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Wednesday, March 6, 2013

WikiLeaks has more US secrets to reveal "Assange told Media"

Wikileaks founder Julian Assange. (AFP Photo / Leon Neal)
WikiLeaks still has some unreleased US government classified documents, but will not publish them as long as the website’s main informer, US Army Private Bradley Manning, undergoes court martial and faces a life sentence.

Julian Assange told Australia’s Fairfax Media on Tuesday that his team will not publish the sensitive data in order to protect the source connected to the US military - despite the fact that Bradley Manning admitted disclosure of classified documents to WikiLeaks project.


The WikiLeaks founder called Bradley Manning “America's foremost political prisoner” who “faces retribution for revealing the truth," the Sydney Morning Herald reports.


Manning leaked classified documents to WikiLeaks in early 2010. Since his arrest, Manning has spent over 1,000 days in prison. He has pleaded guilty to 10 charges and faces 20 years' imprisonment or even a life sentence if found guilty of aiding the enemy.


The Bradley Manning trial is set to start on June 3.
Pfc. Bradley E. Manning is escorted from a hearing, on January 8, 2013 in Fort Meade, Maryland. (AFP Photo / Mark Wilson)


\"We still can't publish it. It would be a questionable action to do so now while Bradley Manning has a potential life sentence hanging over his head," Assange said.

Last week Manning publicly accepted that he handed over hundreds of thousands of classified US State Department diplomatic cables to WikiLeaks. Manning maintained he expected the publication of these documents to push the American public to discuss the US foreign policy and military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Manning still stands a chance


Last week Bradley Manning read a 35-page statement in court explaining his motivation for publishing state secrets.

Julian Assange believes that this is a “very positive development” for Manning, who was allowed to share his views for the first time, and that this statement will “stimulate public debate about war.”


The prosecutors also accuse Manning of passing some classified memoranda of the CIA to WikiLeaks, an accusation much more serious than publishing diplomatic cables.


Julian Assange acknowledged that he "wouldn't go beyond what Manning has said" and cannot confirm whether or not the published CIA documents came from Manning.


"I can't say anything that might suggest that someone had been responsible for, or was party to, any further disclosure," he stressed.


Julian Assange also revealed that WikiLeaks no longer has a video exposing a US airstrike near Granai village in Afghanistan in May 2009 that killed up to 150 Afghan civilians, including many children. The video was acquired through Manning.


WikiLeaks prepared the video for release, but then team member Daniel Domscheit Berg left WikiLeaks, taking a number of important records with him. Berg later claimed he had destroyed the records.

"WikiLeaks no longer has a copy," Assange acknowledged.

In August 2010 WikiLeaks whistleblower posted a 1.4 gigabyte encrypted file called ‘Insurance’ to the World Wide Web. The file appeared to be a guarantee of staying safe for the members of WikiLeaks project, so that if any harm were to come their way a key to the encrypted file will be published and the world will know some really nasty secrets.

Julian Assange has not specified to the Fairfax Media what exact classified information WikiLeaks is going to publish once the Bradley Manning trial is over.

Venezuela announces death of Hugo Chavez

Venezuela's vice president
By Associated Press,

CARACAS, Venezuela — Venezuela’s defense minister is pledging that the military will remain loyal to the constitution in the wake of President Hugo Chavez’s death.


Admiral Diego Molero appeared on national television to appeal for “unity, tranquility and understanding” among Venezuelans.

He says troops will safeguard the sovereignty of the country.

The popular but controversial leader had won his fourth presidential term in 2012 but was never sworn due to his failing health.

The career military officer-turned-politician won friends and enemies as he launched poverty-fighting programs, nationalized key industries and forged alliances with other leftist leaders in Latin America -- particularly the Castro brothers in Cuba.

Rep. Mike Rogers, the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, issued a statement following news of Chavez's death: "Hugo Chavez was a destabilizing force in Latin America, and an obstacle to progress in the region. I hope his death provides an opportunity for a new chapter in U.S.-Venezuelan relations."

His political development took him from social democracy to what he called "Socialism of the 21st Century." His opponents, mostly from the upper-middle class and the wealthy, accused him of becoming a dictator in the mold of his mentor, Fidel Castro, who Chavez once described as being like a father to him.

In a 2002 profile on "60 Minutes," Chavez acknowledged his polarizing effect.


"I have been compared to Hitler, the devil himself. And what I do is struggle for a people. I am a true democrat," he told Steve Kroft.

Toward the end of his life, Chavez's health was treated as a state secret. He had four operations since June 2011, including one that removed a baseball-sized tumor from his pelvic region. Chavez returned to Venezuela Feb. 18 following his most recent surgery in Cuba, performed in December, and was undergoing further treatment at a military hospital in Caracas for what government officials described as a respiratory infection. Aside from several pictures released by the government, Chavez had been unseen by the public for months.



Chavez came to prominence in 1992 when he tried to overthrow then-President Carlos Andres Perez amid growing anger at the government's austerity measures. The coup failed but his message struck a chord with the 19 million Venezuelans living in poverty.

Chavez rose to power over the next six years with his fiery, populist stands against the rich and was elected president in 1998. He moved quickly to tighten control over the country's lucrative state-run oil industry, using the money to open free health clinics and expand social programs.

A new constitution backed by Chavez won a referendum with 72 percent of the vote, although there was only a 50 percent voter turnout. The new document included increased protection for indigenous peoples and women and established the right to education, housing, health care and food.


His strength lay with the country's poor. United Nations statistics show that by 1997, the year before Chavez won his first run for the presidency, the per capita income for Venezuelan citizens had fallen to $2,858 from $5,192 in 1990. Poverty levels had increased by 17.65 percent since 1980 and homicide and other crime rates had more than doubled since 1986, particularly in Caracas. The ground was ripe for the emergence of a populist leader. After his election, he launched a weekly television program -- "Hello President" -- where citizens could call in.


Although full of bravado and revolutionary rhetoric, Chavez's early policies could be described as moderate, capitalist and center-left. But his language turned increasingly radical, and defined himself as anti-imperialist and generally anti-capitalist.

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, accompanied by his wife Marisabel, pulls out the sword of South American independence hero Simon Bolivar, at the door of the tomb of Bolivar in Caracas July 24, 1999
In his second term in office Chavez forged tighter ties with Cuba. Closer relations with the socialist island went hand-in-hand with deteriorating relations with the United States. In 2006, continuing his outspoken criticism of the U.S., Chavez called then-President George W. Bush a "donkey."

Adding to the tension was Chavez's long list of dubious friends over the years - a who's who of America's enemies - from Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran, Muamaar Qaddafi in Libya, and Iraq's Saddam Hussein.


Chavez's self-styled revolution angered the opposition. He was accused of being a "messiah" and out of touch. In 2002, the opposition attempted to unseat Chavez, throwing him in jail in a bloodless coup.


In the days preceding the coup, the five main private Venezuelan TV stations gave advertising space to those calling for anti-Chavez demonstrations. The United States immediately extended recognition to the new government, which claimed Chavez had resigned. But Chavez supporters, both military and civilian, took back control of the presidential palace and freed him from the military barracks where he was being held.

Petroleum production loomed large over his tenure. Venezuela was, at the beginning of the 21st century, the world's fifth largest crude oil exporter. Oil accounted for around 85 percent of the country's exports. Chavez's predecessors tried to privatize the industry and U.S. corporations held significant control.


Chavez, however, set out to curb foreign control over Venezuela's natural resources by nationalizing much of it under the state-run oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela (PdVSA). By 2006, PdVSA had forced private corporations to relinquish at least 51 percent of their control over their 32 operating agreements dating back to the 1990s.


In 2007, Chavez founded and became the leader of United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). This, along with a crackdown on freedom of the press the previous year, led to opposition fears that he was planning to copy Cuba's single-party system and its tight control over civil rights.


Chavez supported Latin American and Caribbean cooperation and developed close ties with Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, in addition to Fidel and then Raul Castro in Cuba.


He was instrumental in setting up the pan-regional Union of South American Nations, The Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, The Bank of the South, and the regional television network TeleSur.


Chavez had a Twitter account with more than 1 million followers. Availability of Internet service in Venezuela rose by 43 percent in 2010 and the government set up nearly 700 community centers with computers and free Internet connections, with more planned.

One problem not solved by the Chavez administration was crime. Homicide rates were said to have more than doubled under his watch. Kidnappings also became more common. The construction of new homes and schools in Caracas' slums ran behind schedule.

However, though a polarizing force at home and abroad, there is no doubt that Chavez was an exceedingly popular leader, especially among poor and working class Venezuelans.

He leaves behind four children, three grandchildren and a nation forever marked by his 14-year reign.

War crimes suspect takes lead as Kenya counts votes

By Yara Bayoumy and George Obulutsa

(Reuters) - A politician wanted for war crimes in the Hague was leading in Kenya's presidential vote tally with about half of ballots counted on Tuesday in a country hoping to avert a repeat of ethnic carnage during its last vote five years ago.

Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta, who faces international charges of crimes against humanity linked to the last election, was provisionally ahead of Prime Minister Raila Odinga by 53 to 42 percent with about half the votes counted.

But Kenyatta, son of the country's independence leader and one of Africa's richest men, could still fall short of victory as the count goes on. Odinga's camp says results are not yet in from many of his strongholds.

If no candidate secures a 50 percent majority, a second round would have to be held.

Kenyans hope the vote will restore their nation's image as one of Africa's most stable democracies after bloodshed at the last election, when more than 1,200 people were killed in ethnic violence after a disputed result. Kenyatta denies charges at the Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC) that he unleashed death squads of his followers after the 2007 vote.

This time around, at least 15 people were killed in pockets of violence, but that is being seen as a broadly peaceful outcome and a big turnout is a positive sign. The real test will be whether the candidates and their backers accept the result.

"Nobody should celebrate, nobody should complain," election commission chairman Isaac Hassan told journalists, saying work was going on to resolve glitches and speed up the count. "We therefore continue to appeal for patience from the public."

The commission says provisional results may not be tallied until Wednesday, meaning an official declaration will not come until then or later.

Kenyatta's lead has held up so far, but with results from central areas arriving before those from remoter regions, 60 percent of polling stations have yet to report.

Odinga's camp said counting in their strongholds had not been completed yet and a debate over the fate of a sizeable number of rejected votes could help shift the balance.

Voting has often been on ethnic lines in Kenya, with Kenyatta hailing from the largest tribe, the Kikuyu, and Odinga from the smaller Luo tribe. Both men are also receiving support from the tribes of their vice presidential running mates.

The United States and Western donors have watched the vote closely, concerned about the stability of a nation seen as a regional ally in the fight against militant Islam.

They also worry about what to do if Kenyatta wins, because of the charges he faces in the Hague.

With memories of that violence still fresh, many Kenyans are determined to prevent a repeat and have vowed to accept the outcome, as have the candidates.

In a reminder of the regional importance of a country that has been allied with the West against Islamist militants, an explosion struck a predominantly Somali neighborhood in the capital Nairobi late on Tuesday, injuring one person.

INVESTOR RELIEF

"People should be patient; in 2007 Mr Odinga was leading against Mwai Kibaki in preliminary results, the following day when we woke up, things turned upside down and Kibaki won the elections. I believe the same thing would happen," said Christopher Otieno, 31, a seller of household wares.

Investors breathed a sigh of relief after voting passed off calmly, initially strengthening the Kenyan shilling against the U.S. dollar. The shilling later lost some of its gains after the slow count cast doubt on whether a first-round victor would emerge. Analysts said an outright win would be preferred to a run-off, which would prolong uncertainty.

The inspector general of the Kenyan police, David Kimaiyo, told a news conference he would not allow demonstrations anywhere in the country over delays in releasing the election results because of concerns protests could turn violent.

With turnout estimated by the election commission at more than 70 percent, a total of about 10 million votes must be tallied in the nation of 14.3 million eligible voters.

"Initially the sentiment was in favor of a first round win for Uhuru, but it's kind of difficult to gauge that now," said Ignatius Chicha, head of markets at Citibank.

William Ruto, Kenyatta's running mate who also faces charges of crimes against humanity at the ICC, called the vote "free, fair and credible".

Should Kenyatta and Ruto take office, Kenya would join neighboring Sudan as a country with a leader wanted by the court in the Hague. However, the two leaders say that unlike Sudan's Omar al-Bashir, they will not become fugitives.

During voting Ruto said: "We shall cooperate with the court with a final intention of clearing our names."

CREDIBILITY

Odinga's CORD party said it was still confident it would get back into the race as the counting continued, but also pointed to irregularities in the process including late voting by voters in some areas, hinting at legal challenges ahead. Odinga had questioned preparations before the poll.

Odinga's running mate, outgoing Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka, discouraged his rivals from "premature celebrations".

"We appeal for calm and call on our supporters to relax because we are confident that after all votes are in, CORD will carry the day," Musyoka said told a news conference.

The election commission acknowledged a polling clerk had been caught issuing extra ballots and said manual voter lists were used where the electronic registration system failed. But it has said there were no significant problems in voting.

Raising the stakes in the race, Odinga could be facing his last crack at the presidency after narrowly missing out in the disputed 2007 result to now-outgoing President Mwai Kibaki, who has served the maximum two five-year terms.

Kenya's African neighbors, whose economies felt the shockwaves from the violence last time, have watched intently. Some landlocked states which rely on Kenya for access to the coast stockpiled fuel and other material, worried that the vital trade route could again be cut if violence flared.

But violence on election day was limited to pockets in the north and east of the country.

At least 15 people were killed in two attacks by machete-wielding gangs in the Mombasa region hours before the vote on Monday. Police officers blamed a separatist movement, the Mombasa Republican Council, suggesting different motives to the ethnic killings after the 2007 vote. The MRC denied any role.

Alongside the presidential race, there were elections for senators, county governors, members of parliament, women representatives in county assemblies and civic leaders.

(Additional reporting by Joseph Akwiri in Mombasa, Richard Lough, Beatrice Gachenge, Duncan Miriri, Kevin Mwanza in Nairobi; Writing by Edmund Blair and James Macharia; Editing by Peter Graff)

Somalia: Dr. Weinstein Response to Commentary About Analysis of 'SFG Political Strategy'


By Michael A. Weinstein, 4 March 2013
opinion

On March 2, Mohamed Abdi Mohamed posted on Hiiraanonline and other Somali websites his "Commentary on Prof. Michael Weinstein's Article 'S.F.G.'s Strategy of Political Conflict dated February 23, 2013.'" As the writer who is the subject of Abdi Mohamed's commentary, I have decided to write a commentary on his commentary in order to try to clear up serious misunderstandings that appear in it. I approach my response not as a polemical attack, but as an opportunity to explain what I conceive my analyses of Somali politics to be, including the article that Abdi Mohamed addresses, which was posted on Garoweonline..

Before moving to a substantive discussion, it is necessary for me to address some observations that Abdi Mohamed makes that pertain to me personally and to my relationship with Garoweonline. Abdi Mohamed did not have to make those observations; they are completely independent of the substantive points that he makes and can only be intended to discredit the objectivity of my analyses. Reluctant as I am to do so, I believe that I should defend myself, because if I did not do so readers might believe that I have no adequate answer to Abdi Mohamed's effort to discredit my work.

The Personal Attack

At the outset of his commentary, Abdi Mohamed writes: "I would have thought that the Professor [Weinstein] would have found it appropriate to express an objective analysis of the Constitutional challenges facing Somalia and not allow himself to be a victim of misinformation and propaganda."

It is obvious that there are two ways of attacking an analyst personally; one can claim that he is willfully biased or one can say that he is an unknowing dupe, which is just what Abdi Mohamed says about me. Each of those personal attacks is devastating to the prime virtue of a political analyst: his objectivity. Perhaps Abdi Mohamed thinks that by calling me a dupe rather than a stealthy partisan, he is doing me a favor. Such, of course, is not the case; he is being patronizing and condescending, treating me as a child.

The answer that I have for Abdi Mohamed is: Read my writings on Somalia and understand that they are based on a methodology that requires me to read dozens of articles each day on Somalia, the Horn of Africa, and the international actors involved in Somalia; take notes on those articles and put those notes into sequential grids that generate timelines of events; and review those grids to discern the power configuration among the conjuncture of actors at a particular time. That basic methodology, which I have practiced regularly for seven years, is supplemented by a wide correspondence with Somali and non-Somali sources who provide me with information that is not available in open sources, and call attention to any inaccuracies or misinterpretations that appear in my analyses, making the methodology self-corrective.

Have grasped the methodology that I use, Abdi Mohamed is free to continue saying that I am a "victim of misinformation and propaganda." I think that his personal attack is ludicrous. I am not a "victim" of anything; Abdi Mohamed and I simply disagree and, in addition, he seems to misunderstand entirely what I am trying to do.

Not satisfied with attempting to cast me as a dupe, Abdi Mohamed proceeds to write: "It is, in my view, not coincidental that this article was published on the Garoweonline website which is owned and operated by relatives of the President of Puntland. It is also not a coincidence that the article seems to establish clear divides between Puntland and the Somali Federal Government (SFG)."

While I find it offensive to be cast as a dupe by Abdi Mohamed, I find it deplorable that he attempts to sully my relationship with Garoweonline, a relationship for which I am grateful and of which I am proud. I post on Garoweonline because it has extended a hand of friendship to me with no strings attached, and has always treated me with perfect respect and has given me complete freedom of expression without ever even suggesting what positions I should take, much less asking that I take a position. One could not wish for better editors.

Again the word "ludicrous" comes to mind. Those people who have read my analyses over the seven years that I have been writing them know that I give readings of the power distribution among political actors and make short-term predictions based on them. Sometimes one of the actors' perspectives coincides with one of my analyses, whereas the next analysis coincides with the perspective of another actor. That happens because I am trying to follow the power distribution rather than pursuing any particular political interest. My readers, including my editors at Garoweonline, are well aware of the many times that my analyses have not coincided with the positions of Puntland's government.

How does Abdi Mohamed get the idea that it is "not a coincidence" that the article that he addresses was posted on Garoweonline and that it "seems to establish clear divides" between Puntland and the S.F.G.? Would he say the same about the series of analyses I wrote about the possibility that Somalia would become balkanized? I establish divides to which my research directs me and I try to make them plain so that all the actors can see them and adjust their own positions accordingly, if they find my analysis to be cogent. My aim is for all the actors in the conjuncture to understand where they are positioned in relation to the others. Practically that kind of analysis should help prevent gross miscalculations by one actor or another. In the analysis that Abdi Mohamed has addressed, I was giving what I called an "early warning" of an impending conflict between the S.F.G. and Puntland unless genuine processes of reconciliation were undertaken.

Abdi Mohamed can back the S.F.G. against Puntland if that is what he wants to do; by doing so his statements become data for me to feed into a conflict analysis. Abdi Mohamed can dismiss Puntland if that is what he wants to do. I am simply warning Abdi Mohamed and the others who take his position that Puntland is not going to dismiss itself and that it is serious about its model of decentralized federalism. Does that mean that I am a propagandist for Puntland? If there is one rule that guides political analysis it is to take the position, interests, and power-resources of each actor seriously, and never to dismiss an actor. My bottom line to Abdi Mohamed is: Get real.

The Substantive Issues

Abdi Mohamed launches his personal attack at the very beginning of his commentary and then, thankfully, engages important substantive issues. The second half of his commentary is directed to policy recommendations for the S.F.G. Those will not concern me here; I am an analyst and I stay away from policy. I have no interest in telling Somalis, or anyone else, what to do - to repeat, I try to give the most accurate description of the power configuration that characterizes the current political situation in and around Somalia. Most of the first half of Abdi Mohamed's commentary, however, is relevant to political analysis and I will address it on those terms following in the order he examines the first three "core issues" that he defines: The Somali Identity, Federalism, and The role of the S.F.G.

On Somali identity, Abdi Mohamed and I are in full agreement that "Somalis share a common identity." "Wherever one goes on this planet, a Somali recognizes another Somali," says Abdi Mohamed. There is no doubt about that; the question is: What are the political implications of that fact?

I would simply say that the Somali identity that Abdi Mohamed puts forward is a social identity with no political implications that logically follow from it. The Somali people could be (and are) divided among different political entities and still remain Somalis. "The central issue is how to shape a nation 'e pluribus unum',"says Abdi Mohamed. Does he include the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, Djibouti, the Northeast Province of Kenya, and Somaliland? It is a serious conceptual mistake to confuse social identity with political identity. Social identity tends towards being a condition in which people find and acknowledge themselves and each other; political identity tends towards being a willed project and is subject to power and interest fluctuations.

I would say to Abdi Mohamed: The central issue is not how to shape a nation 'e pluribus unum,' but whether Somalis want such a nation and, if enough of them do, what political form it would take and to what extent it could be achieved in present circumstances.

It would be disingenuous of me to say that I do not have a position on the question of Somali political identity; it is the only value-commitment I have with regard to Somalia and Somalis: I would like the Somali people to be able to stand up and defend their interests with strength in the world at large. That is my "bias;" I am aware of it; I try not to let it affect my analyses, but it guides my selection of the topics that I address. If enough Somalis do not want to be strong in the world at large, if they want other things more, I will record that situation.

Having defined his basic aim of a unified Somali political community (nation), Abdi Mohamed moves to what I consider to be the fundamental issue of contemporary Somali politics: the form of federalism that Somalia will/might adopt. Abdi Mohamed says: "It would also appear that [Weinstein's] article seeks to publicize some potential disadvantages to Puntland if they embrace the centralized model supported by the Somali Federal Government."

Here again, Abdi Mohamed has fallen into a serious misunderstanding. Does he really mean that Puntland needs me to tell it that it will be disadvantaged if it embraces centralized federalism? Where does he think that I came up with the concepts of decentralized and centralized federalism if not from trying to find accurate terms with which to describe, respectively, Puntland's established and explicit position, and the S.F.G.'s emerging position? Puntland perceives that its vital interests are bound up with implementation of the decentralized federalist model. Abdi Mohamed cannot wish that away by blaming the analyst. Or does he think I have read Puntland's perceived and articulated interests incorrectly? Get real.

Then Abdi Mohamed challenges my thesis that the S.F.G. is seeking to establish dominance and control over the south-central regions, saying that I "fail to mention" what evidence I have to support my assertions. What response can I make? Half of the analysis that he addresses is evidence for my thesis. I go through the S.F.G.'s maneuvers in the south, the southwest, the east-central and central regions. What other evidence does he want? My point is that the S.F.G. does not have the military and financial power to defeat its rivals or buy them off, so it is using a divide-and-rule strategy. I say that the S.F.G.'s strategy is "intelligible" given the constraints (mainly due to the Western "donor"-powers) on it.

Then, turning to the role of the S.F.G., Abdi Mohamed plunges into his gravest misunderstanding when he writes: "While [Weinstein's] article seems to decry the motives of the S.F.G., it is remarkably silent on offering any constructive advice to the SFG."
-------
Here Abdi Mohamed shows that he does not have the slightest clue as to what political analysis does. First off, I do not in the slightest "decry" the S.F.G.; I simply try to describe and explain its strategy, showing that it is "intelligible." Indeed, one could make a case that I am sympathetic towards the S.F.G., because I am trying to understand why it has adopted a strategy of political conflict as the only path open to it for asserting political control. In examining that strategy, I note that it is high risk and could lead to confrontation with Puntland. That is not decrying anything; it is trying to assess the conjuncture of actors as a whole rather from the position and perspective of one of them (as Abdi Mohamed relentlessly does). Secondly, of course I do not offer advice to the S.F.G. or to Puntland or to any actor. What is so remarkable about that? An analyst produces analyses, not policy recommendations.

For the rest of his commentary, Abdi Mohamed fills the gap that he believes I have left by offering his recommendations for improving the S.F.G. I leave it to others to agree with him or dispute him, or offer their own recommendations. Policy is an essential and integral part of politics; there is no politics without it. I honor it and I do not partake of it.

Simply put, I am a diagnostician and not a therapist. It appears that Abdi Mohamed does not understand the distinction. Does he understand its analogue in his professional capacity as fraud examiner? When he uncovers fraud, does he also spend the second half of his report proposing reforms in the laws defining fraud or in accountancy? No doubt he might have ideas about how to improve fraud detection and punishment, but those ideas would not go into his report uncovering fraudsters; they would go elsewhere. I think Abdi Mohamed understands the distinction perfectly, so why won't he extend the same courtesy to me as a political analyst?

Envoi

Abdi Mohamed begins his commentary with the metaphor of the "two-edged blade that can be used to cut an intended object but also cut the user if he or she is not careful." I reply: It is fruitless to try to cut a stone with a butter knife.

Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University in Chicago weinstem@purdue.edu

Tuesday, March 5, 2013

EHAHRDP WELCOMES the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders presented yesterday to the 22nd session of the Human Rights Council being held in Geneva.




PRESS RELEASE:

Geneva: Special Rapporteur on HRDs Highlights Role of National Human Rights Institutions

5th March 2013

The East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project welcomed the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders presented yesterday to the 22nd session of the Human Rights Council being held in Geneva. In her report, Madam Margaret Sekaggya highlighted the role that national human rights institutions (NHRIs) that operate in compliance with the Paris Principles can play as human rights defenders and in support of human rights defenders.

Observing the interactive dialogue in Geneva, EHAHRDP’s executive director, Hassan Shire said: “The Special Rapporteur has recognized that NHRI members and staff – in common with their fellow HRDs, be they lawyers, teachers, activists, journalists, or indeed private individuals – face serious challenges and constraints. Whatever role they play, States must ensure the protection of all human rights defenders to carry out their work.”

While the primary responsibility to protect the rights of human rights defenders, as Madam Sekaggya concurred, remains with States, EHAHRDP calls on NHRIs to implement the Special Rapporteur’s recommendation to establish focal points or entities dedicated to human rights defenders with special attention to the most-at-risk groups of defenders. NHRIs and States should ensure that these focal points have adequate resources to enable them to provide meaningful support to HRDs when they need protection.

EHAHRDP has raised its concerns about the ongoing restrictions, harassment and attacks on human rights defenders in Sudan in a written statement submitted to the Human Rights Council. In December 2012, the Government closed down several civil society organisations. When a group of CSOs attempted to submit a petition against these and similar restrictions to the National Human Rights Commission, they were stopped by police and security services. The NHRC (which has not been accredited by the International Coordinating Committee of NHRIs) condemned the security forces’ actions as “an attack on the integrity of the Commission and its immunity.” EHAHRDP calls on the Government of Sudan to allow human rights defenders to operate freely in the country.

The Special Rapporteur expressed her concern at information she had received on cases of reprisals against HRDs cooperating with UN and regional human rights mechanisms, and reiterated once again her belief that such acts are unacceptable. She expressed her concern about “a trend of misuse or selective use of different types of legislation to restrict, criminalize and stigmatize the work of human rights defenders in all parts of the world.”

Following the general elections that took place yesterday in Kenya, it is timely to reiterate the call made by the Special Rapporteur in her observations on communications transmitted to Governments, for the Government of Kenya to take all measures to ensure that human rights defenders will be able to monitor events freely, without restrictions and without fear of persecution in order to guarantee that all due processes are followed.

For more information, please contact:

Mr Hassan Shire, Executive Director on +41 793 375 875, +256 772 753 753, executive@defenddefenders.org or hshire@yorku.ca

International Human Rights group urges U.N. not to lift Somalia arms embargo

By Louis Charbonneau

(Reuters) - The human rights group Amnesty International warned the U.N. Security Council on Monday not to lift the 21-year-old arms embargo in place for Somalia as called for by a draft resolution, describing the idea as premature.

The 15-nation council is considering lifting the U.N. arms embargo on Somalia's government for one year so it can beef up its army to combat Islamist fighters, according to a draft resolution obtained by Reuters.

"Without adequate safeguards, arms transfers may expose Somali civilians to even greater risk and worsen the humanitarian situation," said Gemma Davies, Amnesty International's Somalia researcher.

"For several years, the arms embargo on Somalia has been continuously violated with arms supplied to armed groups on all sides of the conflict. The flow of arms to Somalia has fueled serious human rights abuses committed during the conflict," Davies said in a statement.

The Amnesty statement described the idea as "premature."

The Somalia government has asked for the arms embargo to be lifted and the United States has been pushing the council to agree, but Britain and France have been wary of removing the ban in a country already awash with weapons, diplomats say.

The draft resolution, drawn up by Britain and obtained by Reuters, appears to propose a compromise: lifting the arms embargo for one year but keeping restrictions in place on heavy weapons such as surface-to-air missiles, howitzers and cannon.

The draft says the arms embargo shall not apply to the deliveries of other "weapons or military equipment or the provision of advice, assistance or training, intended solely for the development of the security forces of the federal government of Somalia and to provide security for the Somali people."

The Security Council imposed the arms embargo in 1992 to cut the flow of arms to feuding warlords, who a year earlier had ousted dictator Mohamed Siad Barre and plunged Somalia into civil war. Last year Somalia held its first national vote since 1991 to elect a president and prime minister.

RUSSIA WANTS CONSENSUS

The council plans to vote on the draft resolution later this week before the mandate of the 17,600-strong African Union peacekeeping force, known as AMISOM, expires on Thursday.

Council diplomats said the idea of lifting the arms embargo remains contentious and the draft resolution could be amended before it is put to a vote.

"We must reach consensus," Russian U.N. Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, president of the Security Council this month, said about the proposal to lift the arms embargo for a year.

"Is it going to be a blanket lifting of the arms embargo or something more nuanced?" he said. "This is something which is still an ongoing matter of discussions among council members."

Some council members are concerned about the security risks involved with removing the embargo. Other diplomats say it is important to make acquiring arms easier for the Somali government, which they say is affected more than the rebels by the arms embargo.

U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon last month suggested the Security Council consider lifting the arms embargo to help rebuild Somalia's forces and consolidate military gains against al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab militants.

The Security Council's Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, an independent panel that reports on compliance with U.N. sanctions, have warned that the Islamist militants in Somalia are receiving weapons from distribution networks linked to Yemen and Iran, diplomats have told Reuters.

A U.N. diplomat also said the U.N. monitors had reported that some al Shabaab militants had infiltrated units of the Somali security forces.

(Additional reporting by Michelle Nichols; Editing by Mohammad Zargham)

Qaraxaan Khasaaraha badan geystay ayaa ka dhacay guri daganaayeen masuuliyiin iyo askar badan badan oo ka tirsan Xarakada Al Shabaab


Qaraxaan Khasaaraha badan geystay ayaa ka dhacay guri ku yaala magaalada Buula barde ee gobolka Hiiraan ee dalka Soomaaliya kaasi oo ay daganaayeen masuuliyiin iyo askar badan badan oo ka tirsan Xarakada Al Shabaab.


Wararka ka imaanaya magaaladaasi ayaa sheegaay in mar qura la maqlay qarax aad u xoogan oo gil gilay guud ahaan magaalada Buula barde iyagoona dadka si aad ah ula yaabay qaraxaan xooga badan iyo halka uu ka dhacay.

Hayee shee daqiiqado kadib waxaa dad goob joogayaal ah ay warbaahinta u sheegeen in guri ku yaala magaalada Buula barde ee gobolka Hiiraan ayna dagan yihiin mas uuliyiin iyo askar ka tirsan Xarakada Al Shabaab uu ka dhacay qarax xoogan isla markaana ay ku geeriyooden ilaa iyo 40 qof oo Al Shabaab ka tirsan.

Qaraxaan ka dhacay magaalada Buula barde waxaa ka hadlay Afhayeenka Maamulka Gobolka Hiiraan ee dowladda Soomaaliya Max?ud Nuur Cagajoof kaasi oo sheegay in uu xaqiijinayo geerida 40 qof oo ka tirsan kooxda Al Shabaab kadib markii uu la qarxay miino ay ku hayeen guri ay daganaayeen oo ku yaala magaalada Buula Barde.

Si kastaba ha ahaatee ma jirto ilaa iyo hada wax war ah oo ka soo baxay dhanka Xarakada Al Shabaab oo ku aadan qarax la sheegay in ay kaga geeriyoodeen 40 qof oo ka tirsan askar iyo mas uuliyiin Al Shabaab ah.

source: Hadhwanaagnews/Office Muqdisho

Monday, March 4, 2013

Somaliland: National Intelligence Service Confirms Arrest of Suspected Terrorists

HARGEISA - In a press statement in which the Somaliland National Intelligence Service confirmed the arrest also provided members of the public a three pointed advice:

1.    The recently approved Intelligence Service Law gives the security forces legal authority to arrest and detain any person be it an ordinary citizen, civil servant or member of any branch of the security forces for investigation.

2.   The people reported by the Newspapers together with others are in custody for investigation

3. Finally be informed that there are ongoing broad based anti-terrorism       operations nationwide by various security agencies.

We therefore ask citizens to cooperate with security agencies and inform on any person known to be a terrorist or has terrorism links regardless of his/her station in life and without fear or favour.

The statement also informed citizens not to fear being arrested without cause since the security agencies are pursuing people who have been under surveillance for some time thus a need to undertake intense investigations.

Sunday, March 3, 2013

Somalia Asks US to Grant Immunity for Former PM


By MATTHEW BARAKAT Associated Press 
McLEAN, Va. March 2, 2013 (AP)


 Somalia's newly recognized government is asking the State Department to grant immunity to a former prime minister who was found responsible in a U.S. court for human-rights abuses.

 The letter issued this week by the Federal Republic of Somalia's prime minister, Abdi Farah Shirdon, seeks immunity for Mohamed Ali Samantar, who now lives in Fairfax but was a top official in dictator Siad Barre's regime in the 1980s and early 1990s.

 Last year, a federal judge in Alexandria awarded seven Somali victims a $21 million judgment against Samantar for orchestrating a campaign of torture and killings against members of the Isaaq clan. Samantar fought the case for years, arguing that U.S. courts had no right to pass judgment on internal Somali affairs. On the eve of trial, he declared bankruptcy and entered a default judgment while continuing to pursue his immunity claim in an appeals court. While he accepted legal liability for the killings, he denied wrongdoing.

 At the time, Samantar was denied immunity in large part because there was no functioning government to claim immunity on his behalf. After Barre's regime collapsed in 1991 the country lacked a true central government for more than 20 years. But in January, the U.S. formally recognized the new Somali government.

 Samantar's attorney, Joseph Peter Drennan, said he expects the U.S. to honor Somalia's request and the case to be dismissed. The 4th U.S. Circuit of Appeals rejected an appeal filed by Samantar last year, but Drennan said Friday he will file papers with the U.S. Supreme Court on Monday to have the case tossed out.

 "We fully expect the U.S. will honor this request for immunity," Drennan said. "To do otherwise would represent an affront to the government of Somalia."

 State Department press officers did not respond to questions about the case Friday.

 The fact that the Somali prime minister, who was himself an official in the Barre regime, requested the immunity so soon after receiving U.S. recognition reflects the importance of the case to the Somali government, Drennan said. He said the new government is seeking to move beyond the old score-settling of clan-based grievances, and lawsuits like the one brought in Virginia by members of the Isaaq clan "represent a threat to efforts to promote peace and reconciliation."

 Kathy Roberts, a lawyer for the San Francisco-based Center for Justice and Accountability, said Somalia's immunity request for Samantar is disappointing.

 "In his meeting with Secretary of State Clinton in January, (Somali) President (Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud) made a commitment to restore faith in governance and the rule of law. Embracing impunity for war criminals is a disappointing beginning," she said in a statement.

 The Somali prime minister's request for immunity for Samantar goes to the State Department. If the State Department decides to honor it, it would be up to a court to dismiss the case.

 In rejecting Samantar's immunity claim last year, the appeals court said the executive branch's recommendation is a big factor in determining immunity, but not the only one. It also said abuses such as torture and extrajudicial killings, like those Samantar was accused of, may never be eligible for protection.

 The case against Samantar was initially filed in 2004 and has already been heard once by the U.S. Supreme Court. Initially the district court judge granted immunity to Samantar but the Supreme Court reinstated the case.

Saturday, March 2, 2013

Somalia, newly recognized by US, seeks immunity for former minister Samantar in civil case

McLEAN, Va. — Somalia’s newly recognized government is asking the State Department to grant immunity to a former prime minister who was found responsible in a U.S. court for human-rights abuses.

The letter issued this week by the Federal Republic of Somalia’s prime minister, Abdi Farah Shirdon, seeks immunity for Mohamed Ali Samantar, who now lives in Fairfax but was a top official in dictator Siad Barre’s regime in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Last year, a federal judge in Alexandria awarded seven Somali victims a $21 million judgment against Samantar for orchestrating a campaign of torture and killings against members of the Isaaq clan. Samantar fought the case for years, arguing that U.S. courts had no right to pass judgment on internal Somali affairs. On the eve of trial, he declared bankruptcy and entered a default judgment while continuing to pursue his immunity claim in an appeals court. While he accepted legal liability for the killings, he denied wrongdoing.

At the time, Samantar was denied immunity in large part because there was no functioning government to claim immunity on his behalf. After Barre’s regime collapsed in 1991 the country lacked a true central government for more than 20 years. But in January, the U.S. formally recognized the new Somali government.


Samantar’s attorney, Joseph Peter Drennan, said he expects the U.S. to honor Somalia’s request and the case to be dismissed. The 4th U.S. Circuit of Appeals rejected an appeal filed by Samantar last year, but Drennan said Friday he will file papers with the U.S. Supreme Court on Monday to have the case tossed out.

“We fully expect the U.S. will honor this request for immunity,” Drennan said. “To do otherwise would represent an affront to the government of Somalia.”

State Department press officers did not respond to questions about the case Friday.

The fact that the Somali prime minister, who was himself an official in the Barre regime, requested the immunity so soon after receiving U.S. recognition reflects the importance of the case to the Somali government, Drennan said. He said the new government is seeking to move beyond the old score-settling of clan-based grievances, and lawsuits like the one brought in Virginia by members of the Isaaq clan “represent a threat to efforts to promote peace and reconciliation.”

Kathy Jackson, a lawyer for the San Francisco-based Center for Justice and Accountability, said Somalia’s immunity request for Samantar is disappointing.

“In his meeting with Secretary of State Clinton in January, (Somali) President (Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud) made a commitment to restore faith in governance and the rule of law. Embracing impunity for war criminals is a disappointing beginning,” she said in a statement.

The Somali prime minister’s request for immunity for Samantar goes to the State Department. If the State Department decides to honor it, it would be up to a court to dismiss the case.
In rejecting Samantar’s immunity claim last year, the appeals court said the executive branch’s recommendation is a big factor in determining immunity, but not the only one. It also said abuses such as torture and extrajudicial killings, like those Samantar was accused of, may never be eligible for protection.

The case against Samantar was initially filed in 2004 and has already been heard once by the U.S. Supreme Court. Initially the district court judge granted immunity to Samantar but the Supreme Court reinstated the case.

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