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How Scared Should You Be of Al Qaeda’s New Butt Bomb?

The most recent issue of al Qaeda’s magazine Inspirecontains what the editors call a special surprise: a recipe for a new kitchen-made bomb, which the magazine urges readers to use on American commercial aircraft.

Without going into excessive detail, the main ingredients of the bomb are a certain amount of an explosive substance derived from broken down matches (don’t buy all your matches at once! it urges) as well as a variety of other household ingredients like nail polish.

The end result is a bomb, about the size of a water bottle, filled with processed match powder and other chemicals. The magazine tells the reader to cover the bomb with about a half a centimeter of silicon to ensure that it doesn’t trigger detection at airport screening. But even with a healthy coat of silicon, it’s the sort of object that would show up under routine inspection or x-ray. So what’s a would-be terrorist to do to get their new kitchen bomb aboard a plane

First, don’t stick it in your underwear. That’s something that the Transportation Security Administration is on the lookout for, thanks to that 2009 incident when Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the so-called “Underwear Bomber,” attempted to blow up an Amsterdam to Detroit-bound airplane on Christmas Day. John Pistole, head of TSA, has said that Abdulmutallab was “very close” to executing the attack and would have gotten away with it if not for the fact that he was carrying around the device for weeks and hadn’t changed his underpants. “The efficacy was degraded,” Pistole remarked to the audible discomfort of the entire Aspen Security Forum in July. Eww. 

Al Qaeda learned a lesson from the experience. The magazine’s feature article on the newest bomb suggests that the would-be-bomber aspire to, shall we say, more ambitious measures to ensure concealment. In a piece for the Intercept, gloriously titled “Al Qaeda Claims New Butt Bomb,” reporters Jana Winter and Sharon Weinberger describe it this way:

“This time around…the Inspire article obliquely references the need to go where Abdulmutallab was perhaps unwilling to go, and place the bomb directly inside the terrorist’s body. The magazine cites the example of Abdullah al-Asiri, an AQAPmember who died in 2009 trying to kill a senior Saudi government official; al-Asiri reportedly hid the bomb in his rectal cavity.”

How safe are we from the new butt bomb?

Tal Hanan, a security and explosives expert at Demoman International in Israel said that the type of bomb featured in the article, which is also called a triacetone triperoxide orTATP explosive, “is more myth then operational tool.
“And we should encourage them to use it.”

TATP bombs aren’t new. Richard Reid, the so-called “Shoe Bomber,” attempted to use one in a December 2001 plot to blow up a plane flying from Paris to Miami. Because of the volatility of the chemicals involved, a would-be bomber has a very good chance of blowing up his kitchen in the cooking process, says Hanan. If the cook succeeds in making a bomb without losing his fingers, he would probably want to use the device sooner rather than later as the material becomes increasingly volatile as it dries. That increases the chances of explosive material remaining on the hands, where it could be detected via swab. (But that’s hardly a foregone conclusion.) 

If the bomber is able to get his device to the airport, wouldTSA be able to spot it at a checkpoint? Good chance. Even al Qaeda in the article acknowledges that the device could be detectable to millimeter wave scanners.

In 2007, TSA moved to install new screening technologies into airports across the country. The most famous of which is the so-called backscanner ray. It sends radiation through a person’s clothing where it bounces off the skin or other objects that have relatively high atomic density. This creates that grainy but revealing nude shot that’s become synonymous with invasive, mechanical airport screening. 


Less well known is millimeter wave scanning, which sends an electromagnetic wave between the 1 and 10 millimeter range toward the subject, passing through the person’s clothing. The beam bounces off of skin as well as explosive materials, cash and liquids. Most millimeter wave scanners are also equipped with automated target recognition software. That allows the machine to better identify strange objects, which most millimeter wave scanners display as little yellow boxes on the outline of the subject in a computerized display.
Here’s how TSA describes it:
“TSA currently uses millimeter wave [advanced imaging technology] to safely screen passengers for metallic and nonmetallic threats, including weapons and explosives, which may be concealed under clothing without physical contact to help TSA keep the traveling public safe.  There are close to 740 AIT units deployed at nearly 160 airports nationwide…All millimeter wave AIT units deployed at airports are outfitted with software designed to enhance passenger privacy by eliminating passenger-specific images and instead auto-detecting potential threats and highlighting their location on a generic outline of a passenger that is identical for all passengers.”
Hanan says that the device outlined in the Inspire article should actually be detectable to backscanner technology as well as millimeter wave scanning. “As it [is] not looking for the explosive, rather for foreign objects/containers concealed on the body… Regardless of the substance,” he said.
Here’s where things get intimate. Is there enough tissue protection in the body cavity  to shield the bomb from scanning radiation that doesn’t penetrate into the skin? Is today’s backscanner and millimeter wave scanner tech robust enough to catch a body bomb at a checkpoint, as Hanan claims, or is there an exploitable vulnerability, which what al Qaeda seems to be assuming?
As a general rule, security authorities won’t discuss the capabilities of detection technology in use at airports or other checkpoints. A U.S. government official directly involved in airport security screening told Defense One: “The issue is that what you’re asking hits at some of the most sensitive stuff with which the [Department of Homeland Security] is currently dealing.”
But al Qaeda has tried TATP bombs aboard passenger jets and failed, and that was before the wide implementation of better scanning technologies.  
The Critical Human Component of Border Protection

Hanan cautions that vigilance on the part of screening officials, and proper installation and use of screening tech, are more important factors in foiling bomb plots than any single piece of technology.

This is the one area on which DHS is willing to comment. On Monday, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson said he had instructedTSA to undertake “an immediate, short-term review” of security and screening measures “to determine whether more is necessary, at both domestic and overseas last-point of departure airports.” He also announced that TSA would increase the number of random searches at airports.

“Previously, in July, I directed enhanced screening at certain foreign airports that are last points of departure to the United States. Since then, a number of foreign governments have themselves enhanced aviation security, buttressing and replacing our own measures at these airports,” he said.

In theory, vigilance on the part of border guards, coupled with correctly installed screening technologies, will catch a bomber trying to smuggle a water bottle-sized bomb onto a plane. The 1986 case of Anne-Marie Murphy demonstrated clearly that an astute guard is a better defense than any innovation in screening, Hanan said.

Murphy, an Irish-born woman who was five months pregnant at the time of what has come to be called the Hindawi Affair, attempted to smuggle 1.5 kilograms of highly explosive semtex onto a flight from London to Tel Aviv. Her Jordanian husband Nezar Nawwaf al-Mansur al-Hindawi placed the material in her luggage. She was caught simply because a border guard marked her as “suspicious,” despite Murphy not fitting any conventional profile. She was then subjected to additional screening.

The guard’s “training kicked in when this nice, innocent lady failed to make sense” in the way she answered questions, Hanan said. “Bored, poorly paid and poorly trained [security] cannot be replaced by technology, as good as it gets.”

Smuggling bombs onto airplanes is much more difficult than it was in 1986, more difficult even than a few years ago. Al Qaeda’s most recent device would be extremely dangerous to attempt to build, very difficult to transfer, may not work in practice, and has a good — but not perfect — chance of alerting security workers who have been given expanded authority to conduct screenings as well as at least one type of common security device, if not two.

In other words, you’re largely protected from the most recent al Qaeda bomb threat, but you’re really only as safe as theTSA agent standing in front of you.


The release becomes especially relevant in the context of the recent events in Paris. AQAP has taken credit for the attack that killed 12, including two police officers, at the headquarters of French satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo. One of the two gunmen who stormed the building has been identified as having trained with AQAP.

AFRICA’S BORDERS SPLIT OVER 177 ETHNIC GROUPS, AND THEIR ‘REAL’ LINES AREN’T WHERE YOU THINK

BY CHRISTINE MUNGAI

If we were to redraw Africa’s borders to have each ethnic group in their own country, we would have at least 2,000 countries

Sign in Botswana: turn left for Namibia, right for Zimbabwe and Zambia. (Photo: Flickr/ Guitarfish). 

AFRICA’S arbitrary borders have done much to foment strife and instability on the continent. Partitioning communities, the argument goes, has led to artificial borders, ethnic struggles, and spurred civil conflict and underdevelopment.

Look at a map of Africa and you will notice the many clean lines. Nearly half (44%) of Africa’s borders are straight lines or follow lines of latitude or longitude, splitting at least 177 ethnic groups in two or more countries.

It’s obviously impractical to have all Africa’s ethnic groups with their own country, simply because Africa is such a diverse place. If we were to redraw Africa’s borders to have each ethnic group in their own country, we would have at least 2,000 countries.

Still, four in ten Africans today belong to an ethnic group that has kin across borders.

Having your community split by a border increases the risk of war, says this seminal study on the long-term effects of African borders, and makes conflict more deadly. One study showed that length of a conflict and its casualty rate is 25% higher in areas where an ethnicity is divided by a national border as opposed to areas where ethnicities have a united homeland.

There are several reasons for this high risk of conflict, the researchers say – partitioning tends to generate irredentist demands, where ethnicities that are minority groups in one country want to unify with their kin across the border.

For example, the Somali are split between five different countries – so apart from Somalia itself, Somalis can be found in northern Kenya, southern Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti.

At least three wars since independence in the 1960s have been driven (partly at least) by the desire of Somalis in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya to become part of Somalia. The Somali national flag is a white five-pointed star set against a blue background; the five points of the star represent these five “estranged” Somali groups.

Risk of conflict heightened

The risk of conflict is also heightened because split ethnicities may fight to gain independence or obtain automony; one historical study documented that around 20% of civil wars in Africa have a secessionist undertone.

Split groups are also more likely to be smaller, as a percentage of the total, in their respective countries, and so are likely to be marginalised and unable to access political power, and the benefits of patronage.

The Malinke of West Africa are among the most partitioned people in Africa, split into six different countries – Senegal, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Cote d’Ivoire and The Gambia.

Similarly, the Ndembu are split between Angola, Zaire, and Zambia; the Nukwe, between Angola, Namibia, Zambia, and Botswana, the Alur, between Uganda and DR Congo, and the Ibibio between Nigeria and Cameroon.

Silver lining

But there’s a silver lining to this seemingly gloomy story. You may not realise it – and African governments don’t give them enough credit – but border communities generate as much GDP as all of Africa’s offices and factories, only that it’s off the books.

Informal cross border trade represents 43% of the official GDP of the continent, thus being almost equivalent to the formal sector, according to data from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.

In some ways, people hardly recognise the arbitrary lines that separate them from their uncles, aunts, brothers and sisters living on the other side.

But in other ways, they are very keen to benefit from the opportunity, leveraging their mobility to make the most of price differences across borders.

One report from USAID estimates that each of about 3 million West African cross-border traders conducts an annual average of $20,000 in transactions, amounting to an aggregate amount of four billion dollars.

Overall informal exports to West Africa from Nigeria is estimated to be between $1.5 and $1.9 billion, and up to 15% of Nigeria’s imports enter Ghana informally, largely along the Benin–Nigeria border.

Livestock are some of the most informally traded commodities. In the Horn of Africa, cross border trade in camels through Ethiopia/Djibouti, South Sudan/north-western Kenya, and eastern Uganda/western Kenya is estimated to be worth $5million per year; informal trade in cattle represented more than 85% of total trade.

In this region, exports of livestock to neighbouring countries in fact at times exceed official trade by a factor of 30% or more, hence making up over 95% of total trade in livestock.

A similar study quoted by the African Development Bank noted that informal traders along the Kenya- Somalia borders were known to realise astounding growth of 500-700% in the value of their livestock and generated annual sales in excess of $11.7 million.

In Uganda, a more relaxed tax regime makes some goods in the country cheaper, leading to the curious phenomenon where goods can be imported to landlocked Uganda through Kenya, only to be re-exported to Kenya – doubling back of the same roads that they were imported through – and still sold for a profit!

Sudan and DR Congo are a major destination for Uganda’s informal exports, jointly accounting for 64%-74% of exports, largely comprising shoes, clothes, fish, beans, maize grain, flour, beer, medicines and alcohol.

A mountain of paperwork

Still, it’s not that these cross-border communities are intent on evading the law – following the legal channels is so incredibly tedious that it can be virtually impossible to comply, if your goods are ever to make it to market on time, before your tomatoes turn to mould.

In most African countries, there are two sets of documents to be filled on either side of a border, which means that the average customs transaction involves 20–30 different parties, 40 documents, 200 data elements (30 of which repeated at least 30 times), and the rekeying of 60-70% of all data at least once, according to the report from UNECA.

These administrative hurdles sharply increase trade costs (it is estimated that each day of delay at customs is equivalent to an additional 85km between the trading countries). They also encourage illicit trade and corruption in order to bypass delays at customs and border posts.

But African borders, formidable as they seem (officially), are actually not as robust in reality, particularly if there’s a common ethnic group living on both sides, as these communities are adept at squeezing through the cracks.

Generally, African governments generally adopt a “live-and-let-live” approach – even though the informal trade denies governments much-needed tax revenue, it provides even-more needed jobs.

The AfDB notes that the informal trade can have numerous knock-on effects, such as lessening the impact of food crises and help reducing price volatility, as well as give a greater availability of goods at affordable prices.

But the most interesting study on borders we have come across so far looked at two communities in Niger and Nigeria. These are the Hausa, who straddle the border between the two countries, and the Zamra, who are found within Niger and so have an “internal” ethnic border with the Hausa.

The study found that the Niger-Nigeria national border did not have such a large impact on the price difference of millet and cowpeas between the two countries, compared to other borders in the region that do not share a common ethnic community on both sides.

Intriguingly, the researchers found that the price difference within Niger, between the Zamra and the Hausa, was much more pronounced than that between the Hausa living on both sides of the Niger-Nigeria international border.

At first, it seems that linguistic differences between the Zamra and Hausa would explain the internal (ethnic) barrier to trade in Niger, as none of the Hausa traders in the study could speak Zamra, and only 20% of Zamra traders could speak Hausa.

It’s the women

But then interviews showed that it takes a very low level of linguistic proficiency to sell millet and cowpeas; just a rudimentary knowledge of simple terms and numbers in either language is enough to close a sale.

So if language isn’t the problem, what explains the price gap? The answer is surprising – women.

The researchers found a stark difference in the gender composition between the Hausa and Zarma regions. At the Hausa-Zamra “internal” border, 30% of traders operating in the Zamra markets are female, as compared with only 5% in the Hausa markets.

The percentage of female traders increases when moving farther west into Zarma regions, and decreases when moving farther east into Hausa.

The cultural difference in gender roles, as reflected by the gender composition of Zarma and Hausa markets, may be one source of the ethnic border effect if male Hausa traders are unwilling to trade with female Zamra traders.

This reluctance to trade with women reduces the optimal quantity traded between those markets – effectively segmenting the markets and creating a “real”, de facto border.

The study thus makes a stunning conclusion: that in such situations, ethnic borders may map the geography of trade more effectively than international borders do.

So if you’re a government, how do you promote trade in such an environment? Fancy customs offices and computerised border posts won’t make much of a difference. It’s easy – encourage intermarriage across communities. Market inefficiencies like this will disappear, because you’ll quickly run out of excuses why you can’t buy cowpeas from your wife’s sister.

Source: Source: Mail & Guardian

TERROR-FINANCE HUNT IMPERILS U.S. MONEY FLOWS TO WORLD’S POOREST

By Jeanna Smialek

For almost two decades, Hersi Suleiman’s relatives in Somalia have used the $100 to $500 he usually sends them each month for food, shelter and other basic needs.

Now, he’s worried that their lifeline will be cut as banks close accounts of money-transfer companies for fear of running afoul of U.S. regulations intended to staunch illegal flows of money to criminals and terrorists.

“If I did not send the money at the end of this month, it would be a huge, huge problem,” said Suleiman, 55, who lives in a Chicago suburb. For his brothers, sisters, nieces and nephews in an east African nation torn by civil war, “it’s a matter of life and death.”

Concerned that money-laundering regulations are unintentionally having a chilling effect on banks, the U.S. Treasury Department is trying to convince them they can comply with the rules and still provide services to businesses that handle the transfers. Doing so could be crucial to maintaining an affordable flow of money to needy families in countries with few banking options.

“The challenge is finding a way to meet the demand and minimize the risk,” said Robert Rowe, vice president and associate chief counsel at the American Bankers Association, a Washington-based trade group that represents the nation’s $15 trillion banking industry.

Failure to strike a balance might have another unintended consequence: driving cash underground, further from regulatory oversight.

‘Black Market’

“Not sending money home is not an option,” said Timothy Ogden, managing director of the Financial Access Initiative, which is housed at the graduate school of public service at New YorkUniversity in New York City. “Those families are going to turn to black-market options.”

Money transfers to other countries haven’t been interrupted yet, Ogden said. Still, as fewer banks work with cash-sending companies, it could drive up the cost of sending money or even choke off transfers to some far-flung and conflict-stricken regions that have limited banking access.

Flows from migrant workers in developed countries to relatives back home, known as remittances, accounted for 21.1 percent of the gross domestic product of Haiti in 2013, 24.9 percent in Moldova and 28.8 percent in Nepal, according to World Bank data.

Worldwide, such flows are projected to climb to $454 billion in 2015 from $435 billion last year, making them more than three times the size of all official development assistance to impoverished countries, based on World Bank research.

The U.S. is the largest sender, with $52 billion in outflows in 2013, the highest since 2008.

Treasury’s Reaction

That makes anything which threatens U.S. remittances a humanitarian concern. According to a notice released by the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network in November, banks may be “indiscriminately terminating” accounts of all money services businesses in order to avoid regulatory scrutiny.

The services issue, sell or redeem money orders or traveler’s checks, cash checks and transmit money, among other functions. Banks see them as particularly risky to work with, because it can be difficult to determine where money comes from and where it’s headed.

Prominent fines, including a $1.9 billion money-laundering charge against HSBC Holdings Plc in 2012 and a $1.7 billion settlement in 2014 for JPMorgan Chase & Co. related to money-laundering controls, have reinforced the perception of danger.

‘Shrinking Number’

“Just the fact that we’re dealing with remittances — that’s what we’re judged by,” said Aden Hassan, compliance manager at Kaah Express in Minneapolis, whose company sends money to countries including Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. “All of these companies are having to rely more and more on a shrinking number of banks that will do business with them.”

Money services such as Kaah Express need banks to deposit funds they receive and to wire the money, Hassan said. Because the smaller companies are the only ones that send remittances to places such as rural Kenya and Somalia, shutting down their U.S. bank access could leave swaths of the region without money transfers from the world’s largest economy, he said.

Last year, the bank that handles the wiring of almost all Somalian flows informed some remittance companies that they could lose their accounts, Hassan said.

The company, Merchants Bank of California NA, has kept the accounts open for now, he said, though it hasn’t indicated its future plans. The Carson, California-based bank didn’t respond to an e-mail and a voicemail requests for comment.

Roundtable Talks

The Treasury is taking note of banks’ reluctance. This week it hosted a roundtable to swap perspectives with the industry.

Remittances pose “real money-laundering and terrorist-financing risk,” David Cohen, undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, said at the Jan. 13 meeting. “But we believe emphatically that risks such as these can and should be managed, not simply avoided altogether.”

Treasury officials “take very seriously concerns that banks have been indiscriminately” terminating or refusing the accounts of all money-service businesses, he said.

The department is reaching out to money transmitters to explain the rules so that they don’t have an unnecessary chilling effect. It has told banks that it’s possible to comply with the Bank Secrecy Act, which requires financial institutions to assist the government in detecting money laundering, while providing money-transfer services, Daniel Glaser, the Treasury’s assistant secretary for terrorist financing, said in an October blog post.

Who’s Responsible?

Finding the balance could prove challenging. Banks remain unsure whether they’re responsible for knowing their customers’ customer and ensuring that the money stays in safe hands, said Rowe from the American Bankers Association.

In 2013, London-based Barclays Plc was involved in a U.K. legal case after it said it would end its business with a Somali company that provided remittance services. A court found that the bank must maintain its relationship with the company while money-laundering concerns were reviewed.

For Suleiman, who moved from Somalia 33 years ago and has spent years working in banking — including 3 1/2 at the money-transfer business Amal USA Inc. — more certainty about the process can’t come soon enough. He’s become a spokesman on the issue, even testifying before Congress in 2012.

“I’m worried about it right now: They might shut it down entirely,” he said of the money channel to Somalia.

Source: Bloomberg

SOMALI AUTHOR NURUDDIN FARAH SPEAKS TRUTH TO POWER [INTERVIEW]

By Brittany Vickers

The current images of Somalia are those of a country ravaged by a 22-year dictatorship and perpetual civil war. Yet through 12 books and countless essays centered on Somalia, author Nuruddin Farah has refuted those images of his homeland and solidified his place as one of Africa’s leading literary voices. EBONY spoke with the global activist and educator on how he keeps Somalia alive through his writing.

EBONY: Growing up in Somalia, books were not easily accessible. At what point did your interest in literature pique despite not having books at your fingertips?

Nuruddin Farah: Books for children specifically and books in general were not available. I had to read whatever books my older brother could lay his hands on. I was between 9 and 11 years old, and I had difficulties understanding many of the words. It was my brother’s idea to give me thick books, to decrease the amount of mischief I could get into.

EBONY: So early on you were introduced to authors and stories from around the world. How did that exposure influence you?

NF: I discovered that the Russians were writing about Russia and the French were writing about the French. So early on in my life I thought, wouldn’t it be necessary to write down stories in which Somali names—children’s names and parents’—would appear.

EBONY: Initially, it was impossible for you to tell your stories in Somalian. How did you move away from the oral tradition?

NF: In a way, tragically I could not [write] in Somali, my mother tongue. Somalia had no standardized script, so one could not write in Somalian.

I would be the first one to move away from [the oral tradition] but [not] completely. I go to the oral tradition quite often; it’s a treasure I borrow [from] and informs a great deal of the writing. I love the oral tradition, but I think one must transcend it, because the only person who can hear you is the person in front of you.

EBONY: How does the cosmopolitan Somalia you grew up in compare to present day Somalia?

NF: Things are terrible [with] the continued absence of the basic necessities in Somalia—in terms of education, in terms of health, in terms of peace, in terms of economic, in terms of everything. The Somali-speaking peninsula of the world is lacking far behind our brethren and sistren in the other neighboring countries.

The tragedy of Somalia is, they have been given a life of discontinuity for the past two decades, and that has affected them mentally, psychologically, educationally and socially.

Read more at EBONY

Source: EBONY

The 14 rules for predicting future geopolitical events

Two big personalities(AP Photo/RIA-Novosti, Mikhail Klimentyev, Presidential Press Service)

Nations are eccentric. But they also have threads of repeated history through which we can discern what comes next. For five centuries, since Ivan the Terrible, for instance, Russia has been characterized by one-man rule, an exaggerated sense of identity, and an acceptance of often deadly cruelty toward individual citizens.  Therefore, it is not surprising that those traits are the bricks and mortar of Vladimir Putin’s rule today.

Many political scientists dismiss the detection of such trends as “deterministic.” Some insist that, unlike in economics and statistics, there is as yet in fact no useful algorithm for foreseeing events—the only tool available to political forecasters is their own intuition. But it is vapid to observe the world, its nations and peoples as an unfathomable mob. History is not a science—but neither is it pure chaos. In aninterview with Quartz last fall, statistician Nate Silver rejected the possibility of predicting geopolitics in the way that he forecasts US elections, and he has a point. Yet, to borrow his own phrase, you can pick out the signal from the noise, and from that derive the likely direction if not the outcome of events.

One of the instruments for doing so is history, as discussed. But there also is a perceptible universal trend to events that cuts across borders. Last fall, we told you about the 11 indicators of energy and geopolitics (here are the original 10; here is the 11th, added in November). Now, we present 14 rules governing geopolitical events. These rules do not divine the future. Rather they allow you, generally speaking, to separate yourself from the unruly, conjectural maw of global opinion-makers and decipher for yourself what is going on, and the probable scenario or scenarios to unfold next. Neither are they complete—please send along your own rules (s@qz.com) and we will publish the best.

This is the first of two posts. The second, derived from the rules here,can be found here and includes our forecasts of global events for 2013.

The rules of global events

1. Muddle-along rule

On and off for several decades, knowing analysts have forecast state collapse for Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, and other nations. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have been said to be destined for economic ruin, and North Korea for the ash heap of history. Yet they have gone on—often with the help of the global community, but gone on they have. The lesson is that countries tend to muddle along regardless of the trouble, and not collapse.

2. Precipice rule

A corollary to Rule No. 1. Even the most violence-riven nations tend not to plunge over the precipice, as it seems they might, but to pull back if only at the last moment and not devolve into utter chaos and ruin. Often they need help—last year, Kenya sent troops to Somalia to break up the radical militia al-Shabab, for example. But absent the Precipice Rule, Kenya’s intervention would not have worked: Somalians in fact did not wish to dive into the abyss. So al-Shabab could be uprooted.

3. Conspiracy rule

When you find a simple explanation for an event, the safest bet is to embrace it. To be sure, conspiracies exist—what would war be without them, for instance? But they are much rarer than many suppose. Generally speaking, groups of people do not successfully conceive and execute dastardly schemes; even if they want to, they are typically confounded by the compound physics of too many moving parts and human fallibility. (You can think of this as the Occam’s Razor of geopolitics.)

4. Economic/health/injustice rule

A desire for these three things—economic success, good health and justice—is the big driver in political revolt and revolution. The inflection point is when a critical mass of individuals despairs for the future of its children, and youths feel they can succeed only under a different circumstance. Governments generally do not fall over questions of liberty and political expression, which are not nearly as potent as a collective sense of injustice, helplessness or outrage over the security or health of their children. To battle this rule, a regime will try to change the subject (using the potent factors of Rule No. 14—nationalism, xenophobia, jingoism and fear of instability) and, if that fails, to scare the wits out of its population.

5. Idea rule

The most over-rated of the drivers of change. Political ideas and theories, even when they are brilliant, only very rarely gain the critical mass to move events. But occasionally they do. A case in point is the Arab Spring. Originally triggered by Rule No. 4, the Spring has spread and been sustained by the idea of the right to rise up.

6. Caesar rule

When states are muddling along, staying away from the precipice and not at the stage of revolt, as described in Rules No. 4 and 5, the only other way that dictators are typically ousted is defection or assassination. Generally speaking, a key ally or a few will either pull away from a ruler, causing an apparently strong edifice of power to crumble, or kill him outright.

7. Staying in power rule

The ultimate objective of almost every leader in the world. Governments including dictatorships may seem sclerotic, but can become among the most nimble of things when under existential threat. Keep this in mind when you are tempted to say, “He will never change. He has always been that way.”

8. Territory rule

Among the most powerfully visceral forces in politics. A threat to even the slenderest sliver of land can arouse the primal and uncontrolled indignation of a people. When territory is involved, common sense can vanish even among otherwise worldly and balanced leaders and their people, leading to brittle diplomacy and, if Rule No. 2 is not invoked, a drift toward war.

9. The rule of averages

As with most matters in life, events tend toward the average, the local version of the moderate middle. There can be periods of wild, insane extremism. But then people are prone to calm down, do business and seek strong, stable and bright futures for their children.

10. Big personality rule

What would Venezuela have been during the 2000s without Hugo Chavez? Libya during the last quarter of the 20th century without Moamar Gadhafi? Russia for the last dozen years without Vladimir Putin? For that matter, Great Britain in 1939 without Winston Churchill, and Vietnam in the 1950s and 1960s without Ho Chi Minh? In politics, personality matters, and big, idiosyncratic personalities move and dominate events.

No. 10 has symbiosis with the following two rules.

11. True-believer rule

While people and countries tend toward the middle, events can turn on exceptions operating on the extremes. Hitler’s Germany is an example. Today, Khamenei’s Iran, Afghanistan’s Taliban, Kim’s North Korea and Chávez’s Venezuela punch above their weight in influencing the geopolitical landscape. 

12. Mountain rule

Like Rule No. 10, this is a direct carryover from the energy indicators. That is, certain countries are so large and their behavior so singular that their actions can create and disrupt economic and geopolitical trends. China, Russia, Saudi Arabia and the United States are among the Mountains. When one or more of them step into the picture, they can and do create news.

There are three corollaries to the Mountain Rule:

                The future superpower corollary: China is not yet a military or economic power of the stature of the US, but since most assume it will be, it is more or less already treated and behaves as one. As a Mountain, it can and does shape and shift economic and political trends.

                 The former colonial/great power corollary: When you formerly were a great power, it is hard to give up the mantle. Such is the lot of countries like France and Great Britain. Though well past their great-power prime—and not Mountains in either case—both from time to time play outsized roles in big events, such as France’s 2011 intervention in Libya. A problem comes, however, when inflated former great-power thinking conflicts with current powers, in which case it is regarded as a nuisance. Such is the case of Russia, a Mountain whose often countervailing policies seem to be Moscow’s strategy for staying in the great-power game (see next corollary).

                  The perceived great power corollary: India, Iran and Turkey all perceive themselves as great powers (and in the latter two cases actually were a long time ago, and as such also fall under the previous corollary). So they can and do behave in ways that impact events far beyond their shores. India projects its weight around the Indian Ocean and the Subcontinent, Turkey around the Mediterranean and into Central Asia, and Iran around the Persian Gulf and into the Levant. Russia, having lost its great-power status in 1991, interjects its leverage wherever it sees a useful opening.

13. Getting-rich rule

Why do leaders act as they do? Often, look no further than personal enrichment.

14. Local politics rule

Most geopolitics begin at home. Whether deliberate or inadvertent, domestic politics are a crucial contextual determinant of future events. Among key local influences are xenophobia, nationalism and jingoism.

EGYPT REJECTS ETHIOPIA DAM STORAGE CAPACITY

Egypt’s irrigation ministry says the current capacity of the Renaissance Dam will negatively affect its water share

Ethiopia’s Great Renaissance Dam is constructed in Guba Woreda, some 40 km (25 miles) from Ethiopia’s border with Sudan, June 28, 2013. (Photo: Reuters)

Egypt has objected to the storage capacity of Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam, currently under construction, which it fears will negatively affect its Nile water share.

Alaa Yassin, spokesperson on the Ethiopia dam issue at Egypt’s irrigation ministry, called for decreasing the dam’s capacity, currently set at 74 billion cubic metres, as this will have an adverse effect on Egypt’s water supply.

Yassin stated, according to state news agency MENA on Sunday, that his country’s “studies” on the dam have shown that the capacity is “unjustified” and “technically unacceptable.”

In October, Ethiopia said it had completed 40 percent of the construction necessary for its $4.2 billion dam project, adding that the first stage of the dam will be operational from June 2015. The 6,000 megawatt dam, set to be Africa’s largest, is expected to be completed by 2017.

Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan have created a tripartite committee to conduct negotiations on the dam, a source of concern for Egypt.

Ethiopia is building the dam on the Blue Nile, the Nile’s most significant tributary, supplying most of its water

The committee is expected to meet mid-January to choose an international firm to conduct studies on the dam’s impact. This meeting has been postponed twice while some firms have withdrawn from the pool of prospective candidates to conduct the study.

In previous statements, Egyptian officials have said that there are several technical issues that could be discussed with Ethiopia should the anticipated report reveal that the dam will diminish Egypt’s water supply.

Egypt will likely need an additional 21 billion cubic metres of water per year by 2050, on top of its current 55 billion cubic metre quota, to meet the water needs of a projected population of 150 million, according to Egypt’s National Planning Institute.

Source: Ahram Online

Oil will roil everything

If sub-$90 oil persists, look for much nervousness even in Riyadh.

There’s a very good chance that we have already seen more or less the average price of oil for the year—$50 to $60 a barrel. (I’ve made a wager with colleagues on the energy beat that Brent crude will end 2015 at $57.75 a barrel.)

We have already weighed in on how these prices will shake up geopolitics this year: In brief, OPEC’s richest countries—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar—will suffer a hit, regardless of their current game faces, but have no choice other than to see their low-price strategy through to its conclusion. This strategy seeks to drive higher-cost rival producers out of the business—those in the US shale oil patch, Canadian oil sands, and Brazilian deepwater crude. The strategy is guided in large part by the Stay in Power Rule, which states that political leaders, regardless of their locality, will do what it takes to keep their jobs. In this case, the longer that shale producers in particular are permitted to build market share, the greater the threat to incumbent drillers in the Persian Gulf.

But along the way, these rich countries will be bruised by the loss of income and draining down of their prodigious cash reserves. Saudi Arabia in particular claims it’s prepared to withstand cut-rate prices for up to five years, but this reeks of bravura: If sub-$90 oil persists for two years—and possibly before—look for much nervousness and a change of tactics even in Riyadh.

As for the poorer OPEC members—such as Iran, Nigeria, and Venezuela—they have barely any cash reserves about which to become agitated. Nigerian officials specifically have observed the Getting Rich Rule all these years, feeding from the trough while large swaths of the population have gone without electricity.

But now that the commodity boom is over, Staying in Power will guide the behavior of these lesser OPEC producers. Low oil prices and tightened government spending can lead to public unrest, in line with the Injustice Rule, which explains the public reaction under conditions of perceived economic and judicial unfairness. Look for a combination of reactions: an initial impulse by governments to crack down on unrest, but eventually—the longer that prices stay low—a move to greater fiscal discipline and economic diversification. What not to expect: utter collapse. This is because, even in times of desperation, nations tend to Muddle Along.

Source: qz.com