Unexpected Victory for Western Sahara Campaigners at the European Parliament

What is the significance of MEPs decision to end the EU-Morocco fisheries agreement?

Fish nor foul? European vessels will no longer fish in Western Saharan waters.

'
By Stefan Simanowitz

December last year Sara Eckymans, international coordinator of Western Sahara Resource Watch, sat intently in the public gallery at back of the voluminous semi-circular auditorium of the European Parliament. Beside her a group of bored school children fidgeted. In front of her, a full house of MEPs attending a plenary session were asked to vote on an proposal to extend the EU fisheries agreement with Morocco, allowing European vessels to continue fishing the waters off occupied Western Sahara. The MEPs pressed their buttons and within seconds the vote appeared on screens around the hall. Eckymans, who has campaigned on the issue for over six years, jotted down the figures. Votes for: 296. Votes against: 326. Abstentions: 58. The auditorium erupted with applause. Ecykman’s pen and papers fell to the floor. Tears coursed down her cheeks. “I’m sorry” she explained to the bemused teacher sat beside her, “something historic has just happened".

Economic stimulus, real change?

The decision was indeed historic. The Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and Morocco was signed in 2005 and controversially granted licences to 119 EU vessels – predominantly Spanish – to fish in Morocco's Atlantic waters.

However, the agreement failed to distinguish between the waters of Morocco and those of Western Sahara, meaning that EU vessels were fishing the waters off Western Sahara’s 1,100-kilometre coastline. The agreement officially expired at the end of February and a one-year extension to the agreement was approved by a small majority in the Council of Ministers in March. However, pressure for the Parliament to reject the extension had been building.

In November, both the parliament’s Budget Committee and the Development Committee recommended that the fisheries agreement be stopped and the 2010 publication of a confidential legal opinion showed that the European Parliament’s Legal Service viewed the fishing by European vessels in Western Sahara’s waters to be in violation of international law.

This view supported that of the UN Legal Adviser, Hans Corell, whose 2002 legal opinion for the UN Security Council on Western Sahara’s natural resources made clear that exploitation of the territory’s resources could only be considered legal if the Saharawi population were consulted and benefited. This consultation had not taken place and according to human rights activist Aminatou Haidar speaking earlier this year, “[t]he Saharawi do not benefit at all from this agreement. Instead it only intensifies their oppression”.

Legal landmark

In response to last week’s MEP’s decision, Morocco ordered foreign fishing boats operating in its waters to leave immediately. Despite the fact that the annual loss of the 36 million Euros $47 million) paid by the EU for fishing rights will have little impact on Morocco, and that the EU decision was perhaps motivated more by the agreement’s poor profitability rather than considerations of international legality, the decision is nevertheless politically important. After nearly 36 years of Moroccan occupation and over 20 years of waiting for a promised referendum on self-determination, the people of Western Sahara have had precious few victories on the international political stage. According to Elarbi Messaoud, Secretary of the collective of Saharawi Human Rights Defenders (CODESA), “the main significance of this decision by the European Parliament lies in the acknowledgement of the unresolved legal status of the territory”.

Western Sahara is classified by the UN as a non-self-governing territory, a term used to describe a nation whose people are yet to attain a full level of self-government. Under General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), the natural resources of Western Sahara should belong to the Saharawi people. In 2002, the UN Legal Counsel Hans Correll declared that exploration and exploitation activities are being carried out “in violation of the principles of international law applicable to mineral resource activities in Non-Self-Governing-Territories”. General Assembly Resolution 63/102 of 2008, called on Member States to take:

“Legislative, administrative or other measures in respect of their nationals and the bodies corporate under their jurisdiction that own and operate enterprises in the Non-Self-Governing Territories that are detrimental to the interests of the inhabitants of those Territories, in order to put an end to those enterprises”.

This has not been done and despite many attempts to break the long-running diplomatic stalemate, progress towards a resolution of the conflict has been tortuously slow.

For Sara Eyckmans the result came as a shock. “Not a single hair on my head was expecting this result” she admits. “I cannot find the words to describe the emotions of Saharawi I spoke with on the phone following the vote: they were crying out of sheer joy and amazement”.

From the coastal towns in Western Sahara, to the dusty desert refugee camps in Algeria, Saharawi were holding impromptu celebrations. But for Elarbi Messaoud celebrations were short lived: “The Japanese, Russians are still fishing our waters,” he says. “Celebrations will never be complete while our right to self-determination remains confiscated, human rights violations increase every day and dozens of Saharawi human rights defenders languish in prison.”

Think Africa Press welcomes inquiries regarding the republication of its articles. If you would like to republish this or any other article for re-print, syndication or educational purposes, please contact:editor@thinkafricapress.com

Occupied and Exploited: Taking Western Sahara's Resources

International action is needed if Sahrawis are to benefit from their own minerals, oil and fishing resources.

Look across the Western Sahara. Photograph by Michele Benericetti.

A freighter called the Ultra Bellambi docked in Vancouver, on Canada’s west coast, carrying a $10 million shipment of phosphate. It will have carried the load all the way from the Western Sahara’s Bou Craa mines, where it was extracted by the Moroccan company OCP, before being purchased by the Canadian firm Agrium. Agrium completed a major deal for the phosphate earlier this month, and such exports are set to continue until at least 2020.

“We believe this agreement signifies the start of a significant partnership between Agrium and OCP, offering clear benefits to both parties,” president and CEO of Agrium, Mike Watson, said in a statement on the transaction.

Morocco is also set to benefit, with phosphate mining representing around a quarter of the value of the nation’s exports.

However, not everyone is happy with the deal. The Polisario Front, a Sahrawi liberation movement campaigning for independence for Western Sahara, claims the agreement is illegal and that Agrium is helping to prop up Morocco’s control of the region.

“The Sahrawi people emphatically do not consent to the development and export of their natural resources from the occupied part of their territory,” said representatives. “We do not have the benefit of those resources, the revenues from which go to sustain the occupation.”

The occupied desert

The marginalisation of Western Sahara stretches back several decades. It was once a Spanish colony called Spanish Sahara and became the site of one of the United Nation's failed decolonisation plans. Long after its neighbours Morocco and Mauritania gained independence in 1956 and 1960 respectively, the territory remained under colonial administration.

It was only by the 1970s that Spain was finally realising its days of controlling a large slice of the Sahara were numbered. Spain recognised the value of Western Sahara's phosphate resources and the lucrative fishing potential of its long Atlantic coastline, but pressure was building for independence.

In November 1975, Spain convened a meeting of Moroccan, Mauritanian, and Spanish officials in Madrid, which concluded in the Madrid Accords. The agreement saw Western Sahara divided between Morocco and Mauritania, with the former receiving the majority of the land and resources. In exchange, Spain retained some economic interests and the rights to fish the territory's waters.

Spain formally exited Western Sahara in 1976, and internal resistance forced Mauritania out by 1979, but Morocco had no intention of submitting to the Sahrawi independence movement. A 16-year guerrilla war ensued between the Polisario Front, which declared an independent Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), and the Moroccan armed forces backed by France and the United States.

By the time a ceasefire was reached in 1991, one million landmines had been laid and Morocco had constructed a 2,700 km separation wall dividing Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, where the majority of the resources are, from Polisario territory. The Sahrawi were divided too; most fled to refugee camps near Tindouf in Algeria, but some remained in occupied territory.

A UN peacekeeping mission was charged with monitoring the ceasefire and organising a self-determination referendum to be held in 1992. Due to constant Moroccan diplomatic pressure and time-consuming (and mostly invalid) challenges to the voter registration process, that referendum has never happened. Moroccan control of the territory, in violation of numerous Security Council resolutions, persists. Repression remains severe. And resource exploitation continues.

(Not) enforcing international law

The Western Sahara is recognised by the UN as a 'non-self-governing territory', and the Polisario Front has gained formal recognition for the SADR from 82 states around the world. According to international legal institutions, the Sahrawi are entitled to self-determination, and “sovereignty over natural wealth and resources [is] a basic constituent of the right to self-determination.”

Yet Moroccan exploration, production, and export of resources from Western Sahara have taken place for decades, as have international oil exploration, phosphate production, and fishing, in violation of this principle.

Hundreds of millions in Western Saharan resources are traded each year with few successful attempts to curb the practice, and Agrium’s deal is simply the latest in a long line of agreements made without the Sahrawi’s consent. Agrium has defended the deal, saying that it had sought appropriate legal guidance and that the company is committed to improving quality of life in all communities that it does business. But criticism has continued.

“Such activities would be illegal if failing to take into account the wishes and the interests of the Saharawi as the original people of the territory,” said Western Sahara Research Watch (WSRW), a group which lobbies against transactions between companies and governments that make use of Western Saharan resources. The organisation estimates almost $300 million in phosphate has been exported from Western Sahara in 44 shiploads so far this year.

WSRW also campaigns against Moroccan, European, and Russian exploitation of Western Sahara's lucrative fishing industry. UN reports suggest the combined value of Moroccan and Western Saharan fishing rights comes to hundreds of millions of dollars each year.

WSRW claims Morocco’s occupation is subsidised to support the industry at the expense of the Sahrawi, and that agreements such as the EU–Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement and similar arrangements with Russia are illegal. The EU partnership has granted licenses to European companies (a majority Spanish) for Western Saharan waters, providing a modern expression of the fishing rights Spanish planners incorporated into the Madrid Accords. The accord was not renewed in December 2011 partly due to a dispute over Western Saharan waters, and a new protocol was put forwards in summer 2013 which the EU claims is in accordance with international law, but WSRW insists it still fails to exclude the waters of the Western Sahara.

Ending resource exploitation

Some efforts at ending the trade of Western Saharan resources without Sahrawi have been successful. On 30 September, for example, four of Sweden's state pension funds decided to sell their stakes in Incitec Pivot and Potash Corp due to the companies’ continued import of Western Saharan phosphate.

"Both companies [are] purchasers of phosphate from a Moroccan supplier that mines its product in Western Sahara, a disputed territory that is on the United Nations’ list of non-self-governing territories that should be decolonised,” said the fund.

The move followed a similar decision by Norwegian state pension funds in 2010.

However, for the most part, there remain real difficulties in persuading companies not to engage in the trade of conflict resources. Despite questions of the legality of doing so, many companies continue to buy phosphates, conduct oil exploration, and engage in the fishing trade. According to Independent Diplomat, a non-profit advisory group which works with Polisario, this is likely go on so long as international law is not enforced and policy is expressed vaguely at national level.

"Responsible governments need to provide legal clarity by providing guidelines to all private companies that any exploration or exploitation of Western Sahara's natural resources must respect international law,” a representative told Think Africa Press. “In failing to provide this clarity, governments will indirectly be allowing companies to violate the sovereign rights of Western Sahara's people to control their own resources."

Indeed, Agrium seems to be well aware of Western Sahara’s non-self governing status. In its company reports, it classifies Western Sahara separately from Morocco – and not only nationally but also by region, listing Western Sahara as part of sub-Saharan Africa and Morocco as part of North Africa. Yet there does not seem to be the pressure or awareness to stop Agrium trading in exploited resources.

When it comes to the Western Sahara’s minerals, oil, and fishing resources, ethical concerns clearly compete with the need for profit. And without enforcement of international law, through the policies of the European Union and major advanced economies, evidence suggests there is little chance of fully curtailing the trade.

Think Africa Press welcomes inquiries regarding the republication of its articles. If you would like to republish this or any other article for re-print, syndication or educational purposes, please contact: editor@thinkafricapress.com.

Eleven media myths, and why they matter

Self-interest underlies much of the debate about the Australian news media, writes Sally Young, and it’s threatening the future of quality journalism

Polarised response: media inquiry head Ray Finkelstein QC. Photo: Dean Lewins/ AAP Image

 

IN THIS turbulent period for the Australian news media, many important issues are at stake – and none more so than the independence and future financial viability of journalism. But this vital debate has recently been reduced to an acrimonious fight about the Finkelstein inquiry’s proposal for a News Media Council. Faced with the possibility of an external body holding them to account, some media outlets have sought to pit journalists against academics who have expressed a view about the plan (and vice versa). This is a red herring that emphasises the personal and obscures the institutional problems and broader social and technological developments that are contributing to the industry’s problems.

The Australian has been at the forefront of debate. It employs some excellent journalists, publishes some insightful writing and has a very welcome commitment to national affairs, but it can also be so strident, defensive and bullying (and not just on this issue) that it is increasingly difficult to take seriously. Some of the paper’s journalists and commentators – and also some journalists at the Age, the Australian Financial Review, the Sydney Morning Herald and the tabloids – have taken up arms against Finkelstein’s proposal. Much of the hyperbole about “censorship,” “repression” and “state control” would be funny if it wasn’t such a poignant reminder that journalists are, all too often, their own worst enemies.

While they are romanticised as independent, truth-seeking crusaders who “hold power to account,” journalists in major news organisations actually work in a setting that is highly controlled, routinised and hierarchical. Compared to members of many other professions, they have very limited autonomy over their work. Perhaps partly as a result, history shows that journalists sometimes pick the wrong side of battles, mistaking their owner’s (or outlet’s) interests for their own. This can be embarrassingly evident – when a journalist repeatedly quotes his or her own boss as the major source for a story, for instance, leaving the strong impression that the journalist is being used as a mouthpiece for the editor’s or owner’s interests.

During the debate about the professionalisation of journalism in the 1970s and 1980s, for example, a range of possibilities for increasing the status and quality of the profession were canvassed. Among the most radical proposals was a call for licensing of journalists; at the other end of the spectrum were calls for journalists to engage in critical self-scrutiny of their profession, have strong, enforceable codes of ethics, and undertake external training or gain certain obligatory qualifications to practise journalism. Journalists were generally aghast even at the milder options and, in the end, they won that battle. But what this ultimately meant – that journalism remained largely a craft learnt inside media organisations and requiring no specific external training – was that journalists had no particular set of skills or knowledge that belonged to them as part of their profession. They could easily be replaced by someone brought in and trained on the job, and they were highly reliant on socialisation within news organisations for their training (which worked against that cherished journalistic principle of independence). Anyone could call themselves “a journalist” – and, with the digital age, they increasingly did; as a result, there is declining meaning attached to, or respect for, the status of journalists in news organisations.

Then, in the 1990s, media organisations, including journalists, resisted digitisation and online content. The attitude was almost one of “let’s ignore it and see if it goes away,” with the consequence that many organisations missed the early opportunities that the new technology offered and have since paid the price in declining audiences and revenues.

Now, in the debate over the Finkelstein recommendations, some journalists are fighting hard against any external oversight and thereby helping to marginalise themselves yet again. As the battles for press freedom going back to the seventeenth century show, there are good reasons for suspicion of regulation. But a knee jerk “no” to any form of external oversight of journalists’ work is counterproductive. If there was clear adherence to journalistic standards (even self-imposed standards), good internal processes of oversight, and appropriate scrutiny and openness, then no external oversight would be needed.

Some international newspapers have their own ombudsman or “readers’ advocate” or “public editor” who corrects errors, explains reporting, offers a right of reply and acts on behalf of readers and the public. These have been in place in some newspapers in other countries for over forty years. Where are the Australian equivalents? There’s just one, appointed by the Sydney Morning Herald in 2011. If Australian news organisations applied their own standards of conduct and performance consistently and adequately, external scrutiny wouldn’t be proposed or needed. Because they don’t, their credibility and reputations are suffering and they will struggle in the future (indeed they already are struggling) to retain increasingly educated readers who have high expectations and a much better awareness of how news media operate.

With all this in mind, let’s look at the myths and faulty logic being promoted by some news media organisations in the current debate.

Myth 1: Critical scrutiny is good, but only if journalists do it

Journalists are told they must always critically interrogate what they see and what they are told. They need to be independent and to be able to criticise and expose where necessary. But when academics or others apply this approach to analysing the media and the work of journalists, this becomes a problem for some news organisations: no longer are these values in the public interest, or necessary, or deserving of praise (see myths 2 and 3).

Myth 2: You need to work in journalism to understand how journalism works

This is a facile point as well as a myth. Being an outsider often aids understanding rather than hindering it – a point exemplified by the fact that many journalists have never worked in government or the public service but feel well-qualified (and so they should) to investigate these institutions and criticise their processes. Indeed, many journalists perpetually place themselves as critical outsiders – outside politics, government and business, outside power – in order to perform their work. That is the whole basis of critical detachment and the principles of neutrality and objectivity that have underpinned journalism for decades.

Myth 3: Even if you have worked in journalism in the past, you are still wrong

In the current debate, some of those who have supported greater scrutiny of media in Australia are former journalists with years, or even decades, of experience working in news organisations. But if their positions contradict the interests of powerful media organisations, they will still be attacked – albeit on other grounds (usually ideological; see myth 6).

Myth 4: Journalists work in journalism organisations

This myth is implicit in the debate, suggesting that journalists are only ever people who work in major news organisations and others are… well, “others.” Never stated overtly, this myth helps explain a tone that suggests the views of “former” journalists should be discredited. Never mind that the increasingly fluid boundaries of “journalism” see many academics contributing regularly to the news media and many private individuals writing what is, to all intents and purposes, excellent journalism.

Myth 5: Power is on the outside of media not on the inside

This is the biggest myth of all. “We scrutinise power,” journalists proclaim, but there is a strange failure to recognise that the media (as a collective) are just as influential (and arguably, much more so) than the hundreds of individual politicians sitting in parliaments across Australia. While there is a long history of journalists scrutinising politicians, who watches the watchers? (Apart from ABC1’s Media Watch, there are few regular, public outlets for media scrutiny in Australia.) The stories news outlets run and how they shape perceptions, the campaigns their outlets promote, the backroom wining and dining and wheeling and dealing that editors and owners engage in with politicians and corporate chiefs are all extraordinarily powerful factors in modern Australian life. So let’s all say this together: “The media is an extremely powerful institution – especially those major organisations that control up to three quarters of newspaper circulation and/or multiple cross-media interests. The media require scrutiny as well as exercising it.” When you work in a major news organisation, you are not outside power, you are sitting right in it.

Myth 6: Because there is no evidence of phone hacking here, there are no problems

Unless someone steps forward with new evidence, it seems that illegal phone tapping or hacking has not been practised by news media in Australia. But this doesn’t mean there are no problems. Last week, the Australian Financial Review reported on a four-year investigation which found that a “dirty tricks” unit inside News Corporation had promoted piracy in order to damage pay TV competitors (an allegation that News has strenuously denied). But the problems are broader than any anti-competitive behaviour. What the UK inquiry and other outlets (especially the Guardian) have revealed is the extent to which some individuals in politics, the government, the police and the media have been acting in close quarters and harbouring cosy networks of vested interests. In Australia, it is the close relationship between the political class and media outlets and owners that is the issue. We know it is the issue because of the fragments of evidence unearthed by people who’ve been brave or foolhardy enough, or retired long enough, to tell us about how the relationship really works. This is a more systemic issue and it isn’t as headline-worthy or sensational as the use of illegal methods of uncovering information, but its corrupting influence on political decision-making is no less important and it needs examining. So who is brave enough to investigate and report on it?

Myth 7: Media ownership – “nothing to see here”

The large media companies don’t like to talk about ownership and it is a taboo subject among their journalists as well (as some have revealed in anonymous surveys in the past). One of the problems with the reporting of the Finkelstein report is that the recommendations about regulation have overshadowed the biggest problem in the Australian market – the concentration of media ownership. Anyone who does talk about this is branded a left-winger (see myth 8).

Myth 8: All academics are against us and all academics who are against us are left-wing

As with some conservative politicians, some editors and commentators seem to believe that all of their critics are left-wing and that’s the source of their critiques. As an argument, it’s as shallow as it is convenient. Despite the perception being fostered in some outlets, far more unites academics and journalists than divides them. Most journalists understand why so many Australian academics who value journalism have concerns about the Australian media (for others, I’ll give a hint: it’s not because they are all left-wing), and they understand why so many of their former colleagues who go into academia and then have the freedom to speak out also express concerns (another hint: it’s nothing to do with Stockholm Syndrome). Many journalists voice those same concerns in private and anonymously; they just can’t do so in the outlets they work for (which puts the lie to those outlets posturing about the importance of “free speech”).

Myth 9: All academics who are interested in journalism teach journalism

Despite the reporting, not all of the lecturers involved in these debates are journalism lecturers. This error has been a launching pad for the argument that these media/journalism academics are corrupting the minds of future journalists by teaching them negative things about the media. (Here I’d note that if aspiring journalists can’t take some negativity, they are not going to last very long in journalism!) But the reality is that not all of those taking part in the debate are journalism lecturers, and the distinction is important. Across Australia, many academics are encouraging their students to study the media or journalism as part of their study of politics, sociology, philosophy, law, history, English, languages, criminology, education, science, medicine and other disciplines. And they are not the only ones. Popular culture is increasingly rich with critical, probing, sometimes cynical analysis of the news media. Think back even as far as ABC TV’s Frontline (1994–97). The media-analysis cat is well and truly out of the bag and yet somehow society still marches on despite the “negativity.”

Myth 10: Academics are experts but only when they say what we want to hear

Many media outlets are keen to have academics in their pages lending credibility and authority to analysis, but some want academics only to talk about topics that are not related to the outlet’s direct commercial interests. If they do otherwise, they are no longer welcome. Ultimately, media academics are the red herring in a strategy to shift the terms of debate and attack the attackers – to make it personal, make it uncomfortable and stifle debate.

Myth 11: Media accountability and media futures are separate

I’ll conclude by noting the myth that media accountability and media futures are somehow separate. The future of the news media in Australia is about much more than the Finkelstein report and its recommendations. In an era of immense change, some outlets are clinging to tired formulas. Some just don’t get it, or they will take time to get it.

Notably, of the academics who publicly supported the idea of a media inquiry and commended aspects of its report, most offered fairly cautious support about the report’s findings and many asked pertinent questions about implementation and how oversight should work. The Australian’s overblown attack in response reminded me of another of its extraordinary retaliations – against political blogs in 2007. When some bloggers dared to criticise the Australian and its political editor for their creative interpretation of opinion poll results, the Australian vehemently decried such blogs as parasitic and a “waste of time.” But, three years later, the Australian hired one of those bloggers – Peter Brent, editor of Mumble – and now promotes his analysis of opinion polls on its website.

Even old dogs can learn new tricks in a new media world. And they do better when they try to learn and adapt rather than relying on bullying, intimidation and self-interest expressed as freedom of the press.
-------
Sally Young is an Associate Professor in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne. Her latest book is How Australia Decides: Election Reporting and the Media (Cambridge University Press, 2011).

- See more at: http://inside.org.au/eleven-media-myths-and-why-they-matter/#sthash.QpNmh1vP.dpuf

New rapid reaction forces at work in Africa crises

Soldiers with Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa's East Africa Response Force (EARF) depart an Air Force C-130 from Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, Dec. 18. The EARF deployed to South Sudan supporting the ordered departure of the U.S. Embassy. (Tech. Sgt. Micah Theurich/Army)

By Ray Locker 

U.S. military quick-reaction forces put in the field after the September 2012 attack on the U.S. consular compound in Benghazi, Libya, have been in the middle of this month’s evacuation of Americans from strife-torn South Sudan.

Based in Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, soldiers in the Army force first left for South Sudan on Dec. 14 to evacuate diplomats at the embassy in the capital of Juba. Meanwhile, Marines stationed at an air base in Moron, Spain, have deployed to Djibouti and Uganda to help in the evacuations.

These moves follow the unsuccessful evacuation attempt of U.S. nationals by a Djibouti-based Navy SEAL team on Dec. 21. Four SEALs were wounded in the evacuation attempt when their V-22 tilt-rotor Osprey aircraft came under small-arms fire over the town of Bor. Their mission was aborted.

As the U.S. involvement in the war in Afghanistan winds down, a series of Africa crises in 2013 has led to greater U.S. activity on the continent. That includes ferrying French troops and supplies to that nation’s intervention in the insurgency in Mali in west Africa, continued activity from Djibouti-based units in the east Africa nation of Somalia and a U.S.-backed effort to stop African warlord Joseph Kony.

The anti-Kony effort involves two of the countries now currently racked by ethnic-based fighting that is veering toward civil war — South Sudan and the Central African Republic, where rival Christian and Muslim groups are fighting for control of the government. Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo are also participating in the fight against Kony, who been engaged in a regional power struggle that started in Uganda in the 1980s and is accused of directing atrocities during that time. He is wanted by the International Criminal Court and is believed to be hiding in the Central African Republic.

Much of the increased U.S. activity in Africa is based at Camp Lemonnier. Home to at least 3,200 U.S. troops, civilians and contractors, the base has been in operation since 2001 and has grown steadily in the last five years. Surveillance drones routinely fly from the base, as do Air Force U-28 intelligence aircraft.

The 2014 defense bill passed last week includes $29 million for more housing and a Navy armory at Camp Lemonnier, and a military construction provision in the bill extends the Defense secretary’s ability to use money to pay for more military construction projects in various parts of the world, including Djibouti and other African nations.

Source: USA TODAY

The traditional systems of justice of Pashtuns and Somalis

Somali nomadic man

Henry Srebrnik

Two peoples living thousands of miles apart, one in the horn of Africa, the other in south-central Asia, employ similar systems of justice and conflict resolution.

The Pashtuns (also known as Pathans) live in eastern and southern Afghanistan; and in Pakistan, mostly in the old North West Frontier Province, now Khyber-Pakhtunkwa, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and northern Balochistan.

The Somalis are found in Somalia, a country which has been without a national government since 1991; the de facto state of Somaliland; Djibouti; and parts of Ethiopia and Kenya.

Until the colonial era, both peoples lived in stateless societies without courts of law. They both have very complex clan and tribal loyalties, and these sub-units have historically engaged in feuds among themselves, which were settled, if at all, by traditional methods of adjudication.

The 43 million Pashtuns are divided into four confederacies: the Batani, Gharghasht, Karlani and Sarabans, which in turn consist of hundreds of tribes and sub-tribes. The 16 million Somalis comprise six major clans: the Darood, Dir, Digil, Hawiye, Isaaq and Rahanwayne. These are also subdivided into a host of sub-clans and lineage groups.

Perhaps this is the reason neither people, despite a very strong consciousness of common ethnic, cultural and religious identity (virtually all are Sunni Muslims), has ever generated a modern state-building form of nationalism.

Pashtunwali is the non-written ethical code of the Pashtuns. It dates back to pre-Islamic times and is widely practiced among Pashtuns. They have relied on it to conduct themselves as individuals and as a society in their dealings between themselves and with others. The pashtunwali serves as a set of guidelines for regulating the otherwise anarchic Pashtun society.

One of its principles is badal, a concept which requires a Pashtun to seek justice or take revenge against the wrongdoer. There is no time limit to when the injustice can be avenged. If badal is not exercised, the offended man or his family will be considered stripped of honour. The exercise of this principle can lead to generations of bloodshed, feuds, and hundreds of lives lost for one insult.

However, once the desire for an honorable peace is clear, the tribal elders gather in a jirga, which is obeyed without question by the Pashtuns. It is an assembly of tribal elders, who take decisions on issues based on consensus. In tribal regions, the jirga is still used as a court for criminal offences.

Somali clans are bound to each other by a social contract known as xeer. Under xeer, there is no authority that dictates what the law should be. It is instead formulated by elders as they determine the best way to resolve a dispute. Disputing parties bring their concerns to them, and the proceedings continue until a resolution is achieved.

Law, and consequently crime, is defined in terms of property rights. Because such rights, if violated, require compensation, rather than punishment, there is no imprisonment, and fines are rare. Such fines as might be imposed seldom exceed the amount of compensation and are paid directly to the victim.

Through xeer, Somalis are committed to paying restitution in the event that physical harm or death is inflicted by a member of one group against a member of another. If a member of one group murders someone, it is the responsibility of the murderer’s group to collectively pay restitution to the group of the victim. If payments are not made or accepted, then vengeance will be taken against any member of the offender’s group.

Xeer can give relationships regularity and reduce violence by creating structures of deterrence. Though enforced by custom and not written law, it is widely followed among Somalis.

The unrecognized state of Somaliland is founded on clan-based power sharing and balanced political representation and it headed off incipient violence soon after its declaration of independence through a shir beeleed (clan conference). The country has incorporated traditional institutions into its government by appointing clan leaders to the 82-member Guurtiida (House of Elders), the upper chamber of parliament. If a clan elder dies or retires, the seat is passed down to one of his descendants. Over the past two decades, clan elders have negotiated inter-clan disputes and kept the peace.

As Muslims, Pashtuns and Somalis may also avail themselves of the Islamic code of justice, the Sharia; however, in most cases not involving religion, pashtunwali and xeer take precedence in the traditions of these two ethnic groups.

But this also helps explain the attraction of Islamists – al-Shabaab among the Somalis and the Taliban in the Pashtun areas. For brutal as they are, their religious fervour enables the Islamists to bring feuding clans together through their harsh and rigid implementation of the Sharia, which supersedes pashtunwali and xeer, and thus, in a way, brings a modicum of peace and safety to these fractious societies. It accustoms them to a form of government that transcends tribe and clan.

Henry Srebrnik is a professor of political science at the University of Prince Edward Island.

 Source: ubpost.mongolnews.mn