence
throughout the region, the United States has not been able to conclude this
agreement. There has been focused criticism nationally and internationally
against the TPP, as it is seen as an undemocratic agreement primarily written
by corporations for the benefit of corporations. Additionally, for the TPP to
conclude, it still needs congressional approval. The push to “fast-track”
Obama’s Trade Promotion Authority is likely to meet further resistance from
lawmakers.
China’s success in regional and global trade, meanwhile,
has given it the economic and fraternal clout to partner with the other
ex-colonial—or ex-socialist—emerging economies to provide an alternative model
to the neoliberal TPP. It is therefore no coincidence that none of the BRICS
countries participates in the TPP.
What BRICS offers is a new reserve currency that helps
stabilize economies in developing markets, thereby providing greater access for
development and trade, as well as a less draconian debt structure, compared to
Wall Street investments.
Of course these competing systems are not mutually
exclusive—after all, China and the United States have a symbiotic and
integrated economic relationship with each other. However, the TPP and the
BRICS economies are competing over the trade and investment rules for the 21st
century—and the neoliberal model no longer gets the last word.
Global South Benefits
The proposed Nicaraguan canal is a tangible symbol of
this emerging multipolarity.
The canal would bypass not only the already congested
Panama Canal, but also the strong U.S. military presence patrolling the area.
The access provided by Nicaragua’s canal would be a welcome and long-sought
opportunity for Global South economies—especially for regional economic and
political trading blocs like the South American Common Market called Mercosur,
and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA).
As we unpeel the geographical layer of the TPP, we find
that the TPP countries form an integrated wall separating the Mercosur and ALBA
economies under Brazil’s economic influence from the Asia-Pacific economies
under China’s regional influence—in effect turning the west coast of South
America into a barrier between two of the BRICS charter members. A Nicaraguan
canal not only provides the maritime access that streamlines the supply chain
between China and Brazil, but it also provides new trade advantages to the
Global South.
This does not necessarily alienate the United States, but
it does have the potential impact of reducing U.S. economic and military
hegemony in the region.
In a 2008
hearing
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on “The New Challenge: China in
the Western Hemisphere,” U.S. representatives expressed concerns that Latin
American countries were beginning to turn away from U.S. investment in favor of
China. Latin America expert Daniel Erikson testified that “the pace of trade
between China and the region has skyrocketed from $10 billion in 2000 to over
$100 billion in 2007.” In 2012, China surpassed $200 billion in trade, doubling
the 2007 figure, and supplanted the EU as Latin America’s second-largest
trading partner after the United States.
The Nicaragua canal would be yet another blow to U.S.
influence in the region. Although the United States relinquished its official
sovereignty over the Panama Canal in 1999, it continues to have a strong
military presence in the region, maintains first rights for the passage of
military ships, and cooperates with Panama to patrol and check ships without
warrant. At this time, the United States does not have such an agreement with Nicaragua.
“Containerment”
Both the TPP and the U.S. “Pacific Pivot” have been
framed as a kind of “China containment strategy.”
This is not to say that the United States is practicing
the same kind of containment strategy it has towards North Korea. For one
thing, as long as China’s trading partnerships remain productive, any
suggestion of containing China would likely be seen as a deluded conceit.
Perhaps a better description is that the United States is
practicing a “containerment” strategy with China—a policy that seeks to assert
greater control over China’s overseas investment by controlling the shipping
lanes that move the bulk of resources and manufactured goods to and from China.
If China gets a new route to the Atlantic, this strategy may wither on the
vine.
A China-led Nicaragua Canal challenges Washington’s
150-year-old claim of military and economic hegemony in the Western Hemisphere
as outlined in the Monroe Doctrine. The rise of the trans-global BRICS economy,
coupled with a new inter-oceanic canal that the United States has no
jurisdiction over, means that the United States has been, at this moment,
out-maneuvered by China.
Whether Washington attempts to reassert its hemispheric
dominance remains to be seen. It will certainly be a challenge, since blowback
from the United States’ historically brutal policies in Latin America
could very well strengthen economic ties among the developing economies
represented by China and their BRICS partners.
Although the completion of a Nicaragua Canal will likely
be fraught with difficulties, this China-Nicaragua partnership demonstrates
that China will not be container-ed.
Foreign Policy In Focus contributor
Arnie Saiki is the coordinator for Moana
Nui Action Alliance, which focuses on Pacific Island political and
economic justice issues.
Source: fpif.org
