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Monday, January 6, 2014

Eleven media myths, and why they matter

Self-interest underlies much of the debate about the Australian news media, writes Sally Young, and it’s threatening the future of quality journalism


Polarised response: media inquiry head Ray Finkelstein QC. Photo: Dean Lewins/ AAP Image
 

IN THIS turbulent period for the Australian news media, many important issues are at stake – and none more so than the independence and future financial viability of journalism. But this vital debate has recently been reduced to an acrimonious fight about the Finkelstein inquiry’s proposal for a News Media Council. Faced with the possibility of an external body holding them to account, some media outlets have sought to pit journalists against academics who have expressed a view about the plan (and vice versa). This is a red herring that emphasises the personal and obscures the institutional problems and broader social and technological developments that are contributing to the industry’s problems.

The Australian has been at the forefront of debate. It employs some excellent journalists, publishes some insightful writing and has a very welcome commitment to national affairs, but it can also be so strident, defensive and bullying (and not just on this issue) that it is increasingly difficult to take seriously. Some of the paper’s journalists and commentators – and also some journalists at the Age, the Australian Financial Review, the Sydney Morning Herald and the tabloids – have taken up arms against Finkelstein’s proposal. Much of the hyperbole about “censorship,” “repression” and “state control” would be funny if it wasn’t such a poignant reminder that journalists are, all too often, their own worst enemies.

While they are romanticised as independent, truth-seeking crusaders who “hold power to account,” journalists in major news organisations actually work in a setting that is highly controlled, routinised and hierarchical. Compared to members of many other professions, they have very limited autonomy over their work. Perhaps partly as a result, history shows that journalists sometimes pick the wrong side of battles, mistaking their owner’s (or outlet’s) interests for their own. This can be embarrassingly evident – when a journalist repeatedly quotes his or her own boss as the major source for a story, for instance, leaving the strong impression that the journalist is being used as a mouthpiece for the editor’s or owner’s interests.

During the debate about the professionalisation of journalism in the 1970s and 1980s, for example, a range of possibilities for increasing the status and quality of the profession were canvassed. Among the most radical proposals was a call for licensing of journalists; at the other end of the spectrum were calls for journalists to engage in critical self-scrutiny of their profession, have strong, enforceable codes of ethics, and undertake external training or gain certain obligatory qualifications to practise journalism. Journalists were generally aghast even at the milder options and, in the end, they won that battle. But what this ultimately meant – that journalism remained largely a craft learnt inside media organisations and requiring no specific external training – was that journalists had no particular set of skills or knowledge that belonged to them as part of their profession. They could easily be replaced by someone brought in and trained on the job, and they were highly reliant on socialisation within news organisations for their training (which worked against that cherished journalistic principle of independence). Anyone could call themselves “a journalist” – and, with the digital age, they increasingly did; as a result, there is declining meaning attached to, or respect for, the status of journalists in news organisations.

Then, in the 1990s, media organisations, including journalists, resisted digitisation and online content. The attitude was almost one of “let’s ignore it and see if it goes away,” with the consequence that many organisations missed the early opportunities that the new technology offered and have since paid the price in declining audiences and revenues.

Now, in the debate over the Finkelstein recommendations, some journalists are fighting hard against any external oversight and thereby helping to marginalise themselves yet again. As the battles for press freedom going back to the seventeenth century show, there are good reasons for suspicion of regulation. But a knee jerk “no” to any form of external oversight of journalists’ work is counterproductive. If there was clear adherence to journalistic standards (even self-imposed standards), good internal processes of oversight, and appropriate scrutiny and openness, then no external oversight would be needed.

Some international newspapers have their own ombudsman or “readers’ advocate” or “public editor” who corrects errors, explains reporting, offers a right of reply and acts on behalf of readers and the public. These have been in place in some newspapers in other countries for over forty years. Where are the Australian equivalents? There’s just one, appointed by the Sydney Morning Herald in 2011. If Australian news organisations applied their own standards of conduct and performance consistently and adequately, external scrutiny wouldn’t be proposed or needed. Because they don’t, their credibility and reputations are suffering and they will struggle in the future (indeed they already are struggling) to retain increasingly educated readers who have high expectations and a much better awareness of how news media operate.

With all this in mind, let’s look at the myths and faulty logic being promoted by some news media organisations in the current debate.

Myth 1: Critical scrutiny is good, but only if journalists do it

Journalists are told they must always critically interrogate what they see and what they are told. They need to be independent and to be able to criticise and expose where necessary. But when academics or others apply this approach to analysing the media and the work of journalists, this becomes a problem for some news organisations: no longer are these values in the public interest, or necessary, or deserving of praise (see myths 2 and 3).

Myth 2: You need to work in journalism to understand how journalism works

This is a facile point as well as a myth. Being an outsider often aids understanding rather than hindering it – a point exemplified by the fact that many journalists have never worked in government or the public service but feel well-qualified (and so they should) to investigate these institutions and criticise their processes. Indeed, many journalists perpetually place themselves as critical outsiders – outside politics, government and business, outside power – in order to perform their work. That is the whole basis of critical detachment and the principles of neutrality and objectivity that have underpinned journalism for decades.

Myth 3: Even if you have worked in journalism in the past, you are still wrong

In the current debate, some of those who have supported greater scrutiny of media in Australia are former journalists with years, or even decades, of experience working in news organisations. But if their positions contradict the interests of powerful media organisations, they will still be attacked – albeit on other grounds (usually ideological; see myth 6).

Myth 4: Journalists work in journalism organisations

This myth is implicit in the debate, suggesting that journalists are only ever people who work in major news organisations and others are… well, “others.” Never stated overtly, this myth helps explain a tone that suggests the views of “former” journalists should be discredited. Never mind that the increasingly fluid boundaries of “journalism” see many academics contributing regularly to the news media and many private individuals writing what is, to all intents and purposes, excellent journalism.

Myth 5: Power is on the outside of media not on the inside

This is the biggest myth of all. “We scrutinise power,” journalists proclaim, but there is a strange failure to recognise that the media (as a collective) are just as influential (and arguably, much more so) than the hundreds of individual politicians sitting in parliaments across Australia. While there is a long history of journalists scrutinising politicians, who watches the watchers? (Apart from ABC1’s Media Watch, there are few regular, public outlets for media scrutiny in Australia.) The stories news outlets run and how they shape perceptions, the campaigns their outlets promote, the backroom wining and dining and wheeling and dealing that editors and owners engage in with politicians and corporate chiefs are all extraordinarily powerful factors in modern Australian life. So let’s all say this together: “The media is an extremely powerful institution – especially those major organisations that control up to three quarters of newspaper circulation and/or multiple cross-media interests. The media require scrutiny as well as exercising it.” When you work in a major news organisation, you are not outside power, you are sitting right in it.

Myth 6: Because there is no evidence of phone hacking here, there are no problems

Unless someone steps forward with new evidence, it seems that illegal phone tapping or hacking has not been practised by news media in Australia. But this doesn’t mean there are no problems. Last week, the Australian Financial Review reported on a four-year investigation which found that a “dirty tricks” unit inside News Corporation had promoted piracy in order to damage pay TV competitors (an allegation that News has strenuously denied). But the problems are broader than any anti-competitive behaviour. What the UK inquiry and other outlets (especially the Guardian) have revealed is the extent to which some individuals in politics, the government, the police and the media have been acting in close quarters and harbouring cosy networks of vested interests. In Australia, it is the close relationship between the political class and media outlets and owners that is the issue. We know it is the issue because of the fragments of evidence unearthed by people who’ve been brave or foolhardy enough, or retired long enough, to tell us about how the relationship really works. This is a more systemic issue and it isn’t as headline-worthy or sensational as the use of illegal methods of uncovering information, but its corrupting influence on political decision-making is no less important and it needs examining. So who is brave enough to investigate and report on it?

Myth 7: Media ownership – “nothing to see here”

The large media companies don’t like to talk about ownership and it is a taboo subject among their journalists as well (as some have revealed in anonymous surveys in the past). One of the problems with the reporting of the Finkelstein report is that the recommendations about regulation have overshadowed the biggest problem in the Australian market – the concentration of media ownership. Anyone who does talk about this is branded a left-winger (see myth 8).

Myth 8: All academics are against us and all academics who are against us are left-wing

As with some conservative politicians, some editors and commentators seem to believe that all of their critics are left-wing and that’s the source of their critiques. As an argument, it’s as shallow as it is convenient. Despite the perception being fostered in some outlets, far more unites academics and journalists than divides them. Most journalists understand why so many Australian academics who value journalism have concerns about the Australian media (for others, I’ll give a hint: it’s not because they are all left-wing), and they understand why so many of their former colleagues who go into academia and then have the freedom to speak out also express concerns (another hint: it’s nothing to do with Stockholm Syndrome). Many journalists voice those same concerns in private and anonymously; they just can’t do so in the outlets they work for (which puts the lie to those outlets posturing about the importance of “free speech”).

Myth 9: All academics who are interested in journalism teach journalism

Despite the reporting, not all of the lecturers involved in these debates are journalism lecturers. This error has been a launching pad for the argument that these media/journalism academics are corrupting the minds of future journalists by teaching them negative things about the media. (Here I’d note that if aspiring journalists can’t take some negativity, they are not going to last very long in journalism!) But the reality is that not all of those taking part in the debate are journalism lecturers, and the distinction is important. Across Australia, many academics are encouraging their students to study the media or journalism as part of their study of politics, sociology, philosophy, law, history, English, languages, criminology, education, science, medicine and other disciplines. And they are not the only ones. Popular culture is increasingly rich with critical, probing, sometimes cynical analysis of the news media. Think back even as far as ABC TV’s Frontline (1994–97). The media-analysis cat is well and truly out of the bag and yet somehow society still marches on despite the “negativity.”

Myth 10: Academics are experts but only when they say what we want to hear

Many media outlets are keen to have academics in their pages lending credibility and authority to analysis, but some want academics only to talk about topics that are not related to the outlet’s direct commercial interests. If they do otherwise, they are no longer welcome. Ultimately, media academics are the red herring in a strategy to shift the terms of debate and attack the attackers – to make it personal, make it uncomfortable and stifle debate.

Myth 11: Media accountability and media futures are separate

I’ll conclude by noting the myth that media accountability and media futures are somehow separate. The future of the news media in Australia is about much more than the Finkelstein report and its recommendations. In an era of immense change, some outlets are clinging to tired formulas. Some just don’t get it, or they will take time to get it.

Notably, of the academics who publicly supported the idea of a media inquiry and commended aspects of its report, most offered fairly cautious support about the report’s findings and many asked pertinent questions about implementation and how oversight should work. The Australian’s overblown attack in response reminded me of another of its extraordinary retaliations – against political blogs in 2007. When some bloggers dared to criticise the Australian and its political editor for their creative interpretation of opinion poll results, the Australian vehemently decried such blogs as parasitic and a “waste of time.” But, three years later, the Australian hired one of those bloggers – Peter Brent, editor of Mumble – and now promotes his analysis of opinion polls on its website.
Even old dogs can learn new tricks in a new media world. And they do better when they try to learn and adapt rather than relying on bullying, intimidation and self-interest expressed as freedom of the press.
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Sally Young is an Associate Professor in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne. Her latest book is
How Australia Decides: Election Reporting and the Media (Cambridge University Press, 2011).
- See more at: http://inside.org.au/eleven-media-myths-and-why-they-matter/#sthash.QpNmh1vP.dpuf

New rapid reaction forces at work in Africa crises







Soldiers with Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa's East Africa Response Force (EARF) depart an Air Force C-130 from Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, Dec. 18. The EARF deployed to South Sudan supporting the ordered departure of the U.S. Embassy. (Tech. Sgt. Micah Theurich/Army)
By Ray Locker 

U.S. military quick-reaction forces put in the field after the September 2012 attack on the U.S. consular compound in Benghazi, Libya, have been in the middle of this month’s evacuation of Americans from strife-torn South Sudan.

Based in Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, soldiers in the Army force first left for South Sudan on Dec. 14 to evacuate diplomats at the embassy in the capital of Juba. Meanwhile, Marines stationed at an air base in Moron, Spain, have deployed to Djibouti and Uganda to help in the evacuations.

These moves follow the unsuccessful evacuation attempt of U.S. nationals by a Djibouti-based Navy SEAL team on Dec. 21. Four SEALs were wounded in the evacuation attempt when their V-22 tilt-rotor Osprey aircraft came under small-arms fire over the town of Bor. Their mission was aborted.

As the U.S. involvement in the war in Afghanistan winds down, a series of Africa crises in 2013 has led to greater U.S. activity on the continent. That includes ferrying French troops and supplies to that nation’s intervention in the insurgency in Mali in west Africa, continued activity from Djibouti-based units in the east Africa nation of Somalia and a U.S.-backed effort to stop African warlord Joseph Kony.

The anti-Kony effort involves two of the countries now currently racked by ethnic-based fighting that is veering toward civil war — South Sudan and the Central African Republic, where rival Christian and Muslim groups are fighting for control of the government. Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo are also participating in the fight against Kony, who been engaged in a regional power struggle that started in Uganda in the 1980s and is accused of directing atrocities during that time. He is wanted by the International Criminal Court and is believed to be hiding in the Central African Republic.

Much of the increased U.S. activity in Africa is based at Camp Lemonnier. Home to at least 3,200 U.S. troops, civilians and contractors, the base has been in operation since 2001 and has grown steadily in the last five years. Surveillance drones routinely fly from the base, as do Air Force U-28 intelligence aircraft.

The 2014 defense bill passed last week includes $29 million for more housing and a Navy armory at Camp Lemonnier, and a military construction provision in the bill extends the Defense secretary’s ability to use money to pay for more military construction projects in various parts of the world, including Djibouti and other African nations.

Source: USA TODAY


The traditional systems of justice of Pashtuns and Somalis







Somali nomadic man

Two peoples living thousands of miles apart, one in the horn of Africa, the other in south-central Asia, employ similar systems of justice and conflict resolution.
The Pashtuns (also known as Pathans) live in eastern and southern Afghanistan; and in Pakistan, mostly in the old North West Frontier Province, now Khyber-Pakhtunkwa, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and northern Balochistan.
The Somalis are found in Somalia, a country which has been without a national government since 1991; the de facto state of Somaliland; Djibouti; and parts of Ethiopia and Kenya.
Until the colonial era, both peoples lived in stateless societies without courts of law. They both have very complex clan and tribal loyalties, and these sub-units have historically engaged in feuds among themselves, which were settled, if at all, by traditional methods of adjudication.

The 43 million Pashtuns are divided into four confederacies: the Batani, Gharghasht, Karlani and Sarabans, which in turn consist of hundreds of tribes and sub-tribes. The 16 million Somalis comprise six major clans: the Darood, Dir, Digil, Hawiye, Isaaq and Rahanwayne. These are also subdivided into a host of sub-clans and lineage groups.
Perhaps this is the reason neither people, despite a very strong consciousness of common ethnic, cultural and religious identity (virtually all are Sunni Muslims), has ever generated a modern state-building form of nationalism.
Pashtunwali is the non-written ethical code of the Pashtuns. It dates back to pre-Islamic times and is widely practiced among Pashtuns. They have relied on it to conduct themselves as individuals and as a society in their dealings between themselves and with others. The pashtunwali serves as a set of guidelines for regulating the otherwise anarchic Pashtun society.
One of its principles is badal, a concept which requires a Pashtun to seek justice or take revenge against the wrongdoer. There is no time limit to when the injustice can be avenged. If badal is not exercised, the offended man or his family will be considered stripped of honour. The exercise of this principle can lead to generations of bloodshed, feuds, and hundreds of lives lost for one insult.
However, once the desire for an honorable peace is clear, the tribal elders gather in a jirga, which is obeyed without question by the Pashtuns. It is an assembly of tribal elders, who take decisions on issues based on consensus. In tribal regions, the jirga is still used as a court for criminal offences.
Somali clans are bound to each other by a social contract known as xeer. Under xeer, there is no authority that dictates what the law should be. It is instead formulated by elders as they determine the best way to resolve a dispute. Disputing parties bring their concerns to them, and the proceedings continue until a resolution is achieved.
Law, and consequently crime, is defined in terms of property rights. Because such rights, if violated, require compensation, rather than punishment, there is no imprisonment, and fines are rare. Such fines as might be imposed seldom exceed the amount of compensation and are paid directly to the victim.
Through xeer, Somalis are committed to paying restitution in the event that physical harm or death is inflicted by a member of one group against a member of another. If a member of one group murders someone, it is the responsibility of the murderer’s group to collectively pay restitution to the group of the victim. If payments are not made or accepted, then vengeance will be taken against any member of the offender’s group.
Xeer can give relationships regularity and reduce violence by creating structures of deterrence. Though enforced by custom and not written law, it is widely followed among Somalis.
The unrecognized state of Somaliland is founded on clan-based power sharing and balanced political representation and it headed off incipient violence soon after its declaration of independence through a shir beeleed (clan conference). The country has incorporated traditional institutions into its government by appointing clan leaders to the 82-member Guurtiida (House of Elders), the upper chamber of parliament. If a clan elder dies or retires, the seat is passed down to one of his descendants. Over the past two decades, clan elders have negotiated inter-clan disputes and kept the peace.
As Muslims, Pashtuns and Somalis may also avail themselves of the Islamic code of justice, the Sharia; however, in most cases not involving religion, pashtunwali and xeer take precedence in the traditions of these two ethnic groups.
But this also helps explain the attraction of Islamists – al-Shabaab among the Somalis and the Taliban in the Pashtun areas. For brutal as they are, their religious fervour enables the Islamists to bring feuding clans together through their harsh and rigid implementation of the Sharia, which supersedes pashtunwali and xeer, and thus, in a way, brings a modicum of peace and safety to these fractious societies. It accustoms them to a form of government that transcends tribe and clan.

Henry Srebrnik is a professor of political science at the University of Prince Edward Island.
 Source: ubpost.mongolnews.mn

Somaliland: Mercury Public Affairs Takes Government PR Portfolio from Glover Park Group






Hargeisa - The Government of the Republic is to have new strategies in its engagement with the USA government following the signing of a communications contract with Mercury Public Affair LLC.

The Somaliland minister for foreign affairs, Mohamed BehiYonis, has just signed a contract with New York public relations company Mercury Public Affair LLC for it to lobby with the American government to recognize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somaliland.

The Ministry of Presidential Affairs of the Republic of Somaliland signed a lobbying and communications contract with Glover Park Group but Mercury Public Affairs is expected to replace the Glover Company. The new company will start its work in 2014 according to Somaliland Foreign Ministry Director General Hon. Mohamed Hassan Said.

Mercury will work on government relations and public relations services on behalf of Somaliland.

The DG said that Mercury worked with former US president the likes of Bill Clinton and the current US president Obama.

He added that the company will work with Somaliland on the cause and lobby of the recognition.

The contract is due to last for one year and is expected to begin in 2014.

Once asked about the price tag of the contract said that it is a bit cheaper than the previous contract that the government signed with Glover Park Group which was estimated to be around 22, 500 dollars per month.


To learn about Mercury visit http://www.mercurypublicaffairs.com