Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 4
An African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) soldier keeps guard on top of an armoured vehicle in the old part of Mogadishu (Source Reuters)
After decades of conflict that have nearly destroyed the nation, Somalia now stands poised to make a final drive with
international assistance
to shatter the strength of radical al-Qaeda-associated Islamists in
central and southern Somalia, but there are indications that Somalia’s
leaders may be posing an even greater obstacle to Somalia’s successful
reconstruction.
Arms Embargoes and Missing Weapons
In mid-February, the UN Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group issued a
report to the UN Security Council’s sanctions committee claiming that
weapons obtained by the Somali government under a temporary easing of UN
arms sanctions were being sold to Somalia’s al-Shabaab extremists in
what was described as “high-level and systematic abuses in weapons and
ammunition management and distribution” (Reuters, February 13). A UN
arms embargo was placed on Somalia in 1992, but in the last year the
Somali government has been able to obtain once-restricted small arms and
other weapons such as rocket-propelled-grenades under a partial lifting
of the embargo designed to help fight al-Shabaab terrorists.
Among the observations contained in the report were the following:
- Shipments of weapons from Ethiopia, Djibouti and Uganda could not be accounted for.
- The Somali government cancelled several UN inspections of armories
- A
key presidential adviser from President Hassan Shaykh Mohamud’s own
Abgaal sub-clan was involved in planning weapons transfers to al-Shabaab
commander Shaykh Yusuf Isse “Kabukatukade,” another member of the
Abgaal.
- A government
minister from the Habr Gadir sub-clan made unauthorized weapons
purchases from a Gulf state that were transferred to private locations
in Mogadishu for use by a Habr Gadir clan militia.
- The Monitoring team photographed rifles sent to Somalia’s national army for sale in the Mogadishu arms market with their serial numbers filed off (Reuters, February13; AFP, February 16).
The easing of the Somali arms embargo is scheduled to end in March.
Though a final decision on its future has yet to be made, it seems
likely that the easing will remain in place until a new report on arms
violations is due in October. The Somali government is looking for a
complete removal of the embargo, allowing it to obtain heavy weapons and
sophisticated military materiel (Reuters, February 14). The Monitoring
Group has recommended either the full restoration of the embargo or a
heightened monitoring regime to accompany an extension of the partial
easement.
Somali security officials have complained that the UN monitors have
not provided them with any information regarding the alleged arms sales
to al-Shabaab or the alleged activities of Abgaal and Habr Gadir
insiders at the presidential palace arranging such arms sales. One
security official complained that the UN allegations could not be proven
without examining al-Shabaab’s arms: “If they haven’t inspected
al-Shabaab’s [arms], how are they arriving at the conclusion government
weapons are being sold to al-Shabaab. This is a dangerous and creative
position by the UN” (Suna Times/Waagacusub.net, February 18).
The head of Somalia’s military, General Dahir Aden Elmi “Indhaqarshe”
described the UN report as fabricated, false and without credibility,
though he acknowledged an investigation into how al-Shabaab obtains its
arms would be worthwhile, as the movement “does not get arms from the
sky.” However, the Somali army commander sees darker purposes behind the
work of the UN monitors: “The UN Monitoring Group want al-Shabaab to be
an endless project in order to gain funds from the world while they are
struggling hard to make Somalia’s government weak and nonfunctional”
(Raxanreeb, February 17).
Shady Dealings and Economic Challenges
Some light was shed on the murky financial dealings of Somalia’s
central government when central bank governor Yussur Abrar quit after
only seven weeks on the job following repeated efforts to force her to
approve dubious transactions benefiting members and friends of the
government. In her resignation letter to Somali President Hassan Shaykh
Mohamud, Abrar described corruption and constant government interference
in Central Bank operations”
From
the moment I was appointed, I have continuously been asked to sanction
deals and transactions that would contradict my personal values and
violate my fiduciary responsibility to the Somali people as head of the
nation's monetary authority… The message that I have received from
multiple parties is that I have to be flexible, that I don't understand
the Somali way, that I cannot go against your [Mohamud’s] wishes, and
that my own personal security would be at risk as a result (Suna Times,
October 30, 2013).
Turkey has been the main supporter
of Somali reconstruction, offering technical support, materials,
medical teams, hospitals, machinery and various other means of
assistance, including, apparently, lots of cash. A recent Reuters report
cited various officials within the Turkish and Somali governments that
Ankara had decided in December to stop its direct financial support to
Mogadishu, which took the form of $4.5 million in U.S. $100 dollar bills
transferred to the Somali central bank every month (Reuters, February
13). However, three days later, the Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a
statement saying that the payments were in line with procedure in light
of the fact Somalia has no banking services and that efforts were
“underway to provide budget support to the Somali Federal Government in
the year 2014” (
Hurriyet, February 16). The Turkish statement did
not outline what measures, if any, were taken to trace the end use of
these funds, but the potential for abuse is apparent in the absence of
verifiable banking and accounting procedures in Mogadishu.
Over two decades of social and political chaos mean that the
challenges to Somalia’s reconstruction efforts only begin with the
elimination of al-Shabaab:
- Somalia lacks trade
agreements with the West, lacks a proper certificatory regime and is not
a member of the World Trade Organization, making exports difficult. The
vast bulk of Somalia’s current exports consist of charcoal and
livestock heading to the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Yemen.
- Multiple
currencies are in circulation, some of them worthless. Monetary control
remains elusive with no new official bank-notes having been printed
since the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991, leading to a thriving black
market in currency.
- The
national government has begun signing oil and gas deals that are in
conflict with deals signed by regional administrations like Puntland
during the absence of an effective central government. (IRIN, February
14).
AMISOM Operations: Fighting Somalia’s War
The growing deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM), now 22,000 strong, includes troops from Uganda, Burundi,
Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia and Sierra Leone, as well as police from
Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Uganda.
While Ethiopia has continued to mount its own independent military
operations in regions of Somalia bordering Ethiopia since its general
withdrawal from Somalia in 2009, lack of coordination with AMISOM tended
to give al-Shabaab militants space to withdraw and operate elsewhere
until Ethiopian operations were concluded. It was therefore regarded as
good news when Ethiopia decided to integrate its Somali operations into
the AMISOM command in January [Dalsan Radio [Mogadishu], February 18).
Ethiopian forces followed their integration by deploying to Beledweyne
in Hiraan Region (where they are establishing a new base) and to Baidoa
in Bay Region, where they will be responsible for security operations in
the Bay, Bakool and Gedo Regions (Shabelle Media Network [Mogadishu],
January 28).
Uganda, which has roughly 8,000 troops in Somalia, has just
rotated in 1,600 fresh troops under Colonel William Bainomugisha
(Xinhua, February 14).
The Somali army is about to launch new operations in cooperation with
AMISOM forces to re-take Bardhere in the Juba River valley and the last
major port under al-Shabaab control, Barawe, which has also acted as an
important headquarters and training base for the militants since the
loss of Kismayo to Kenyan troops (Garowe Online, February 11;
Raxanreeb.com, February 11).
If successful, this new offensive would
divide Shabaab forces, significantly reduce the area under its control
and eliminate the movement’s last major source of revenue.
Unfortunately, rather than align for a final push against the militants,
some units of the Somali Army in the Lower Shabelle region have been
using their new arms to fight each other, based on clan allegiances
(Shabelle Media Network, January 28; January 30; Garowe Online, January
29).
According to AMISOM spokesman Colonel Ali Aden Humad (part of the
Djiboutian contingent of 960 troops deployed in Hiraan Region), the
offensive will suffer from a lack of naval forces (suggesting Kenya will
continue its policy of consolidating the area it has taken in southern
Somalia rather than move further north) and helicopters, which AMISOM
hopes will still arrive from some African Union country. Most important,
however, is the failure of the Somali Army to build up a force as large
as AMISOM that could not only participate in operations in a meaningful
way, but also undertake important garrison and consolidation duties
that must now be carried out by AMISOM forces.
Colonel Humad admitted it
was a mystery that the
national army
remained small despite years of international training programs and
funding: “AMISOM trained many Somali soldiers and equipped some. So, the
question is where have they gone? When we train them, we turn them over
to the government. So, where do they go? Where are they kept?” (Sabahi,
February 7).
Al-Shabaab Leaders Go to Ground
The continuing American drone campaign in Somalia is a major concern
for al-Shabaab, which has seen several senior members targeted and
killed in the last year.
The movement has responded with mass arrests of
suspected spies believed to help in the targeting, including a number
of al-Shabaab fighters.
The drone strikes have also damaged
communications within al-Shabaab and restricted the movements of its
leaders, with many senior members, including al-Shabaab leader Abdi
Godane, believing that contact with mobile communications equipment can
be tracked to target drone strikes. Like the Somali army, there is
infighting within al-Shabaab, which might divide into smaller groups if
Godane is killed. Having narrowly survived at least two recent attempts
on his life, Godane is reported to have even grown suspicious of his own
bodyguards in al-Shabaab’s Amniyat intelligence unit (Sabahi, February
7). Al-Shabaab has actually succeeded in intimidating a major Somali
telecommunications provider to cut internet service in southern Somalia
to prevent any type of communications with U.S. or AMISOM intelligence
groups (Suna Times, February 10). Last October, the United States began
deploying a number of military trainers and advisors in Somalia.
Conclusion
Despite disappearing arms and soldiers and the distractions provided
by incessant clan warfare, Somali Prime Minister Abdiweli Shaykh Ahmad
Muhammad says that, with international assistance, “The plan is to have
al-Shabaab out of the areas that they control by the end of 2014”
(Xinhua, February 19). Meanwhile, the insurgency continues to wreak
havoc across parts of central and southern Somalia. New UN figures
indicate that two million Somalis (of 10 million) suffer from food
insecurity, with 850,000 of those “in desperate need of food.” Most of
the latter have been displaced by fighting and insecurity (Independent,
February 19). In recent days, al-Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu and its
airport have been on the rise, including a February 13 suicide bomb that
killed seven just outside of Mogadishu’s Aden Adde airport, which also
serves as a secure base for AMISOM and foreign diplomats (Raxanreeb.com,
February 13; Reuters, February 13). Eliminating the Shabaab threat will
remain impossible no matter what degree of international assistance and
funding is provided so long as service in national and local
administrations in Somalia is seen as a means for personal
self-enrichment and the furtherance of clan interests at the expense of
national interests. Ultimately, the path Somalia will follow will depend
not on UN assistance or AU military deployments, but rather on the
interest Somalis themselves have in the national project.
Andrew McGregor is the Senior Editor of Global Terrorism Analysis
and the Director of Aberfoyle International Security, a Toronto-based
agency specializing in security issues related to the Islamic world.
Source: jamestown.org
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