Al Shabaab in East Africa Latesty Security Report

By James Miller

Multiple crises throughout the world—in Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, and now Israel—have pulled attention from growing violence in East Africa. Al Qaeda’s group in Somalia, al Shabaab, now has an operational reach that covers all of the Horn of Africa. Even within Somalia, al Shabaab continues to conduct significant attacks in the capital, Mogadishu, and in key cities like Kismayo, Baidoa, and Beledweyne. There exists a popular notion that al Shabaab is in decline due to the efforts of Somali forces and the African Union peacekeepers, a view echoed on June 3, 2014 by U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman.  But al Shabaab’s recent activity in the region belies any such claim.[1] Al Shabaab still controls significant territory in Somalia and in the past year, has been active in Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Djibouti.

Al Shabaab voiced its intent and increasingly demonstrates its capability to conduct attacks throughout East Africa. Its first major international attack was in July 2010, when al Shabaab carried out twin suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda.[2] The absence of a second major attack and the start of a major offensive against al Shabaab in fall 2011 led many to dismiss the Kampala bombings as a one-off strike and to assess that al Shabaab had been significantly weakened. The group had lost control of territory and announced that it would focus on asymmetrical attacks, rather than holding land. Its continued threats against the regional troop-contributing countries (TCC) to the peacekeeping mission in Somalia appeared to be aspirational at best.

The spectacular assault on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, in September 2013 was al Shabaab’s second major international attack.[3] Al Shabaab cultivated its Kenyan network leading up to the Westgate attack, establishing partnerships with Kenyan extremist networks. Key partners such as al Hijra, a group comprised primarily of indigenous Kenyans, provided al Shabaab with an extensive fundraising and recruitment network in Nairobi and along the Kenyan coast.[4] The growth of these networks allowed al Shabaab to declare a pivot to Kenya on May 22, 2014, encouraging Muslims to take up arms against the Kenyan government.[5] Since then, al Shabaab has claimed responsibility for killing as many as ninety people in a series of attacks along the Kenyan coast in June and July.[6]

Al Shabaab has also focused its efforts on other TCCs. Of the six primary countries, al Shabaab has attempted attacks in four over the past year. Two al Shabaab operatives attempted, but failed, to bomb an October 16, 2013 World Cup qualifying match in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and Ethiopian authorities announced the arrest of five Somali conspirators on December 19.[7] Uganda remains a target. U.S. Embassy Kampala has issued several terror warnings in the past year for Uganda, most recently citing a specific threat to Entebbe International Airport on July 3, 2014.[8] Al Shabaab has also been tied to the May suicide attack at a Djibouti restaurant popular among Westerners.[9]Though not all of al Shabaab’s attacks have been successful, its growing operational reach and regional influence is evident.

Al Shabaab’s activity and rhetoric suggest that the group will continue to conduct operations outside of Somalia. Al Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane’s May 2014 statement, expressing solidarity with Muslims in the Central African Republic (CAR), indicates that the group’s gaze extends beyond the TCCs.[10] Rumored al Shabaab correspondence with Nigeria’s Boko Haram and potential cooperation with Tanzanian extremist networks further evidence continued operational growth throughout Africa.[11] Al Shabaab’s observed activity, demonstrated operational capability and capacity, as well as expanded regional influence over the past year indicates that, contrary to popular belief, the group remains a dynamic threat throughout East Africa.   

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[1] Wendy Sherman, “U.S. Foreign Policy in Somalia,” United States Institute of Peace, June 3, 2014. Available:http://www.usip.org/events/us-foreign-policy-in-somalia

[2] Chris Harnisch, “Al Shabaab’s First International Strike: Analysis of the July 11 Uganda Bombings,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, July 14, 2010. Available: http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/al-shabaabs-first-international-strike-analysis-july-11-uganda-bombings-july-14-2010-4532

[3] Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, “Al-Shabaab breaks new ground with complex Nairobi attack,” CNN, September 23, 2014. Available: http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/22/world/meast/kenya-mall-al-shabaab-analysis/

[4] Fredrick Nzes, “Al-Hijra: Al-Shabab’s Affiliate in Kenya,” CTC Sentinel, May 29, 2014. Available:https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-hijra-al-shababs-affiliate-in-kenya

[5] “Somalia’s Al-Shabaab chief says war ‘shifting to Kenya,’” AFP, May 22, 2014. Available:http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Somalia-s-Al-Shabaab-chief-say-war--shifting-to-Kenya-/-/2558/2323312/-/ict24e/-/index.html

[6] Drazen Jorgic, “Islamists kill 50 in Kenya, some during World Cup screening,” Reuters, June 16, 2014. Available: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/16/us-kenya-attacks-idUSKBN0ER0FF20140616

“Islamist militants kill 15 more in new attack on Kenya coast,” The East African, June 17, 2014. Available:http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Islamist-militants-kill-eight-more-in-new-attack-on-Kenya-coast/-/2558/2351298/-/10xuqxjz/-/index.html

Joseph Akwiri, “Gunmen kill at least 29 in latest raids on Kenyan coast,” Reuters, July 6, 2014. Available:http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/06/us-kenya-attacks-idUSKBN0FB05R20140706

[7] Aaron Maasho, “Ethiopia says arrests five suspects in soccer match bomb plot,” Reuters, December 19, 2013. Available: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/19/us-ethiopia-bombers-idUSBRE9BI14F20131219

[8]“Possible Westgate-style attack in Kampala,” U.S. Embassy Kampala, October 15, 2013. Available:http://kampala.usembassy.gov/sm101513.html

“Potential for a Terrorist Attack in Kampala Feb/Mar 2014,” U.S. Embassy Kampala, February 10, 2014. Available:http://kampala.usembassy.gov/sm_021014.html

“Potential for a Terrorist Attack in Kampala May/June 2014,” U.S. Embassy Kampala, May 6, 2014. Available:http://kampala.usembassy.gov/potential_terrorist_attack_kampala_may_june_2014.html

“Possible Attack at Entebbe International Airport,” U.S. Embassy Kampala, July 3, 2014. Available:http://kampala.usembassy.gov/em-070314.html

[9] “Al Shabaab claims responsibility for Djibouti suicide attack,” Reuters, May 27, 2014. Available:http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/27/uk-djibouti-attacks-idUSKBN0E72AA20140527

[10] “Shabaab Leader Links France, Missionaries to CAR Attacks,” SITE Intel Group, May 14, 2014. Available at SITE.

[11] Sigi De Vos and Alexander Smith, “Boko Haram Trades Terrorist Tactics with Somalia’s Al Shabaab,” NBC News, July 6, 2014. Available: http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/missing-nigeria-schoolgirls/boko-haram-trades-terrorist-tactics-somalias-al-shabaab-n140456

Tres Thomas, “Threat of Al-Shabaab and Extremist Attacks Grows in Tanzania,” Somalia Newsroom, July 11, 2014. Available: http://somalianewsroom.com/2014/07/11/threat-of-al-shabaab-and-extremist-attacks-grows-in-tanzania/

“Tanzanian police arrest 11 for undergoing al-Shabaab military training,” Sabahi Online, October 8, 2013. Available: http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2013/10/08/newsbrief-01

Djibouti Files Arbitration Against DP World Over Alleged Corruption in Port Deal

Government Says It Has Rescinded Concession to Run Africa's Largest Port

By 

 

 

ASA FITCH

 

DUBAI—The government of Djibouti has filed an arbitration case in London against Dubai's DP World, DPW.NDB +0.50% alleging the global ports operator paid bribes to secure a concession to run the Doraleh Container Terminal in 2000.

The Djibouti government said in an emailed statement that it rescinded DP World's 20-year concession and launched the case before the London Court of International Arbitration after out-of-court negotiations broke down.

DP World rejected the allegations, saying in a statement that it was "disappointed" in the government's decision to take legal action after 14 years of cooperation on the development and operation of the port, which opened in 2008.

The port is Africa's largest container terminal and Djibouti's biggest employer.

DP World, which operates more than 65 ports around the world, mostly in emerging markets, said it would continue to manage the Doraleh terminal pending the arbitration decision.

"We reject the allegations made and will vigorously defend our position during the arbitration procedure," DP World said.

Djibouti said the case sprang from an investigation of Abdourahman Boreh, the former chairman of the Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority.

The government has launched numerous legal actions against the Dubai-based Mr. Boreh in recent years and obtained a global freezing order on his assets.

The government has alleged that he misused his government position to gain personal advantage. One major case is scheduled to go to trial in London next year.

Mr. Boreh couldn't be reached for comment, but has previously denied allegations against him.

Djibouti claimed in its statement that it uncovered evidence "indicating that DP World paid bribes and gave other financial incentives to Mr. Boreh while he was negotiating the Doraleh Container Terminal concession agreement with DP World, as well as afterwards."

The bribes, the Djibouti government alleged, were made through consultancy agreements and foreign shell companies.

"Although the government of Djibouti sought to resolve the matter through direct discussions, negotiations have now broken down, leaving Djibouti with no choice but to request arbitration to declare the concession agreement and related project documents rescinded for illegality and corruption," the government's statement said.

Write to Asa Fitch at asa.fitch@wsj.com

 

Orange co-financing Sea-Me-We 5 cable connecting through Djibouti, Egypt

Construction of a high-speed submarine cable connecting France to Singapore via Djibouti and Egypt in Africa will be co-financed by telecoms giant Orange.

The 20,000 km Sea-Me-We 5, which stands for South East Asia-Middle East-Western Europe 5, is planned to connect Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri-Lanka, India, Pakistan, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Italy and France.

Orange is a member of an international consortium building the network, which is expected to come online at the end of 2016.

Development of Sea-Me-We 5 also follows on from the establishment of Sea-Me-We 3 in 1999, Sea-Me-We 4 in 2005 and IMeWe in 2010.

Orange co-owns these three other submarine cables as well.

“In addition to providing extra capacity, the Sea-Me-We 5 cable provides Orange with an alternative route that guarantees the protection of voice and data traffic passing through the other cables in the area,” said Orange in a press statement released last week.

“Moreover, thanks to the inter-connection point in Djibouti, Orange can open up a new route towards the Indian Ocean to support the booming growth of broadband services in the islands of Reunion and Mayotte,” said Orange.

The Sea-Me-We 5 cable design is based on 100 Gbps technology and is expected to offer a capacity of 24 Tbps, according to Orange.

Orange’s move to co-finance Sea-Me-We 5 also follows on the French telecom operator’s announcement last week that it has opened West Africa’s first large-capacity internet protocol (IP) Point of Presence (PoP) in Abidjan, Ivory Coast.

Orange is also part of a consortium that has built the $700 million Africa Coast to Europe (ACE) submarine cable, which links Europe to Africa’s West Coast.

Djibouti strongly condemns Armenia`s aggression against Azerbaijan

 

Baku The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Djibouti has released a statement strongly condemning Armenia`s aggression against Azerbaijan.

In the statement, the Government of Djibouti says it considers the actions perpetrated against civilian Azerbaijani population in the occupied Azerbaijani territories as “crimes against humanity”,APA reports quoting AzerTag.

Recalling the resolutions of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the United NationsGeneral Assembly and Security Council, the statement “strongly condemns any looting and destruction of the archeological, cultural and religious monuments in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan”.

It strongly demands “the strict implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions 8221853,874 and,884 as well as the United Nations General Assembly resolution NRESl62l243, and the immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of Armenian forces from all occupied Azerbaijani territories including the Nagorno-Karabakh region and strongly urges Armenia

to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan”.

Djibouti`s Government also calls for a just and peaceful settlement of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the basis of respect for the principles of territorial integrity of states and inviolability of internationally recognized borders.