April 26, 2014: Peacekeepers and Somali security forces
continue to chase al Shabaab out of towns and villages from central
Somalia (west of Mogadishu) south to the Kenyan border. The al Shabaab
gunmen tend to flee, so it’s largely a matter of chasing the Islamic
terrorists constantly, leaving them little opportunity to organize
attacks.
Al Shabaab is forced to forage and loot to survive, which makes
them even less tolerable to the locals. There has been some violence,
or threats of violence and this has produced over 40,000 refugees. There
are also a lot of roads that go through areas where al Shabaab operate
and often ambush and rob vehicles. This has made delivery of aid more
difficult.
There are still over half a million people in the area
dependent on food aid. Al Shabaab publicly insists that it will fight
on, so the peacekeepers are wearing them down to the point where al
Shabaab is no longer a major threat. That could take years, as in until
the end of the decade.
That is what has worked against similar terrorist
movements in the past and grinding them down still appears to be the
only solution.
In response to a March 31
st al Shabaab attack
(three bombs) in Kenya the government there immediately began searching
buildings in the main Somali neighbourhood of the city seeking al Shabaab
members and sympathizers. By the next day police had arrested over 650
local Somalis for questioning and so far several thousand have been
taken in for interrogation.
This brought forth much criticism from the
UN and the Arab world. This did not bother the Kenyans who consider the
Arabs complicit in the creation and spread of Islamic terrorism.
Al
Qaeda and other Islamic radical groups came out of Arabia and many
wealthy Arabs still support Islamic terrorist groups like al Shabaab.
The fact that current al Shabaab leadership contains many Arabs adds to
Kenyan animosity towards the Arabs.
The UN is considered corrupt and
subservient to oil-rich Arab states and Western leftists who glamorize
and sympathize with some Islamic radical groups. Ignoring the UN and
Arab criticism Kenya has been deporting hundreds of Somalis back to
Somalia.
Those sent back are the ones found living illegally in Nairobi
outside refugee camps. Police believe these illegals are the most likely
to be Islamic terrorists or al Shabaab supporters. To add to the
problems there is the long-standing animosity between Somalis (who are
Moslem and consider themselves “Arab”) and the Kenyans (who are
Christian and black Africans, who have long been disdained and abused by
Arabs). The crackdown on Somalis in Kenya is popular with most Kenyans
but hampered by the corruption. Somalis (even al Shabaab members) with
enough cash can buy their way out of detention, arrest or deportation.
The Somali government has been seeking ways to deal with al
Shabaab terrorist cells returning to Mogadishu. The city has 1.5 million
residents and too few (and too corrupt) police to deal with crime or
terrorism. Efforts to set up an informant network stumbled because of
the rampant corruption among police and the general knowledge that
police can be bribed by al Shabaab to get out of being arrested or to
obtain the names of informants.
The UN is bringing in trainers, advisors and cash to create a
Somali operated logistical capability for the Somali Army. This force
currently consists of six brigades and about 7,000 troops actually in
service. The ultimate size is to be three times that and without support
troops that won’t happen. Corruption and poor discipline remain a major
problem and creating a logistical force that will handle purchasing,
storing and distributing supplies as well as maintaining equipment will
face enormous problems with corruption. Meanwhile the 22,000 foreign
peacekeepers provide most of the logistical support for Somali security
forces.
The Somali pirates are still in business and there have been
five attacks so far this month. The piracy business has changed a lot
since 2010, when it reached levels of activity not seen in over a
century. But over the next three years that all changed. By 2013 attacks
on ships by Somali pirates had declined 95 percent from the 2010 peak.
It’s been over two years since the Somali pirates captured a large
commercial ship, and even smaller fishing ships and dhows (small local
cargo ships of traditional construction) are harder for them to grab.
The rapid collapse of the Somali pirates since 2010 was no accident. It
was all a matter of organization, international cooperation and
innovation. It all began back in 2009 when 80 seafaring nations formed
(with the help of a UN resolution) the Contact Group on Piracy off the
Coast of Somalia. The most visible aspect of the Contact Group was the
organization of an anti-piracy patrol off the Somali coast.
This came to
consist of over two dozen warships and several dozen manned and
unmanned aircraft, as well as support from space satellites and major
intelligence and police agencies. Despite all this there are still
pirates who are active along the coast.
April 23, 2014: In Kenya (Nairobi) a car bomb went off outside
a police station in a Somali neighborhood, killing two policemen and
two civilians.
April 22, 2014: In Mogadishu two al Shabaab men shot dead a
member of parliament. The government agreed to provide better security
for senior government officials while al Shabaab has boasted that it
will keep on killing key government people. Most of these officials are
hiring whatever security they can afford.
April 21, 2014: In Mogadishu an al Shabaab bomb placed under his car killed one member of parliament and wounded another.
April 18, 2014: In Balad (30 kilometers north of Mogadishu)
militiamen of a local pro-government warlord got into a fire-fight with
some national police. There were several casualties before a ceasefire
was arranged. Balad was under al Shabaab control until June 2012 and
because of a shortage of trained and trustworthy security personnel the
government had to make deals with local warlords to keep the peace.
These warlords are often uncomfortable around the trained police and
army units and their gunmen are undisciplined and unpredictable.
April 17, 2014: Uganda has sent 400 more peacekeepers to
Somalia to provide security for UN facilities. These troops received
specific training for this duty.
April 10, 2014: In Mogadishu three Turkish construction
workers were wounded when al Shabaab fired RPG rockets at the Turkish
embassy compound.
In the south, near the Kenyan border, Kenyan peacekeepers
rescued two Kenyan aid workers who were kidnapped in 2011. The two were
finally released in March when they agreed to convert to Islam. Al
Shabaab was unable to obtain any ransom for the two men and sought to at
least get some positive publicity with the “conversion.” The two men
were still being watched but found an opportunity to escape when
peacekeepers patrolled the area they were in.
April 7, 2014: At the Mogadishu airport two UN anti-drug
officials were shot dead. It’s unclear who was responsible, although al
Shabaab will kill anyone associated with the UN and there many criminal
gangs who would murder anti-drug investigators from anywhere.
April 4, 2014: In central Somalia (Gal Hareri) there was a
large explosion outside the town and when troops arrived they found
three dead al Shabaab men and evidence that wounded victims were
removed. The Islamic terrorists were apparently assembling a car bomb
when the explosives went off by accident. This sort of thing is becoming
more common as experienced bomb builders are killed, captured or flee
the region because of the constant pressure from peacekeepers and
security forces.
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