A group photo in Leningrad in 1968. Seated military officers are Colonel Doonyaale (at the left), Hassan Farah Matan (the man in the spectacles was a graduate from Sandhurst military academy in Britain; currently living in Dubai) and Soviet Tutors (all are Generals). Standing are Mohamed Aalim, the late Hassan Mohamud Roble and one of their Soviet tutors.
Mohamed Haji (Ingiriis)
Saturday, May 21, 2011
Colonel Ibrahim Rooble Warfaa “Doonyaale” was one of the greatest military leaders in post-independence Somalia. Born in an area between Harardheere and Ada-Kibir – a locality of Adado town in central Somalia – he raised in Eelbuur where his talent surfaced beneath the surface. Soon he emerged to be a self-trained swimmer and trainer.
During the rainy seasons of the 1940s, the city of Eelbuur was known to be carved into two separate quarters by torrential floods. According to some of his peers in the military, the rationale of why Doonyaale was nicknamed ‘Doonyaale’ was his invention of an archaic boat in Eelbuur at the age of 13 in order to craft access to cross the deluge.1
In 1954, Doonyaale enlisted in the first group of Somali cadets to be taken to Italy for military training. Pointing out to their last military ranks, the cadets, consisted of 14 young officers, were:
1. Colonel Mohamed Nuur Mohamed “Baarqab”.
2. Colonel Elmi Nuur Tarambi.
3. Colonel Ibraahim Rooble Warfaa “Doonyaale”.
4. Colonel Hassan Mohamed Sabriye “Gaamuur”.
5. Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed.
6. Colonel Abuukar Gacal Muudeey.
7. Lieutenant General Mohamed Ali Samatar.
8. Brigadier General Mohamed Farah Aideed.
9. Brigadier General Salaad Gabeyre Kediye.
10. Brigadier General Abuukar Xasan Weheliye “Suulaleey”.
11. Major General Cabdalla Mohamed Faadil.
12. Brigadier General Mohamed Jama Xarbi.
13. Brigadier General Nuur Addow Ali.
14. Brigadier General Mohamed Ali Mohamed “Sharmaan”.
Upon three years of military training, Doonyaale and his group returned to Mogadishu in the summer of 1957, travelling by ship from Italy2. In July 1960, General Daa’uud Abdulle Hersi, the father of Somali Armed Forces, instructed Doonyaale to conduct an examination of new Somali cadets to be enlisted in the army. In his close scrutiny - with the help of Salad Gabeyre - Doonyaale selected below officers to be taken to Italy for military training (I point out to their last military ranks as well):
1. Colonel Aweys Jeylaani (a man from Hamarweyne neighbourhood of Mogadishu; he was a number one at that examination). He is now a well-known businessman in Mombasa, Kenya.
2. Lt Colonel Mohamed Ismail Ibrahim known as Sera Sera Sete (777). He currently lives in both Manchester, the UK and Germany3.
3. Colonel Mohamed Ahmed Aalim. He later became Ambassador to Pakistan, currently living in London4.
4. Colonel Hassan Mohamud Roble “Hassan Dheere”. He passed away in Kampala, Uganda, in peacefully.
5. Colonel Mohamed Hassan Barre Tooxow. He was assassinated during the time of Barre.
6. Captain Mohamud Ali Hawiye known as ‘Mohamud Ga’amey’. He once was deputy of Salad Gabeyre in the Military Operations Command. In 1969, he was the head of Military Hospital in Mogadishu, Isbitaalka Xoogga. Nevertheless, Barre sacked him from the military out of clan. He now lives in Venray, the Netherlands.
7. Lieutenant Colonel Mohamud Sheikh Aden, a brother of former Somali Ambassador to Paris, France, Dr Abdi Sheikh Aden, who currently lives in London. However, Mohamud passed away in peacefully.
8. Captain Abdullahi Ahmed Shire nicknamed “Shaxam”. He died in calmly.
9. Colonel Aweys Sheekh Maxamed. He died in peacefully.
10. Colonel Mohamud Sheikh Qaamoow. He currently lives in Qoryooley, Somalia.
11. Colonel Jama Ali Jama, one of the longest political prisoners of Barre. On the night of 21 October 1969, he was sent to lead the unit commissioned to capture Radio Mogadishu. He currently lives in London.
12. Major General Omar Haji Mohamed Masalle. Barre promoted him out of clan nepotism while ‘the Doonyaale’ that registered him in the military was left Colonelship. In the early 1980s he became acting Minister of Defence in Barre regime. Omar currently lives in Liecester, the UK.
13. Major General Yusuf Ahmed Salxaan. One of the aides of Barre, he later became Minister of Tourism. He currently lives in Virginia, America.
14. Brigadier General Yusuf Ahmed Tallan. One of the most talented in his group, he was murdered in Mogadishu during President Abdikassim Salad’s tenure.
15. Brigadier General Abukar Mohamed Mohamud “Aftooje”. Later on his life, he became an intellectual who mastered military history. He was the husband of the ‘phenomenal lady’, Fawzia Yusuf Haji Adam who contested for Somaliland Presidency. He passed away in London in peacefully.
16. Major Abdirashid Sheikh Hussein. He passed away in calmly.
17. Colonel Ahmed Iise Abdi. He was a cousin of Ali Shiddo Abdi, former SYL chairman and Somali Ambassador to Paris, France and Riyad, Saudi Arabia.
18. Colonel Bashiir Yusuf Elmi. He was a member of Barre’s Supreme Revolutionary Council and was killed in an unknown bullet in Mogadishu during the height of the civil war.
19. Captain Abdikadir Iise Ali. He was killed in a bomb explosion in 1967 in Somalia.
20. Lieutenant Colonel Abdi Mohamed “Gaawiido”. This man was allegedly killed by Abdullahi Yusuf in Ethiopia.
21. Captain Muhiddiin Ismaaiil known by his peers “Ina Xabiibo”. He was killed in Ethiopia.
22. Captain Saadak Mohamed. He was killed in a bomb explosion that believed to be intended to assassinate the late President, Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke in 1968.
23. Brigadier General Mohamud Hussein Daa’uud known as Iminka or Hiirane. He currently lives in America. According to him, Barre ordered him in 1965 to write down for him all the clans and sub-clans of Somali Military Officers, claiming that he refused.
24. Colonel Abdiaziz Hassan “Womo”. He now lives in America.
25. Colonel Abdi Warsame Isaak, a long-time aide of Siad Barre. He is currently in severe health condition at hospital in London.
26. Colonel Osman Maye. He died in Somalia in normal way.
27. Colonel Abdikadir Haji Mohamed Masalle, a member of Barre’s Supreme Revolutionary Council and judge in National Security Court – Maxkamadda Badbaadada Qaranka. He was the right-hand man of Barre for many years while his brother (General Omar Haji Masalle) and brother-in-law (Abdirashid Sheikh Ali Sufi) were in prison. He currently lives in London.
This group comprised of three tank officers, two military vehicle officers, three mining operations officers, two communications officers, two financial administration officers, five artillery officers and ten infantry officers. However, General Talan, General Aftooje and Col Abdikadir Haji Masalle were not taken to Italy and left in Mogadishu.
Following the outbreak of war with Ethiopia in 1964, Doonyaale, a Major in the military at the time as well as the commanding officer of Birjeex brigade in Northern Military Sector, was the only officer that crossed what Somalis regarded Xad-beenaadka. Our renowned singer, the late Seynab Haji Ali Siigaale, popularly known as Baxsan, added her voice in praising Doonyaale in a song released on Radio Mogadishu in 1964 “Rooblow... Rooblow... Ma run baa?”
Start from the right: Gen Harbi, Gen Aideed, Col Abdullahi Yusuf, Gen Nuur Addow, Gen Salad Gabeyre, Col Doonyaale, Col Hassan Gaamuur, Gen Abdalla Faadil, Col Elmi Nur, Gen Samatar, Col Baarqab, Col Abukar Gacal, Col Abukar Suulaley and Gen Sharmaan.
Consequently, General Daa’uud promptly accepted a proposal suggesting two stars had to be awarded to Doonyaale (one heroic gold medal and one promotion), thus becoming a Lieutenant Colonel while his peers were Majors at that time. He was the first Somali recipient of those decorations.
In 1965, Doonyaale was sent to Leningrad Military Academy for senior military officer training and modern weaponry. Nonetheless, when Barre staged his coup d’état, Doonyaale was still in Leningrad, studying military logistics. Upon returning to Mogadishu, Barre barred him from the military service. After two years of unemployment from public service, Barre appointed Doonyaale to be the General Manager of Las Qorey Fish Industry. A decree signed by Barre was written in this way:
DECRETO DEL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO RIVOLUZIONARIO SUPREMO
1 Settembre 1971, N. 105.5
Nomina del Colonnello Ibrahim Roble Warfa a General Manager dell’Industria di Las-Kore.
IL PRESIDENTE
DEL CONSIGLIO RIVOLUZIONARIO SUPREMO
VISTA la Prima Carta della Rivoluzione;
VISTA la Legge n. 1 del 21 Ottobre 1969;
RITENUTO la necessita di nominare il Col Ibrahim Roble Warfa a General Manager dell’Industria di Las-Kore;
DECRETA:
ARTICOLO UNICO
Il Colonnello Ibrahim Roble Warfa e stato nominato General Manager dell’Industria del pesce di Las-Kore.
Mogadiscio, li 1 Settembre 1971.
IL PRESIDENTE
del Consiglio Rivoluzionario Supremo
Gen. Div. Mohamed Siad Barre
In spite of this, by 1976, Doonyaale was reregistered in the Army in order to join the Somali-Ethiopian Battle of 1977, notwithstanding that he attested without fear about his steadfast adversary of dictatorial regime. In 1978, Doonyaale was arrested and accused of assisting the abortive coup of Colonel Mohamed Sheikh Osman “Cirro and Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. Upon his release in 1981, Doonyaale was nominated by Barre to be the Director of ADC. He was again arrested in 1990 for his association of Manifesto Group soon after they wrote a letter demanding dictator’s departure.
Unfortunately, Doonyaale lost his life in what turned out to be a futile attempt to capture Barre. He was assassinated in January 1991. Rumour is still rife in Somalia and beyond that his elimination was orchestrated by either Aideed or Barre.
May Allah rest Doonyaale in peace, aamiin.
Notes:
1. A conversation I had with Ahmed Suleyman Dafle in Garde de Noord, Brussels, at the end of 2004.
2. A conversation I had with Hassan Gaamuur in Minneapolis and in Virginia in 2008.
3. The most staggering man in this group was Sera Sera Sete. I interviewed him more than twice in London. In 1971, he witnessed that some of his peers (captains, like Masalle brothers) were promoted Majors and Lieutenant Colonels, so he wore the military uniform of Lt Colonel without Barre’s approval. When Barre asked him why he wore it, he said, “Didn’t you say on the radio that promotion had to come from the public, thus the people of Xarardheere promoted me to wear this uniform after having considered my hard-work”. He was arrested and then sacked from the military.
4. I am indebted much to Ambassador Aalim who assisted me in compiling this list.
5. Bullettino Ufficiale, supp. N.2 al N. 8, 20/08/1972.
Mohamed Hagi (Ingiriis)
Ingiriis@yahoo.com
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Wednesday, July 27, 2011
The "Letter-of-Death" by General 'Morgan'
January 23, 1987
Following is the famous "Letter-of-Death" as translated into English by Mohamoud Sheikh Ahmed Musa, former President of the Supreme Court, including his explanatory notes as footnotes:1
The report is addressed to the President of the SDR, the Minister of Defence, and the Minister of Interior. The latter, Major-General Ahmed Suleiman Abdalla, is also a son-in-law of the President, and Third Deputy Prime Minister. Since President Barre is also the Minister of Defence -- the previous holder of that portfolio, General Mohamed Ali Samatar, having been promoted Prime Minister on January 30, 1987 -- the report is seemingly confined to family members. This would explain its extreme frankness in specifying certain clans as targets for implemented and recommended punitive action.
The target is the Isaaq Clan Family. The term "clan family" was first coined by Professor I.M. Lewis, Professor Social Anthropology at the London School Economics, to describe the collective name for each of the several major divisions to which Somali clans traditionally divide themselves. The Isaaq clan family sub-divides into four main clans.
Top Secret
The Somali Democratic Republic
The Ministry of Defense
26th Sector G.H.Q.
TQ 826/XKT/28-56/87
Date: 23/01/87
Report
To: The President of the SDR
The Minister of Defence, SDR
The Minister of Interior, SDR
Please refer to the report on the state of the defence and security of the 26th Sector's area of control which I transmitted on 17.1.87.2
The security of the North West and Togdheer Regions has deteriorated. The Ethiopians brought additional troops to the area with the objective of securing a foothold similar to [those of] Balan Balle and Galdogob.3 As you gathered from my previous report, they did not succeed in their joint incursion. Subsequently we took punitive measures against the positions jointly occupied by Qurmis4 and the Ethiopians resulting in loss to both of them and in the obliteration of villages, including Dibiile, Rabaso, Raamaale, and Garanuugle.5 All our measures were implemented at night and, except for some light injuries, all the troops returned safely to base.
Following their incursions and their consequent losses, Qurmis resorted to appealing to clan sentiment and began to sound a clarion call to action under [the slogan] "On Isaaq clans!".6 Their objective is to present the curfew7 as a persecution of their own people. Similarly, they directed a propaganda campaign at the people to the effect that they were about to capture the North West Region and Togdheer.
This much can be gathered from the expressions written on the walls of buildings and from the leaflets distributed in Gabiley District, and at Allaybaday village, Lughaya District.8 All this is an indication of a resurgence of anti-State clan sentiment. They have appealed to their various sections to recruit 2000 persons for Qurmis to be trained in Awaare.<$FAwaare, south of Hargeisa, is deep in Somali-populated eastern Ethiopia , in the area commonly known as the Ogaden. So far, 400 individuals have joined. Similarly, 60 Sa'ad Muuse members of the Faraweyne Front9 and a lieutenant who was their commanding officer gave themselves up to the Ethiopians and the Qurmis following the capture of the State-wreckers. The rest stole into the bush out of fear, but they have now started to return to the village.
Comrade President, Comrades:
It has been demonstrated to us that, unless Qurmis and its supporters are subjected to a campaign of obliteration, there will come a time when they will raise their heads again. But, today, we possess the right remedy for the virus in the [body of the] Somali State . It consists of:
Balancing the well-to-do to eliminate the concentration of wealth [in the hands of the SNM supporters].
The reconstruction of the Local Council in such a way as to balance its present membership which is exclusively from a particular people; as well as the dilution of the school population with an infusion of children from the Refugee Camps in the vicinity of Hargeisa.10
Rendering uninhabitable the territory between the army and the enemy, which can be done by destroying the water tanks and the villages lying across the territory used by them for infiltration.
Removing from the membership of the armed forces and the civil service all those who are open to suspicion of aiding the enemy -- especially those holding sensitive posts.
We set out below for your information those steps of the planned action already implemented:
Before now the number of buses used as public transport were 337, two-thirds of which were owned by members of one clan (the Sa'ad Muuse). However, when, on investigation, it became clear that most of the buses were not operating in accordance with security procedures, due to defects in their registration and circulation documents; and when information received revealed that they were sometimes used to carry drugs11 or persons open to suspicion, in secrecy and without notification to the security organisations; and since the number of buses greatly exceed the needs of the city, the following decisions were adopted and implemented:
(a) the number of the buses must not exceed 80;
(b) every bus must have a serial number for identification purposes;
(c) the buses must be evenly distributed amongst the districts of the city, with each bus limited to a particular route and departure and finishing points;
(d) a just and balance redistribution of licences regulating bus ownership in such a way as to give preference to persons relating to the Revolution, and to deny those politically opposed to it; six four-wheel drive vehicles were confiscated at Berbera harbour, and similarly, the removal of vehicles in the city is in progress; those found to be serviceable will be mounted with weapons and the others used as transport for reconnaissance purposes and for officers in command of forces in forward positions; we are also engaged in a process of reclassifying transport.
Of the persons detained as suspected supporters of Qurmis, 45 are from Hargeisa, 30 from Burao, while seven are officers. Most of them are businessmen and well-to-do people, while some are headmen (Nabadoons).12 They are held in Mandhera prison. However, it is hereby requested that they be transported urgently to Laanta Buur prison, or Bari prison, etc.13 in order to ensure their continued incarceration during the reorganisation of the local prisons which show many defects from a security standpoint.
The Western Somali Liberation Front14 has been remobilized, and 300 men have been stationed at a place near Geed-Deeble.15 According to plan, they will be re-armed and then put amidst those brigades and battalions considered to be capable of furthering the fight against Qurmis. At the same time they can implement operations inside [Ethiopia ] whenever required.
Since it has become evident that the Isaaq were, by act and intent, with the SNM; and since we could not see them giving up the line they have pursued so deceptively for some time; and in order to forestall them; we arranged for the other inhabitants of the North continuous meetings and a mobilization campaign designed to rouse them to action and to raise their level of awareness. This was intended to strengthen their unity and to surround Somali unity with a defensive wall. Among those inhabitants are: the Awdal people, the various sections of Western Somalis, the Las Qorey people, and the Daami people, etc.16 There is no doubt that the unity of these people will restore the balance of the scales which are now tipped in favour of the Isaaq. If they attack their tasks energetically, their unity will also undoubtedly humble those who arrogantly maintain that they own the North when the reality is otherwise.
We are still engaged in identifying the positions of those people who maintain current accounts at banks in the North West and Togdheer Regions. The accounts of those recognised as Qurmis supporters will continue to be frozen; the rest will be unfrozen in the near future.
We see the economic strangulation of the people who work for the enemy as serving a useful purpose. However, it is absolutely essential that this should be accompanied by the strengthening of the economic positions of non-Northerners, with a view to raising the level of their capabilities and their interests in these Regions. This will enable them to put under pressure those who have grown fat on the opportunities offered by the Government banks, but have revolted against the State, having persuaded themselves to use their acquired capabilities against the State and it Revolutionary Government.
Undoubtedly, those successive steps, taken to cripple Qurmis, will instill anxiety in those in Mogadishu who are related to it. We hope that these will not be listened to or heeded so that the impetus of the war being waged against it would not drop.
An investigation into the action of Qurmis against the Burao base revealed that a lieutenant and five sakaris (all police) and some civilians had been behind it. It was implemented by the Habar Je'lo Qurmis.17 When the inquiry is completed, the culprits will be court-martialled.
Comrade President, in order to implement the above-mentioned matters, we need to:
(a) purge the Somali Police Force, the Security Force, and the Hangash Force,18 the members of all of which are largely recruited locally; this can be done by finding a force to dilute them and by transferring the present members; and
(b) replace the present members of the Custodial Corps, who -- having assumed the distinctive character of being exclusively from the North -- cannot be entrusted with the task of guarding the prisons, with a force composed of other Somalis.
2. We also need up to a Division to reinforce the 3rd Division's zone if it is possible to withdraw units from sectors whose areas of control are stable, since the quality of a force in a state of mobilization cannot achieve very much.
3. We also need the power of the Commercial Bank to give loans and to determine who shall receive them to be transferred to us, so that the past mistakes relating to the economic strengthening of the anti-State people may be rectified and those worthy of it be given a chance.
We propose that those of our forces we consider to be unsatisfactory should send representatives to discuss urgent corrective action. The reason is that the reaction to the measures we have already taken or will take must be met in advance. Since the intelligence-gathering organisations are suspect, and since some of them have committed clear offences, it is prudent to take precautionary measures before it is too late. Up to now we have been walking on ground deliberately strewn with broken glass in an attempt to reduce the momentum of [our] efforts. It is essential to sweep away the broken glass without leaving a single piece behind. There is a Somali proverb: "Oh hyena, you cannot drag away hides without making a sound."19
We are awaiting your guidance and directives.
(signed)
Major General Mohamed Saeed Hirsi (Morgan)
The Commander of the 26th Sector, North West
Translator's Note:
The translation of the text of the above report is from Somali -- the original language of the report. The footnotes are not part of the report and have been added by me to enhance the clarity of the document. Accuracy, rather than elegance of style, has been my principal aim in this translation.
I am persuaded, on investigation, that the signature to the report which purports to be that of Major-General Mohamed Saeed Hirsi (Morgan) (Commander of the 26th Sector and de facto governor of the regions covered by the report) is in fact his own, and that the report is genuine.
My aim in translating this remarkable document is to make it available to researchers, lawyers, and human rights officials. I am not a member or sympathiser of the SNM or SSDF, although I am opposed to the present regime in Somalia .
In my years in Somalia as a legal practitioner, or member and then President of the Supreme Court, I never saw an official document with recommendations so frank in their departure from legality or accepted norms. Such a document ought not to be allowed to be confined to dissident circles that are privately circulating copies of the original.
This translation was done by me, Mohamoud Sheikh Ahmed Musa, in London on April 27, 1987.
(signed)
Mohamoud Sheikh Ahmed Musa
Signed before me this 27th day of April 1987 by the above mentioned
(signed)
R. Barnett
113-116 Strand
SOMALIA: Is General Samantar partially responsible the State failure?
By: Omar Mohamud Dholawaa
Friday, February 25th, 2011
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| Mohamed Ali Samantar |
General Samantar and his colleagues had been running the country, from tea boy to president. Late 1969 they took over, and further strengthened, one of the strongest military army in Africa and the most highly trained and highly disciplined police force in the continent. All judicial and other governmental institutions were well established and functional. The masses, the Somali citizens, were desperate to be led and they pose no challenge against this regime. From 1969 to late 1989, Somalia was the focus of the world superpowers and relatively rich Arab neighbours on other side of the red sea. These parts; the West, the East and the rich Arab neighbours, have heavily bombarded with money to the Somali treasury for geopolitical reasons. The Somali government of the time had enormously benefited from these readily available resources in money terms. Nevertheless, how they manage, run, guide and direct their subjects was entirely their choice. They could shape and form socially viable and competitive citizens or help them to head the highway to hell. I believe they choose the later option.
During the regime’s era they have practiced the legitimacy to rule the country in their own terms from south to north. During this time many injustices had been done; many people were killed with no legal ground, many were denied the rights of employment, many citizens’ property or assets were either destroyed or confiscated. Many foreign businesses were nationalized without taking the proper channels. The people’s concern of injustice, the proliferation of tribalism and favoritism had been ignored and allowed to prosper. The freedom of expression had been denied. The basic education had been neglected and abandoned. The wrongs had replaced the rights and the Somali citizens frantically struggled to find alternatives, in most cases, violently.
Ultimately, after years of death and destruction coupled by torturous and traumatic experience and the continuous failure of the leadership in all areas of government, the Somali State automatically promoted itself from failed State to collapsed State in 1991. Then, all imaginable and unimaginable social ills and social evils had officially emerged in Somalia .
Now the Question is who should be held responsible for this State failure and its consequence? Is it Qanyare, Suudi Yallahow, Aideed, or Omar Finish and alike. No. None of these individuals are, in my view, responsible to what happened in Somalia and to the Somalians. Surely, one may argue that those people in the south are lacking the skills to rule and consequently failed to pick themselves up from the ashes and move on. But rationally they should not be blamed for the past failures and the social catastrophe that followed.
Now, to come to the point of the discussion, is General Samantar at least partially responsible to what happened to us and our land?
In short, Ali Samantar, as I said earlier, was a member of the Politburo (the sole decision makers of the nation), first vice-president, and the Minister of Defense. The Ministry of Defense was responsible for the execution of all illegal and evil actions that the Somali government has carried out against its people. Ali Samantar and his apparatus in the army had the implicit mandate to kill, destroy, arrest and carry out all the terrorizing acts that the Somali people had experienced during Samantar’s era in the Ministry. The military machine carried out all the summary executions that took place in Somalia from Hargeisa to Jassira beach and in between. Of course there are others, whether they are still alive or dead, who should share with him these responsibilities, but he is the only living person to answer and may be held responsible to what happened to the Somali people. This is purely because of his status and his position of the government that ruled Somalia from 1969 to 1991.
One may ask and argue about the difference between Ali Samantar and Yallahow, one of the notorious Somali warlords, who is now enjoying his new title, so-called the ‘Member of Parliament’. The simple answer is Ali Samantar was educated, trained, employed, crowned with the Somali flag, empowered and sworn in to serve the Somali people by a Somali Government. In other words, Samantar had statutory authority. In contrary, Suudi Yallahow has emerged from the dust and the debris that Ali Samantar and his colleagues had left behind, and he unskillfully struggled to survive in that mayhem. However, that will not absolve him (Yallahow) from any wrong doing, even though no one has entrusted him any responsibility and he never received a mandate or directive from anyone.
Therefore, legally and rationally General Mohamed Ali Samantar should be held responsible not only the crimes that his lieutenants committed in his Ministry but what happened to Somalia since then. In my view, all evils and human-devils that emerged after 22 years of corrupted, dictatorial, oppressive, aggressive, tyrannical, despotic and cruel regime should be held responsible to Samantar and his colleagues respectively. A Somali baby boy, who was born when Ali Samantar joined the leadership of the Somali Government turned 22 years in 1991 and he (the Somali boy) violently and madly chased the General out of the country. This boy simply took the path that the General and his colleagues had paved for him. Definitely, this boy could be, if he is guided to the right path, a law abiding citizen who can differentiate wrongs from rights and consequently respect and protect the General and his colleagues rather than chasing them.
Confusingly, despite all this empirical evidence, some people are defending Ali Samantar and helping him financially to challenge against the people whose loved ones he (Ali Samantar) has killed. If history has any significance in this context; Milosevic, Pol Pot, Hitler, and the Rwandese perpetrators have not pulled the trigger, but they were legally hunted down purely because of their statutory authority and what their lieutenants had committed in their respective countries. Is General Samantar different from them!!! Or are the defenders just victims of Stockholm syndrome1.
Sadly, this defense exercise, in favor of the General, will have colossal political and social dimensions in Somalia .
The political dimension concerns the facts that the union of the South and the North was based on brotherhood and common interest. If the southerners are so openly defending a man who is seen by the northerners the killer of their children, mums and dads unlawfully, then obviously the northerners will be left nothing but to conclude that this is a conspiracy against northern inhabitants. And it will definitely, in the long term, diminish the trust, if any, between the two parts.
The social dimension, applies the rights of the citizen and what someone can or cannot do in Somalia . Unfortunately, the main argument of General Samantar’s supporters is there are so many other criminals who are not incriminated yet. That may be true, but it is extremely difficulty to comprehend how your neighbor can challenge against you if you want to take to court the man who you believe to be responsible for the death of your loved ones, because some one on the other side of road was not incriminated by his/her victim. What kind of message will this send to the Somali society? I wonder why northerners (Somaliland ) are so adamant to secede once and for all. I also wonder why many people are killed by Somalians and no one is held accountable!!!
In conclusion, I sincerely believe, that anyone who has been victimized should have the opportunity to take his alleged villain to the court without any obstruction, where the defendant has the right to respond to the raised allegations. Anything different from this process will surely make us a jungle-society that should apply the law of the jungle.
Omar Mohamud Farah (Dhollawaa)
Dhollawaa@yahoo.com.au
Tuesday, July 26, 2011
Ex-Somali PM to be deposed in war crimes suit
Updated: July 20, 2011, 5:46 PM
ALEXANDRIA, Va. (AP) - Aziz Deria has waited seven years to confront the former Somali leader he blames for the deaths of his father, brother and thousands of his countrymen. He could have his chance this week.
Somalia's former prime minister Mohamed Ali Samantar is scheduled to begin a deposition Thursday in a federal lawsuit accusing him of war crimes. The northern Virginia resident pulled out of previously planned questioning by citing ill health, but a judge has ordered him to cooperate this time unless extraordinary circumstances arise.
His accuser is skeptical of his efforts to avoid the deposition.
"This man knows what he has done. He will try to do anything to be away from the court system," said Deria, a 47-year-old businessman in Bellevue, Wash.
In 2004, a human rights group helped Deria and another man sue Samantar under a U.S. law that allows civil action against foreign officials responsible for torture or wrongful killings. They allege Samantar, a one-time top lieutenant to dictator Siad Barre, commited war crimes against northern Somalia's Isaaq clan in retribution for what he perceived as efforts to split Somalia in two.
Deria's father is among those who killed in a crackdown on the clan, the lawsuit alleges. The Barre regime collapsed in 1991, and there hasn't been a strong national government there since.
Samantar was once one of the most important men in Africa, a power broker who used Somalia's strategic position on the Horn of Africa to gain alternating favor from the United States and the Soviet Union. He served from 1980 to 1986 as defense minister, building one of most formidable armies in sub-Saharan Africa. He served as prime minister from 1986 to 1990.
He now lives in a split-level in the Washington suburb of Fairfax, surrounded not by presidents and potentates but by large extended family. He is still well-known among Somali diaspora.
His illnesses aren't contrived, says his lawyer Joseph Peter Drennan, explaining that Samantar is on dialysis and has become weaker in recent weeks. He has filed emergency motions with an appeals court seeking to halt the lawsuit. But a judge has ordered that Samantar submit to three days of depositions this month.
For Deria, who is represented by the San Francisco-based Center for Justice and Accountability, the opportunity to question Samantar is the primary reason he has pursued a lawsuit for so many years. The lawsuit was once tossed out by a federal judge who said Samantar had diplomatic immunity, but the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed and reinstated it.
Samantar isn't wealthy, so Deria does not expect to profit financially. Holding him accountable is the real goal.
Yet many Somalis, even those victimized by the Barre regime, don't understand why Deria is pursuing Samantar through the U.S. court system.
"They don't know how to hold people accountable," Deria said, referring to Somalis and others throughout the developing world, where political leaders are typically above the law. "I want my people to learn about accountability."
"For him to pretend he is innocent, and that nobody can touch him, it is insulting to our intelligence," Deria said.
The Somali diaspora has mixed feelings about Samantar and others from the Barre regime, said Ahmed Elmi, chairman of the Somali American Community Association in Silver Spring, Md. Many don't understand the need to dredge up the past when bad conditions in Somalia still need attention, he said. And while most recognize that atrocities occurred under Barre, others also remember years when schools were built and the country flourished.
Elmi said Somali immigrants generally respect surviving elders from the Barre regime.
For his part, Elmi understands and supports victims' desire for justice.
"That's why we have a court," Elmi said. "If he did these things to my family, I would do the same."
The lawsuit is deeply personal to Samantar. In 1988, he was a college student in California when Somalia began to deteriorate. His father, Mohamed Deria Ali, operated a large import-export business and planned to move the family from Hargeisa to the capital of Mogadishu. Before he could, though, the military attacked the town the town where many Issaq clan members lived.
Back in the U.S., Aziz Deria lost contact with his family. He eventually learned that his father and younger brother, Mustafa Deria, were taken from the family home and never seen again.
Still, Deria gives Samantar credit for his role in Somalia's wars against Ethiopia early in his career. He feels sorry for Samantar in some ways and doesn't consider him evil.
"He became ruthless to survive," Deria said. "I don't think he's a bad person at all. It's just the nature of dictators."
Samantar has refused multiple interview requests, but his lawyer said he didn't persecute the Isaaq clan while in power.
"Samantar, above all, is a fervent nationalist who believes all Somalis should live under one flag," Drennan said. "He is proud of his service to his country."
Drennan said the lawsuit is about clan grievances among the Isaaq, many of whom have pursued establishment of an independent state in northern Somalia.
"Certainly, there were human rights abuses under the Barre regime. It was not a democratic regime. But is it worse than al-Shabab?" he asked, referring to the radical Islamic militia that now controls large swaths of the country and is aligned with al-Qaida.
Deria knows that the lawsuit alone won't provide closure. He's also been traveling back to the region surrounding his home city to help provide proper burials for remains from hundreds of mass graves dug during the Barre regime. In the rainy seasons, bones sometimes wash up from the river beds.
"It is so disgusting to see the skeletons come out. Those skeletons could be my father, my brother, my cousins" Deria said. "For me to have any closure, those people need to have a proper burial. ... It bothers me whenever it rains. It really makes my heart sink."
ALEXANDRIA, Va. (AP) - Aziz Deria has waited seven years to confront the former Somali leader he blames for the deaths of his father, brother and thousands of his countrymen. He could have his chance this week.
Somalia's former prime minister Mohamed Ali Samantar is scheduled to begin a deposition Thursday in a federal lawsuit accusing him of war crimes. The northern Virginia resident pulled out of previously planned questioning by citing ill health, but a judge has ordered him to cooperate this time unless extraordinary circumstances arise.
His accuser is skeptical of his efforts to avoid the deposition.
"This man knows what he has done. He will try to do anything to be away from the court system," said Deria, a 47-year-old businessman in Bellevue, Wash.
In 2004, a human rights group helped Deria and another man sue Samantar under a U.S. law that allows civil action against foreign officials responsible for torture or wrongful killings. They allege Samantar, a one-time top lieutenant to dictator Siad Barre, commited war crimes against northern Somalia's Isaaq clan in retribution for what he perceived as efforts to split Somalia in two.
Deria's father is among those who killed in a crackdown on the clan, the lawsuit alleges. The Barre regime collapsed in 1991, and there hasn't been a strong national government there since.
Samantar was once one of the most important men in Africa, a power broker who used Somalia's strategic position on the Horn of Africa to gain alternating favor from the United States and the Soviet Union. He served from 1980 to 1986 as defense minister, building one of most formidable armies in sub-Saharan Africa. He served as prime minister from 1986 to 1990.
He now lives in a split-level in the Washington suburb of Fairfax, surrounded not by presidents and potentates but by large extended family. He is still well-known among Somali diaspora.
His illnesses aren't contrived, says his lawyer Joseph Peter Drennan, explaining that Samantar is on dialysis and has become weaker in recent weeks. He has filed emergency motions with an appeals court seeking to halt the lawsuit. But a judge has ordered that Samantar submit to three days of depositions this month.
For Deria, who is represented by the San Francisco-based Center for Justice and Accountability, the opportunity to question Samantar is the primary reason he has pursued a lawsuit for so many years. The lawsuit was once tossed out by a federal judge who said Samantar had diplomatic immunity, but the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed and reinstated it.
Samantar isn't wealthy, so Deria does not expect to profit financially. Holding him accountable is the real goal.
Yet many Somalis, even those victimized by the Barre regime, don't understand why Deria is pursuing Samantar through the U.S. court system.
"They don't know how to hold people accountable," Deria said, referring to Somalis and others throughout the developing world, where political leaders are typically above the law. "I want my people to learn about accountability."
"For him to pretend he is innocent, and that nobody can touch him, it is insulting to our intelligence," Deria said.
The Somali diaspora has mixed feelings about Samantar and others from the Barre regime, said Ahmed Elmi, chairman of the Somali American Community Association in Silver Spring, Md. Many don't understand the need to dredge up the past when bad conditions in Somalia still need attention, he said. And while most recognize that atrocities occurred under Barre, others also remember years when schools were built and the country flourished.
Elmi said Somali immigrants generally respect surviving elders from the Barre regime.
For his part, Elmi understands and supports victims' desire for justice.
"That's why we have a court," Elmi said. "If he did these things to my family, I would do the same."
The lawsuit is deeply personal to Samantar. In 1988, he was a college student in California when Somalia began to deteriorate. His father, Mohamed Deria Ali, operated a large import-export business and planned to move the family from Hargeisa to the capital of Mogadishu. Before he could, though, the military attacked the town the town where many Issaq clan members lived.
Back in the U.S., Aziz Deria lost contact with his family. He eventually learned that his father and younger brother, Mustafa Deria, were taken from the family home and never seen again.
Still, Deria gives Samantar credit for his role in Somalia's wars against Ethiopia early in his career. He feels sorry for Samantar in some ways and doesn't consider him evil.
"He became ruthless to survive," Deria said. "I don't think he's a bad person at all. It's just the nature of dictators."
Samantar has refused multiple interview requests, but his lawyer said he didn't persecute the Isaaq clan while in power.
"Samantar, above all, is a fervent nationalist who believes all Somalis should live under one flag," Drennan said. "He is proud of his service to his country."
Drennan said the lawsuit is about clan grievances among the Isaaq, many of whom have pursued establishment of an independent state in northern Somalia.
"Certainly, there were human rights abuses under the Barre regime. It was not a democratic regime. But is it worse than al-Shabab?" he asked, referring to the radical Islamic militia that now controls large swaths of the country and is aligned with al-Qaida.
Deria knows that the lawsuit alone won't provide closure. He's also been traveling back to the region surrounding his home city to help provide proper burials for remains from hundreds of mass graves dug during the Barre regime. In the rainy seasons, bones sometimes wash up from the river beds.
"It is so disgusting to see the skeletons come out. Those skeletons could be my father, my brother, my cousins" Deria said. "For me to have any closure, those people need to have a proper burial. ... It bothers me whenever it rains. It really makes my heart sink."
Sunday, July 24, 2011
How Broadband will get to Somalia
Last week, I interviewed Mohamed Ahmed Jama, CEO of Dalkom Somalia and board member of Frontier Optical Networks Ltd (FON) in Kenya. Jama described four potential Broadband cables that could be a part of a terrestrial backbone throughout East Africa, including in Somalia. A fifth was announced yesterday in Somaliland.
Though all three of these proposed links are just that—proposals—they are indicative of the rapid growth of Broadband connectivity in the region. Most East African governments are actively engaged in rolling out backbone terrestrial networks, while four years ago the World Bank called East African connectivity the world’s only “missing link.”
South Sudan is working with the CTO to develop an ICT strategic plan; Burundi recently received funding from the World Bank; and Uganda has also invested as well. And private companies are facilitating the expansion of Broadband cables as well as they are working with the national governments to lay the cables and to fund the projects.
The East African Backhaul System was recently announced as a combined $400 million partnership between Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, South Sudan, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo governments and a variety of private telecoms. The unique partnerships between the public and private sector make the ICT space in East Africa distinct from other regions.
Potential backbone networks in Somalia, Ethiopia, and South Sudan are outlined below:
* Somalia’s Connection to EASSy Cables
According to Jama, Dalkom Somalia has built two cable landing sites in Somalia from the EASSy submarine cable, one in Somaliland and the other in Mogadishu, Somalia. Unfortunately, the government of Somaliland revoked Dalkom’s license last year before the cable was completed (scheduled to be finished in October, 2010).
The Somaliland government claimed that they had already signed an agreement with a local company, SomCable. However, no additional work has been carried out since last year, leaving construction at a stand-still and the region unconnected. In Mogadishu, on the other hand, the landing cable lays ready to be used, but remains unconnected due to security issues at the site. To make matters more frustrating, Dalkom has funding, contracts awarded and the regulatory approval to extend the cables from the landing site inward, creating a national terrestrial backbone. Security issues in the area are the only contingency.
* Mombasa—Nairobi—Moyale, Ethiopia Cable
The EASSy submarine cable has been extended inland previously from Mombasa to Nairobi. For the past year, discussions have been underway been the Kenyan and Ethiopian government on possibly constructing a terrestrial cable from Nairobi to Moyale, on the Ethiopian border. However, with FON’s assistance, the cable has been built, but is yet to be lighted. The only remaining holdup is to sign an agreement of understanding with the Ethiopia government, which has historically been reluctant to work with private sector ICT companies.
* Somalia—Kenya Connection
According to Jama, there is 560 km remaining between fiber optic terrestrial backbone cables in Somalia and the state of Mandera in Northeastern Kenya. Jama proposes that the Kenyan government bring the fiber to the border, and then Dalkom Somalia would complete the Somali side.
This connection would connect Somalia to the African backbone network. However, there has been intermittent violence on the Kenya-Somalia border in Mandera, with the most recent issue being a land mine blast that killed eleven Kenyan officers. The volatility of the border could potentially lead to another security standstill before lighting the fiber, like in Mogadisho. Dalkom and the governments, then, need to concern themselves not only with the technical issues and construction of the remaining fiber, but also on the political instability of the region.
* Juba—Lokichogio Link
Southern Sudan and Kenya plan to construct a fiber optic cable link between the two nations as part of a larger project entitled “four-in-one.” The project includes the construction of a railway line from Lodwar-Lokichogio to Juba, road rehabilitation, an oil pipeline, and fiber optic cables. Currently, the governments need to conduct a feasibility test given the mountainous nature of the route, especially the Great Rift Valley. In all likelihood, the project will not be finished before 2015.
* Djibouti—Somaliland SomCable
SomCable, supported by the interim government in the territory of Somaliland, reportedly signed an agreement to buy the necessary buildings and licensing in Djibouti to route the EASSy cable into Berbera and throughout Somaliland. The President of SomCable, Mohammed Gueti, announced his recent acquisitions just yesterday.
Gueti has strong ties with the president of Djibouti’s family, arguably giving his company an advantage over Dalkom Somalia at winning the contract. However, as Jama points out, construction has yet to begin on this cable line, possibly suggesting that the announcement is merely a political move by the government of Somaliland as Gueti does has any rights to extend the EASSY Cable. Neither purchases any capacity from the members of the Consortium.
Jeffrey Swindle, Global Broadband & Innovation
Facts about Somaliland Outcast Minority Groups
Despite the relative success of the 2010 Somaliland election, tensions remain high in the Sool, Sanag and Cayn regions claimed by both Somaliland and Puntland administrations. June 2010 saw increasing tension between clans and competition over resources, leading to the displacement of thousands of civilians from these regions.
The maltreatment of minorities in Somaliland remains a significant problem. Somaliland's Gaboye minority held protests in Burao, Somaliland and London, UK in 2010, in order to 'raise awareness [of] the continual suffering of Somaliland, and the minority tribes in Somalia'. In particular, the protests focused on the unwarranted detention and abuse of two Gaboye men and a Gaboye woman in the Aynabo district of Somaliland. According to the protesters, Gaboye lack legal representation and access to justice, and also face violence in the Somaliland courts. Most notably, the Gaboye Minority Organization Europe highlighted an incident involving the abuse and kidnapping of two Gaboye women during a trial, in the presence of a judge and police officers.
In a July 2010 article published by the African Press International, Gaboye clan elder Ahmed Shide Jama identified some of the problems facing Gaboye, including discrimination in the labour market, and lack of political representation and access to healthcare. Moreover, he identified inter-marriage between clans as something treated as a problem, 'despite the fact that [Gaboye] are Somalis and Muslims' as well.
source: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,SOM,,4e16d362c,0.html
The maltreatment of minorities in Somaliland remains a significant problem. Somaliland's Gaboye minority held protests in Burao, Somaliland and London, UK in 2010, in order to 'raise awareness [of] the continual suffering of Somaliland, and the minority tribes in Somalia'. In particular, the protests focused on the unwarranted detention and abuse of two Gaboye men and a Gaboye woman in the Aynabo district of Somaliland. According to the protesters, Gaboye lack legal representation and access to justice, and also face violence in the Somaliland courts. Most notably, the Gaboye Minority Organization Europe highlighted an incident involving the abuse and kidnapping of two Gaboye women during a trial, in the presence of a judge and police officers.
In a July 2010 article published by the African Press International, Gaboye clan elder Ahmed Shide Jama identified some of the problems facing Gaboye, including discrimination in the labour market, and lack of political representation and access to healthcare. Moreover, he identified inter-marriage between clans as something treated as a problem, 'despite the fact that [Gaboye] are Somalis and Muslims' as well.
source: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,SOM,,4e16d362c,0.html
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