Let’s Join Hands and Build the Nation

EDITORIAL

This should be a time that all Somalilanders, especially in the media industry, join hands together and build the nation by expounding in the truthful manner befitting and with the best salesmanship acumen possible thereof of the great potentialities available in the land as regards the mining sectors.

It was quite sinister that when the JNA cluster reports brought forth into the limelight that there was a great potential of Uranium mining in Somaliland, many of us could not help wondering or frowning in consternation as to why nobody got excited or jumped up saying Hoorah!

We are of course shocked that our people always keep mum about this wonderful industry to a point that might put to query their real feelings as far as patriotism is concerned.

The last time the major players in the industry from the whole world met in Australia, curiously, only this paper highlighted the importance of that convention hence at the same time shed light on the forth coming mining Indaba slated for the end of the week.

It is not worthwhile to indulging in what may be wrongly perceived as witch hunting but the more important issue now and today in particular is the putting onto 'The World Map' the true picture, true potential and true essence of Somaliland.

We support the minerals boss Hon. Duale in his endeavours and wish him well.

To be privy of the fact that he is to give a major speech on this subject at the right time and in the right place is of course hilariously wonderful.

On the other hand, to acknowledge the fact that Somalilanders are in the dark about the same subject because of either conscious (or unconscious) misdemeanor by way of dis-service to the people from the local media is really hurting as it is disgusting.

The best however the general populace can do is to sustain and maintain peaceful stability for there can never be apt and tangible investiture in an aura devoid of tranquility.

Meanwhile, when it comes to peace and stability, and knowing that there prevails such a scenario in the country, it is not concerting to read or see in our local media what we witnessed over the week as concerns our resettlement minister while in Djibouti.

As far as how right our memories may serve us, we are inclined to believe that SL refugees from neighbouring countries notably Djibouti and Ethiopia who happened in flee the country in the nineties have all come home to roost courtesy of governmental and UNHCR efforts.

It is our belief that batches of groups of families were gradually transported back to the country with the last one of them officially ended by the end/beginning of 2009/10.

What we hear now coming from Ali-ade camp is quite perturbing.

Before, there was a problem as for discerning refugees from IDPs. Now, we hear of refugees almost three years after the issue was reportedly brought to a close officially.

We believe that the way local press reported the issue meets more then the eyes (and ears) witnessed three years ago, such that it may be detrimental to the way we handle issues.

Were the last state/UNHCR reports wrong? If so, what is the exact nature of these refugees who could not come back after decade and a half of peaceful times?

What's our cut out policies on the issue?

Somaliland clan loyalty hampers women's political prospects

Female activist Suad Abdi hopes to shake up system by standing for parliament, which has one woman among 164 MPs

Suad Abdi, a founding member of the National Women's Network, Nagaad, is determined to run for office in Somaliland. Photograph: Cathy Scott/Progressio

the guardian

After 18 years as a social activist in Somaliland, Suad Abdi feels it is time to run for parliament. But she stands as much chance of winning a seat as a camel has of passing through the eye of a needle.
Women face few restrictions in Somaliland, the self-declared independent republic in the north-western corner of conflict-ridden Somalia. They can work, own property, and be vocal on social issues. But politics remains a man's world in the former British protectorate, an oasis of stability in the region.

There is only one woman among the 164 MPs and just three in the cabinet of 40. There is not a single female judge in Somaliland, although in 2012 four deputy attorney generals were appointed for the first time.

Abdi, a founding member of the National Women's Network, Nagaad, and country representative of the charity Progressio, attributes the lack of women in politics to the male-dominated clan system.

"Most political parties get support from clans, which decide who should become candidates and the clans don't put women forward. The clans want men because they know where the men's loyalties lie. When women marry, their loyalty changes to her husband's clan," says Abdi.

The clan a woman is born into tends to be reluctant to support her if she marries into another clan, yet her husband's clan may suspect she remains loyal to her own clan. Somaliland, home to 3.4 million people, consists of three main clans with eight sub-clans.

Abdi belongs to the Isaaq, Somaliland's largest clan. To shake up the republic's political order, Nagaad and other civil society groups are pushing for changes in the law that would set a 20% quota for women in parliament, in the runup to elections at the end of the year.

An attempt in 2007 was blocked by the House of Elders, the conservative upper chamber, and a bill in 2012 ran out of time. The president, Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud Silanyo, is on record as favouring quotas, but Abdi doubts he is 100% committed, while parliament, she says, thinks it is the responsibility of the government to take the initiative. Both favour a 10% quota. "The ball is between parliament and the president," says Abdi, who thinks 10% is too low.

Some question whether quotas are the solution to women's under-representation in politics, but Helen Clark, who was prime minister of New Zealand for three terms and now heads the UN Development Programme, has no such doubts. "I think if nothing else is working, you should have quotas," she said at the Women of the Year lecture in London last week.

"One of the things that improved representation here in the UK was Labour's women-only shortlists. Women are now much more numerous in the House of Commons. We reached the 30% representation in New Zealand, which is a millennium development goal, because we switched to proportional representation, partially, and parties had to put women on the party lists."

Quotas are increasingly common in sub-Saharan Africa. Since 2003, Rwanda has led the world in women's representation in a single or lower house of parliament. After the 2013 election, it had 64% women in its chamber of deputies. Nearly a dozen sub-Saharan countries top the world list, with more than 30% women in their parliaments. The first countries to adopt quotas in the 1990s and early 2000s were emerging from conflict such as Burundi, Eritrea, Mozambique and later, Angola.

Seeking a fresh political start after war, these countries adopted new constitutions and electoral laws that included quotas, Gretchen Bauer, professor and chair of political science at the University of Delaware, wrote on the Democracy in Africa blog last month. Pressure from national women's movements with support internationally and a liberation movement with a stated commitment to women's emancipation helped.

Other countries have since jumped on the bandwagon: Kenya, Lesotho, South Sudan, Sudan and Zimbabwe and for the first time, Francophone countries such as Burkina Faso, Cape Verde and Senegal. Somaliland has to look only next door to Somalia, which has 35 female MPs and a female foreign minister. The constitution has reserved 30% of seats for women in the lower house, although the actual numbers – 38 of 275 – total 14%. Still, that is much more than Somaliland, which prides itself as more politically advanced than Somalia.

Although Abdi is determined to run for office, she has no ambitions to become a minister. "When you become a government official you are accountable to the president and there is very little room for change," she says. "Leaders take criticism as personal attacks rather than constructive feedback, and you become a 'yes person'. I have my own views; I am not that kind of person."

Source: theguardian.com

Sterling Energy completes Odewayne additional farm-in

Sterling Energy subsidiary said the Government of Somaliland has consented to subsidiary Sterling Energy (East Africa) Ltd executing a Farmout Agreement for the Production Sharing Contract of the onshore Odewayne Block with Jacka Resources Somaliland Ltd.

Pursuant to the Farmout Agreement, Sterling has obtained an additional 15% interest in the PSC. Sterling already held a 10% interest in the PSC pursuant to a transaction with Petrosoma Limited that completed on 6 November 2013.

Following completion, the holders of the PSC are now: Genel Energy Somaliland Limited (Operator) 50%; Sterling Energy (East Africa) Limited 25%; Petrosoma Limited 10%; Jacka Resources Somaliland Limited 15%.

Story provided by StockMarketWire.com

Jacka Resources Somaliland receives government nod to farmout Odewayne Block

Jacka Resources Somaliland receives government nod to farmout Odewayne Block 

 

The PSC covers block SL6 and part of blocks SL7 and SL10. (Image source: Cfiesler/Flickr)

Jacka Resources Somaliland has received government approval for the completion of a farmout agreement with Sterling Energy (East Africa) for the Odewayne Block production sharing contract (PSC) onshore Somaliland

The Odewayne Block covers 22,000 sq km, located adjacent to the border with Ethiopia. The PSC covers block SL6 and part of blocks SL7 and SL10.

Upon the completion of the agreement, Jacka Resources Somaliland will be paid an aggregate amount of up to US$12mn by Sterling Energy upon the achievement of operational milestones linked to the minimum work programme in the third and fourth periods of the PSC, the company said.
Sterling Energy will take over a 15 per cent interest in the PSC from Jacka Resources Somaliland upon completion.

The partners in the PSC include operator Genel Energy Somaliland with a 50 per cent interest and Jacka Resources Somaliland carrying a 15 per cent share. Sterling Energy (East Africa) and Petrosoma own 25 per cent and 10 per cent interest, respectively.

Witness - The Mayor of Mogadishu

It is one of the world's toughest jobs, but one man is determined to make a difference in the war-torn Somali capital. Filmmaker: Robert Elliott

Somaliland attends indaba hoping to attract investors

Berbera International Port

By: Ilan Solomons

Somaliland will, for the first time, form part of the African Mining Ministerial Forum at the 2014 Investing in African Mining Indaba, which will take place at the Cape Town International Convention Centre from February 3 to 6.

“The indaba provides Somaliland with a platform to present the mining potential of the country and attract potential investors,” Somaliland Energy and Minerals Minister Hussein Abdi Dualeh tells Mining Weekly.

According to the Somaliland Sun, an independent online news portal on Somaliland and the Horn of Africa, Dualeh was invited to attend this year’s indaba by South African Mineral Resources Minister Susan Shabangu in August, last year, when both Ministers attended the Africa Down Under conference in Perth, Australia.

“Somaliland has had a stable democratic government for the past 22 years and is prodevelopment. We have adopted an open-door policy on mining investment in our country,” states Dualeh, adding that while there are no active commercial mining operations in Somaliland, there are a few small-scale artisanal mining operations.

However, he points out that Somaliland is largely virgin territory, which is “just waiting for prospective mining companies”.

Somaliland Energy and Minerals Minister Hussein Abdi Dualeh

Dualeh emphasises that Somaliland is a low security risk, compared with other parts of the Horn of Africa.

“Government is also offer- ing competitive fiscal terms to potential mining companies. Most of the potential mineralised zones are along Somaliland’s coastline. Therefore, small discoveries are likely to be commercially viable owing to the easy access mining companies will have to coastal export terminals,” he says.

In addition, he notes that Somaliland’s Berbera port, in the north-western Berbera district, is situated near large reserves of uranium, platinum, rare-earth metals, gold, copper, iron-ore, coal, manganese, tin and gemstones. The port also has the added advantage of having direct access to major global shipping lanes.

Indaba Address and Networking

Dualeh tells Mining Weekly that he will speak during the indaba’s African Mining Ministerial Forum about mining opportunities in Somaliland.

“The geological environment and indications of mineralisation are favourable for the discovery and development of several types of metallic minerals. Recent geological surveys indicate that Somaliland has abundant deposits of iron-ore and manganese, as well as platinum- bearing and gold-bearing veins,” he states.

Further, Dualeh notes that there are several known deposits of other minerals, such as tantalite, columbite, tin, feldspar, kaolin, kyanite, lead, quartz crystals and glass sand.

He adds that recent geological fieldwork along the Somaliland coast confirms the presence of high concentrations of titanium- and iron-bearing mineral sands.

Egal International Airport 

“My presentation is directed at investors, financiers and international mining exploration companies in Africa and worldwide and will provide industry stakeholders with insight about the great opportunities that exist in Somaliland,” Dualeh enthuses.

“Mining exploration and production in Somaliland will greatly enhance the African mining success story,” he notes.

“Events such as the indaba are a great forum for African mining industry executives, as well as professionals and representatives from resource-rich countries, to network and secure deals to develop African mining,” he concludes.

Edited by: Samantha Moolman

Source: miningweekly.com

Drone Warfare: More than 2,400 dead as Obama’s drone campaign marks five years

Obama has launched over 390 covert drone strikes in his first five years in office (Pete Souza/White House).

by Jack Serle

Five years ago, on January 23 2009, a CIA drone flattened a house in Pakistan’s tribal regions. It was the third day of Barack Obama’s presidency, and this was the new commander-in-chief’s first covert drone strike.

Initial reports said up to ten militants were killed, including foreign fighters and possibly a ‘high-value target’ – a successful first hit for the fledgling administration.

But reports of civilian casualties began to emerge. As later reports revealed, the strike was far from a success. At least nine civilians died, most of them from one family. There was one survivor, 14-year-old Fahim Qureshi, but with horrific injuries including shrapnel wounds in his stomach, a fractured skull and a lost eye, he was as much a victim as his dead relatives.

Fahim Qureshi, injured in the first Obama strike
(Vocativ/YouTube).

Later that day, the CIA attacked again – and levelled another house. It proved another mistake, this time one that killed between five and ten people, all civilians.

Obama was briefed on the civilian casualties almost immediately and was ‘understandably disturbed’, Newsweek reporter Daniel Klaidman later wrote. Three days earlier, in his inauguration address, Obama had told the world ‘that America is a friend of each nation, and every man, woman and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity.’

The Pakistani government also knew civilians had been killed in the strikes. A record of the strikes made by the local political administration and published by the Bureau last year listed nine civilians among the dead. But the government said nothing about this loss of life.

Yet despite this disastrous start the Obama administration markedly stepped up the use of drones. Since Obama’s inauguration in 2009, the CIA has launched 330 strikes on Pakistan – his predecessor, President George Bush, conducted 51 strikes in four years. And in Yemen, Obama has opened a new front in the secret drone war.

Lethal strikes
Across Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, the Obama administration has launched more than 390 drone strikes in the five years since the first attack that injured Qureshi – eight times as many as were launched in the entire Bush presidency. These strikes have killed more than 2,400 people, at least 273 of them reportedly civilians.

Although drone strikes under Obama’s presidency have killed nearly six times as many people as were killed under Bush, the casualty rate – the number of people killed on average in each strike – has dropped from eight to six under Obama. The civilian casualty rate has fallen too. Strikes during the Bush years killed nearly more than three civilians in each strike on average. This has halved under Obama (1.43 civilians per strike on average). In fact reported civilian casualties in Pakistan have fallen sharply since 2010, with no confirmed reports of civilian casualties in 2013.

The decline in civilian casualties could be because of reported improvements in drone and missile technology, rising tensions between Pakistan and the US over the drone campaign, and greater scrutiny of the covert drone campaign both at home and abroad.

Obama has sharply escalated the drone campaign in Pakistan.

The apparent change in targeting  is well demonstrated by comparing a strike carried out by the Bush administration in 2006 and one seven years later under Obama. On October 30 2006 at least 68 children were killed when CIA drones destroyed a madrassa – a religious school – in the Bajaur area of Pakistan’s tribal belt. The attack was reportedly targeting then-al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al Zawahiri. He escaped. On November 21 last year, drones again targeted a madrassa, this time in Hangu, outside the tribal regions. As many as 80 students were sleeping in the building. But the strike destroyed a specific portion of the building – just one or two rooms – and killed between six and nine people.

In Yemen, however, civilians continue to die in US drone strikes. Last year saw the highest civilian casualty rate since Obama first hit the country in 2009.

In recent years drones have come to dominate Obama’s war in Yemen as much as in Pakistan.

Drones were not the first weapon the administration turned to when it started to attack the country. On December 17 2009 a US Navy submarine launched a cluster bomb-laden cruise missile at a suspected militant camp in al Majala, southern Yemen.

The missile slammed into a hamlet hitting one of the poorest tribes in Yemen. Shrapnel and fire left at least 41 civilians dead, including at least 21 children and 12 women – five of them were pregnant. A week earlier President Obama had been awardedthe Nobel Peace Prize. He used his acceptance speech to defend the use of force at times as ‘not only necessary but morally justified’. He warned that ‘negotiations cannot convince al Qaeda’s leaders to lay down their arms’.

Strikes in Pakistan are carried out by the CIA. But in Yemen the CIA and the US military’s special forces unit, Joint Special Operations Command, have used various weapons including drones and conventional jets as well as cruise missiles to target al Qaeda militants.

However in recent years drones have come to dominate Obama’s war in Yemen as much as in Pakistan. President Bush ordered a single drone strike in Yemen, killing six people in 2002. Under Obama, the CIA and the Pentagon have launched at least 58 drone strikes on the country killing more than 281 people, including at least 24 reported civilians.

Opaque operations
The escalation in the drone war has happened with almost no official transparency from the White House. It took Obama three years to publicly mention his use of drones. In January 2012 he said ‘actually drones have not caused a huge number of civilian casualties’. He added: ‘For the most part they have been very precise, precision strikes against al Qaeda and affiliates.’

In this period Bureau records show drones reportedly killed at least 236 civilians – including 61 children. And according to a leaked CIA record of drone strikes, seen by the McClatchy news agency, the US often did not know who it was killing. In the year after September 2010 at least 265 of up to 482 people were recorded as the documents as killed by drones ‘were “assessed” as Afghan, Pakistani and unknown extremists’.

A letter written by Attorney General Eric Holder and leaked to NBC confirmed drones had killed four US citizens living abroad. US citizen Anwar al Awlaki died in a missile strike in Yemen on September 30 2011. His 16-year-old son Abdulrahman, who was born in Detroit, was killed in a separate strike two weeks later.

In April 2013 a leaked Department of Justice memo outlined the administration’s legal justification for such killings: the US has the right to kill US citizens if they pose an imminent threat, it said. It added that determining a citizen poses an imminent threat ‘does not require the United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on US persons and interests will take place in the immediate future’. Jameel Jaffer of the American Civil Liberties Union described the memo as a ‘chilling document’.

For the most part they have been very precise, precision strikes against al Qaeda and affiliates- President Obama

The following month President Obama made a major policy speech in which he codified the rules his administration must follow as it selects targets for drone strikes and special forces teams.

The rules are meant to constrain the use of drones. Obama said the US only carries out such attacks against individuals who pose ‘a continuing and imminent threat’ to US citizens, not ‘to punish individuals’. Obama acknowledged drone strikes had killed civilians, saying: ‘For me, and those in my chain of command, those deaths will haunt us as long as we live.’ And he added: ‘Before any strike is taken, there must be near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured – the highest standard we can set’.

However Bureau analysis shows more people were killed in Pakistan and Yemen in the six months after the speech than the six months before. And the casualty rate also rose over the same period.

In 2013, there were no confirmed civilian casualties in Pakistan – the first year of the drone campaign that this was the case. But in Yemen, the year ended with mass civilian casualties. On December 12, JSOC drones attacked a convoy taking a bride to her wedding. The attack destroyed several vehicles and flying shrapnel killed up to 15 civilians. It was the biggest single loss of civilian life from a US strike for more than a year. The Yemeni government initially claimed al Qaeda militants were killed. But the Yemeni government quickly negotiated reparations with the families of the victims, sending them $140,000 and 100 rifles. The US has not commented on the strike, but in an unprecedented move Washington is carrying out an investigation.

Source: thebureauinvestigates.com

Somaliland: “Turkey is an Honest Broker between Somaliland and Somalia” Amb Shinn

While the "Istanbul II Communiqué is essentially a framework agreement for continued talks between Somalia and Somaliland"

By Yusuf M Hasan

In acquiescing, in Istanbul to atrocities having been perpetrated the Somalia Federal Government-SFG only condemns the actions of the Siad Barre government but does not seem intended to apply to any subsequent government in Somalia.

This is how Ambassador David Shinn perceives the last point of the Istanbul II Communiqué which was the outcome of fifth phase of internationally sanctioned talks between Somaliland and Somalia the neigbouring countries whose voluntary union of 1960 was dissolved when Somaliland a former British protectorate re-declared its sovereignty in 1991 signed the nine points Istanbul II Communiqué on the 17th Jan 2014 after three days of talks hosted by the government of Turkey.

Amb David H. Shinn, Adjunct Professor, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University and a former US ambassador to Ethiopia (1996-99) and to Burkina Faso (1987-90) made the interpretations to the last point and others of the Istanbul II Communiqué which was the outcome of fifth phase of internationally sanctioned talks between Somaliland and Somalia during an exclusive interview with investigative journalists Mahmud Walaleye of Somalilandsun.

On the effectiveness of international companies investing in various sectors under contract from gthe government in Hargeisa as pertains to the from 1991 till now elusive quest for international recognition by Somaliland as a sovereign nation Amb Shinn urges the lobbying of "governments since they , Governments, not the private sector, make decisions on international recognition"

On the duration and ultimate outcome of the Somaliland Somalia talks that whose sixth phase is slated for 3rd March 2014 David Shinn who opinionates that "they are likely to take many months before there is success on tangible issues" is also positive on the impartiality of Turkey a country he thinks hasn't any ulterior motive but only is trying to play the role of a neutral and helpful mediator.

On the other hand the Horn analyst says the realization of a joint air traffic control body within 45 days from 18th Jan is the litmus test for continued dialogue between Somaliland and Somalia.

Read below the full verbatim excerpts of the interview with Amb David Shinn

Q: Is the Istanbul II Communiqué of 18 January 2014 a resounding victory for the people and government of Somaliland or Somalia?

A: I do not read too much into the Istanbul II Communiqué. It is essentially a framework agreement for negotiating teams from Somalia and Somaliland to continue talks. It is an expansion of the previous agreements at Chevening, Dubai, Ankara and Istanbul I. I conclude that it is a modest victory for both Somaliland and Somalia because it keeps both parties in dialogue.

Q: Does the agreement by the parties to resolve "all problems and disputes in an exclusively peaceful manner" end Puntland's claims on parts of Somaliland in a Somali or international court?

A: So long as the claims over parts of Somaliland are pursued peacefully, I don't see that this commitment ends the possibility of legal claims. If you are referring to international arbitration, however, both sides normally have to agree in advance to this arrangement.

Q: Does the statement that "we condemn all the atrocities committed by that regime [the military regime before 1991] throughout all Somali people particularly the people in Somaliland" place the blame on Somalia and give Somaliland grounds for future legal action?

A: I interpret this statement narrowly. It condemns the actions of the Siad Barre government but does not seem intended to apply to any subsequent government in Somalia.

Q: The Turkish Foreign Ministry in a press release welcomed "the Communiqué aiming at developing the relations between the governments of Somalia and Somaliland." Is there a bias or double standard in Turkey's policy towards either Somaliland or Somalia?

A: This statement by the Turkish Foreign Ministry seems even handed and appropriate. I think it is a reflection that Turkey is trying to play the role of a neutral and helpful mediator. I don't see any ulterior motive.

Q: Will engagement by more private foreign companies in Somaliland help Somaliland achieve international recognition?

A: While increased engagement by private foreign companies in Somaliland will aid economic development and give additional positive publicity to Somaliland, I doubt that this activity will have much impact on international recognition. Governments, not the private sector, make decisions on international recognition.

Q: How long do you predict these discussions will continue and, if ultimately futile, what can the international community do to intervene in the process?

A: These talks are likely to take many months before there is success on tangible issues. The parties agreed in Istanbul II to nominate members to an Air Traffic Control Board within 45 days. If this happens and an effective Air Traffic Control Board is created, it will be an important indication that tangible progress can be achieved. There need to be more steps like this that benefit both parties. This creates trust in Somalia and Somaliland. This kind of progress also gives more time to Somalia to reassert control over its territory.

The Recovery of Somalia: Check Back With Us Again Next Year

By Felipe Umaña
Failed States Index 2013

Somalia has been what many would describe as the quintessential “failed state” since the inception of the Failed States Index (FSI). Struggling with an occasionally unforgiving semi-arid topography in much of the North, widespread poverty as a result of tight competition for few resources, and mired by high levels of insecurity, an inchoate political system, and a disjointed sovereignty, Somalia has performed poorly in virtually every indicator measured on this and other global indices.

Somalia today represents a hollow shell of the state it was prior to the collapse of its government in 1991. Although the international community still recognizes Somalia as an integral nation, much of the North is beyond the governance of Mogadishu — the de facto independent Somaliland and neighboring Puntland make up a substantial chunk of the country’s territory. Today, an ailing post-transitional government headed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud continues to make strides to unite the autonomous northern regions and return Somalia to the peace and unity it once enjoyed. Because of these and other state pressures, it may come as little surprise that Somalia is once again at the top of the FSI for the sixth year in a row.

Overall trends seen in the last five years of the FSI underline many of Somalia’s destabilizing factors, though small improvements have been more plentiful than expected. Despite some gains in the 2011 FSI, last year saw the worsening again of many indicators as security and development declined and insurgency, crime, and lawlessness increased, even as al-Shabaab’s insurgency was largely quelled around the capital city. Somalia’s 2012 FSI score was actually the highest ever seen in the history of the FSI.

Notwithstanding, the 2013 FSI — which included the numerous advancements and improvements in security won in 2012 — sees Somalia improving in six indicators and actually earning its lowest score ever. The Security Apparatus and State Legitimacy indicators improved due to gains against al-Shabaab and a marked decrease in maritime piracy. The near-unanimous passing of a new Provisional Constitution, the inauguration of the Federal Parliament of Somalia, and a peaceful democratic presidential election have also demonstrated that a confident government could make strides even in uncertain times. Additionally, the Group Grievance score also improved, likely due to a decrease in discrimination and violence against religious and ethnic groups targeted by al-Shabaab.

Somalia’s informal economic networks have burgeoned in spite of poor security conditions and have hardened to these conditions over the years. Furthermore, although a worsening in the Human Flight indicator may mean lower numbers of skilled or educated individuals choosing to remain in Somalia, this outflow of talent has been partially offset by remittances sent from abroad that have in turn helped to keep Somalia’s economy afloat.

Somalia’s food security conditions also improved marginally in 2012, decreasing its Demographic Pressures score. The improvement is in part due to the rainy season in the Fall of 2012, which raised crop output and helped end Somalia’s 2011 famine; likewise, distribution of emergency food aid was better facilitated by stronger security around distribution sites. The situation in Somalia, however, remains far from stable. Indeed, though the rains were welcome to the success of crops, they also caused substantial damage and displaced over 20,000 people, thus impacting the Refugees and IDPs score to the highest it can possibly get on the FSI.

Somalia’s long-standing lack of any widely accepted central authority, combined with the existence of numerous disparate informal political institutions, particularly rural clans, lend to Somalia’s abysmally high Human Rights and Factionalized Elites scores. All in all, Somalia’s improvements on the FSI 2013 reflect a rise in government confidence, a slight movement towards increased economic activity, and a somewhat stronger security apparatus, though still small enough to get lost in Somalia’s multitude of other stresses.

Yet, what has persisted in making Somalia the epitome of what some regard as a “failed state”? For one, the manner in which the international community and President Mohamud’s government have window-dressed the country’s myriad of issues is problematic. The international community, for instance, has focused its assistance on sectors like humanitarian aid, health and sanitation, meaning aid has been funneled more towards the symptoms rather than the existing structures that encapsulate these very problems. Without the explicit targeting of Somalia’s existing economic, political, and social institutions, it is likely that Somalia will be unable to escape its ailments. This is critical as international actors must help Somalia develop and grow by allowing their existing institutions to bear the weight of reconstruction.

Moreover, by ignoring the peripheral informal institutions — rural tribes and clans, who usually view the central government with distrust — and focusing only on top-down forms of assistance, international donors risk alienating those in clan-aligned areas. The absence of a strong central government since 1991 has allowed for the development of informal, but stalwart, civil, religious, and customary structures in rural regions, which have the necessary authority to organize local Somalis. If both informal and formal institutions are not reconciled, in what President Mohamud called “a very delicate balance,” the crab-in-the-bucket mentality could prevail. This could pit clans and the federal government against each other and any progress towards greater unity could be lost.

Lastly, many viewed the London Conference on Somalia this past May as a diplomatic event dealing mainly with the symptoms in Somalia, not the more intractable, sensitive issues. Critics complained that the international community has no consensus on Somaliland vis-à-vis Somalia, for instance, and have sent mixed messages to both governments, excluding one from deliberations with the other. Others see Somalia’s government as ignoring reality, and still, many view the international community as blind to the actual nuts and bolts on the ground. Though international forums like these could prove useful in many ways, they must move away from obscuring the country’s pressures.

Instead of disguising Somalia’s problems, the international community should practice smart development. In by-passing typically corrupt aid-delivery structures, governments and private companies can work together and improve conditions on the ground. The international community can also move towards developing regions outside of Mogadishu, which has been the focal point for most assistance. Though this might be limited to areas not under insurgent control, parts of Puntland and the central state of Galmudug, as well as others, could benefit from increased international attention.

One of Somalia’s greatest problems has been the absence of a widely accepted political authority capable of bringing together Somalis under a common set of goals. Although President Mohamud’s administration has made some strides in the political arena, much more needs to be done to remove Somalia’s “failed state” moniker and help the country rebuild. This is critical not only on a moral ground, but also for global security. Somalia’s widespread lawlessness over the last decade has made the country a hotbed for jihadists and rampant criminality. Though efforts to stifle these threats on both land and sea have improved security conditions, for the most part, these and other issues stand to continue to threaten the stability of the country, Africa, and the international community as a whole. Tackling these crises will undoubtedly involve substantial costs for global actors. If they are not dealt with promptly and effectively, however, Somalia and the world will face greater costs in the future.

Base restriction lifted in Djibouti

U.S. troops wait for a transfer of authority ceremony to begin at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, on Dec. 14, 2013.

CHAD THOMPSON/U.S. AIR FORCE

A four-month order that restricted Djibouti-based troops to Camp Lemonnier was lifted on Friday, a spokesman said.

The decision to keep troops restricted to base was tied to a host of factors, such as the Westgate mall shooting rampage in Kenya in September, the military said.

“We’re constantly assessing our force protection posture, based on threats and intelligence,” said Lt. Col. Glen Roberts, a spokesman for Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa.

“We always have to be vigilant.”

Liberty means troops will now be able to make some short trips off post. But servicemembers are still required to take precautions, such as traveling in small groups.

“We’ve got some trips back on. Liberty is open. That’s good news for the men and women here,” Roberts said.

news@stripes.com