The Horn of Africa: International influence as the basis for never ending violence

The Horn of Africa is one of the most restless African regions. The countries in the Horn, namely Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, are suffering from internal conflicts among different communities and are involved in border conflicts among each other. A common feature of the Horn countries is high militarisation of its inhabitants,(2) which is a basis for continued violent conflicts. These include human rights atrocities, child conscription and the collapse of state infrastructure. There is almost no conversation among the states, nor is there accountability, flexibility, legitimacy and stability in the region.(3)

Analysts suggest that there are several internal and external factors that stimulate continued conflicts in the African Horn. These are geophysical conditions, resource scarcity, poverty, socio-economic inequalities and ethnic divisions, militarisation, competition for state power, and also the legacies of the colonial and Cold War policies.(4)

This paper focuses on the last two factors, namely the legacies of the colonial and Cold War policies. First, it describes the external interventions in the region during the colonial era and analyses their consequences. The paper continues by analysing the Cold War superpowers’ influence in the Horn, which used the region as one of their battlefields. The wars that took place in the region, and the United States of America (USA or US) and Soviet Union’s politics of searching for allies are further described. 

In the last section, the paper analyses recent conflicts and wars in the African Horn and the international presence and support. They serve as proof that international interventions are not decreasing the tensions in the region, nor are they working towards changing the legacy of colonialism and the Cold War era.

Colonial era and bringing the European patterns to the African Horn

The colonial era, despite its relatively short duration of less than 100 years, set the basis for today’s chaotic situation in the African Horn. The region was partitioned among Britain, France and Italy. Today’s Somalia was divided between Britain and Italy. Italy also occupied a part of Ethiopia and established Eritrea as a colonial entity, while France occupied Djibouti.(5)

It seemed that colonialism brought progress, established civil service and judicial systems and brought peace and stability to the region. Yet, the reality was different. The main aim of colonial powers was the exploitation of natural resources and cheap labour force, which only brought suffering to the local inhabitants. Civil service and judicial systems were established, but were intended to serve colonial interests and not the interests of independent states. 

The inhabitants of the Horn lost their right to govern themselves. Indigenous people could not even learn how to lead a country since they were considered and treated as subordinated people throughout the colonial time. They were humiliated, persecuted, tortured and deprived of their basic rights and civil liberties. 

Their silence was interpreted as peace and stability, which was only superficial. Moreover, colonialists created a new geo-political setup. Many states at that time were artificially created. New boundaries cut across pre-existing ethnic groups, states and kingdoms and united different cultures, languages and traditions. This caused, on the one hand, unrest within newly created countries and, on the other hand, border disputes and demands for unification of dispersed ethnic groups.(6)

Already colonial powers waged border wars in order to get more strategically important territory. The British demarcated their borders between 1932 and 1934, which could not be claimed for the Italians, who were not satisfied with the colonised territory. They launched an invasion against Ethiopia and successfully annexed the grazing area of the Ogaden to Somalia. The region was later returned to Ethiopia, but the border became a barrier to nomadic migrations and only triggered further disputes between those two countries.(7)

Colonial powers left the African Horn in bad shape. States were culturally and economically weakened and a crisis of the leadership appeared.(8) Newly independent states had to establish new governance. They used the patterns they knew from the colonial era. It often happened that the power was in the hands of ethnic or ideological oligarchies. For example, Amharas and Tigreanes dominated resources in Ethiopia.(9) Different kinds of oppressive regimes appeared, such as the communist juntas, dictatorships, rivalling militias, warlords and clan leaders. Fights for power triggered several internal violent conflicts.(10) An important legacy of the colonialist era was also expansionism. It was apparent in the Somali irredentism, Ethiopia’s annexation of Eritrea, claims of French-protected Djibouti and various other border disputes.(11)

The Cold War: African Horn as a competitive scene for the superpowers 

Due to its strategic importance, the Horn of Africa was very interesting for the Cold War superpowers, the USA and the Soviet Union. The Horn is located directly at the southern end of the Red Sea, across the Arabian Peninsula, which makes it a neighbour to the major oil lines. Both superpowers tried to get allies in the Horn in order to supervise the oil lines and prevent access to the lines to the other superpower.(12) The USA and Soviet Union started attracting their potential allies on the Horn by militarising them heavily. Consequently, the countries in the region grew in number of armed forces, escalated their defence expenditures, increased their propensity for internal and external war and military dominance of a civil society appeared.(13)

The USA and the Soviet Union’s relationship with various regimes in the region evolved according to their perceived importance within an East-West framework.(14) The USA first found its ally in Ethiopia, where, in the late 1960s, it established the largest embassy in Sub-Saharan Africa.(15) At that time, Ethiopia was a part of a worldwide telecommunications network directed against the Soviet Union.(16) The country received the largest economic and military programme from the USA. When Ethiopia was threatened by Somali irredentism or Eritrean separatism, the USA strongly backed the Haile Selassie Government.(17) Yet, after the Ethiopian revolution, which lasted from 1974 to 1977, a Soviet-backed regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam came to power in Ethiopia. The USA took away its support and backed the Somali regime of the dictator Mohamed Siad Barre. Somalia became an access country from which the USA could militarily counter any perceived Soviet threat to the Middle Eastern oil fields.(18)

According to the relationship between the superpowers, the relationship between Somalia and Ethiopia largely depended on the game between the USA and the Soviet Union and the external aid and support they were receiving from them. Especially Somalia, which was already unstable due to the internal fights for power, became a match-ball between the USA and the Soviet Union due to its geo-strategic position, which served as a base for further actions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region.(19) One of the most violent consequences of those two countries’ militarisation was a destructive war for the Ogaden region in 1963 and 1964 and then again in 1977 and 1978.(20) It was one of the actions with which Somalia wanted to fulfil its idea of Greater Somalia and re-unite Somali people that were divided among Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya during the colonial times.(21)

The Cold War was losing its power, as were the regimes backed by the superpowers. In 1988, Somalia and Ethiopia concluded a peace agreement, mostly with the aim to defuse conflictual external relations in order to effectively deal with the internal regime-threatening guerrilla insurgencies. In Somalia it was the Somali National Movement and in Ethiopia the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front. In 1991, both governing regimes were overthrown by guerrilla insurgencies.(22) The end of superpower competition in the Horn left a political vacuum and the competition for power started again.(23) Moreover, major changes happened. Ethiopia had been reconstructed with the independence of Eritrea, Somalia was bankrupted and Djibouti was about to enter civil war(24) and the former British Somaliland territory declared sovereignty.(25)

Post Cold War era: New era, same old patterns

The violent history and the patterns that the inhabitants of the Horn region learned during the colonial era and the Cold War were a bad basis for the stabilisation of the region. Contrary to stabilisation, Somalia has been at the top of the Failed States Index for four years in a row.(26) In 2012, Ethiopia ranked 17th, Eritrea 23rd and Djibouti 53rd.(27) In comparison with the last two years, they have been scaling up the list.(28)

Border disputes among the neighbouring countries in the Horn did not end. In 1993, Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia after a long guerrilla war, yet the border was not strictly demarcated.(29) Ethiopia refused to recognise and implement the borders agreed to in the 2000 Algiers Agreement, which gave the town of Badme to Eritrea. Ethiopia even blocked the United Nations technical team, which wanted to demarcate the border. Five years later, the war over the border started again. 

The war took the form of a proxy war since both countries amassed their troops in neighbouring Somalia. Somali Islamists demanded that Ethiopian troops withdraw from the country and several clashes started throughout the country.(30) The USA got involved and backed Ethiopia with the excuse that the Eritrean regime supported transnational terrorism and needed to be stopped. The war officially ended in 2000, but tensions remained.(31) The United Nations sent its troops to the border, but due to the extreme danger posed to its personnel, the United Nations Security Council unanimously voted to withdraw its troops from the region.(32) Moreover, Eritrea was also involved in border conflicts with Djibouti. Eritrea ignored the United Nations Security Council resolution, which demanded its withdrawal from Djibouti, which led to deadly clashes in 2008.(33)

The biggest problem in the region represents Somalia, which has the best strategic position and was massively misused during the Cold War. It is still involved in a border dispute with Ethiopia. War-torn Somalia continues to be a subject of the African Union’s peacekeeping interventions. At the end of 2011, troops from Djibouti arrived in Somalia to join forces from Burundi and Uganda, which have been present in Somalia for the last two years as part of the African Union peace mission to combat the militants. Moreover, the US aerial attack drones and French naval firepower have coordinated with the Kenyan ground assault.(34)

The USA is still intervening in the internal affairs of these countries. The former American General, William Ward, pledged continued support to Somalia’s Transitional 

Federal Government and condemned Somali rebels, who were accused of supporting the Government of Eritrea in its border conflict with Djibouti.(35) But the USA again changed allies and Ethiopia is now a close Washington ally. In 2006, the USA gave a green light to Ethiopia to invade Somalia, where the Islamic Courts Union was in power.(36) In 2011, military sources confirmed that the Obama administration was engaged in a new war in a famine-hit African Horn. It supported Kenya in its fight against Somalia in its anti-terrorism war. And the French joined them, too.(37)

Today the USA and its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies do not only support the countries of the Horn, but are also physically present in the region. They lay the groundwork for increased naval, air and ground operations in the Horn of Africa. 

The British Prime Minister described Somalia as the country to which special attention should be given. The USA also entered Djibouti and established the Pentagon’s first permanent base in Africa with 2,500 personnel. Djibouti is also the headquarters of the US Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF – HOA), which was set up in 2001. Its responsibilities include all countries of this region and some other countries as well.(38) Djibouti is still a base for France’s largest military base on the continent, and the USA has more than 1,200 troops there as a part of its anti-terrorism task force in the Horn of Africa.(39) Troops, warplanes and armoured vehicles under the flag of NATO, the European Union (EU), France and the USA have intervened in all of the Horn countries and some others, too. Starting in 2008, NATO commenced its war against the pirates on the coast of Somalia. The NATO and EU deployments in the Gulf of Aden are the first such naval operations in both organisations’ history and the EU’s first in African coastal waters.(40)

Conclusion

Countries in the Horn of Africa hardly promote any communication among each other. Their relationship is still characterised by mistrust and suspicion; consequently, they are not able to solve problems constructively. If they agree to negotiations, those mostly bring mutual accusations. There have been examples when neutral regional third parties offered good offices by providing a neutral territory for negotiations, but with little success. As noted earlier, international interventions even fuelled further conflicts in the region.(41) International actors are regularly present in the region. In the past they admitted that they were attracted by the strategic position of the Horn. Today, they are allegedly trying to solve the conflicts that happen due to the power struggles and unresolved border issues. Yet, it appears that their interest in local conflict solutions is still subordinated to the strategic importance of the region and the USA’s commitment to fight global terrorism. 

The two most important reasons for violence in Africa are “perceptions of mistreatment by a population, and no legal channel for that population to address that perceived injustice,” said Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.(42) That implies that the USA and other Western powers should start helping the region in a manner they should have done a century ago: by teaching the countries/Governments how to establish democracy and communicate with each other in a peaceful manner, and not to further militarise the already over-militarised region just to keep the control over a strategically important region.

NOTES:

(1) Contact Petra Pavšič through Consultancy Africa Intelligence's Conflict and Terrorism Unit ( conflict.terrorism@consultancyafrica.com).
(2) Wasara, S.S., 2002. Conflict and state security in the Horn of Africa: Militarisation of civilian groups. African Association of Political Science, 7(2), pp. 39-60.
(3) Elmore, E.K., 2010. The Horn of Africa: Critical analysis of conflict management and startegies for success in the Horn's future. Student Pulse, 2(6), http://www.studentpulse.com.
(4) 'Costs and Causes of the Conflict in the Great Horn of Africa', Conflict Prevention, http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com.
(5) Degu, W.A., 'The State, the crisis of state institutions and refugee migration in the Horn of Africa: The cases of Ethiopa, Sudan and Somalia', 2002, http://dare.uva.nl.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Elmore, E.K., 2010. The Horn of Africa: Critical nalysis of conflict management and startegies for success in the Horn's future. Student Pulse, 2(6), http://www.studentpulse.com
(8) 'Costs and Causes of the Conflict in the Great Horn of Africa', Conflict Prevention, http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com.
(9) Wasara, S.S., 2002. Conflict and state security in the Horn of Africa: Militarisation of civilian groups. African Association of Political Science, 7(2), pp. 39-60.
(10) Elmore, E.K., 2010. The Horn of Africa: Critical Analysis of Conflict Management and Startegies for Success in the Horn's Future. Student Pulse, 2(6), http://www.studentpulse.com.
(11) 'Costs and Causes of the Conflict in the Great Horn of Africa', Conflict Prevention, http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com.
(12) Schulz, P., 2011. The Horn of Africa in a bipolar world - The Cold War as the origin of the Somalia crisis. Undergraduate Research Journal for the Human Sciences, 10, http://urc.kon.org.
(13) Agyeman-Duah, B., 1996. The Horn of Africa: Conflict, demilitarisation and reconstruction. The Journal of Conflict Studies, 16(2), http://journals.hil.unb.ca.
(14) Schraeder, P.J., 1992. The Horn of Africa: The US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment. Middle East Journal, 46(4), pp. 571-593.
(15) Shinn, D.H., 'US Policy towards the Horn of Africa', International Policy Digest, 2012, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org. 
(16) Schraeder, P.J., 1992. The Horn of Africa: The US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment. Middle East Journal, 46(4), pp. 571-593.
(17) Shinn, D.H., 'US Policy towards the Horn of Africa', International Policy Digest, 2012, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org.
(18) Schraeder, P.J., 1992. The Horn of Africa: The US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment. Middle East Journal, 46(4), pp. 571-593.
(19) Schulz, P., 2011. The Horn of Africa in a bipolar World -  The Cold War as the origin of the Somalia crisis. Undergraduate Research Journal for the Human Sciences, 10,  http://urc.kon.org.
(20) Agyeman-Duah, B., 1996. The Horn of Africa: Conflict, demilitarisation and reconstruction. The Journal of Conflict Studies, 16(2),  http://journals.hil.unb.ca.
(21) Wasara, S.S., 2002. Conflict and state security in the Horn of Africa: Militarisation of civilian groups. African Association of Political Science, 7(2), pp. 39-60.
(22) Schraeder, P.J., 1992. The Horn of Africa: The US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment. Middle East Journal, 46(4), pp. 571-593.
(23) Wasara, S.S., 2002. Conflict and state security in the Horn of Africa: Militarisation of civilian groups. African Association of Political Science, 7(2), pp. 39-60.
(24) Agyeman-Duah, B., 1996. The Horn of Africa: Conflict, demilitarisation and reconstruction. The Journal of Conflict Studies, 16(2), http://journals.hil.unb.ca.
(25) Schraeder, P.J., 1992. The Horn of Africa: The US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment. Middle East Journal, 46(4), pp. 571-593.
(26) 'The Failed States Index 2011', Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com.
(27) 'The Failed States: The Rankings 2012', Foreign Policy,http://www.foreignpolicy.com. 
(28) 'The Failed States Index 2010', Foreign Policy,http://www.foreignpolicy.com; 'The Failed States Index 2011', Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com.
(29) 'Ethiopia/Eritrea War', Global Security,org, http://www.globalsecurity.org.
(30) Hanson, S., 'Proxy War in Africa's Horn.' Council on Foreign Relations,20 December 2006, http://www.cfr.org; Woldemariam, Y. and Yohannes, O., ‘War Clouds in the Horn of Africa’, Sudan Tribune, 10 November 2007, http://www.sudantribune.com.
(31) Wasara, S.S., 2002. Conflict and state security in the Horn of Africa: Militarisation of civilian groups. African Association of Political Science, 7(2), pp. 39-60.
(32) 'UN ends African Horn peace force', BBC News, 30 July 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
(33) 'Eritrea 'ignored' UN resolution', BBC News, 8 April 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk. 
(34) Cunningham, F., 'Horn of Africa: Proxy War in Somalia Veers Towards Regional Conflicts', Global Research,1 January 2012, http://www.globalresearch.ca. 
(35) Rozoff, R., 'U.S., NATO Expand Afghan War To Horn of Africa And Indian Ocean', Global Research, 8 January 2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca.
(36) Cunningham, F., 'Horn of Africa: Proxy War in Somalia Veers Towards Regional Conflicts', Global Research,1 January 2012, http://www.globalresearch.ca.
(37) Cunningham, F., 'America's War in the Horn of Africa: “Drone Alley” – a Harbinger of Western Power across the African Continent’, Global Research, 29 October 2011, http://www.globalresearch.ca.  
(38) Rozoff, R., 'U.S., NATO Expand Afghan War To Horn of Africa And Indian Ocean', Global Research, 8 January 2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca.
(39) 'Eritrea 'ignored' UN resolution', BBC News, 8 April 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
(40) Rozoff, R., 'U.S., NATO Expand Afghan War To Horn of Africa And Indian Ocean', Global Research, 8 January 2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca.
(41) Elmore, E.K., 2010. The Horn of Africa: Critical analysis of conflict management and strategies for success in the Horn's future. Student Pulse, 2(6), http://www.studentpulse.com
(42) 'Costs and Causes of the Conflict in the Great Horn of Africa,' Conflict Prevention, http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com.

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Written on Friday, 16 November 2012 08:12 by Petra Pavšič (1)