Nile dam study fails to stem the tide of Egyptian indignation towards Ethiopia

Claim and counter-claim has attended the delayed publication of a report on the likely impact of the Grand Renaissance dam

Villagers on the Nile in Khartoum. Ethiopia's Gerd dam may give Sudan greater water access than an agreement with Egypt allows. Photograph: Antony Njuguna/Reuters

The opening sentence of Egypt's new constitution describes the country as the river Nile's gift to Egyptians. It is a grand claim, but one that helps explain Egypt's indignation at the ongoing construction of a blockage on the Nile, thousands of miles upstream: the $4.7bn (£2.8bn) Grand Ethiopian Renaissance dam (Gerd).

Egyptians have long maintained that Ethiopia's dam project will dangerously deplete its water stocks – about 95% of which are derived from the world's longest river. A year ago, a former Egyptian water official boldly claimed that the Gerd might deprive Egypt of up to 10bn kilolitres, devastating roughly a million acres of farmland along the shores of the Nile.

"Then you might cross the Nile on the back of a camel," the former head of Egypt's National Water Research Centre said at the time, in what were highly contested claims.

Egyptian politicians have used such claims to portray the dam as a threat to national security, and have occasionally made ambiguous statements about the possibility of military action. For their part, the Ethiopian government sees the Gerd as a crucial developmental goal – a 6,000 megawatt source of surplus electricity that they could sell to foreign countries to boost their economy.

Last month, the saga took a fresh twist after the leak of a highly anticipated and hitherto suppressed report into the long-term effects of what would be Africa's largest hydroelectric dam. Written by two water experts from each of the three main countries concerned – Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan – as well as international advisers, the report was seen as a much needed means of arbitration between the parties concerned.

But for nearly a year the report's contents were a mystery. After its submission last April, publication was suppressed at the request of one of the countries involved, enabling all concerned to make whatever claims they liked about its contents.

That should have changed at the end of March, when a leaked version (pdf) was finally published by the International Rivers Network (IRN), an independent group that campaigns against dams across the world. But rather than clarifying the dam's impact once and for all, the report has become the latest pawn in a war of words between Egypt and Ethiopia.

IRN said it showed that "big questions remain" and called for a halt to the dam's construction. But Ethiopian government spokesman Getachew Reda said the group was "absolutely biased", and "part of the smear campaign organised by Egypt". In the meantime, the dam's construction continues apace.

The report is nuanced and complex, and does not try to quantify exactly the likely downstream effect of the dam on Egypt's water supply. But its 48 pages nonetheless contain alarming findings. If the dam's reservoirs are filled during years of average or above-average rainfall, says the report, the hydroelectric capacity of Egypt's downstream Aswan High dam (Had) – which provides about 15% of Egypt's power – could face a temporary 6% decrease. But if filled during years of below-average rainfall, the Gerd may "significantly impact on water supply to Egypt and cause the loss of power generation at Had for extended periods".

Among other criticisms, the report warns that the dam's foundations may need further structural support to protect against sliding. It also says Ethiopia has done little to assess the Gerd's effect on local people, ecosystems and biodiversity. Based on these findings, the IRN concludes that the report "confirms Egypt's concerns that the project's impacts could be significant", and calls for construction to cease pending better analysis.

Not all independent analysts share this view, however. According to Dr Ana Cascão, a researcher at the Stockholm International Water Institute whose doctoral thesis analysed hydropolitics in the Nile basin, Egypt fought for the report to be kept secret. Cascão argues the study is largely optimistic about the Gerd's impacts – "and that's why Egypt was not happy for it to be released". It is critical about the dam's social and environmental impact, she says, "but otherwise – in terms of dam safety and even in terms of water going downstream – the report is quite positive".

This is because the Gerd may eventually help to reduce the build-up of sediment in downstream dams like the Had, increasing capacity. The Gerd will also help to keep the Nile's flow – which presently fluctuates according to the amount of rainfall, potentially causing problems for downstream farmers even in Egypt – constant throughout the year. In terms of structural safety, Sudan – the country most endangered by any catastrophe at the Gerd – is satisfied with its construction.

Egypt's interests may actually be aligned with Ethiopia's, since Ethiopia will ultimately want to see as much water flow through the Gerd as possible in order to maximise hydroelectric power. It is, says Cascão, Sudan's intentions that may instead cause the greatest long-term concern for Egypt. The Gerd would allow Sudan to siphon off more downstream water for farm irrigation, potentially allowing the republic to take more water from the Nile than allowed by an agreement signed with Egypt in 1959.

Sudan has achieved this leverage by engaging positively with the dam's construction; Egypt's only means of reaching a grand compromise may be through similar engagement.

But it may now be too late. According to the Ethiopian government, an army of 8,500 builders, working 24 hours a day, has already completed about 30% of the 1,800 sq km site.

HISTORY OF Somaliland Protectorate from 1905 to 1913

Military activities in the Somaliland Protectorate from 1905 to 1907 (This should be read as a continuation of The Fourth Campaign article that can be read here ) Please open the map HERE By March of 1905 the Mullah was in treaty agreement with the Italian authorities and had accepted the requirement to live a peaceful life with his followers in the vicinity of Illig.  The British had covertly supported Italian ambitions elsewhere in Somaliland by influencing the Zanzibari Sultan to concede the Benadir ports, and by recognising an Italian land claim near Kismayu.  The Somaliland Protectorate was now under new direction from London as in 1905 the Colonial Office took over responsibility from the Foreign Office.  The Mullah did keep to his side of the bargain for a couple of years until the grazing areas around Illig became exhausted and insufficient for his followers’ herds and flocks. Meanwhile the British reorganised their defence force in the Somaliland Protectorate.  After some deliberation and changes 6th King’s African Rifles (6 KAR), the Somali-based battalion, was organised in 1906 as a unit of six rifle companies.  A local Somali Standing Militia, formed after the Fourth Campaign, had been disbanded after the bulk of its personnel were transferred into 6 KAR.  Four of the new rifle companies contained Somalis whilst the other two were composed of seconded Indian Army volunteers.  Of the four Somali companies ‘A’ and ‘B’ were pony-mounted, ‘C’ was mule-mounted and ‘D’ was a Camel Company. Above: Drummers and buglers of 6 KAR, with a detachment of recruits in the rear, circa 1906, when the 6 KAR was a mixed Indian/Somali unit. The men are all Somalis, including the officer. One of the Indian companies was stationed in cantonments near the small Sheikh blockhouse, and the other in a mud fort at Burao.  The fort at Bohotle had been dismantled and those at Shimber Berris and Kirrit were unoccupied; the strong blockhouse at Las Dureh was garrisoned by a few tribal riflemen.  The Somali rifle companies occupied garrison posts along the caravan routes.  Thus the Protectorate troops were dissipated on outpost duty in locations that probably would not withstand a serious Dervish attack, and there was no military reserve to put into the field if such an attack was launched. In October 1907 the British Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, 33 year-old Winston S. Churchill, made a brief stop in Berbera and travelled inland to see the country.  He was not enthusiastic about what he saw, and recommended either a withdrawal to the coast or an occupation of the interior that, in an alliance with the Italians, would crush the Mullah.  He deplored the lack of a submarine communications cable between Berbera and Aden, which would be a small investment that could be used to quickly request reinforcements.  Back in London nobody was particularly interested in Churchill’s report, and it gathered dust whilst its author moved on to become President of the Board of Trade. But the Mullah was not without his critics within Islam.  In 1908 he was denounced from Mecca by the head of the Salihiya Tariqa, Sheikh Salih, as a sinner against Allah and the Prophet, a veritable kaffir, an unbeliever and a madman.  Although this denunciation was widely circulated in the Protectorate the British failed to use it to advantage by obtaining the Turkish Grand Mufti’s comments on the matter, and the Mullah finally shrugged it off, brutally dealing with opponents who publicly mentioned it. The 1908-1910 ‘Campaign’ By early 1908 complaints were pouring into Berbera from the interior stating that agitators were again proclaiming the right of the Mullah to be the leader of all the Somali inland tribes.  The last thing that the British wanted was the expense of another campaign but something had to be done, and a decision was made to send around 1,200 KAR Askari from other Protectorates into the Somaliland interior to uphold British prestige and rule, whilst 300 Indian Sepoys arrived from Aden. First to arrive in January 1909 was Battalion Headquarters and 300 Askari of 1 KAR from Nyasaland, under Lieutenant Colonel H.A. Walker (Royal Fusiliers).  The battalion marched up to Wadamago where it performed mundane escort duties and fatigues for a year before returning to Nyasaland. In February 1909 Battalion Headquarters and 450 Askari of 3 KAR, under Lieutenant Colonel J.D. McKay (Middlesex Regiment), arrived from Kenya and also performed security duties in the Wadamago region for a year.  Finally Lieutenant Colonel B.R. Graham (Corps of Guides, Indian Army), brought his 4 KAR Battalion Headquarters and 460 Askari for their 12-month stint in the Somaliland interior, returning to Uganda in February 1910. Despite not firing a shot in anger, all those troops who had served in Somaliland or off its coastline between August 1908 and January 1910 became eligible for the clasp SOMALILAND 1908-10 to the African General Service Medal. Whilst the KAR Askari were marching thirstily up and down the dusty camel trails in the interior without gaining sight of an aggressive Dervish, Lieutenant General Sir Reginald Wingate, Governor General and Sirdar of the Sudan, had been attempting without success to negotiate with the Mullah.  Wingate’s partner in this mission was General Sir Rudolf (Baron) von Slatin, Inspector General of the Sudan.  The British administration had become adamant that it would not finance another campaign, and when Wingate’s & Slatin’s negotiations failed the decision was made to abandon the interior of the Protectorate.  Italy protested, as this withdrawal meant an end to the treaty with the Mullah, but Britain was determined to withdraw into what was termed the Coastal Concentration. Above: Somali dance Coastal Concentration In March 1910 all Somali troops were back at Berbera where 6 KAR was disbanded, a coastal garrison being provided by the Indian Army contingent that was ordered not to move more than three miles inland.  A few local mounted police were retained.  Tribes in the interior who had sided with the British were extremely disgruntled and fearful for their own security, as the Dervishes were now openly coming out on the rampage.  These tribes were given rifles and ammunition which they promptly used to settle old scores between themselves, and to raid.  The Mullah raided everyone everywhere he could and brutal anarchy prevailed; thousands of men, women and children were killed and tens of thousands of head of stock changed hands.  Most tribes sided with the Mullah in order to survive.  Imported merchandise rotted in Berbera because camel-owners would not risk taking convoys inland. The formation of the Somaliland Camel Constabulary This disintegration of British rule in the Somaliland Protectorate was highlighted in February 1912 when Dervishes penetrated Berbera, causing panic and leaving a mysterious cabbalistic sign on trees and buildings.  The outskirts of Bulhar were also raided.  The Protectorate Commissioner, Horace Byatt, vigorously criticised the Coastal Concentration strategy and demanded a camel-mounted constabulary that could operate within an 80-kilometre radius of Berbera; the Bikaner Camel Corps that had seen much service in Somaliland was Byatt’s model. Right: Young Richard Corfield Byatt’s arguments won the day and in September 1912 sanction was given for a Camel Constabulary of 150 Somalis to be raised.  The Constabulary was tasked to restore peace and order amongst the friendly tribes but it was not to be used on offensive operations against the Dervishes.  Meanwhile earlier in June that year two companies of the Indian Army 119th Infantry (The Mooltan Regiment) had arrived in Berbera from Aden to protect the coastal towns, they joined the 200 Sepoys who had remained in the Protectorate when 6 KAR had been disbanded. The Mullah observed this British military activity and thought it a preliminary to another campaign against himself and his followers.  He started one of his periodic bouts of flowery letter-writing with Byatt, expressing a desire for peace.  Byatt’s answer was to the point – the Mullah could prove his intentions by ending raids and ceasing exhortations to tribes ostensibly still under British protection to join the Dervishes in a jihad or holy war.  The Mullah’s correspondence ceased in 1912 as he entered into a period of building permanent stone forts at Laba Bari, Bohotle, Damer and Taleh - a magnificent fort that was his pride and joy.  Professional stone masons and fort-builders were recruited from Yemen to supervise the construction.  It is probable that at this stage in his life the Mullah was becoming more obese and immobile as a result of elephantiasis; his days as a swift-moving nomadic warrior were now just memories. Above: Corfield and the Constabulary The battle of Dul Madoba Command of the Somaliland Camel Constabulary was given to a 30-year old Political Officer, Richard Conyngham Corfield, who had previous service in Somaliland, South Africa and Nigeria.  The two other officers appointed were Alan Gibb and Cecil de Sivrac Dunn.  Riding camels and saddlery were obtained from India and musketry training was conducted near Berbera.  By early December 1912 the Corps was based at Mandera, 68 kilometres south-west of Berbera and it went into the field to retrieve stolen stock from Sulagudub raiders.  The operation was successful and 1,282 camels, 11,300 sheep, 170 cows, 17 donkeys, 6 horses and 16 rifles were delivered to Adadleh where a post of the Indian 119th Infantry was located.  Thirtyeight of the raiders had been killed for no loss to Corfield’s command.  This type of low-level operation continued, to the satisfaction of the friendly tribes. Left: Corfield distributing arms in Burao Fort. In January 1913 the Corps occupied Sheikh and then Burao, but was not permitted to advance further south although it did move west to settle disputes at Hargeisa.  But Corfield chafed at the bit and did move south to Idaweina to search for Dervish raiders.  This action resulted in a critical memorandum to Corfield written by the Acting Commissioner Geoffrey Francis Archer, who reminded Corfield that the Corps was to stay near Burao and was not to take offensive action. Eight months later Archer visited Burao accompanied by Captain G.H. Summers, 26th (King George’s Own) Light Cavalry, Indian Army, who commanded the Indian Contingent in Somaliland.  Archer’s arrival was quickly followed by reports of Dervishes attacking friendly tribes between Idoweina, Burao and Ber.  The friendly tribes requested British protection, and in order to discover the facts Archer authorised Corfield to make a strong reconnaissance towards Ber; Summers was ordered to accompany Corfield as the military advisor. On 8th August a 15-man pony section from the Constabulary was order to reconnoitre, and shortly afterwards Archer permitted Corfield with 119 camel-mounted men to follow up the reconnaissance and observe the situation.  The riflemen carried .303 Martini Henry rifles with 140 rounds in bandoliers plus a reserve of 60 rounds in their saddle bags.  Also one Maxim gun with 4,000 rounds of ammunition packed in cork-lined tin boxes was transported on camels.  At 1900 hours that evening one of the pony reconnaissance party was met coming back to report.  He stated that a large force of Dervishes was driving many herds of looted stock towards Idoweina; the reconnaissance party had engaged the enemy, firing over 80 rounds each, and had hit several Dervishes who in retaliation had killed two ponies.  Corfield advanced for a couple of hours and then formed a zariba with the camels sat down in the centre.  The fires in the Dervish camp could be seen about eight kilometres distant.  The pony section returned with a Dervish strength estimate of 2,000 footmen and 150 mounted men, all armed with rifles.  The Dervish leader was Ow Yusuf Abdillah Hassan, a brother of the Mullah.  Local friendly Dolbahanta tribesmen assured Corfield that they would provide at least 300 men tomorrow, armed with rifles or spears, to assist in recovering their stolen stock. Corfield expressed his intention of either attacking the Dervish camp that night or of intercepting the enemy during the next day, and he sought Summers’ opinion.  Summers was adamant that Corfield could not win a battle against such a strong Dervish force, and he urged him to stick to his orders and just reconnoitre.  But Corfield wanted a battle and he decided to intercept the Dervishes the next day. Corfield moved his men out at dawn, tracking the Dervish line of march by the dust clouds that the herds threw up.  At 0645 hours near a location named Dul Mahoba (black hill) Corfield’s men were ordered into a skirmish line to face the left flank of the Dervish advance, with the Dolbahanta tribesmen positioned on the left flank.  Corfield attempted to advance his line through thick bush in order to reach more open ground ahead but the Dervish advance was too swift, catching Corfield in a totally unsound position where his men could not always see each other.  Summers urged Corfield to form a square, the safest formation to adopt as it could not be dangerously out-flanked as a line could, but Corfield wanted all his riflemen to fire at the same time, and so he left them floundering in a skirmish line without a reserve of troops or flank or rear protection. The Dervishes scented victory and charged forward, firing as they ran; nearly all the Dolbahanta tribesmen immediately fled the scene.  The Constabulary line was quickly outflanked causing some of Corfield’s men to disperse to the rear.  The Maxim gun fired three belts but was then permanently put out of action by bullet strikes on the mechanism.  Richard Corfield, who had positioned himself near the gun, was shot and died instantly at about 0715 hours.  Summers, who was hit three times and badly wounded, and Dunn rallied their surviving men and formed a protective zareba from the bodies of the dead camels and ponies that now littered the battlefield.  The wounded were brought into the zareba and a very few Somali officers and senior ranks began to exert fire discipline over the surviving riflemen.  Dervish attacks, which consisted of forward rushes that sometimes delivered warriors into the zareba, continued until 1100 hours when they began to tail away, and an hour later the Dervishes withdrew altogether with their captured herds as their stocks of ammunition were exhausted.  The Dolbahanta who had initially fled the scene now returned to loot the bodies on the battlefield. Dunn, now the force commander, sent a report to Archer and cleared the battlefield whilst a reconnaissance patrol followed the Dervish movements.  Twenty six riflemen remained fit to fight, and 16 wounded needed evacuation on the surviving camels.  In his after-action report Summers praised Colour Sergeants Gaboba Ali and Jama Hersi and Sergeant Jama Said for the leadership and gallantry that they displayed during the battle.  He also commented on the extreme bravery of the Dervishes, and on their use of modern rifles that had been obtained from traders working out of Djibouti and Muscat. Above: Taleh Fort At around 1500 hours that afternoon, when the reconnaissance patrol had established that the Dervishes were not lying in wait, Dunn withdrew to Idoweina where foul but just-drinkable water was found, and then moved slowly through the night to meet up with Archer at Gombur Magag, 30 kilometres from Burao which was itself reached on the morning of 10th August. As well as the death of Corfield and the wounding of Summers, 32 riflemen were killed and 15 wounded in the zareba.  A further 31 riflemen had gone missing from the zareba but most re-joined the column the next day.  The losses in mounts were 50 camels and 9 ponies; the Dervishes had seized four of these camels, the remainder being either killed in the battle or wounded and put down later.  The number of Dervish dead was estimated at between 200 and 600; many Dervish wounded later died of their wounds.  As the Mullah had ordered the ponies to be tied up away from the battlefield all the Dervish mounts survived.  Awards made for the action were Captain Gerald H. Summers appointed to be a Brevet Major and Captain Cecil de S. Dunn to receive the Police Medal.  During 1913 Geoffrey Archer was appointed a Companion of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George (CMG).  Withdrawal from Burao The Camel Constabulary needed re-organising and Archer withdrew it to the coast; the friendly tribes around Burao swiftly followed and were housed in a temporary camp near Berbera.  Britain again lost prestige in the interior and a further bout of anarchic raiding and looting ensued.  In September 1913 Alan Gibb returned to the Protectorate from overseas leave and took over command of the Camel Constabulary from Dunn.  Three months later Major A.S. Lawrance, 1st County of London Yeomanry and a former officer in 6 KAR, took over from Gibb.  The Somaliland Camel Corps, as it was soon to be titled, was authorised to recruit a total of 300 men.  Meanwhile in the interior the Mullah, who had written a dramatic popular poem about Corfield’s defeat, was advancing his influence by building strong masonry forts at Jidali, Urgai and even Shimber Berris – only 80 kilometres from Burao. Above: Q SUD M,AGSM JUBA, SOMAL 02-04, NAN 05-06, SOMAL 08-10, K SUD M Hafir & Firket (To be continued). (An edited version of this article has appeared in a recent edition of the Journal of the Anglo-Somali Societyhttp://www.anglosomalisociety.org.uk/Home.php  )  SOURCES: ·        Moyse-Bartlett, H., The King’s African Rifles.  1956, Gale & Polden Ltd, Aldershot.  Reprinted by The Naval & Military Press Ltd. ·        Jardine, Douglas, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland.  1923, Herbert Jenkins Ltd., London. Downloadable here:https://archive.org/details/TheMadMullahOfSomaliland ·        Beachey, Ray.  Warrior Mullah. The Horn Aflame 1892-1920.  1990, Bellew Publishing, London. ·        Digest of History of Somaliland Camel Corps, KAR. (The National Archives reference: WO 106/272). ·        3rd Battalion King’s African Rifles Historical Record 1895-1928.  (The National Archives reference: WO 106/270). ·        Hayward, J., Birch, D., and Bishop, R., British Battles and Medals.  2006, Spink, London. ·        Despatches published in The London Gazette. ·        Magor, R.B., African General Service Medals.  1983, Naval & Military Press. Please visit us at the forum at http://gmic.co.uk/ And don't forget!! www.thedeadmanshill.com

Plane stowaway 'wanted to return to Somalia'

An airline spokeswoman said the teenager was "exceptionally lucky" to have survived the flight

The father of a US teenager who stowed away in a wheel well on a flight to Hawaii has said his son was unhappy at school and trying to return to Somalia.

In an interview with US broadcaster Voice of America, Abdilahi Yusuf Abdi said "Allah had saved" his son.

The 16-year-old survived lack of oxygen and freezing temperatures on a five-hour flight from California to Hawaii.

Mr Abdi said his son, Yahya Abdi, would return to California after he finished health checks in Hawaii.

The teenager jumped over a fence at San Jose airport to get to the plane.

He reportedly told investigators he had been in an argument at home and then went to the airport, choosing the aircraft nearest to the fence,according to local media.

Dr Neil Spratt, senior lecturer in neurology at the University of Newcastle, Australia, told the BBC the young man would have likely not survived the lack of oxygen if he had not been exposed to such cold temperatures.

"We know that cold can protect the brain and other organs and it is used for that in various medical situations," Dr Spratt said.

A spokesman for Hawaiian Airlines said airline staff noticed the disorientated boy on the tarmac after the plane landed in Maui on Sunday morning.

He was questioned by the FBI and given a medical screening and was said to be in a stable condition.

A spokeswoman for Hawaiian Airlines said the boy was "exceptionally lucky to have survived".

Mr Abdi told the Voice of America he first heard of the news when Hawaiian police called him to tell him they had his son.

"When I watched the analysis about the extraordinary and dangerous trip of my son on local TVs and that Allah had saved him, I thanked God and I was very happy," he told the broadcaster.

Mr Abdi said his son was "always talking about going back to Africa" and since the family came to the US, the son had been bothered by "education problems".

"We want to go back [to Somalia], but due to the current living conditions we can't go back," the father said.

The 16-year-old transferred into a Santa Clara high school only five weeks ago, according to the school system.

Progress or Peril in Somalia? Nicholas Kay UN Representative for Somalai said that "Somaliland and Somalia is very different states"

Streamed live on Apr 22, 2014
Progress or Peril in Somalia? A Conversation with U.N. Special Representative for Somalia Nicholas Kay

The Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General for Somalia, Nicholas Kay, will discuss the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia's progress in executing key governance and security goals. This event has been rescheduled from the original event date of March 12, 2014.

For more information about this event, visit:



http://www.usip.org/events/progress-o...

Despite the optimism that surrounded President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's inauguration in 2012, Somalia has struggled to achieve key governance and security goals. A recent cabinet reshuffle and intensified al-Shabab militant activity in Mogadishu have raised more concerns about Somalia's trajectory. With elections planned for 2016, rapid progress is required to bolster confidence in Somalia's government and leadership.

To address these issues, USIP is pleased to host a discussion with Nicholas Kay, the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General for Somalia. As the head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), Amb. Kay oversees a mission charged with providing policy advice to the federal government on a range of governance and security issues and coordinating international engagement. He will provide an update on recent developments and UNSOM's progress in executing its mandate and take questions from the audience.

If you RSVP'd for the previous scheduled event (March 12, 2014) it will be necessary for you to RSVP again.

Featured Speakers:

Ambassador Nicholas Kay
Special Representative of the Secretary General for Somalia

Ambassador Johnnie Carson, Moderator

Special Advisor to the President, U.S. Institute of Peace
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Learning From Barbarian Underdogs: Sayid Mohammed Abdullah Hassan

ISLAMIC AWAKENING

Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, the so-called “Mad Mullah” (ALAMY)

by Oliver Barrett 

“I have no forts, no houses, no country. I have no cultivated fields, no silver or gold for you to take — all you can get from me is war, nothing else. I have met your men in battle and have killed them. We are greatly pleased about this. Our men who have fallen in battle have won paradise. God fights for us. We fight by   God’s order. If you wish war I am happy; if you wish peace I am also content. But  if you wish peace, go away from my country to your own. If you wish war, stay where you are.”  – the Mad Mullah

In 1910, the “Mad Mullah” of Somalia, a Sunni sheik named Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, gained notoriety for mercilessly killing British service members and their sympathizers among the Somali population. Born in 1856, Hassan studied under local religious scholars and undertook the hajj and studied under Mohammed Salih in Mecca in the 1890s. He returned to Somalia a religious ultra-nationalist, determined to free his homeland from the tightening grip of Italian and British occupying forces. (1)  The Mad Mullah fermented a religio-military revolution, allying with a variety of Somali clans and acquiring weapons from sympathetic regional regimes to battle and eventually prevail over the superpowers of his day.

Can studying the decision-making abilities of indigenous leaders like Hassan –  and the socio-cultural contexts in which they operate –  help the West to get its counter-insurgency act together?

As the U.S. and its NATO partners write the last sentences of the closing chapter of a humbling experience in the “Land of the Afghans,” introspection and objectivity should be the lights used to illuminate both the successes and failings of the campaign. Any honest appraisal of Western forces performance would certainly rank as a standout failing (especially during the first critical years of occupation) the alliance’s inability to appreciate, respect and respond to the complex human terrain upon which its forces fought. To minimize avoidable slips and falls in future asymmetric battle spaces, it would be prudent for Western commanders (and their political overseers) to at least review the “Cliff Notes” on the human terrain upon which they will wage war. The automatic assumption of inevitable victory due to technological primacy is flawed logic that must now be replaced with an understanding that “Barbarian Underdogs” are able to deliver ego crushing geopolitical upsets.

 Looking Over Our Shoulders to See Ahead  

Studying the leadership traits and strategies of indigenous protagonists in history’s little known liberation struggles is not common practice across Western militaries’ academic centers (e.g. war colleges and “think tanks”).  Alien, mostly non-white commanders are rarely credited with possessing the same level of intellect and military acumen as their uniformed European counterparts. The British saw Hassan’s resistance as irrational, a result of madness brought on by religious fanaticism and brain damage, as opposed to Hassan’s fury at the fact that Somalis were ruled by non-Muslims.(2)  Successful indigenous leaders like Somalia’s Hassan are the not-supposed-to-be-there characters in history’s military Hall of Fame.  Derogatory appellations and name formulations that include labels like barbarian, butcher, fanatic, tyrant, zealot and madman are simplistic but effective propaganda effects employed to deepen domestic fear of adversaries.

Vilification is a valuable tactic that is critical to the propagandist prior to and during hostilities for a few reasons. It defines the enemy as it does the home team (i.e., evil vs. good), rouses deepseated ethnocentric sentiments, and can serve as a stand-alone casus belli. But outside of the military information operations space, such language becomes counterproductive, and hurts any genuine effort to discern the art and genius of commanders who don’t look like us, think like us, fight like us, or pray like us. To uncover the battle logic of successful indigenous leaders like Hassan, or even any of today’s religio-military leaders, students of the art of war – military and civilian alike – must overcome euro-centric biases to bring into focus how “barbarians” continue to successfully exploit their respective human terrain to the West’s detriment.

Statue of Sayyid Mohammed Abdullah Hassan in Mogadishu, Somalia

Echoes from the Past 

Somalia’s David – the so-called Mad Mullah who led the fight against the Goliath of his day – aptly channeled the resentment and zeal of East African tribes to wage a successful guerrilla war of attrition. The British launched five military expeditions (to include air power) in the Horn of Africa to capture or kill Hassan, and never succeeded. British officers had superior schooling and firepower, including the first self-loading machine gun, but the cunning mullah exploited his home field advantage brilliantly. His intimate knowledge of regional tribes’ history, culture, and aspirations enabled him to build alliances and to ultimately prevail. Hassan and his ragtag forces hid in caves, survived long deserts crossings by drinking water from the bellies of dead camels and employed varied assortment of survival techniques that would make even American SEAL team units envious. He was a general, imam, politician and gifted propagandist all rolled into one who used poetry and oratory to both inspire his fighters and intimidate his European nemesis.

Douglas Jardine, who served in the Somaliland Protectorate during that era and who later wrote a history of the conflict, shared that the British hard power machine found itself outmaneuvered by an enemy “who offered no target for attack, no city, no fort, no land…in short, there was no tangible military objective.”(3)  Though Hassan was by no means a benevolent leader (he killed thousands of Somalis who chose not to ally with his team), the enigmatic leader is still today revered by many Somalis as a Muslim resistance fighter who defended his people from an alien encroaching force.

The mullah’s defiant spirit echoed 80 years into the future to taunt multi-national troops in the wake of the now famous Black Hawk Down massacre in 1993. In the days following the event that shocked the international community, anti-American Somali fighters circulated leaflets quoting verses from a mocking poem the Mullah wrote about a British commander he killed entitled simply “The Death of Richard Corfield.” (4) The mullah instructs the now deceased Corfield on what he should tell God’s helpers on his way to hell. “Say: In fury they fell upon us — report how savagely their swords tore you.” (5) Hassan’s warnings to senior British commanders like, “I wish to fight with you. I like war, but you do not” laced Osama Bin Laden’s own 1996 declaration of war against Americans, “These [Muslim] youths love death as you love life.”

Hassan’s success in ejecting colonial forces from the Somaliland interior and back towards the Indian Ocean coastline after a 21-year revolt remains the high water mark of Somali nationalism. Every Somali school child knows about the “Mad Mullah” and the ignoble role that the Europeans played in subjugating them in the same way that young Americans learn to view American Revolution-era British forces as inhumane oppressors. He is remembered as a patriot, soldier, religious leader and poet in the Horn of Africa, and serves as a persistent inspiration for anti-Christendom sentiment in the region.

Different Battle Songs — Same album

The ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Yemen, Southern Philippines, Tribal Pakistan, Palestine, and Iraq are all to varying extents different songs of the same album.  For example, the Al-Qaeda inspired group Al-Shabaab (the “Youngsters”) based in a region of Somalia once colonized by Italy, targets West friendly forces operating in Somaliland and beyond. One of their most well-known terrorist acts was the storm and siege of an upscale Kenyan mall in September 2013. The attack killed 62 people and subsequently earned the leaders of the group the attention of American drone missiles. Some of Al-Shabaab’s leaders credit Hassan for inspiring their declared war against the Western-backed newly-formed Somali government.  Ahmed Abdi Godane, the nerdy 36-year-old leader of the group, promised more violence if Kenya refused to withdraw its forces from neighboring Somalia. In an audio message he stated, “You cannot withstand a war of attrition inside your own country — so withdraw all your forces, or be prepared for an abundance of blood that will be spilt in your country.” (6) The defiant spirit of Hassan lives on and speaks through the young religio-military leaders of today.

Time to Be Two-Faced

The Greek god Janus – the deity for which the month of January is named – could see into the past with one face and into the future with the other.  He represented the middle ground between barbarism and civilization — rural and urban space.  If the West is to prevail in future Afghan type conflicts then foreign policy decision makers and military planners must look to the past to inform the policy and strategy decisions of tomorrow.

The United States and NATO struggled to pacify Afghanistan. (source: Global Research)

The Afghanistan counter-insurgency operation – and the Iraq campaign before it – exposed the limits of Western hard power, especially on physical and human terrains that do not play to the strengths of conventional forces. If the West chooses to fight religio-military leaders like Hassan in the future, then indirect and not frontal approaches are most sensible – harnessing local allies to do the fighting. But killing is only the tail side of the proverbial coin in the asymmetric warfare toss up.

The “heads” side is the application of civil-military and soft power activities designed to dry up adversaries’ local support by co-opting and protecting the locals. This “befriend, aid and protect” approach was the strategy employed with success by General Petraeus during the 2006 Iraqi surge, creating the conditions for a face-saving withdrawal of American troops a few years later. Petraeus stated in a Foreign Policy magazine article in 2013, “The biggest of the big ideas that guided the strategy during the surge was explicit recognition that the most important terrain in the campaign in Iraq was the human terrain.” To avoid the mistakes the British made fighting Hassan, contemporary military commanders should check their egos at the door when battling indigenous adversaries and instead employ the full spectrum of proven civil-military approaches in concert with measured hard power.

Hopefully, a greater appreciation for “human terrain” will be one of the outcomes and lessons learned from the last 13 years of warfare.  Like the Greek god Janus, the West can become wiser by looking to the past to inform decision making as it works to help to transform fragile states’ “barbarism” into “civilization” – that is human terrain that no longer serve as safe havens for destructive religio-military movements. If the lessons learned from fighting Hassan types (past and present) are not acknowledged, digested and leveraged to enable more enlightened policymaking, doctrines and strategies, then future generations will likely lose new wars that don’t need to be fought against foes that aren’t-supposed-to-be that smart.

_____________________________________________

(1) Digest of History of the Somaliland Camel Corps, King’s African Rifles, London, National
Archives, WO 106/272, p. 197
(2) John P. Slight, “British and Somali Views of Muhammad
Abdullah Hassan’s Jihad, 1899–1920.”BILDHAAN: An International Journal of Somali Studies, vol. 10, 2010 
(3) “Ahmed Abdi Godane, The new ‘Mad Mullah’ bent on jihad” http://www.newsweek.com/muhammad-abdille-hassan-somali-mad-mullah-who-predated-bin-laden-79127
(4) Colin Freeman, “Ahmed Abdi Godane: the new ‘Mad Mullah’ bent on jihad.” The Telegraph, 28 Sept., 2013.
(5) Jeffrey Bartholet, Newsweek, September 30, 2009.
(6) Colin Freeman, “Ahmed Abdi Godane: the new ‘Mad Mullah’ bent on jihad.” The Telegraph, 28 Sept., 2013

Oil and Gas: Ophir energy's exciting African campaign

Ophir has the rights to acreage in Western Sahara and Somaliland, two areas seeking international sovereignty.

"We believe that we are supporting the appropriate resource holders or else we would not be there. We would love to be investing significant capital into them." 

Ophir chief executive Nick Cooper 

By Marshall Van Valen

The London-based oil and gas explorer, Ophir energy, is appraising gas finds in equatorial Guinea and tanzania that will be developed into major projects by 2020.

Ophir Energy, an Africa- focused explorer founded in 2004, has entered into a crucial year as it appraises major gas fields.

With about 1.25bn barrels of oil equivalent in reserves, Ophir is due to make investment decisions on two of its most promising projects within the next few years.

This is our most exciting campaign

Ophir chief executive Nick Cooper tells The Africa Report: "We are in the middle of what we would see as the most exciting campaign we have ever drilled."

Ophir holds an 80% stake in Equatorial Guinea's Block R, and the company expects to develop Africa's first floating liquefied natural gas (FLNG) project.

Ophir will drill three wells, in a mixture of appraisal and exploration, this year, says Cooper.

"In Equatorial Guinea, the main event is around appraising the gas and finding a bit more gas for the FLNG project. But in addition there is the potential that the Niger Delta oil play extends under the acreage, and so we will be testing that."

The company now estimates that it has 2.6 trillion cubic feet (tcf ) of recoverable reserves in Block R and that this year's drilling will take it up to more than 3 tcf.

Cooper says backing the FLNG project has been a learning process both for the company and the government.

"FLNG has been talked about for a long time, and I think there was a fair bit of cynicism around it. That said, incrementally, all the parts of the project have been proven elsewhere."

He says Ophir and the Malabo government are both seeking to maximise value: "It is possible to structure them [FLNG projects] like the gas equivalent of an FPSO [floating production, storage and offloading] project, where the oil companies do not need to own the vessels."

Ophir expects to make a final investment decision by mid-2015 and to produce first gas by 2018, at least two years before LNG projects in Tanzania take off.

Ophir partners with BG Group on Blocks 1, 3 and 4 in the Tanzanian offshore.

"The scale of the project at the moment is two 5m tonne trains. Each 5m tonnne train needs about 6tcf recoverable," explains Cooper.

He says that before the year is over, the company is likely to have discovered enough gas to supply a third LNG train.

Partners to develop

Ophir holds a 40% stake in those Tanzanian blocks, and its activities there highlight the company's business model.

It is in the process of selling a 20% share, valued at $1.29bn, to Pavilion Energy, a subsidiary of Temasek, a Singaporean investment fund.

Cooper explains: "Our cost of capital is a lot higher than that of a big oil company, which means we are very prepared to fully fund and undertake big exploration programmes, and we do that.

"But when we get to the more mature phases where we have been successful, we bring in bigger oil companies who can help to fund that development phase."

While Ophir has had its success with gas discoveries, it is now drilling in Gabon's Padouck Deep field to see if it holds similarities to the fields discovered in offshore Brazil.

The company is also evaluating three potential plays on its L9 block in offshore Kenya.

In March, Ophir farmed in to two blocks in the Seychelles, continuing its trend of looking for large blocks to operate.

"Africa is substantially more licensed by the oil and gas sector than it was say, five or six years ago," says Cooper.

Ophir has the rights to acreage in Western Sahara and Somaliland, two areas seeking international sovereignty.

"We believe that we are supporting the appropriate resource holders or else we would not be there. We would love to be investing significant capital into them." 

Read the original article on Theafricareport.com : Oil and Gas: Ophir energy's exciting African campaign | West Africa

Clampdown on corruption

Is the first corporate prosecution under the UK Bribery Act just around the corner, asks HFW's Daniel Martin

In the August 2011 edition of Port Strategy, HFW discussed the global implications of the UK Bribery Act which came in to force on 1 July 2011. The article focussed on the very wide drafting and ambitious territorial application of the Act. In particular, it considered the impact on ports internationally, both from a port operator's and a port user's perspective.

Slipped in: port authorities need to remain vigilant to bribery attempts

The article considered the treatment which activities such as promising an incentive to stevedores to discharge a vessel in a timely manner, giving a bottle of whiskey to a customs official to avoid delays, or offering a large box of cigarettes to a port agent so as to receive special treatment could receive under the new Act.  

Two and a half years later, what impact has the UK Bribery Act had and what lessons can be drawn by port operators and port users?

Even its most fervent supporters would accept that, at least to date, the impact of the UK Bribery Act has been relatively limited. However, there have been recent signs from enforcement agencies in the UK that things may be about to change, reinforcing the need for vigilance.

The entry into force of the Act resulted in a flurry of revised Codes of Conduct and a tightening of rules on corporate hospitality, in some cases making companies reluctant to engage in even normal and reasonable corporate hospitality, which the Ministry of Justice has always stressed was not the intention of the Act.

As such, we have seen corruption move higher up the corporate agenda, but many have said that the Act will only be treated seriously if companies see that it has teeth and is being actively enforced.

While we are still awaiting the first corporate prosecution under the Act, there have been indications from the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) recently that the position may change before too long.

In October 2013, David Green, the director of the SFO, said the following: “More generally, the SFO currently has some 13 cases involving 34 defendants (two of which are corporates) in the Court system awaiting their trial. Eight of these trials are listed after April 2014.” In the same month Alun Milford, the general counsel of the SFO, said that “about half of our operational resource is engaged in corruption-related casework".

Individual focus

There have also been developments which, while short of a corporate prosecution, show that Courts and enforcement agencies are looking closely at incidents of corporate bribery.

In August 2013, four individuals connected with Sustainable AgroEnergy plc were charged with offences under the Act of making and accepting a financial advantage. There appears to be no corporate prosecution against Sustainable AgroEnergy for failing to prevent corruption.

In October 2013, Smith & Ouzman Ltd and four individuals were charged with offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 (the offences took place between November 2006 and December 2010, so before the Act came into effect) in connection with alleged corrupt payments to win business in Mauritania, Ghana, Somaliland and Kenya.

Most recently, in a decision at the end of November, a survey company was criticised by the English High Court because its surveyors contemplated bribing officials in Mumbai. The case did not turn on the bribery allegations and the court stressed that no bribes were paid. It is worth highlighting that, even if bribes had been offered or paid, all of the conduct occurred in the Spring of 2010, before the Act was passed. Nevertheless, the case is a useful reminder that, as a matter of English law, facilitation payments are bribes, however they are described (the relevant emails talked about “suitably greasing the authorities”, paying “administrative charges”, providing “perks” and making “gratis payments”, all of which appeared to be euphemisms for bribes).

As an example, a payment by a shipowner, shipowner's agent or ship's master to an official to speed up the clearance of a vessel into a port (in circumstances where no official fast track service is available) is likely to be considered an offence under the Act.

All of the above demonstrates the importance of vigilance and adopting (and enforcing) adequate procedures to prevent bribery. While everyone eagerly awaits the first corporate prosecution, no one wants to find that they are in the unenviable position of being forever known as the first company to be prosecuted. Just ask Munir Patel, the first individual to be prosecuted under the Act, who is inevitably mentioned in any discussion of the Act.

Daniel Martin is a partner at Holman Fenwick Willan, an international law firm advising businesses engaged in international commerce.

portstrategy.com

DAAWO VIDEO: MAWQIFKA Dhaqdhaqaaqyada Dimuquraadiyad-doonka Somaliland: KU LUG LAHAANSHAHA SAXAAFADA GAARKA AH LOOLANKA BAADHISTA SHIDAALKA

Public Release: Somaliland-018

POSSITION LETTER MAWQIFKA Dhaqdhaqaaqyada Dimuquraadiyad-doonka Somaliland EE KIISKA HAATUF IYO XUKUUMADA SOMALILAND KA DHEX OOGAN

Wax kasta oo caqliga Aadamiga faraha looga qaadaa waxa uu ku dambeeyaa qoomamo, Saxaafad Anshax marin iyadu ay is mariso suubisataana Somaliland waxa cadaatay in aanay hirgali karin 20kii sanadood ee u dambeeyay. Maxaa xal ah?


Anagoo ah Dhaqdhaqaaqyada Dimuquraadiyad-doonka Somaliland oo ka kooban Difaacayaasha madaxabanaan ee xuquuqda aadamiga, ururrada bulshada rayidka ah, kooxaha u dhaqdhaqaaqa dadka laga tirada badan yahay, Ururada Naafada, waxa aanu guud ahaan bulshada caalamka, iyo shacabka Somaliland halkna maanta ugu iftiiminaynaa mawqifka wadajirka ah ee ku saabsan dagaalka ka dhex oogan Xukuumada Somaliland iyo warbaahinta gaarka loo leeyahay ee Haatuf (HMG).




Todoba sanadood ka hor markii sidan oo kale Ciidamo ka tirsan booliska Somaliland ay galeen isla markaasina xabsiga u taxaabeen mulkiilaha warbaahinta Haatuf Yusuf Abdi Gabobe, Tafatirihiisii Sare Cali Cabdi Diini iyo Wariyihii uga soo waramijiray gobolka Awdal Maxamed Cumar, waxanu si buuxda taageerada difaac u siinay lana hawlwadeenada sare ee Warbaahinta Haatuf iyo Mulkiilaheeda, iyadoo xiligaasi dadaal badan u samaynay sidii eedaysanihii afraad Maxamed Rashiid oo markaa dhuumasho ku joogay Hargeysa dalka looga saari lahaa ee uu u heli lahaa dal kale oo uu si nabadgalyo ah ugu noolaado isla markaasina u fududaynay sidii uu bilkasta u heli lahaa dhaqaalihii uu ku noolaan kari lahaa, taasi oo u socotay ilaa markii Madaxwaynihii hore Mud. Daahir Rayaale Kaahin u cafiyay dhamaan Hawlwadeenadii Saxaafada Haatuf.

Laakiin maanta Warbaahinta Haatuf iyo Mulkiilaheedu may mutaysan taageerada iyo u doodista Difaacayaasha Xuquuqda Aadamiga Somaliland, sababtoo ah markii aanu si qoto dheer uga baaraandegeen arinta runta ah ee uu salka ku hayo dagaalka Haatuf iyo Xukuumada Somaliland waxa noo cadaatay in Warbaahinta Haatuf warbaahintoodii in ay ka dhigteen mid ay uga faa'iidaystaan masaalix gaar ah sidaasina ku lumiyeen mabaadii'dii aasaasiga ahayd ee ay ku heli lahayd taageerada, iyo hiilka difaacayaasha xuquuqda iyo xoriyadaha aadamaha ee Somaliland.

Sababta kali ah ee sanadkii 2007 suxufiyiintii warbaahinta Haatuf ku heshay taageerada ururada xuquuqda aadamiga Somaliland ayaa ahayd, kadib markii aanu si buuxda ugu qancnay warbaahinta Haatuf in aanay jirin wax dan gaar ah ama maslaxad ah nooca ay doonto ha ahaatee oo ugu jirtay faafinta falalka musuqmaasuq oo ay ku baahin jireen wargaysyadooda xiligaasi oo aan ka ahayn gudashada waajibaadkooda masuuliyada saxaafadeed oo ah la socodsiinta shacabka Somaliland ficilada ay ku kacaan masuuliyiinta xilka ay u igmadeen.

Nasiibdaro haatan waxa si buuxda noogu cadaatay dagaalka ka dhex oogan Warbaahinta Haatuf iyo xukuumada Somaliland in aanu shuqul ku lahayn xoriyad saxaafadeed iyo madaxbanaanideed balse uu salka ku ahyo warbaahinta haatuf oo shantii bilood ee ugu dambaysay u xuubsiibatay mid si toos ah loogaga aargoosto ashkhaas iyo masuuliyiin ay u arkaan in ay ka horyimaadeen masaaliix dhinaca baadhista shidaalka ah oo dabada uu ka riixayay Mulkiilaha Warbaahinta Haatuf kuwaasi oo uu watay mid ka mid ah qaraabadiisu.

Baadhayaasha ururada xuquuqda aadamiga Somaliland ayaa helay dhukumenti ku taariikhaysan 25 Oct. 2012 kana soo baxay shirkada baadhista Macdanta ee lagu magacaabo Boulle Mining Group , kaasi oo ujeedadiisu tahay Codsi Ogolaanshaha Baadhitaanka Shidaalka Somaliland (Expression of Interest to secure Petroleum Exploration and Development Licenses within Somaliland), qoraalkan oo shirkadu ugu magacawday wakiilkooda buuxa ee Somaliland in uu yahay Mr. Yusuf Abdilahi Omar ugana masuul yahay shirkada meelmarinta codsigooda ay ku rabto dhul ay ka baadho shidaal waxan lagu socodsiiyay qoraalkan wasaarada Macdanta iyo Tamarta Somaliland kuna rabto ogolaanshaha dhul ay ka sahimiso batroolka.

Difaacayaasha Xuquuqda Aadamiga Somaliland oo waxay kale oo ay ogaadeen si ay u dhacdayba in Wasaarada Macdantu ay ishortaagtay ogolaanshahaaasi, iyadoo ku sababaysay in shirkadu buuxin wayday shuruudaha Somaliland ku xidho shirkadaha raba in ay shidaal ka baadhaan dalka. Waxa kale oo baadhayaasha xadgubyada xuquuqda aadamiga Somaliland la kulmeen kana qaadeen waraysiyo qaar ka mid ah ergooyin Wasaarada Macdanta iyo Tamarta ku cadaadinayay meelmarinta codsiga shirkadaasi, kaasi oo ku soo gabogaboobay natiijo la'aan.

Intaasi kadib Kadib Warbaahinta Haatuf waxay bilowday dagaal toos ah oo dhinaca warbaahinta ah oo ay la bartilmaameedsanayso Wasiirka Macdanta iyo Tamarta Somaliland.

Ururada Xuquuqda Aadamiga Somaliland ayaa diiwaangaliyay qoraalo iyo warar tirobadan shantii bilood ee ugu dambaysay oo wargaysyada warbaahinta Haatuf si shaqsi ah ugu weerarayso magacsamida, karaamada iyo sharafta uu aadamiga EEBE siiyay dastuurka Somalilandna uu damaano qaaday. Sidoo kale eedo musuqmaasuq oo tirada badan oo dhamaantood si gaar ah Warbaahinta Haatuf ugu eedaynaysay Wasiirka Tamarta iyo Macdanta Somaliland ayay si joogto ah u baahinayeen.

Aqlabiyada hawlwadeenada Saxaafada Madaxabanaan ee Somaliland ayaa qiray in Mulkiilaha Warbaahinta Haatuf seddexdii sano ee ugu dambeeyay oo ay talada dalka haysay xukuumada Kulmiye isaga iyo warbaahitiisu ay ahaayeen kuwa u janjeedha dhinaca xukuumada, kuna qabay masaaliix gaar ah,

Ku lug lahaansha hay'ad warbaahineed oo madaxbanaan loolanka ay ugu jiraan shirkadaha baadhista shidaalka sidii ay u heli lahaayeen ogolaanshaha dhul ay shidaal ka baadhaan, iyo u isticmaalka mihnadii iyo waxsoosaarki saxaafada ayaa noqonaysa caqabad hor leh oo haatan uun ka bilaabantay dalka Somaliland. Caqabadan ayaa u muuqata mid aanu dalka Somaliland lahayn siyaasad iyo qaanuuno lagu xalin karo, iyadoo ku abuuri karta khalkhal hawlaha muhiimada wayn u leh qaranka gaar ahaan baadhitaanada shidaalka iyo soo jiidashada maalgashadayaal caalami ah oo tan iyo markii ay xukuumada Siilaanyo talada dalka la wareegtay sanadkii 2010 dadaal balaadhan kadib ku guulaysato bilowga sahaminta shidaalka dalka Somaliland.

Dagaalka warbaahineed ee Saxaafada Haatuf sida shaqsiga ah warbaahintooda ay kaga aargoosanayaan cid kasta oo ay u arkaan in ay ishortaageen hawlaha la xidhiidha baadhitaanada shidaalka oo meelmarintooda Mulkiilaha Haatuf uu dabada ka riixayay waxa Difaacayaasha Xuquuqda Aadamiga Somaliland u arkaan mid dhabarjabka ku ah Anshaxa iyo Milgaha Saxaafad xor ah, kuna lid ah dhaqanka suuban ee Islaamka iyo mabaadii'da xuquuqda iyo xoriyadaha dastuuriga ah, sababtoo ah waxa si shaqsi ah waxsoosaarka Warbaahinta Haatuf dhaawacyo laagu gaysanayay magacsamida qof ahaaneed iyo karaamada uu Eebe siyay ashkhasta ay sida gaarka ah ugu weerayaan ceebaynayeen warbaahintooda, oo la odhan karo waxay gaadhay ilaa xad ay gaadhay heer la mid ah kalay keerlay.

Gabogabadii Difaacayaasha Xuquuqda Aadamiga Somaliland waxay si xooggan uga soo horjeedaan isla markaana uga digayaan ururo sheeganaya xuquuqda aadamiga iyo saxaafada oo shacbiga Somaliland ka duudsiyay xaqii ay u lahaayeen in ay helaan xaqiiqada runta ah ee sababta dhacdo kasta oo ay warinayaan, tusaale ahaan ururka suxufiyiinta Somaliland iyo urur wata magaca xuquuqda aadamiga ah ayaa si dhamaystiran daboolka u saaray kana qariyay shacabka Somaliland waxa ay tahay sababta dhabta ah ee uu salka ku hayo dagaalka wargaysyada Haatuf oo kali ahi in ka badan 150 maalmood kula jiro Wasiir kali ah oo ka tirsan xukuumada Somaliland, kaasi oo ah kan ay u arkaan in uu yahay ka ishortaagay masaaliixdoodii gaarka ahayd iyo/ama tii dad ay qaraabo yihiin, iyagoo taasi bedelkeeda warbaahinta Haatuf si badheedh ah ugu sheegay in mashaqda Xukuumada Somaliland iyo Warbaahinta Haatuf ay tahay cabudhin xukuumada ku hayso saxaafada madaxabanaan.

Difaacayaasha Xuquuqda Aadamiga Somaliland waxay la yaaban yihiin sababta warbaahinta madaxbanaan ee Somaliland ka soo baxda sida jaraa'idka, mareegaha internetka, kuwa maqalka iyo muuqaal baahiyaa ay ugu yaraan hal mid oo ka mid ahi Haatuf ugu soo labayn wayday musuqa Haatuf aragto ama loo waayay warbaahin kale oo ku wehelisa cayda Kanlay keerlay.
Arinta werwerkeeda leh, ayaanu u aragnaa in ay tahay marka ragii ugu aqoonta saxaafada badnaa dalku da'ahaana ka midka ahaa wayeelka xirfadlayaasha warbaahinta Somaliland ay ka dhiganayaan warbaahintii mid danahooda shaqsiga ah iyo tan qaraabadooda ay ku suubistaan maxaa laga filan karaa jiilalka suxufiyiinta da'yarta ah ee casharada ka baranaya falalkaasi guracan, Difaacayaasha Xuquuqda Aadamiga Somaliland oo aaminsan in dal kastaba suxufiyiintiisu in ay yihiin kuwa saamaynta ugu badan ku leh saqaafada iyo tadawurka xadaaradeed iyo horumarka dhaqan dhaqaale oo dadkiisa kasbadaan.

Sidaasi darteed, Difaacayaasha Xuquuqda Aadamiga Somaliland, iyagoo ilaalinaya mabaadii'da dhexdhexaadnimo ee ay u abuuran yihiin waxa ay halkan cid kasta oo danaynaysa ugu sheegayaan in aanay iyagu noqonaynin salaan ay cid gaar ahi dantooda ku gaadhaan waxana aanu u aragnaa xaaraan in aanu difaacno, una doodno ama u hiilino, cid kasta oo dantooda gaarka ah ku fushanaya mihnada Saxaafada, kuna aargoosanaysa, arinta kali ah ee taageerada difaacayaasha xuquuqda aadamiga lagu heli karaa waxa ay tahay haddii saxaafadu aanay dano u gaar ah mulkiilayaasha iyo tafotirayaasha u lahayn balse hadii Mulkiilayaasha warbaahintu ama tafatirayaasheedu u isticmaalayaan warbaahinta mid ay kaga aargoosanayaan cid kasta oo ka hor timaada danahooda taasi waxa aanu u aragnaa mid la mid ah xanuun dilaa ah oo dal iyo dad midna aan habaynaynin.

Difaacayaasha Xuquuqda Aadamiga Somaliland waxay u arkaan xalka kiiskani inuu ku jiro dacwad si madani ah loogu oogo madaxda ama maamulka wargeyska, balse aannu ahayn in gebi ahaanba la xayiro shaqadii soo bixida wargeysyadaasi.

Waxaannuna ku baaqaynaa in xayiraada laga qaado haddii maamulka Haatuf ogolaanayo in waxsoosaarka saxaafadoodu in aanay ka gudbaynin xaydaabka anshaxa iyo milgaha aasaasiga ah ee mihnada saxaafada, iyo dhaqanka suuban ee islaamka

Waxa aanu ugu baaqaynaa sharcidajinta iyo xukuumada Somaliland in siyaasada iyo shuruucda warbaahinta dalka dib loogu noqdo lana curiyo Siyaasad iyo Qaanuun ku khasbaya suxufiyiinta dalka in ay kor u qaadaan aqoontooda saxaafadeed iyo dhinac farsamo iyo dhinac aqooneed, iyo anshaxba, qaanuunkaasi oo ah mid warbaahinta ka ilaaliya in dhaawac u gaysato maslaxada umadda jiritaanka qaranka, masaaliixdiisa dhaqaale ganacsi iyo maalgashi.

Kiiskan iyo kuwo kale oo badan ayaa khasab ka dhigaya dib u habayn balaadhan oo lagu sameeyo siyaasada iyo shuruucda warbahinta dalka, haatan waxa muuqata in wali saxaafada Somaliland aan hubka dhigis togan lagu samaynin, taasi oo keenaysa in ay mulkiilayaasha saxaafadu sida ay rabaan in ay u istimaalaan.

Wasaarada Tamarta iyo Macdanta Somaliland, iyo dhamaan wasaaradaha iyo hay'adha kale ee dakhliga leh oo ay ku jiraan kuwa dawladaha hoose ee dalku waxa aanu ugu baaqaynaa in bulshadu xaq ugu leedahay in ay xogogaal u noqoto xadiga dakhliga ay soo xareeyaan iyo shilinkastaaba sida uu ku baxo. Sidaasi darteed, wakhtigan xaadirka ah waxa aanu u aragnaa in qaabka ugu sahlan ee habkan lagu suurtogalin karaa in uu yahay iyadoo hay'adaha xukuumadu sameeyaan baro internetka ah oo bulshada ay ku siiyaan xogta ay uga baahan tahay, iyadoo aanu soo dhawaynayno hay'adaha mar hore sameeyay baro internetka ah sida barta internetka ee hay'ada wadooyinka, oo lagu daalacda cid kasta oo bixisa qaadhaanka wadada ceerigaabo/burco iyo xadiga dhaqaale ee ay ku dareen.

Talo soojeedintayda ugu dambaysay, waxanu ka digaynaa in dad gaar ahi isku koobaan dheefta dhaqan dhaqaale ee qaranka Somaliland, arimaha dhacaya haatan ayaa noola muuqda in dadka dega gobolada dhexe ee dalku u dhaqmayaan in dalka aanay cid kaleba la lahayn, waxanu si xoogan u rumaysanahay in habka noocaas ahi aanu horseedaynin meel marinta qaran cadaalad bulsho ku dhisan oo dadkiisuna isku duuban yihiin.

Madaxwaynaha Jamhuuriyada Mud. Axmed Maxamed Maxamuud 'Siilaanyo', golahiisa xukuumada golaha sharcidajinta, inta caqliga iyo aqoonta u saaxiibka ah waxanu ugu baaqaynaa in si wadajir ah looga shaqeeyo sidii siyaasada qaranka ee wadajirka, midnimada iyo xoojinta isdhexgalka is aaminka ummada somaliland in ay ku iman karta oo kali ah si siman u qaybsiga khayraadka dalka, iyo dheefta qaranimo oo ah mid nimcooyinkeeda haddii cadaalad lagu saleeyo umadda Somaliland wada deeqi karta, waa in xukuumaddu samaysaa dadaalo ay isku soo gaadhsiinayso awooda ganacsi ee bulshada Somaliland iyadoo fursad siinaysa beelaha darafyada sidii ay u gaadhi lahaayeen faaiida ku jirta ganacsiga xoolaha nool iyo qandaraasyada la xidhiidha sahaminta shidaalka iyo macdanaha ee dalka sida xawliga leh ugu soo badanaya.

Ururada iyo Hay'adaha Caalamiga ah ee Xuquuqda Aadamaha iyo Madaxbanaanida Saxaafada ka hawlgala ee qoraalkan oo u baahda faahfaahin ama raba in lala socodsiiyo geedi socodka saxaafada Somaliland, xadugubyada laga galo warbaahinta, iyo tan ay iyadu gaysato labadaba waxa ay la soo xiriiri karaan xuquuq@gmail.com, hornwatch@yahoo.com, ama nagu soo booqo xafiiskayaga oo ku yaal faras Magaalaha caasimada Hargeysa tel: 5147777
Suleiman ismail Bolaleh

Speaker of Somaliland Pro-democratic Movements