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Monday, October 7, 2013

Libya, Somalia raids show U.S. reach, problems




By Ghaith Shennib and Abdi Sheikh

TRIPOLI/MOGADISHU

(Reuters) - Two U.S. raids in Africa show the United States is pressuring al Qaeda, officials said on Sunday, though a failure in Somalia and an angry response in Libya also highlighted Washington's problems.

In Tripoli, U.S. forces snatched a Libyan wanted over the bombings of the American embassy in Nairobi 15 years ago and whisked him out of the country, prompting Secretary of State John Kerry to declare that al Qaeda leaders "can run but they can't hide".

But the capture of Nazih al-Ragye, better known as Abu Anas al-Liby, also provoked a complaint about the "kidnap" from the Western-backed Libyan prime minister; he faces a backlash from armed Islamists who have carved out a share of power since the West helped Libyan rebels oust Muammar Gaddafi two years ago.

In Somalia, Navy SEALS stormed ashore into the al Shabaab stronghold of Barawe but, a U.S. official said, they failed to capture or kill the target among the Somali allies of al Qaeda.

U.S. officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Reuters the target was a Kenyan of Somali origin known by the name Ikrima, described as a foreign fighter commander for al Shabaab in Somalia.

One of the officials said it was not known if Ikrima was connected to last month's attack on Westgate
mall in Nairobi by al Shabaab gunmen in which at least 67 people were killed.

Kerry, on a visit to Indonesia, said President Barack Obama's administration was "pleased with the results" of the combined assaults early on Saturday. "We hope this makes clear that the United States of America will never stop in its effort to hold those accountable who conduct acts of terror," he said.

Two years after Navy SEALs finally tracked down and killed al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, a decade after al Qaeda's September 11 attacks on the United States in 2001, the twin operation demonstrated the reach of U.S. military forces in Africa, where Islamist militancy has been in the ascendant.

The forays also threw a spotlight on Somalia's status as a fragmented haven for al Qaeda allies more than 20 years after Washington intervened in vain in its civil war and Libya's descent into an anarchic battleground between rival bands on the Mediterranean that stretches deep south into the Sahara.

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said they showed Washington would "spare no effort to hold terrorists accountable".

Yet disrupting its most aggressive enemy, in an oil-rich state that is awash with arms and sits on Europe's doorstep, may have been more the priority in the Libya raid than putting on trial a little known suspect in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed 224 people.

LIBYA RISKS

Clearly aware of the risks to his government of complicity in the snatching of Liby as he returned to his suburban home from dawn prayers, Prime Minister Ali Zeidan said: "The Libyan government is following the news of the kidnapping of a Libyan citizen who is wanted by U.S. authorities.

"The Libyan government has contacted U.S. authorities to ask them to provide an explanation."

State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf, without commenting on any specific communications, said, "we consult regularly with the Libyan government on a range of security and counterterrorism issues."

Another U.S. official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told Reuters the Libyan government had been notified of the operation, but did not specify when Libya was informed.

Liby's son, Abdullah al Ragye, 19, told reporters at the family home that men had pulled up in four cars, knocked him out with some kind of drug, dragged him from his vehicle and driven off with him in a Mercedes.

"They had a Libyan look and Libyan accents," he said. It was not clear, however, whether the men were connected to the Libyan state, which may either have sought to keep its distance or been sidelined by Washington for fear of leaks.

Abdul Bassit Haroun, a former Islamist militia commander who works with the Libyan government on security, said the U.S. raid would show Libya was no refuge for "international terrorists".

"But it is also very bad that no state institutions had the slightest information about this process, nor do they have a force which was able to capture him," he told Reuters.

"This means the Libyan state simply does not exist."

He warned that Islamist militants, like those blamed for the deadly attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi a year ago, would hit back violently. "This won't just pass," Haroun said.

"There will be a strong reaction in order to take revenge because this is one of the most important al Qaeda figures."

SOMALI CHAOS

Somalia's Western-backed government said it did cooperate with Washington, though its control of much of the country, including the port of Barawe, 180 km (110 miles) south of the capital Mogadishu, is limited by powerful armed groups.

"We have collaboration with the world and with neighboring countries in the battle against al Shabaab,"

Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon said when asked of Somalia's role in the raid.

U.S. forces have used airborne drones to kill Somalis in the past and last year SEALs freed two kidnapped aid workers there.

Somali police said seven people were killed in Barawe. U.S. officials said their forces took no casualties but had broken off the fighting to avoid harming civilians. They failed to capture or kill their target during fighting around dawn at a seaside villa that al Shabaab said was one of its bases.

A Somali intelligence official said a Chechen commander, who might have been the Americans' target, was wounded.

In Somalia, al Shabaab spokesman Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab told Reuters no senior figure was present when the Americans came ashore. "Ordinary fighters lived in the house and they bravely counter attacked and chased off the attackers," he said.

Al Shabaab said that in attacking the Nairobi mall it was hitting back at Kenyan intervention in Somalia, which has forced it from much of its territory. It also targeted Westerners out shopping.

AFRICAN VIOLENCE

From Nigeria in the west, through Mali, Algeria and Libya to Somalia and Kenya in the east, Africa has seen major attacks on its own people and on Western economic interests, including an Algerian desert gas plant in January and the Nairobi mall as well as the killing of the U.S. ambassador in Libya a year ago.

The trend reflects a number of factors, including Western efforts to force al Qaeda from its former base in Afghanistan, the overthrow of anti-Islamist authoritarian rulers in the Arab Spring of 2011 and growing resentment among Africa's poor with governments they view as corrupt pawns of Western powers.

Western intelligence experts say there is evidence of growing links among Islamist militants across North Africa, who share al Qaeda's goal of a strict Islamic state and the expulsion of Western interests from Muslim lands.

Liby, who has been reported as having fled Gaddafi's police state to join bin Laden in Sudan in the 1990s before securing political asylum in Britain, may have been part of that bid to consolidate an operational base, analysts say.

Wanted by the FBI, which gives his age as 49 and had offered a $5 million reward for help in capturing him, Liby was indicted in 2000 along with 20 other al Qaeda suspects including bin Laden and current global leader Ayman al-Zawahri.

Charges relating to him personally accused him of discussing the bombing of the Nairobi embassy in retaliation for the U.S. intervention in the Somali civil war in 1992-1993 and of helping reconnoiter and plan the attack in the years before 1998.

Obama, wrestling with the legal and political difficulties posed by prisoners at the U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, has said he does not want to send more suspects there. But a spokeswoman for the White House National Security Council said it was still not decided where Liby would be tried.

His indictment was filed in New York, making that a possible venue for a civilian, rather than military, trial. It was unclear where Liby was on Sunday. U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean, as well as bases in Italy and Germany, would provide ample facilities within a short flight time.


(Additional reporting by Lesley Wroughton in Bali, Mark Hosenball, Phil Stewart and Tabassum Zakaria in Washington, James Macharia in Nairobi, Patrick Markey in Tunis and Feisal Omar in Mogadishu; Writing by Alastair Macdonald; Editing by Philippa Fletcher, Christopher Wilson and Mohammad Zargham)

Sunday, October 6, 2013

Unidentified foreign forces have launched a night-time raid on a militant base in the south Somali town of Barawe from the sea, reports say.
A spokesman for the al-Shabaab Islamist group told Reuters news agency that a fighter had been killed in the raid.

Reports speak of residents in the militant-controlled town being woken by heavy gunfire before dawn prayers.

Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility last month for a deadly attack on a Kenyan shopping mall.

At least 67 people were killed after militants stormed the Westgate mall in the capital, Nairobi, on 21 September.

'Helicopters'

There was no immediate comment on Saturday's alleged attack in Barawe from the Western-backed authorities in Somalia.

According to the Somali news website Midnimo, two helicopters were also involved in the raid.

"Westerners in boats attacked our base at Barawe beach and one was martyred from our side," Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab, described as al-Shabaab's spokesman for military operations, told Reuters by telephone.

Another al-Shabaab member, named as Abu Mohamed, told the Associated Press that "foreign" soldiers had attacked a house in Barawe.

Militants rushed to the scene to capture a foreign soldier but were unsuccessful, he added.
Western navies tasked with fighting piracy patrol the seas off Somalia, which has been beset by conflict for more than two decades.

The US military has used drones in Somalia to support the government and African Union forces in their battle against al-Shabaab.

France has also intervened militarily on occasion, carrying out an unsuccessful commando raid to free a French intelligence agent in January. Two French commandos were killed and al-Shabaab later reported that it had killed the agent.

Source: BBC

Xooaga Shabaab ayaa soo bandhiga muuqaalo muujinaya qalab milateri oo ay ka tageen ciidankii habeen hore weeraray Degmada Baraawe


Xooaga Shabaab ayaa soo bandhiga muuqaalo muujinaya qalab milateri oo ay ka tageen ciidankii habeen hore weeraray Degmada Baraawe ee Gobolka Shabeelaha hoose.

Sawiro ay Shabaab soo galiyeen baraha internetka ayaa waxa ay ku sheegeen in ciidamada Weerarka soo qaaday ay aqabkaasi uga carareen xeebta Degmada Baraawe oo guri ku dhaw uu howlgalka ka dhacay.

Waxyaabaha ay soo bandhigeen Shabaab ayaa ka kooban qalab ay ku sheegeen GPS-ka oo loo adeegsado bambooyinka, iyo rasaas ka dhacda qoriga M16 oo habeenkii iftiinka bixisa.

Afhayeen u hadlay Al-Shabaab ayaa sheegay in weerarkaasi ay fashiliyeen oo sidii loo rabay uusan u dhicin, wuxuuna dhanka kale qirtay in hal ruux oo Shabaab ka tirsan uu ku geeriyooday weerarka

Thursday, October 3, 2013

Inside Somaliland’s Pirate Rehab




The customs station in Zeila, Somaliland
By Mark Hay

Beside the customs station at the tiny port in the dusty, hell-hot town of Zeila, Somaliland, two men load a large truck with crates upon crates of Tabasco sauce. Soon the Tabasco truck will trundle along the sole makeshift road out of town, until it reaches the pit-stop in Asha Addo, where it will idle alongside dozens of other freighters funneling goods and wealth into the heart of the country.

It’s a scene of commerce that might have seemed impossible just a couple of years ago, when international shippers avoided Somali ports for fear of rocket-wielding pirates.

A Zeilai import truck.
Naturally, Zeilai residents deny that locals had anything to do with the stealing of civilian ships’ booty. They will admit, however – as numerous anti-piracy NGO posters in the cafes around town attest – that trade has ebbed and the port has languished in recent years.

Now, though, as the story goes, the era of piracy in Somali waters is over – although Somali pirates have struck at ships farther afield, it’s been well over a year since a hijacking took place in the immediate shipping lanes off the coast. The decline of the Somali pirates at the hands of an international maritime coalition, the development of strong anti-piracy sentiments in coastal Somali communities and the creation of a 600-man, 12-base Somaliland coast guard have all received bullish coverage.

Yet while the world processed the story of what happened to Somali piracy, I wondered what happens to all those hundreds of actual pirates once they've been apprehended by the authorities.
The interior cell block of the Hargeisa prison
As it turns out, quite a few of them are making their way – in custody – to Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland, although not all of them were captured in the region. For people operating in fishing dhows with outboard motors, Somali pirates are able to cover surprisingly large differences and as a result they’ve been snapped up in over a dozen countries across the Indian Ocean. But few of those countries had the facilities – much less the inclination – to deal with the legal headaches related to mass influxes of foreign pirates, leading to a robust rhetoric advocating the return of Somali pirates to a Somali state for justice.

Ever eager to prove its ability, morality and global team spirit, it was mutually agreed that Somaliland would be a good repository for all Somali-pirate prisoners, no matter their provenance. The only problem was that such a relocation was both dangerous and really bad PR, given that the major pirate prison in the port of Berbera was a circa 19th-century cesspool and – Ministry of Justice officials readily admit – prone to prison breaks.

So the best solution to everyone’s problems, naturally, was to funnel in a couple of million dollars in UN funds in 2010 to build an internationally acceptable, state-of-the-art prison in Hargeisa to handle pirates and other high-profile criminals (such as members of the al-Shabaab/al-Qaeda terror affiliate).

“It’s like the Ambassador Hotel,” jokes Mohamed “Wali” Isa, an official at Somaliland’s Ministry of Justice who deals with pirate-prisoner transfers. He’s referring to a swanky Hargeisa hotel frequented by the UN crowd, and as he makes his gag he shows me pictures of the whitewashed, multi-walled prison during its construction.
A window in a Hargeisa prison cell
But it’s not entirely a joke – at least when compared with the Berbera prison. The new Hargeisa prison has around 200 staffers with international training in modern prison etiquette, and the prisoners get leisure time and phone access, soccer programmes, medical facilities and, most importantly, an active focus on retraining and rehabilitating pirates for re-release into the world.

A number of pirates caught in Somaliland (although, officials stridently claim, not Somalilanders themselves) are now located in the prison, but more importantly it seems to be succeeding in its goal to become a hub for international cooperation on the piracy issue. Wali gestures to a folder in his cabinet labelled “Seychelles”, detailing two group transfers from that nation to Somaliland over the past couple of years. A third group was expected at the start of the year, but construction of the new prison that is meant to house them is on hold.

Taking in the prisoners everyone else sees as a headache (and reportedly treating them relatively well) has been good political business for Somaliland. Wali stresses that a significant part of the prominence and care in prison reform and piracy law is the recognition of Somaliland’s responsibilities for the security of its waters and the incentive to maintain open trade routes.

However, he admits that the implicit political message sent by Seychelles’ cooperation with the Somaliland government is a nice perk too. He characterizes the deal with Seychelles as a form of de facto recognition for the nation’s independence – all the more important now that international attention is being drawn toward a new government in Mogadishu to the south. Cooperation on piracy has also led to the first official meetings between the presidents of Somaliland and Somalia in over a decade, and contracts between the UN and Somaliland treating the latter as an autonomous entity (although not as a sovereign nation state). Given that most mainstream political rhetoric and strategy in the nation – the answer to every ailment – is “achieve recognition,” there’s been a strong incentive to make real and full efforts at what might otherwise be empty goals of quality, training and rehabilitation.

Prisoners at Hargeisa prison.
The skills training and educational programs Wali mentions are probably something most Somalilanders would clamour to get access to. Aside from classes in English, computer training and math, there are practical courses in brick making, welding, painting and carpentry – all skills high in demand in a country with almost no vocational training. In fact, the absence of native skill in such practical trades has led, despite massive local unemployment, to recruitment of Ethiopian and Yemeni labourers to fill jobs in cities like Hargeisa. So one would think this was the ultimate win-win: score international points, reportedly do a good job at something other governments would botch, gain a new Somali workforce and effectively integrate pirates (and their new salaries) into local communities (and economies). The only problem is that, despite all the time and effort, Wali says the government has no earthly intention of integrating these pirates here, not into Somaliland society.
A truck stop outside Zeila.
This resistance to the repatriation of the Hargeisa pirates seems to stem from the overarching local rhetoric that none (or only one or two) of the Somali pirates are actually Somalilanders. Just as the legitimate claim that there were no pirate bases or attacks directly on Somaliland’s coast over the years helped to bolster the nation’s sense of security, there’s significant national and rhetorical value in the visible disassociation of Somaliland from any connection to piracy, save antipirate justice and security.

Although Wali will reluctantly admit that they don’t really completely know the true identity of all the prisoners, he insists that all of the pirates currently in the Hargeisa prison are members of the Hawiye clan from warn-torn southern Somalia. When the new international darling government in Mogadishu gets on its feet and builds a prison up to international standards, he says, they will transfer all of the prisoners there. And even if Mogadishu never completes its prison, if the new government fails and international cooperation once again re-centers primarily upon Somaliland and neighbouring Puntland in the north, Wali maintains that they will deport the prisoners to the south after their terms are complete.

The inevitability of the transfer south makes the whole venture feel a little hollow. To Wali, the value of the rehabilitation seems to lie in the image of competence, international cooperation and compliance it projects, not to mention, he says, that it keeps the prisoners’ active and limits their time to plan escapes (Shawshank adventures appear to have been quite common in the older prisons). But the part of the plan that deals with the actual value of that training beyond the cell walls, the integration of pirates as rehabilitated citizens, and their potential to become valuable members of a local economy, has become a buck to be passed along the line to another government. At best, if the government in Mogadishu stabilises, then Somaliland lends its southern neighbour a hale and healthy influx of workers while steadily taking on the task of rehabilitating pirates from a grateful and overburdened Indian Ocean community. At the worst, they reintroduce ex-pirates to war and chaos, it all goes to pot, and they falter, recidivate, or worse. But for now the best we can say is we know where the pirates are washing up and what they’re up to now.

Itoobiya oo soo xidhay xafiiskeedii Garowe iyo Fiisayaashii Baasaaboor Somaliga oo Hargeysa loo soo wareejiyay



 

Warar isa soo taraya oo ka soo baxaya qaabkii Qunsuliyadda Itoobiya ku leedahay Hargeysa ayaa sheegaya in ay sadexdii maalmood ee u danbeeyay ay bilowday in ay Fiisayaal ku bixiso baasaaboorka E-passport-ka Somaliya kaasoo aanay hore u bixin jirin.

Sadexdii Maalmood ee u danbeeyay waxa Xarunta Qunsuliyadda Itoobiya ku leedahay hargeysa buux dhaafiyay dad sita Baasaaboorkaasi sida ay waaheen u xaqiijiyeen ilo wareedyo u dhuun daloolay dhaqdhaqaaqa Dadkaasi, waxaanay ku sababeeyeen ogolaanshaha ay Qunsuliyaddu ogolaatay in ay Baasaaboorka Somaliya Fiise ka siiso Hargeysa.

Ilo wareedyaddu waxa ay ku sababeeyeen Ogolaanshaha Qunsuliyadda Hargeysa ay ku bixinayso Fiisaha baasaaboor Somaliga Qunsulkii Itoobiya u fadhiyay Maamul Goboleedka Puntland oo u soo wareegay hargeysa, kaasoo ku bixinaya Hargeysa gudaheeda Fiisayaasha Passport-ka Somaliya.

Bixinta ay Qunsuliyaddu Fiisayaasha ku siinayso Passport-ka Somaliya ayaa u muuqda inuu ka dhex abuuray Qunsuliyadda iyo Xafiiska Laanta Socdaalka Somaliland dareen ah in ay Somaliland diidan tahay talaabadan cusub, waxaanay warar dheeraad ah oo Waaheen helaysaa sheegayaan in ay Cabsi wayn ka qabaan in Amaanku wiiqmo maadaama aanay Somaliland ogolayn Passport-ka Somaliya ee E-passport-ka.

Ma jiro war cad oo labada dhinac ka soo baxay oo ay Qunsuliyadduna ku ogolaatay ama ku sharaxday Nidaamka cusub ee ay ku bixinayso Fiisayaashan Passport-ka Somaliya, dhinaca Somaliland-na ilaa hada ma jiro wax talaabo ah oo muuqda oo ay arintan ka qaaday, hase yeeshee waxa soo baxaya warar tibaaxaya in xafiiska Socdaalka Somaliland ee Wajaale qab qabtay dad dhinaca Somaliland ka baxayay oo sitay Baasaabooro Somaliya ah oo Fiisayaal ka qaatay Qunsuliyadda Itoobiya ee Hargeysa.

Qunsulka Itoobiya u fadhiya Hargeysa Mr: Berha oo Wargeyska waaheen xalay khadka Telefoonka kula xidhiidhay ayaa u sheegay inaanay jirin Fiisayaal ay Baasaaboor Somaliga siinayaan, waxaanu ku dooday Xafiiskoodu kaliya inuu ku kooban yahay Baasaaboor Somaliland-ka.

Sidoo kale, wargeyska Waaheen oo saaka booqday Xafiiska Qunsulka ayaa kula kulmay barxada hore dhalinyaro farabadan iyo Dad kale oo u socdaali lahaa Itoobiya kuwaas oo ka cabanaya in culays farabadani ka jiro bixintii Fiisayaasha, waxaanay qaarkood ku doodeen in ay safaaradu soo kordhisay in ay Fiisayaal siiso baasaaboorka Dawladda Federalka ah ee Somaliya taasoo keentay in dadka Fiisa doonka ahi bataan.

Mid ka mid ah dhalinyarada Fiise doonka ah oo aan weydiinay halka uu ka yimi iyo baasaaboorka uu sito ayaa Waaheen u xaqiijiyay in uu ka yimi Garowe isla markaana uu sito baasaaboor Somali, waxaanu xusay in safaaradii Garowe arrimo dhinaca Amniga ah ay Itoobiya usoo xidhay isla markaana ay Ogeysiiyeen Hargeysa in ay usoo doontaan Fiisayaasha ay ku galayaan Itoobiya.

Somaliland iyo Itoobiya ayaa si wadajir ah u maarayn jiray hawlaha shaqo ee ay qabanyaan isla markaana ula socon jiray dhaqdhaqaaqa dhinac xuduudka labada Dal si isku mid ah taasoo keentay in ay labada Dalba ku qanacsanaayeen ilaalinta iyo hubinta dadka isaga gudbaya, basle arrintani waxa ay Somaliland ku soo kordhisay shaki ah in ay ugu soo dhex dhuuman karaan dad aanay aqoon u lahayn oo xorriyad u hela in ay ka samayn karaan dhaqdhaqaaq dhaawici kara amaanka labada dal gaar ahaana ka Somaliland oo ka feejigan tabaha iyo Xeeladaha kooxaha kacdoonada ka wada Mandaqada.

Agaasimaha Guud ee Wasaaradda Arrimaha Dibeda Somaliland oo aanu isku daynay inaanu wax ka weydiino ayaa ka gaabsaday arrintan, waxaanu ku af-gobaadsaday haddii ay jirto in ay kala xidhiidhi doonaan Qunsuliyadda isla markaana wax ka qaban doonaan.

Taliyaha Laanta Socdaalka Somaliland ayaa isna ka gaabsaday inuu macluumaad ka bixiyo arrintan, waxaanu xusay wali in ay ku jiraan baadhitaan la xidhiidha dhabnimada Warkan.