Somalia, remittances and unintended consequences: in conversation with Abdirashid Duale

Abdirashid Duale, Chief Executive of Dahabshiil,

by Edward Paice

This interview was conducted on 29 July 2013. The views expressed by Abdirashid Duale are not necessarily those of Africa Research Institute.

In May 2013, Barclays informed three-quarters of its clients in the money services business that it was closing their bank accounts. These included many handling overseas money transfers from diaspora communities in the UK to destinations as diverse as Somalia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Yemen, Sri Lanka and Poland. The International Association of Money Transfer Networks (IAMTN) says that up to 250 companies have been affected by the decision. Notice periods of no more than two months were given. Barclays justified its actions as a move to reduce the risk of being implicated in money-laundering or terrorist financing.

Edward Paice, director of Africa Research Institute, talked to Abdirashid Duale, chief executive of Dahabshiil, the largest money transfer business in the Horn of Africa, about the crucial importance of remittances to the Somali region and the potential impact if money transfers are reduced.

What will be the impact on Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland if money transfers from the UK are curtailed because Dahabshiil and other money transfer agencies are denied access to UK banking facilities?
I can honestly say it would be a recipe for disaster. It is estimated that remittances from the diaspora provide essential support to 40% of the Somali territories.  We have nearly 300 branches in the territories and thousands of agents servicing people in towns and rural areas. For them, money sent from relatives overseas is an economic lifeline. It is mainly spent on food, medicines and school fees – for the absolute basics, not for luxuries.

How substantial are these remittances?

More than US$1.2 billion is remitted to the Somali territories annually. This is over half of Somalia’s gross national income. So you can see the importance of remittances to the region. About US$500m is sent from the UK. At Dahabshiil’s branches in the UK, we process hundreds of thousands of transactions each year. The average transaction size is US$200-300.

Are people sending money to their relatives the only users of money transfer services to the Somali region?
Not at all. All the international aid agencies and NGOs use money transfer businesses (MTBs) to operate. They and their partners use us to pay staff, buy equipment and supplies, and make cash payments as part of social safety net programmes.  Oxfam, Save the Children, UNDP, CARE, BBC Media Action, Islamic humanitarian agencies – you name it, they use MTBs. Even Somali veterans who fought for the British in World War II, and their widows, are paid their grants through Dahabshiil.

A great many local charities and NGOs use MTBs to collect donations, pay salaries and buy things. At the weekend, when Olympic double gold medal winner Mo Farah protested about the imminent closure of the bank accounts of Somali MTBs, he highlighted the impact it would have on the activities of the Mo Farah Foundation.

Finally, I would mention the private sector. In Somaliland and Puntland, which have been relatively peaceful for many years, many people are investing in businesses and property. Now the same is happening in southern and central Somalia as well. Investors send their money through MTBs. This investment is crucially important for economic development in the region. Factories are being built. If I am a local businessman, how do I pay for building materials or diesel from the Gulf or Ethiopia? I use an MTB. International oil and mining companies are also prospecting in the region now and they too use MTBs. No business can operate without them.

NO SOMALI BANKING SYSTEM

Will the impact on the Somali region be different to that on other countries affected by the Barclays decision?

It will be much more acute. You see, in Somalia there is really no alternative to using MTBs. The whole banking infrastructure collapsed in the civil war in the early 1990s and it has never been rebuilt. So MTBs are the banking system now. That’s the way things are. Under the circumstances, which have been as difficult as you can imagine, it’s a system that works very well. The larger firms are very professional and efficient.

We also provide a service for the people who might not use banks even if they could – for the unbanked in the UK, Somalia and elsewhere. Forget the Somalia end of things for a moment. We fill a gap for diaspora communities.  If you go to a Dahabshiil location or agent in the UK – where there are more than 100,000 people of Somali origin – most open early in the morning and work up to 10 o’clock at night, 7 days a week. You deal with people you know, the service is fast and friendly, it is easy to use, and it is half the cost of the big Western money transfer companies.

If you go to any bank in the world and say you want to send money to Somalia or Somaliland, they cannot do it. The big global money transfer companies like Western Union can’t do it either. They have one branch in Hargeisa, in Somaliland. Western financial institutions have no links to the Somali banking network because there isn’t one.

If the Somali MTBs are forced to pack up in the UK and elsewhere, how would money get to the Horn of Africa?
Well, a great many people would simply stop sending money altogether. That is a certainty. For some, it has to be said, remittances are an unpopular obligation. They can be quite a burden. Any excuse to stop sending money would be seized upon by these people. If Somalis could no longer send remittances it is likely that the UK taxpayer and other foreign taxpayers would be asked for more aid. Will they willingly fill the gap caused by a drastic reduction of remittances? I don’t think so – not in the middle of a financial crisis in the West.

Others would resort to sending cash with unregulated couriers – which will be much more expensive and less reliable than the current system – and by illegal means.  Lorries and planes of cash would come in from neighbouring countries. Lots of small informal operators would fill the gap left by Dahabshiil and the regulated firms whose transaction records can be inspected. We have seen this before – when al-Barakat’s money transfer business was closed down in the USA after 9/11. As far as aid agencies and businesses are concerned, I have no idea how they could carry on operating as usual.

Basically, the transfer business would be driven underground. It would be much smaller and it would be exploited. I understand the global concern about money-laundering and terrorist financing by a small minority of MTBs, but bashing the regulated and reputable firms like Dahabshiil is not the way to counter this. When law enforcement agencies come to us, we always help them.

THE BARCLAYS DECISION
When did you first receive notice from Barclays that they would be closing your banking facilities with them?
Well, this is a funny thing. Barclays wrote to the board of Dahabshiil on May 8^th. That was exactly the same day that I had been asked by the Foreign Office to speak at their Somali “Trade and Investment Forum” during the UK-Somalia government conference. I was asked to speak about financing, and the role of the diaspora in development. There were members of the Barclays senior management also present at these events. They met Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, President of Somalia, and they were talking about the importance of developing the private sector in Somalia, and the opportunities. So were people from the Department for International Development (DFID).

The special role of money transfers in Somalia, the diaspora, and their importance to the country’s reconstruction was recognised by everyone at the conference, including the Prime Minister, David Cameron.  The recent World Bank and UK government-sponsored review of Somalia’s public financial management system even envisaged using Somali money service businesses to pay civil servants and the salaries of the security services.

Anyway, I gave my talk and the next day I received the termination letter from Barclays. They said that Dahabshiil did not meet their “amended eligibility criteria”.  That was that. We were given two months’ notice to find another bank and no opportunity to try and meet the new criteria – despite the fact that we had banked with them for 15 years and are an authorised payment institution (API) regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).

It was all very sudden. The process was not at all transparent and it came out of the blue. We’ve never been given the chance to understand what the game was about. There are many companies in our position.

Did anyone at the FCA or at Barclays voice any concerns about the way you conduct your business in the months preceding the decision to close your accounts?

No. If they had, our response would have been to comply with their requests no matter what the cost. Barclays has regularly inspected and monitored our systems, as have the regulatory and tax authorities. If any of them had demanded a special forensic audit, we would have done it gladly. If they had asked for changes in our “Know Your Customer” – or KYC – procedures, we would have made them. But we’ve never actually been reprimanded or accused of anything by Barclays or the regulators. Our business has been based on compliance.

It is ironic that a letter we received from Barclays on 20 June stated “please understand that the decision to exit our business relationship with you is not a negative reflection of your Anti-Money-Laundering standards, nor a belief that your business has unwittingly been a conduct for financial crime. It is, however, a commercial decision we have taken due to the risks of the sector in which we operate”.

Can’t Dahabshiil and others simply transfer their accounts to another bank?

Well, it is not so easy. Despite what was said at the UK-Somalia conference, Barclays has told us that the money transfer business is “at particular risk” of being used for money-laundering and financing terrorist activity. Other leading banks share this concern and have already withdrawn from the sector or are not taking on new clients. HSBC pulled out of the sector in February.

I understand that the new management at Barclays have problems like the LIBOR fixing scandal and the mis-selling scandals to deal with and they want to put all that behind them. But I also share their determination to prevent money-laundering and terrorist financing.

SOMALI REACTIONS AND IMPACT ON UK GOVERNMENT FOREIGN POLICY, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN OBJECTIVES

What will be the reaction of Somalis towards the British government if money transfers from the UK diminish markedly because MTBs can’t get anyone in the UK to provide them with banking facilities?

The situation in the Horn of Africa remains very fragile at the moment and very sensitive. When the system is under stress bad things emerge – like piracy and violent extremism. If money transfers stop, or are much less, there is a real danger that Somalis will start saying the West is against them. It may also increase sympathy for radicals who already fight and preach against the West and the people who say the West is in our country to destroy it, not to help.

If people become desperate as a result of economic hardship, they can become angry. Foreign governments need to understand the potential consequences of their banks effectively cutting off the money supply to Somalia at this crucial time. The presidents of Somalia and Somaliland have written to the UK government to make this clear. People in the Somali region don’t distinguish between the UK   government and British businesses.

As for Somalis in the UK, apart from job losses and closed businesses there would be a great sense of disillusionment. I know this for certain.

What is the solution? How can the transfer of remittances and investment to Somalia be maintained?

I can say one thing – shutting down the bank accounts of money transfer companies in two months, which was what we were told in May, is not the solution to anything. In June, we asked Barclays for a 6 month extension to enable us to explore our options properly. We were given one month more – until 12 August. Today we received a second extension to the end of September.

The UK government needs to take the lead. It has significant foreign policy involvement in Somalia. It is pumping DFID money into Somalia and in the UK there are many Somali businesses and voters. I can’t speak for Bangladesh and other countries affected, but I am sure the UK government has interests and objectives in them as well.

The British government has often called on Somalis to help themselves. This is what we are determined to do. But we can’t rebuild everything if the key component of the region’s economic infrastructure is knocked out. That is a fact.

If everyone gets together – government, banks, money service businesses, lawyers and other experts – and there is real consultation, I am sure that a solution can be found. This needs to happen quickly, or at least an interim solution must happen quickly, because if everyone just talks for 2 years it will be too late. Where will that leave the UK government and other foreign governments, let alone Somalis?

Somali money matters – an update on the remittances saga

Edward Paice is director of Africa Research Institute

by Edward Paice

 

Since the announcement by Barclays in May 2013 that it intended to close the bank accounts of all but 19 of its 165 clients in the remittance transfer business, following the earlier withdrawal by other banks from the sector, there has been significant “behind the scenes” political wrangling and negotiation. Justine Greening, Secretary of State for International Development, has described the issue as “one of the most important things I’ve dealt with in my political career”.

In the absence of any formal banking system, money transfer operators (MTO) are a financial lifeline for the Somali regions. An injunction prohibiting Barclays from closing the accounts of the largest Somali money transfer operator (MTO) means that this company is able to continue operations for the time being. The UK Department for International Development has chaired a series of private meetings and consultations with the aim of establishing a “safer corridor” for remittances to Somalia in partnership with existing MTOs. The objective is to implement this within 12 months. In the meantime, the future of the US$1.2 billion annual remittance flow to the region hangs in the balance.

An effective and sustainable solution will require concerted political will and co-operation at the highest level – and an appreciation of the unique nature of the Somali financial market.

Misguided advice

In response to sustained pressure from Somali campaigners, MPs and influential commentatorsabout the dire consequences of any disruption of remittances to the Somali regions, the UK government released a ministerial statement on 10 October 2013. It promised an Action Group on Cross Border Remittances and a pilot project to “help secure remittance channels to Somalia”.

Whilst this statement of intent was welcomed, a “Factsheet on Somali remittances” circulated by the government just a week later contained a number of statements which prompted renewed concern that the government was misinformed on certain key issues.

The most contentious pieces of advice to the diaspora were as follows:

1. “To use one of the many small Somali remittance companies which do not need a bank account”.

This statement showed no appreciation of the close ties between remitters and specific remittance companies (often based on clan or regional links but also service-related). A subsequent claim by government that “most [my italics] Somali remittances are made through small scale businesses that operate in cash” was derided.

The advice was particularly perplexing given that concerns about money-laundering and terrorism financing had been used by Barclays, and other banks before it, to justify bank account closures. The suggestion that Somalis who had previously used operators regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and HM Revenue & Customs should now resort to using wholly unregulated – and invariably more expensive – operators was not well received.

2. “To use mobile payments, which are widely used in Somalia, and can be sent from the UK”.

The mobile money market is developing rapidly in the Somali regions, but it is still very much in its infancy and concentrated in certain urban areas. The claim that the payment of bills by mobile money is higher in Somalia than anywhere else in the world – a claim often cited by government – appears to have its origins in a World Bank database which treated findings from a 2011 survey of 1000 people in the city of Hargeisa, capital of Somaliland, as if they were representative of all Somalia. Moreover, the same database claims that 31% of Somalis have an account with a formal financial institution, somewhat implausible in a region virtually devoid of such institutions.

Dahabshiil injunction against Barclays – and action

At a court hearing on 15 and 16 October, Dahabshiil sought an injunction against Barclays for “abuse of market dominance”. Mr. Justice Henderson concluded that there were grounds for a full trial. This meant that Dahabshiil could continue to continue to bank with Barclays until the trial, currently scheduled for October 2014, although Barclays have successfully sought an appeal against the injunction ruling.

ALSO READ - Somalia, remittances and unintended consequences: in conversation with Abdirashid Duale 

After the injunction, press comment understandably dwindled, awaiting developments, while campaigners openly questioned whether the government was prepared to take decisive action. However, the signal importance of remittance transfers to the Somali region – and the singularity of a market with no established banking system – has now been accepted. In early January 2014, DFID announced details about the Action Group on Remittances and its Working Group on Safer Corridors.

The Working Group on Safer Corridors is responsible for implementing, within 12 months, a reliable and secure remittances channel to the Somali regions. It will have an advisory group comprising members of the Somali Money Services Association (SOMSA), and representatives of Somali community associations, the British Bankers Association (BBA), NGOs active in the region, the Treasury, HMRC, the Home Office, the World Bank and the FCA will also be involved. The implementation group will comprise the World Bank, Financial Sector Deepening Africa (FSDA), and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP).

Cause for concern

The UK government’s renewed commitment to finding a solution is to be welcomed. However, there are no proposals on the table to counter the serious handicap for Somali MTOs of having had their bank accounts closed by Barclays, or others before them.

DFID has emphasised that the safer corridor will “protect the commercial interests of existing players” in the Somali remittance transfer market. The intention is to “strengthen existing channels”, thereby “giving banks and others comfort on regulatory matters” and ensuring that banks “get back into this market”. Yet the absence of banking facilities jeopardises the survival of larger Somali MTOs.

In short, there is a real risk that by the time a solution is found, the “existing players” will be counted on fewer than the fingers of one hand – a situation that is bad for competition and bad for regional “reach”, as many MTOs have predominantly local or clan presence.

Carrot and stick

The official line is that the UK government cannot force a bank, even one substantially owned by the taxpayer, to provide banking facilities to Somali – or any other – MTOs. Similarly, providing a bank with an indemnity against, for example, a fine for money-laundering if it provides the required banking facilities is not an option due to the risks to the UK taxpayer.  This may be technically correct, but it is  disingenuous.

UK banks are routinely forced, or rather “persuaded”, by government with the use of stick or carrot (or a combination of the two). One need look no further than the Help to Buy scheme, through which the UK Treasury has provided (taxpayer-funded) guarantees to the tune of up to £3.5 billion to induce banks to provide 95% mortgages in a property market which most commentators consider “frothy”.

Persuasion or inducement, for which there are precedents, or possibly even setting up a UK remittances bank operated by an existing bank (with the necessary indemnities, of course), need to be revisited as a matter of extreme urgency.

A prize for the taking

Last week Justine Greening MP, Secretary of State for International Development, met with representatives of a number of UK Somali communities in Ealing Town Hall. “It’s one of the most important things I’ve dealt with in my political career”, she told the audience. The minister also sought to give reassurance that “the best experts on the planet are working on a solution”.

There are a great many “cooks” toiling on the Action Group on Remittances and Working Groups “broth”, representing very different – and sometimes diametrically opposed – interests and objectives. Ensuring that some cooks do not spoil the broth will be a key priority for the Action Group’s independent chairman and senior ministers. But there is a prize for the taking. According to Justine Greening, if the various partners can make a safer corridor for Somali remittances work then “it will be adopted everywhere”.

All over the globe, money transfer companies – and the banks through which they operate – are on the back foot, buffeted by regulatory headwinds. Yet no one disputes the vital importance of remittances to developing countries. This will be even greater as the US Federal Reserve starts to apply the brakes, however carefully, to its money stimulus programme. A resolution must be found in the interests of the global economy, and for humanitarian reasons.

Ultimately, this is a straightforward test of political will (of the cross-party variety). Justine Greening has assured UK Somalis that the Prime Minister has personally voiced his recognition that a rapid solution to this situation is “massively important”. Any solution, however, will require politicians of sufficient rank and determination to insist on one being found.

Meanwhile, Somalis from all walks of life and countries continue to voice their deeply-felt concerns about the consequences if remittance flows to the Somali region diminish, or are choked.  After all, remittances are not only a lifeline for many individuals and families but the engine of the region’s economy – the prime source of cash that can’t be embezzled or “diverted”. As such, it is worth remembering, they are also an essential pillar of the £1.5 billion “New Deal for Somalia” announced by donors in September 2013.

Edward Paice is director of Africa Research Institute

The Somali Remittances Saga: New blog & parliamentary debate

Ahead of a Westminster Hall debate on Wednesday, ARI's Director Edward Paice gives a blow-by-blow account of the UK government's efforts to protect remittance flows to the Somali regions.

Since Barclays announced in May 2013 that it intended to close the bank accounts of all but 19 of its 165 clients in the remittance transfer business, there has been significant “behind the scenes” political wrangling and negotiation. UK International Development Secretary Justine Greening described the issue as: “one of the most important things I’ve dealt with in my political career”. With no formal banking system, money transfer operators are a financial lifeline for the Somali regions. An injunction prohibiting Barclays from closing the accounts of the largest Somali money transfer operator means it can continue operations for the time being. The Department for International Development has run a series of private meetings and consultations with the aim of establishing a “safer corridor” for remittances to Somalia, together with existing money transfer operators – within a year. Meanwhile, the $1.2 billion annual remittance flow to the region is under threat. A sustainable solution will require political will at the highest level together with an appreciation of the unique nature of the Somali financial market. For the full article, visit our blog.     22nd January: UK parliamentary debate This Wednesday, Kevin Brennan, MP for Cardiff West, will lead a Westminster Hall debate on 'Government steps to support money transfer accounts and the remittance sector'. This week's session follows on from a July 2013 debate led by Rushanara Ali MP, the text of which can be found here. The debate starts at 9:30am and can be watched online live here.    Somalia, remittances & unintended consequences Last July, Edward Paice talked to Abdirashid Duale, chief executive of Dahabshiil, the largest money transfer business in the Horn of Africa, about the crucial importance of remittances to the Somali region and the potential impact if money transfers are reduced. You can read the interview here.   In addition to remittances, we are also focusing on tax and urban issues in the coming months, please visit our website for further information.  follow on Twitter | friend on Facebook | forward to a friend  Copyright © 2014 Africa Research Institute, All rights reserved. Africa Research Institute mailing list Our mailing address is: 55 Tufton St, London, SW1P 3QL

Apache helicopters set to be ungrounded next month

By Elaine Hou

Taipei - Taiwan is set to lift the grounding of its 12 AH-64E Apache attack helicopters in February, more than a month after grounding the aircraft following a failure in the same model reported by the U.S. Army, a source in Taiwan's military said Monday.

The grounding of the Apaches is set to be lifted in mid-February once they have received new main transmission boxes, allowing Army Aviation Special Forces pilots to fly the helicopters, according to the source who asked not to be named.

The U.S. Army has also started replacing the main transmission boxes on its helicopters, the source said.

The main transmission boxes for the next three batches of helicopters set for delivery will be removed for further checks before they are shipped from the U.S., the source said.

Those shipments have been scheduled for March, May and July.

Taiwan grounded its first two batches of Apaches for safety checks after receiving word from the U.S. mid-December of a main transmission failure in one of the Apache AH-64Es in service in the U.S. Army.

No problems have been found in the helicopters already in Taiwan, however, the source said.

Though the helicopters have been grounded, ground and simulation training have continued, the source added.

Taiwan received its first batch of six Apache helicopters to a base in Tainan last November, followed by a second batch in early January.

The aircraft are part of a 30-helicopter package purchased from the United States at a cost of more than US$2 billion. The model E is the latest in the Apache attack helicopter series.

The U.S. and Taiwan are the only two countries that have used the latest Apache helicopter model so far. 

Source: focustaiwan.tw

Mutuality in Pak-China relationship

Dr Muhammad Khan

China will give you (Pakistan) every support and assistance and by helping you, we have to help ourselves.” This was stated by Chinese Prime Minister Mr Li Kegiang on May 23, 2013, during his visit to Pakistan. An analysis of this statement would reveal that, Chinese Prime has acknowledged the geopolitical location and strategic significance of Pakistan for the China. Besides, this statement is indeed the recognition of such a reality, which very less scholars and strategists have debated on, while describing the unyielding foundation and continuity thereafter of the Pak-China relationship. 

In fact, during the formative years of People’s Republic of China (PRC), Pakistan was instrumentalto global recognition of China, where, Communist won over the Nationalists and world community was more biased towards later. So much so, the Republic of China (Taiwan) was allowed to maintain the status of the successor state of primitive China until October 1971. Pakistan along with some other sympathizers of China had to lobby a lot in the Western world and elsewhere among the Muslim world for giving PRC, the actual status of successor state of old China, being the mainland.

Later, PRC was given the status of permanent members of United Nations Security Council in November 1971. It was Nixon era in United States and Pakistan undertook a secret diplomacy for bridging the wide gulf between US and PRC. This new era of bilateral relationship brought these two countries closer together in the global politics, thus paving the way for Chine permanentmembership of UNSC. Since 1971 ROC is out of UN membership and hopefully it will be united back to its parent country, the People’s Republic of China. Upon detonation of its nuclear device in 1964, China becomes part of declared nuclear states and later a signatory of NPT in 1968. 

Then after Indo-China War-1962, China remained in a state of constant threat, especially in the wake of US and Western military and financial support to India. Since India was a rival state of Pakistan, therefore major focus of Pakistani defence has been towards India. In a way, India was militarily engaged by Pakistan throughout, practically freeing China from an active Indian threat and a likely military aggression. This does not mean that Pakistan has been fighting with India as a proxy to China; however, Indo-Pak military engagement throughout the history has minimized the active military threats for China. Furthermore, Pakistan had a say in the Muslim world, therefore, played an important role in bringing together China and fifty-seven countries Muslim world. Today China enjoys an excellent relationship with all Muslim countries. 

Since Pakistan played a vital role in bringing together the major power houses of world and China, therefore, Chinese Premier, Mr LI Kegiang was perhaps acknowledging the Pakistani contributions towards China. Pakistan is determined to continue these relations in the days to come. Since the international relation is based on mutuality, therefore, China has been reciprocating the Pakistani assistance to this giant in the subsequent years. Being a Permanent member of the UNSC, China has been supporting the Pakistani view point at the international level. Otherwise, there has been unanimity in the views of Pakistan and China on most of the regional and global issues. 

China considered Kashmir dispute as the main hurdle in the regional prosperity of South Asia, especially; Pakistan and India. It has been emphasizing both countries for the resolution of the issue as per the wishes of its people and in accordance with the UN resolutions. China has been supporting the Pakistani stance on Kashmir and condemned the Indian obstinacy, which hindered its resolution after sixty-six years. On the issue of terrorism, Pakistan and China have similar views. Both consider this menace as the worst enemies of their people and countries. Pakistan has a clear position that, East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is a terrorist organization and China has a clear stance that TTP is terrorist organization, being financed and harboured by anti-Pakistan forces.

Contrary to Pakistan’s Western allies, China has always valued the Pakistani contributions during the war against terror. Indeed, China “respects the anti-terrorism strategy developed and implemented by the Pakistani side in light of its own conditions. …China expresses its appreciation and continued willingness to help Pakistan build up counter-terrorism capacity.” China even advised the global community not to have double standards and discriminatory approach in the recognition of Pakistani sacrifices during this global campaign. It is worth mentioning that Pakistan lost 7500 security forces personnel in last twelve years, compare to only 3400 soldiers of forty-eight members ISAF in Afghanistan. The economic losses are over $110 billion. Being the immediate neighbours, Pakistan and China desire a stable and peaceful Afghanistan in the post 2014 scenario, once NATO and US forces leave Afghanistan. China and Pakistan support for the ‘Afghan-owned and Afghan-led’ peace and reconciliation process, and would like the regionalcountries and the international community to help Afghanistan achieve peace, stability andsecurity.” 

Besides having cooperation in many developmental projects in Pakistan, China is providing all out assistance to Pakistan in the field of ‘civil nuclear technology. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif inaugurated two Chinese sponsored nuclear power projects of 1100 MW each in Karachi on November 26, 2013. Earlier, China has helped Pakistan in establishing four civil nuclear power plants (including two under construction) at Chasma. China rejected the concern of US and its allies in this Pak-China civil nuclear cooperation. 

China has assured Pakistan that; it would “consolidate its friendship with Pakistan no matter how the international situation developed.” Pakistan otherwise considers its ‘friendship with China as the cornerstone’ of its foreign policy. In the rapidly changing geo-strategic and securityenvironment, both countries are likely to face many regional and global challenges. The need of the hour is that, leadership of both countries should “work in close collaboration for further cementing the traditional Sino-Pak relationship especially the prospects of an economic corridor; a project which would bring economic prosperity for Pakistan and underdeveloped western autonomous region of China. In the wordings of Chinese Premier Li, “To be friends forever is the cherished desire of both nations.”

— The writer is Islamabad-based IR analyst.

What it takes to make a new state

The road to statehood is a complicated process. In this edition of U-talk, Kate in Dublin asked: “Basically it takes three elements to create a new country – a permanent population, a defined territory and a government. But in legal terms how does a nation become an independent state?”

Doctor of Political Science and Honorary Consul of Kosovo, Odile Perrot, responded: “We generally say that these three elements – people, government and territory – constitute a state. But these elements alone are not sufficient to account for the dynamics of the creation of a state. To become independent, a state needs other countries’ recognition.

“Let’s look at South Ossetia, Abkhazia or the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus for instance. These three countries proclaimed their independence, but only a very small number of states have recognised their independence. So the international effectiveness of these three countries is almost zero.

“Such recognition is not immediately given, it is a long and complex process. It is a long process because newly-created states have to start diplomatic relations – discussions with representatives of other countries – in order to be able, ultimately, to exchange letters with countries which recognise each other.

“It is also a complex process because there are international and regional political issues at stake. We saw this with the independence of South Sudan in 2011, with the independence of Montenegro in 2006 and also with Kosovo, which declared its independence in February 2008. So in the end, the definition of a state is as much political as legal.

“If recognition by other states is essential, it also allows the new state – under certain conditions of majority of course – to become a member of international and regional organisations.

“However, membership of international organisations, such as the United Nations, does not automatically determine the nature of a state. In fact some states, such as Taiwan, are not members of the UN even though they are unofficially treated as states by a part of the international community.

“To conclude, a state is not just a set of rules, a set of institutions, it is also a question of practice. The practice of sovereignty at home and vis-à-vis other states.”

Click here to watch video news of this news: What it takes to make a new state | euronews, u talk

Source: euronews.com

Baku slams U.S. legislator’s proposal to recognize "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic"

MP Mike Gatto

By Sara Rajabova

Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry spokesman Elman Abdullayev has slammed California State Legislature member Mike Gatto for his proposal for recognizing the independence of the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state.

Gatto submitted the proposal to California State Legislature on January 6.

Abdullayev strongly criticized the Armenian lobby in the United States in this regard.

Commenting on the issue, Abdullayev told local media that the federal government, not the states determine the foreign policy of the United States.

Abdullayev said the job of lawmakers is to defend the laws, human rights, norms and principles of the international law.

He noted that Mike Gatto, who submitted the resolution, does not hide that he works together with the Armenian lobby, he has announced it on his website.

"Human values and human rights should be above all, they should not be sacrificed for personal and political interests. Mike Gatto's country supports Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. The U.S. is one of the members of the UN Security Council, which condemns the occupation of Azerbaijani territories," Abdullayev said.

He said Gatto turns a blind eye to all these facts and acts following the directives of the Armenian lobby, which shows that he is biased and pursues his own interests.

Gatto's resolution, which recognizes the occupied Nagorno Karabakh as a "sovereign state", refers to the rights of people to self-determination. However, it doesn't indicate the current regime of the so-called "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic" was established through the military occupation of the Azerbaijani territory and ethnic cleansing by the Armenian armed forces.

The Armenian media said Gatto works for closely with the Armenian organizations in the United States on legislative initiatives. He was also one of the authors of the resolution calling for the recognition of the so-called "Armenian genocide".

Turkic Diaspora of America has already opposed such a legislative initiative. Pax Turcica organization noted the fact that as a result of occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent regions by Armenian armed forces in 1991-1994, more than 30,000 people was killed and over one million people became refugees and internally displaced persons.

The City Council of Highland in California adopted in November 2013 two proclamations, "recognizing the independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic" and "establishing a sister city relationship with the city of Berdzor in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic."

Armenia occupied over 20 percent of Azerbaijan's internationally recognized territory, including Nagorno-Karabakh and seven adjacent regions, after laying territorial claims against its South Caucasus neighbor that caused a brutal war in the early 1990s. Long-standing efforts by US, Russian and French mediators have been largely fruitless so far.

As a result of the military aggression of Armenia, over 20,000 Azerbaijanis were killed, 4,866 are reported missing and almost 100,000 were injured, and 50,000 were disabled.

The UN Security Council has passed four resolutions on Armenian withdrawal from the Azerbaijani territory, but they have not been enforced to this day.

Source: azernews.az