Why is the Horn different?

BY CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM

In this essay for the Rift Valley Review, Christopher Clapham, distinguished historian of Ethiopia, discusses the distinctive features and fraught history of the Horn of Africa, its arbitrary frontiers, its contrasting styles of government, and its hold on the scholarly imagination

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Why is the Horn so peculiarly violent? Why is it not a normal part of Africa, like East Africa or anywhere else?  To put it bluntly, what is wrong with it?  In raising this question, I am very much aware that all of independent Africa has had its problems, and that East Africa–especially Uganda–has certainly not been spared. But these problems have proved relatively manageable, compared with those of the Horn, and we can only pray that they will remain so. The history of the Horn countries, in contrast, has been one overwhelmingly of tragic human suffering, to which the numbers of refugees seeking safety in Kenya and elsewhere bear witness. For most of the world, outside the region itself, this part of Africa is familiar in recent years mainly as the setting for some of the worst famines encountered anywhere in the world. These famines, even if they are in part the result of climatic conditions such as drought–and possibly the global problems resulting from climate change–have been made massively worse by human agency, in the form of viciously repressive regimes or, notably in Somalia, the lack of any stable form of government at all.  They have left millions of people in the Horn permanently dependent on outside aid, which in turn has relieved governments in the region of an important part of their own responsibilities.

Famine thus goes hand-in-hand with recurring human conflicts, including two major wars between African states–between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977/78, and between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998/2000. Elsewhere in Africa such wars between states have been rare. The Horn has also been racked by ongoing civil wars, including the war for Eritrean independence, the struggle to overthrow the Derg regime in Ethiopia, and an almost perennial war in Somalia, currently taking the form of conflict between the successor to the Transitional Federal Government (itself a government only in name), and the Islamist forces grouped under the name of al-Shabaab.  One striking indicator of political failure is that the Horn provides virtually the only cases anywhere in Africa–if South Sudan is included–in which secessionist movements, such as those in Eritrea and Somaliland, have succeeded in splitting away from their original states, and setting up independent governments of their own.

The absence of the democratic structures of governance that much of independent Africa now happily takes for granted is itself the result of–and at the same time contributes to–the deep-seated political problems of the Horn. In only one state in the region–ironically, the internationally unrecognised state of Somaliland–has it been possible to create genuinely democratic political structures, which have passed the acid test of an opposition party successfully contesting and winning a free and fair election, and peacefully taking over control of the government. Elsewhere, the norm runs from anarchy to dictatorship, even if the dictatorships are at times disguised by norminally democratic forms of government.  With a lack of democracy, inevitably, goes a pervasive disregard for human rights and welfare (whether this results from brutal government, or from the lack of any government at all,) and a generally very weak performance in terms of economic development, even though present-day Ethiopia may in some respects be regarded as an exception.

'The fundamental problem of the Horn is that it is not part of colonial Africa'

So, to come back to the basic question with which I started, what is ‘wrong’ with this part of the world?

The Horn of Africa is an extremely complex region, in which layers upon layers of potential problems are piled one on top of another.  Not only is much of the natural environment of the Horn extremely forbidding, but vast differences in its environmental endowment – ranging from the plateau lands of northern Ethiopia through to the Somali scrub–create very different kinds of society, with dramatically contrasting values and ways of life.  The region falls on the frontier between two of the world’s major religions, Islam and Christianity, and encompasses a huge range of ethnic groups, languages and cultures.  These differences have in turn been intensified by patterns of colonial conquest (internal as well as external), the creation of highly artificial states, and the uneven incorporation of the region into the global economy, and into global conflicts. The Cold War affected the Horn far more directly and intensively than it did other parts of sub-Saharan Africa, and the region is now again on a global frontline in the so-called ‘global war on terror’. A profound awareness of all these factors, and of how they fit together, is needed before one can even start to understand the nature of its current problems.

But we have to start somewhere, and I would propose a very simple basic answer, onto which the other factors making for conflict can then be grafted: that the fundamental problem of the Horn is that it is not part of colonial Africa; that this leads its peoples and governments to behave in ways different from those that other Africans have become used to, in East Africa or the rest of the continent; and that this in turn makes it extremely difficult to fit the Horn into ‘normal’ African ways of doing things.  I say this with some embarrassment, as a citizen of the state that colonised more Africans that any other and with a deep awareness of all the problems that colonialism has created for the peoples of Africa.  But we have become so accustomed to regarding colonialism, automatically, as the source of anything that we regard as being ‘wrong’ with Africa, that we rarely think of looking to see how things work when they are organised differently, as they are in the two core states of the Horn: Ethiopia, as Africa’s sole indigenous state to survive through the period of colonial conquest as an imperial state, with a long and proud tradition of its own;  and Somalia, as the one state in Africa that sought to establish itself on explicitly nationalist grounds, as the homeland of a single Somali people.

Both of these challenged the way in which African states were created by colonial rule. These states consisted typically of an almost random collection of territorial units, whose frontiers were demarcated by Europeans on maps, with a staggering disregard for the peoples who inhabited the area, resulting in the creation of the most obviously artificial set of states in the world.  One could indeed plausibly argue that creating states in the way that either Ethiopia or Somalia were created, as the product of essentially internal identities and social forces, would make for much stronger and more legitimate states, rooted in their local environments, than the peculiar collection of territories that independent Africa inherited from European colonial partition. After all, empires–in the sense of large contiguous terrorial entities, created by the conquest of surrounding territories by local rulers, not by outsiders from far away, as happened with imperialism in Africa–have been, whatever we may think of them, a very common pattern of state formation. In the past, the Chinese, Mughal, Ottoman and Persian empires ruled much of Asia, and–especially in the case of China—provide an important legacy for their modern successor states.  Only a hundred years ago, the Austrian, German, Russian and Ottoman empires ruled much of Europe, as indeed, in a much earlier epoch, did the Inca and Mayan empires in the Americas, not to mention the Zulu, Songhay and other empires in Africa itself.

On the other hand, nation-states such as the Somalis sought to create have become the normal and recognised way of forming states in Europe, with the result that Germany and Italy were united in the nineteenth century (and Germany reunited at the end of the twentieth), while new nation-states like Poland, Estonia, Hungary, Bulgaria and many others have been created from the ruins of the Ottoman, Austrian and Russian empires. We may very reasonably ask whether a genuinely African way of creating states in the continent would follow a similar pattern, and make the Ethiopian and Somali experiences seem perfectly normal. But even if we were to come up with a positive answer, the fact remains that in Africa, that is not what has actually happened, and states that are different from their neighbours create problems simply because they are not ‘normal’.

'Africa’s frontiers are crazy: lines drawn on maps by colonialists and rulers who had never set foot in the areas they partitioned among themselves’

One striking illustration of such problems is the very process by which the territorial structure of a state is created, the issue of frontiers. Africa’s frontiers are completely crazy: they are simply the lines drawn on maps by colonialists, often on the basis of extremely uncertain information and by rulers who had never set foot in the areas which they partitioned among themselves. So why have there been so very few conflicts between Africa states about their frontiers?  One might plausibly expect these frontiers to be swept away with the colonialists who created them, as soon as independent Africans gained the right to determine their own destinies. But in point of fact, it is precisely because these frontiers are so crazy that independent African states have been so keen to maintain them, and not to ask awkward questions about them. Kenya indeed provides several striking examples of the haphazard nature of African territoriality. Much of coastal Kenya, for instance, belonged in pre-colonial times to the sultanate of Zanzibar, and might therefore have been incorporated in the British protectorate over Zanzibar, and thus in time have formed part of Tanzania; but this area was allocated by the British to Kenya, and—despite some current agitation to recognise its separate identity—it simply remains that way. And while Kenya gained a significant strip of territory on the Indian Ocean, it correspondingly lost a large area, west of the Tana river, which was given by the British to Italy during the 1920s, and is now formally accepted by Kenya as belonging to Somalia.

Most bizarrely of all, the reason why Mount Kilimanjaro falls entirely within modern Tanzania is because Queen Victoria gave it to her grandson, Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany, as a birthday present. But what matters for our present purposes–and much more important, for the welfare of the peoples of the countries concerned–is that there has been no war between Tanzania and Kenya over the coastal territories or Kilimanjaro, or between Kenya and Somalia over the ‘lost’ territories on the north-east frontier, because all of the states concerned abide by the principles articulated by the Organisation of African Unity on the acceptance of Africa’s colonial frontiers, with the result that Kenya, in nearly fifty years of independence, has never yet been engaged in war, unless you count the recent invasion of Southern Somalia.

In the Horn, it is very different indeed.  Ethiopia regarded the Italian colony of Eritrea as part of ‘historic’ Ethiopia, linked by history and culture to the Ethiopian empire, and ceaselessly and successfully lobbied in the UN after the Second World War for it to be ‘reunited with the motherland’, with eventually catastrophic consequences. Even more dangerously, the government of Somalia claimed that all of the territories inhabited by Somali people should be incorporated into a single Somali nation—a claim expressed with poetic impracticality in the saying, ‘wherever the camel goes, that is Somalia’.  This aspiration placed the Somali state on a collision course with all of its neighbours. Under the Siyad Barre regime that seized power in 1969 it led to war with Ethiopia, and a catastrophic military defeat for Somalia that eventually did much to lead to the collapse of the state itself.

Nor did the re-emergence in the Horn of states derived from the former colonial territories resolve the problem. When Eritrea eventually succeeded in gaining its independence—effectively in 1991, even though it was formalised only in 1993—it took over the frontiers created by Italian colonialism in 1890, and in that respect was no different from other newly independent African states some thirty years earlier. But the new Eritrea was not just a post-colonial state, content to live peacefully with its neighbours. It was a liberated state, sanctified by the blood of the martyrs who had died to create it during a long and extremely costly war against the government in Addis Ababa. Every square inch of its territory was correspondingly sacred, and the new Eritrean government’s prickly nationalism led to conflicts over territory with all of its neighbours, most catastrophically the war against Ethiopia of 1998-2000, over a trivial area of economically useless land, which led to the deaths of probably about a hundred thousand combatants on both sides, and eventually resulted in Eritrea’s defeat.

The claims to independence of the still unrecognised Republic of Somaliland derive from its previous existence as a British colony (and subsequently, for five days, as an independent state), prior to its unification with formerly Italian Somalia on 1 July 1960, but this territorial definition on the basis of the former colonial boundaries clashes with an ethnic definition on the basis of the Somali clan system that notably leaves two Darod clans, the Dulbahante and Warsangeli, stradding the border between 'Puntland’, in former Italian Somalia, and Somaliland, the Isaaq-dominated former British colony. Furthermore, any revived Somali nationalist movement, like that led by the Organisation of Islamic Courts in 2006, is almost bound to revive claims over territories belonging to a united Somalia, including not only Somaliland, but also the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and large areas of north-east Kenya.

'The Ethiopian empire did not belong equally to all Ethiopians, but was the creation of the Orthodox Christian Amhara and Tigrayan peoples of the northern highlands'

The second great problem that the countries of the Horn derive from their inability to fit into the standard model of African post-colonial statehood is that of governance: who rules and how? The advantage of colonialism in this respect, dare one say it, is that the oppressors came from outside the ranks of the indigenous peoples, all of whom were treated in broadly the same way by the colonial regime (despite some variance derived from their own internal systems of governance and their greater or lesser degree of hostility to the colonisers), and none of whom enjoyed any in-built superiority over their fellows.  Once the colonisers had been removed, therefore, each newly independent state could start from a premise of equality, except for the advantages conferred on some groups by ethnic arithmetic in the case of political parties that enjoyed disproportionate support from particular groups, or by geographical location in some particularly influential area. 

But in an ancient and historic state like Ethiopia, imperialism was internal and not external. It was created by the historic dominance of one of the indigenous peoples over the others, and the extension of their control over what then became internally subject peoples.  The Ethiopian empire did not belong equally to all Ethiopians, but was specifically the creation of the Orthodox Christian Amhara and Tigrayan peoples of the northern Ethiopian highlands, who were then in a position, at precisely the same moment in the later nineteenth century when European states were carving out their African colonial empires, to impose their own centralised state by conquest on their Moslem and other non-Christian neighbours.

The very language of the Ethiopian government was (and remains) Amharic, the language of the Amhara people who have formed the core of the modern Ethiopian state, rather than (as was generally the case in the European colonies) that of the distant colonisers. Getting educated meant learning Amharic, and becoming associated with the ancient state in other ways, not least of which was that Christians (and especially Orthodox Christians) enjoyed an in-built advantage in government over Moslems and others. Land in most of southern Ethiopia, until the 1974 revolution, was allocated as conquered territory to landlords and settlers who were overwhelmingly drawn from the ruling group and those associated with it, which meant that the imposition of a landlord class on Ethiopia’s subject peoples was intimately associated with the imposition of the central state, and provided a means by which, through the often vicious exploitation of the local peasantry, that state could be maintained on the backs of those who suffered most from it—a system with obvious potential not only for violence, but for the rejection of the state itself.

This structure of inequality could not be removed—as was possible in territories like Kenya which had a colonial settler group of their own–by getting rid of the colonialists who had created it, because the colonialists derived their power and position of privilege from the very existence of the state. That is most basically why Ethiopia, uniquely in Africa, experienced a violent revolution dedicated to overthrowing the structures of internal imperial rule. The Emperor Haile-Selassie, revered in much of the rest of Africa, was by the later 1960s regarded by many younger and more educated Ethiopians as merely an anachronistic obstacle to progress.

'In the Soviet Union, the model from which Ethiopian ethnic federalism was derived, the collapse of the Communist Party was rapidly followed by its dismemberment into separate independent republics'

Yet even the 1974 Ethiopian revolution, bloody as it was, did not revolve the basic problem, because the organisation that then took power, led essentially by the Ethiopian army, itself shared an idea of Ethiopian nationalism that reinforced the dominance of the central government, and assumed that once the social injustices of the imperial regime were removed—notably by the destruction of the landlord class, and the nationalisation of all land—then the way would be open to make all Ethiopians equal citizens of a single national state. Instead, it generated rebellions among the excluded peripheral peoples of the empire, in Eritrea, in Tigray, among the Somalis, and in some degree from Oromos and elsewhere. These, eventually, in 1991, grew strong enough to defeat even the massive armies, supported by the USSR, which the revolutionary regime created to defend itself

The new government, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front led by Meles Zenawi, which came to power in 1991, therefore set out to create a form of federalism which, uniquely in Africa, explicitly recognised and entrenched the ethnic divisions which most African states have been desperate to suppress and overcome. The new rulers felt that the problems created by the Ethiopian empire could be resolved only if all the peoples of Ethiopia were enabled to run their own indigenous local governments, with the ultimate guarantee, entrenched (to the amazement of other Africans) in the national constitution, of a right to self determination, up to and including the right to secession. How this system is working out in practice is a very different matter, and beyond question the present Ethiopian government has been determined to maintain and entrench its control, restoring in the process some of Ethiopia’s ancient practices of government. But the idea that your ‘nationality’ or ethnicity is central to your relationship to the state, once established, will be very difficult to remove: in the Soviet Union, the model from which, more than any other, the idea of Ethiopian ethnic federalism was derived, the collapse in 1989 of the Communist Party, which provided much of the glue that held the centralised state together, was rapidly followed by its dismemberment into fifteen separate independent republics.

'Somalis had no in-built assumption of inequality: all were equally Somali. Nor did they inherit the culture of dominance built into the Ethiopian empire'

In Somalia, the problems of governance were very different, but equally difficult to resolve.  Somalis had no in-built assumption of inequality: on the contrary, all were equally Somali. Nor did they inherit the culture of dominance and inequality built into the Ethiopian empire: Somali political culture, for men at least, is democratic to the point of anarchy. The problem lay in the clash between the inherent instability of Somali democratic culture and the nationalist mission of the Somali state, which proved well beyond its ability to achieve.  This resulted in the overthrow of the democratic political system created at independence by a nationalist military regime which sought arms from the superpowers to promote its mission of unification, and in the disastrous war against Ethiopia, and vicious repression within Somalia itself, that led to the total collapse of the Somali state in 1991.

In this situation, both in Ethiopia and in Somalia, it was plausible to suppose that the answer lay in breaking up the state that had done so much harm to so many of its own people.  In 1991, therefore—the critical year in the modern history of the Horn—both Eritrea and (formerly British) Somaliland declared their separate independence, in each case following the frontiers previously established by colonial rule. This reinforced, once again, the apparently indispensable role of colonialism in establishing the state structures of independent Africa, and might have been expected to lead to the creation of ‘normal’ post-colonial states in the Horn. Instead, it actually demonstrated, as does the more recent case of South Sudan, that secession, even if evidently unavoidable, is not a final answer to the regional anomaly of state-formation, but leaves problems of its own.

'How has a movement so disciplined and so heroic led to the tragedy that is Eritrea today?'

Eritrea is the extreme case of a post-insurgent state, created by the liberation war, by the courage and dedication of many Eritreans, and by the extraordinary ability of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, which has to be recognised as one of the best organised and most effective national liberation movements in the history of the world. As a young teacher in Addis Ababa University, in the final years of the imperial regime, I became accustomed to my Eritrean students suddenly disappearing from class, as they went off to join the struggle in the north.  And on my first visit to Asmara after Eritrea’s liberation in 1991, I met one of those students, now working in a responsible position in the new government of Eritrea.  He told me that he had been one of a group of eighteen idealistic young Eritreans who had left Addis Ababa to fight—and that when the EPLF finally marched into Asmara some twenty years later, he was the only one still left alive: the other seventeen had died along the way. I know of no more poignant illustration of the heroism of the Eritrean struggle, and of the costs that it imposed, not only on those who had died, but on those still left behind.

The problem with which that leaves us is, how has a movement so disciplined and so heroic led to the tragedy that is Eritrea today: poor, repressive, isolated, at odds with all its neighbours?  And the answer to that question lies in the liberation movement itself, not just in Eritrea (even though it provides a particularly extreme example), but in other countries ruled by victorious guerrillas throughout the world.  The central problem is that the legacy of the struggle defines the character and rationale of the state that the victorious liberators take over and seek to rule.  The people who led the struggle take over and run the state, by right, and almost inevitably apply the methods essential to running a guerrilla war to the very different task if trying to run an independent state.  Central to these methods is an intense commitment to the discipline needed to win the war, and the instant stigmatisation of any kind of opposition or dissent – especially if this involves compromise, bargaining, or the need to take into account the views of any group outside the central leadership – as treason.  Outsiders, whether foreigners or national citizens seen as not fully committed to the cause, are treated with intense suspicion – a tendency magnified in Eritrea by the perception that Eritreans had fought alone against a hostile world, and achieved eventual triumph by rejecting any possibility of compromise.  And with the legacy of liberation war, too, goes a tendency to resort to violence, even war, as the solution to all problems.  Not until the generation of Eritrean leaders formed by liberation war–and notably Isayas Afewerki–have departed the scene does Eritrea have a chance of developing into a normal state, capable of living at peace with its neighbours, and serving the best interests of its own people.

But it is not only Eritreans, and indeed other peoples of the Horn, who have been traumatised by the tragedies that the region has suffered over recent decades.  So also, in some degree, have those of us who study it. Anyone who has been involved with the affairs of the Horn over any length of time has known far too many people who have died, often quite unnecessarily, as the result of its troubles, not to mention a very great many more who have been forced into exile, and have been unable to make the vital contributions that they could otherwise have done to the welfare of their countries of origin.  To have been engaged with the region – as I have been now for a period of fifty years – is almost of necessity to regard peace, accompanied by government in the interests of its citizens, as the first and greatest of its needs.  But at the same time it is a region of great fascination, of ancient civilisation, and of enduring affection and concern for all of us who have come to know it.

Dahabshiil the Largest Somali Money Transfer Service Wins UK Reprieve: UK High Court decided

International Experts said "the injunction was "a victory for the millions of Somalis and other Africans, many of whose livelihoods depend on remittances."

Dahabshiil runs branches in 144 countries worldwide

The injunction means customers will be able to transfer money through Dahabshiil for the foreseeable future.

Barclays had planned to cut off services to the company amid concerns over money laundering.

Dahabshiil is the largest provider of remittance services to the 100,000 Somalis living in the UK.

They are believed to send back millions of pounds every year to friends and relatives in Somalia - a vital source of income for the impoverished country.

"The Court handed down its judgment, granting an interim injunction which has the effect of preserving Dahabshiil's banking arrangements with Barclays until the conclusion of a full trial," a Dahabshiil statement read.

"This is not just a victory for Dahabshiil. It is a victory for the millions of Somalis and other Africans, many of whose livelihoods depend on our services."

Barclays asked to appeal against the injunction, but that request was rejected.

It must now maintain services to Dahabshiil until a new hearing - expected some time next year.

The charity Oxfam welcomed the injunction, but warned that it was only temporary.

'Long-term fix needed'

"The ruling provides a small window of opportunity for Somalis living in the UK to send money home to loved ones in one of the poorest countries in the world," it said.

"However, this does not solve the problem - a long-term fix is needed to safeguard hundreds of thousands of people relying on the money for food, medicines and education."

The charity's call for a permanent solution was echoed by Somalia's Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon, who urged: "Governments, the money remittance sector and all key stakeholders must now work together to find a permanent legitimate and transparent solution that keeps open this vital lifeline."

Barclays had provided Dahabshiil with bank account services. But it expressed concern that money transfer services like Dahabshiil could be used for money laundering or even the funding of terrorism.

Barclays announced plans to close the accounts of several money transfer companies, including Dahabshiil, in May, but Dahabshiil sought an injunction preventing Barclays from closing its account, on the grounds that it was abusing its dominant position.

Barclays is the last major UK bank that still provides money transfer services to Somalia.

Barclays argued that some money service businesses "don't have the necessary checks in place to spot criminal activity with the degree of confidence required by the regulatory environment under which Barclays operates".

The withdrawal of Barclays services from Dahabshiil and similar money transfer services would have had a dramatic effect on the flow of remittances from the UK to Somalia.

Remittances from the UK to Somalia total more than £100m a year, according to Oxfam, and campaigners say they provide a lifeline to Somali families with no other source of income and no access to conventional banking services.

'Lifeline'

Leyla Jama, a 52-year-old Somali who came to the UK more than 20 years ago, works for the Somali Community and Cultural Association in Haringey.

Like many of her fellow Somalis, she sends back hundreds of pounds a year to her elderly parents in Somaliland - a semi-autonomous region of northern Somalia.

Olympic champion Mo Farah, who was born in Somalia, has campaigned to keep remittance services running

Between her and her brothers and sisters in the US and Canada, they send back more than $700 (£437) a month.

"[My parents] are old so they can't get jobs," she told the BBC. "There is no other source of income. The remittances are everything to Somalia - school, food, clothes, everything."

She said fears that Dahabshiil could be cut off had been a major worry among Haringey's Somali community in recent weeks.

"This is a lifeline for the Somali people. Everyone sends money back, so everyone here is really worried.

It is the number one thing people are talking about at the moment."

International development experts say remittances are vital to countries such as Somalia, which has been ravaged by civil war and continuing political instability, where there are few conventional banking services.

A recent report by the UN suggests that more than 40% of Somalia's population receives remittances from overseas - more than four million people.

Money-laundering fines

Oxfam suggests remittances on average account for 60% of recipients' income, with about £1bn a year coming in from Somalis in countries around the world. Only Somalis in the US send back more each year than the UK's Somali community.

The importance of remittances to Somali has been underlined by the intervention of Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who said last month that his government was watching events in London "with great concern".

Somalia-born Briton Mo Farah also joined the campaign to keep remittance services going.

But Barclays is facing its own pressures. Rival bank HSBC was hit with a huge $1.9bn fine for failing to prevent money laundering that had taken place through accounts it managed.

The UK Serious Organised Crime Agency has identified money service businesses generally as a potential money laundering risk, prompting banks such as Barclays to move out of this area of business.

Meanwhile, the presence in Somalia of militant groups such as al-Shabab, responsible for the attack on a Kenyan shopping centre last month, has raised concerns that money transfer services could also be used to fund terrorism. Somali pirates also remain a problem.

But experts warn that ending transfer services, including Dahabshiil, could force the money transfer business underground, helping supporters of terrorism while increasing the risk for Somalis who simply want to support their families.

"It will be the perfect opportunity for those who want to send money to Somalia to fund terrorism or enable money laundering," said Laura Hammond, a development expert at London's School of Oriental and African Studies. "It creates a black hole for accountability."

Source: BBC

EU considering sanctions on US over spying

The European Union is considering a possible imposition of sanctions on the United States as a response to Washington’s massive spying activities on its closest European allies.

German officials said Monday that the EU is considering suspending a data-sharing agreement between the EU and the US. 

The agreement allows the United States access to funds transferred through the private, Belgium-based Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), used by thousands of banks to send transaction information securely. 

“This would be a signal that something can happen and make clear to the Americans that the (EU’s) policy is changing,” said German Justice Minister Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger.

An EU delegation also met on Monday with US lawmakers in Washington to seek answers to revelations that the US National Security Agency (NSA) spied on European citizens and officials. 

Following the meeting, Elmar Brok, the chairman of the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs, said, “Confidence is damaged. We have to work hard that confidence is re-established between the leaders, between our people.” 

Spain became the latest US ally on Monday to demand explanations after a report by the Spanish daily El Mundorevealed that the NSA spied on 60 million Spanish telephone calls in a single month last year. 

The Guardian reported on October 24 that the NSA had monitored the telephone conversations of 35 world leaders. 

CAH/HN/HJL

Pentagon Says Shabab Bomb Specialist Is Killed in Missile Strike in Somalia

By ERIC SCHMITT and MARK MAZZETTI

WASHINGTON — The United States military carried out a missile strike against a top Shabab operative in Somalia on Monday, according to Defense Department officials, three weeks after a Navy SEAL raid in another part of the country failed to capture a senior leader of the Somali Islamic militant group.

 The American strike is the latest evidence that the Obama administration has decided to escalate operations against the Shabab in the aftermath of the bloody siege at a shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya, last month in which more than 60 men, women and children were killed. A White House spokeswoman declined to comment on the strike, referring questions to the Pentagon.

Preliminary evidence collected by the military indicated that the attack killed its intended target, Ibrahim Ali, an explosives specialist for the Shabab known for his skill in building and using homemade bombs and suicide vests, a Defense Department official said.

“He’s been identified as someone we’ve been tracking for a long time,” said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the mission was conducted by the military’s secretive Joint Special Operations Command.

Residents in the Somali town of Jilib reported that a huge explosion hit a car carrying Shabab commanders traveling to Baraawe, a coastal town that is one of the group’s strongholds. Navy SEALs staged an unsuccessful raid in Baraawe this month that had targeted a Kenyan of Somali origin known as Abdikadir Mohamed Abdikadir, who uses the nom de guerre Ikrimah and is considered one of the Shabab’s top planners for attacks outside Somalia.

Residents said that at least two people were killed when the car burst in flames. “We heard a loud explosion — it was awful,” said Nuh Abdi of Jilib. “We later learned that a car headed to Baraawe was hit.”

Another resident, Liban Dahir, said that he saw militants remove two bodies from a burning car. “I don’t know exactly who was targeted, but I confirm that the car was carrying Shabab members,” Mr. Dahir said. The men were carrying guns and wore black scarves that hid their faces, he said.

Even as President Obama has ordered a punishing campaign of drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen, the administration has been far more reluctant to use similar tactics in Somalia. The reluctance partly centered around questions of whether the Shabab — which has not tried to carry out an attack on American soil — could legally be the target of lethal operations by the military or the C.I.A.

Some argued that American strikes might only incite Shabab operatives, transforming the group from a regional organization focused on repelling foreign troops from Somalia into one with an agenda akin to Al Qaeda’s: striking the West at every turn.

There are also domestic concerns for the administration, since about 30 Somali-American men have left their homes in places like Minneapolis and Columbus, Ohio, to fight among the Shabab’s ranks in Somalia. F.B.I. officials have sought to closely monitor any battle-tested young men returning to the United States for signs of radicalization and possible plans to conduct attacks on American soil.

Even as commanders at the Joint Special Operations Command pushed this year for permission to begin operations intended to capture or kill Shabab’s leaders, their views were mostly marginalized as the White House pursued a strategy of using African troops to fight the Shabab in Somalia.

But Monday’s strike is a sign that views about the Shabab inside the administration may have changed. In May, the White House announced that it would carry out targeted killing operations only against those who posed a “continuing and imminent threat to the American people.”

The strike on Monday was the first known American operation resulting in a death since that policy was announced.

Mohammed Ibrahim contributed reporting from Mogadishu, Somalia, and Nicholas Kulish from Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo.

This article has been revised to reflect the following correction:

Correction: October 29, 2013

An earlier version of this article incorrectly said that a Twitter account associated with the Shabab militant group stated that the missile strike had killed “innocent and unarmed civilians,” not Shabab fighters. But the Twitter account was not associated with the militant group.

To Fight al-Shabaab, Clean Up Somalia

By the Editor

 In the wake of the barbarous attack on Kenya’s Westgate shopping mall last month, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon wants decisive action against the group responsible for at least 67 deaths, the Somalia-based al-Shabaab.

He proposes adding 4,000 African Union troops to the 18,000 already in Somalia and providing the forces with attack helicopters and other advanced equipment so they can pursue al-Shabaab in its sanctuaries in the rural south.

The idea sounds reasonable. In addition to attacking Kenya, al-Shabaab struck Uganda in 2010, killing more than 70 people, and this year it has repeatedly assaulted Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu. The group controls parts of southern Somalia, including the port of Baraawe, from which U.S. commandos retreated under fire earlier this month, having failed to capture an al-Shabaab commander.

Before the UN expands the role of the AU troops, however, it should first work to clean up the mission. One of its components, the 4,600-strong Kenyan contingent, has been a force for illas much as good in the effort to stabilize Somalia; its corruption is even helping to enrich al-Shabaab.

The Kenyan troops have been instrumental in ejecting al-Shabaab from its urban strongholds, notably the city of Kismayo in September 2012. The port had been key to al-Shabaab’s $25 million a year in earnings from the export of charcoal made from acacia trees. The razing of trees for this trade has turned lush areas of Somalia into deserts, which contributed to a famine in 2010 and 2011 that killed 260,000 people, according to the UN’s estimate. In 2012, the UN Security Council banned the import and export of Somali charcoal.

One might have expected the Kenyans, once in control of Kismayo, to enforce the export ban. Instead, they collaborated with the Ras Kamboni militia led by a former al-Shabaab ally to increase violations. By July 2013, Somalia’s charcoal exports had risen 140 percent.

The trade at Kismayo is divided between Kenyan business interests, Ras Kamboni and, astonishingly, al-Shabaab. People connected to the group control a third of the exports, and al-Shabaab continues to tax trucks heading to Kismayo. With the income from exports from Baraawe, the charcoal trade is earning al-Shabaab more than ever, the UN estimates.

So before pushing to expand the AU force -- which the UN supports logistically -- Ban should first require that the Kenyan contingent respect the charcoal sanctions. The U.S., which has provided training and other assistance for the Kenyans, and the European Union, which pays their allowances, should second the demand.

Ending the Kenyans’ corruption is essential to repairing the AU mission’s credibility, as well as the UN’s. Cutting off al-Shabaab’s charcoal profits would also make the group more vulnerable to Ban’s proposed assault on its remaining refuges.

To contact the Bloomberg View editorial board: view@bloomberg.net.

'Drone' kills two in Somalia: witnesses

Eyewitnesses say missile came from a drone amid reports dead men are senior members of the al-Shabab armed group.

A suspected drone strike has hit a car in southern Somalia and killed two fighters from the armed group al-Shabab, witnesses said. The men were the only occupants of the vehicle and no one else was harmed, they said. The witnesses blamed the United States, which has carried out drone strikes in Somalia before, for the attack. It was after afternoon prayers between 1:30pm and 2pm when I heard a loud bang. Just one big bang. Witness in Jilib town An al-Shabab member, who gave his name as Abu Mohamed, told the Associated Press news agency that one of those killed was al-Shabab's top explosives expert, known as Anta. AP reported that both of the men killed were senior members of the group. Four witnesses at the scene confirmed the strike to Al Jazeera and said that both fighters killed were Somali. The rebels are known to have foreign fighters in their ranks. Al-Shabab, a rebel group fighting Somalia's Western-backed government, did not comment.  The witnesses said the strike happened near the town of Jilib, 114km north of al-Shabab's former stronghold of Kismayu. Jilib is the most populous town in the horn of Africa nation's Middle Juba region. "It was after afternoon prayers between 1:30pm and 2pm when I heard a loud bang.  Just one big bang," a witness from Jilib told Al Jazeera. "I came to the scene shortly after. I saw two dead bodies. Then al-Shabab fighters came to scene and took the bodies from the Suzuki vehicle. It was a drone strike." Earlier this month, US forces carried out a dawn-raid on an al-Shabab base in the town of Barawe but failed to capture their intended target after a gunbattle. One rebel fighter died in the firefight. In September, al-Shabab launched an assault on a shopping mall in Nairobi, the capital of neighbouring Kenya, which left at least 67 people dead. Follow Hamza Mohamed on Twitter: @Hamza_Africa

Source: Al Jazeera and agencies

Somalia: Golis Employees Jailed after Former Boss Enters Race for the Puntland Presidency

Candidate Warsame

Garowe - The fight for the presidency of the Somalia administrative region of Puntland has taken a dramatic turn after son of sitting president Abdirahman Farole ordered the arrest of Golis Telecommunication company employees.

The purported reason behind the arrest of a large number of Golis employees is the Puntland presidential candidature of their former boss Ali Haji Warsame who resigned his managerial post at the company to contest Farole seat in forthcoming elections slated for later this year in Puntland.

According to Somaliland sources the very powerful son of the ultra powerful Farole has also ordered law enforcement agencies in the region to detain on sight presidential candidate Warsame who is currently in hiding in Taleeh from where he hails from purportedly attending the Khatumo 3 meeting which is also the source of ongoing acrimony between Ferule's Majeerten clan and Warsame's Dulbahante clan.

With growing acrimony on a daily basis between Puntland and Khatumo secessionists the never a starter state of Khatumo proposed for hiving from areas under the jurisdiction of Somaliland continue to diminish at a fast pace.

What with yesterday's mass defection by Khatumo aligned militiamen to Somaliland together with shiny new military hardware supplied by Farole to foment trouble inside Somaliland and the dwindling stature of Farole's acolyte in the guise of general Abdisamad Ali Shire who catered the now in Somaliland armed forces hands weapons, Khatumo vis 'a' vis their Puntland paymasters are doomed.

Our sources also indicate that the failure of any form of violence against Somaliland which was meant to be an excuse for postponing the presidential elections in Puntland has raised another quandary for the now out of tricks Farole.

Somaliland: From Kat-Seller to a Medical Doctor

A Model of Determination and Courage

Khat Seller not Dr Hodan

By: Abdirahman Adan Mohamoud

In this vastly-growing world, we often hear stories about inspiring people. We read tales from rags to riches, from school drop outs to highly successful software programmers, to chief executives and presidents. The below story, is not less interesting, I hope, than those heralded in the leading Newspapers and best seller books.

Dr. Hodan Jama is a mother of 7 children and she happily lives with her husband along with their children in Borama town. As they were a low-income family, both Hodan and her husband had to work together to win against the odds of life and hence Dr. Hodan had to go out and do petty activities to help her family survive.

Determined to come up with a long lasting solution to her family's financial constraints, Dr. Hodan decided to continue and intensify her struggle towards a decent living for the family.

To achieve this goal, this struggle took her to many spectrums of life. It took her to tough occupations and trying circumstances. In order to help meet basic education needs of her children, she started to work at Annallena Tonneli TB Hospital as a focal point for the fight against Female Genital Mutilation and then Borama Regional Hospital as an auxiliary nurse.

While she was there, she intensified the realization of her childhood dream in which she fantasized about becoming a medical doctor and helping women and children obtain access to health services.

However, still her earning could not suffice her family basic needs; therefore, she opted for selling Kat in the streets of Borama to supplement their meager income. Generally, female-headed families are often involved in Kat- selling and they are repeatedly subjected to bad debt, countless mal-treatment as well as discrediting one's dignity and Hodan was not an exception. She nevertheless tolerated all these unscrupulous and humiliating acts for the sake of her family.

Though her time was primarily preoccupied with helping her husband secure livelihood of her family, she never gave up her strong desire for further education. In an effort to enhance her competency, she consequently joined different schools. She registered a Diploma program at Amoud Agriculture School, which was at the time supported by a foreign NGO.

Later on, she would also earn another Diploma in Business Administration from Amoud University.

Interestingly, she earned these certificates while she was selling Kat! As an extra-curricular activity, she was also a founding member of Africa Youth Development Association (AYODA), one of the most successful and prominent local organizations in Borama. However, the fundamental change of her life took place when she managed to enroll at the medical school of Amoud University. Students with high grades are only eligible to register in this faculty, thus competition was understandably high.

Furthermore, one would not miss to realistically assess the burden shouldered on a normal medical student, not to mention the additional family responsibilities left on such a daring and determined parent. Yet, she skillfully managed to simultaneously continue her studies successfully and take care of her family to the best of her ability.

khat selling and chewing is big income biznesskhat selling and chewing is big income bizness

After seven years of successfully balancing the complex pressure of a mother with seven children and the challenging and demanding study schedule, she succeeded to graduate with honor. In the graduation ceremony, dressed in graduation gowns, she attracted the hearts and minds of the attendees as her well-dressed children and her husband, were proudly sitting next to her in a cheerful mood.

It was a moment she truly deserved to see! Ceremony attendees, perhaps admiring her accomplishment, honored her with standing ovation and prolonged applause.

It is, nevertheless, very rare to see a young mother with these wonderful achievements. Her resilience and determination are the magnet-like features that engrossed the attention of those who were present or have heard her story. Unlike many Somali fathers, her husband truly demonstrated a sense of parenthood and seriousness as he encouraged her to continue studies and more importantly, provided the required material and moral support to her.

It is very unusual to see a mother with seven children but yet going to school, let alone a mother like Dr. Hodan, with her multiple responsibilities and achievements.

khat selling and chewing is big income bizness

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Paradoxically, in this case, we have a female medical student who was once making her families' earnings from Kat-selling and at the same time was the second bread-winner of her relatively extended family; a combination seldom observed.

In conclusion, this is a wake-up call to everyone particularly to women. Dr. Hodan is a model of courage and determination. Her journey is unique but doable by others too. And this is a good lesson to all. Above all, we have learnt from her, what matters to make change in your life is to have a well-defined target, persistent determination and hard work. Anyone can replicate this and do the same if they are committed!

Her fantasy in the near future is to offer greater help to the needy people, predominantly women and children and as such contribute to the betterment of health services. For this reason, she is presently doing her specialization in Family Medicine at Amoud's Medical School.

Ps:

1. I would to express my gratitude to Dr. Hodan Jama for accepting our request to publish her story and share it with readers. My appreciation also goes to Mohamed-Deeq Omer for conducting the interview and providing coordination support.

2. This story is part of a series of "Untold Stories" that the afore-mentioned writer periodically publishes to unveil the local unsung talents. Other articles of this series include, The Dean of Shoe-shiners and The Resilient Medical Student. Untold stories are a bilingual series that can be available at www.horusocod.blogspot.com, both in Somali and English languages.

Abdirahman Adan Mohamoud

abdirahman.adan@gmail.com

KENYA OIL OPERATIONS UPDATE

The Ngamia 1 drilling well in Turkana County. Photo/ FILE

October 28, 2013 (AOI–TSXV, AOI–NASDAQ OMX First North) … Africa Oil Corp. (“Africa Oil” or the “Company”) announces that the Company and its operating partner, Tullow Oil plc (“Tullow” or, together, the “Partnership”), have temporarily suspended all operations as a precautionary measure in Block 10BB and Block 13T in Northern Kenya. This decision follows demonstrations by local people regarding concerns around employment.

Africa Oil and Tullow take their relationship with the local communities extremely seriously and the decision to suspend exploration and appraisal operations was taken to prevent further escalation of the demonstrations while discussions to resolve this issue for the long term are ongoing. 

Africa Oil and Tullow are working closely with the local communities, the local Government and the national Government so that work can resume on Blocks 10BB and 13T as soon as possible. The Partnership is fully committed to utilising as many local workers and local services as possible and currently employs over 800 people from the Turkana region out of the 1,400 people currently employed on the Partnership’s Kenyan operations.

About Africa Oil

Africa Oil Corp. is a Canadian oil and gas company with assets in Kenya and Ethiopia as well as Puntland (Somalia) through its 45% equity interest in Horn Petroleum Corporation. Africa Oil's East African holdings are within a world-class exploration play fairway with a total gross land package in this prolific region in excess of 250,000 square kilometers. The East African Rift Basin system is one of the last of the great rift basins to be explored. Four new significant discoveries have been announced in the Northern Kenyan basin in which the Company holds a 50% interest along with operator Tullow Oil plc. The Company is listed on the TSX Venture Exchange and on First North at NASDAQ OMX-Stockholm under the symbol "AOI".

Forward Looking Statements

Certain statements made and information contained herein constitute "forward-looking information" (within the meaning of applicable Canadian securities legislation). Such statements and information (together, "forward looking statements") relate to future events or the Company's future performance, business prospects or opportunities. Forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, statements with respect to estimates of reserves and or resources, future production levels, future capital expenditures and their allocation to exploration and development activities, future drilling and other exploration and development activities, ultimate recovery of reserves or resources and dates by which certain areas will be explored, developed or reach expected operating capacity, that are based on forecasts of future results, estimates of amounts not yet determinable and assumptions of management.

All statements other than statements of historical fact may be forward-looking statements. Statements concerning proven and probable reserves and resource estimates may also be deemed to constitute forward-looking statements and reflect conclusions that are based on certain assumptions that the reserves and resources can be economically exploited. Any statements that express or involve discussions with respect to predictions, expectations, beliefs, plans, projections, objectives, assumptions or future events or performance (often, but not always, using words or phrases such as "seek", "anticipate", "plan", "continue", "estimate", "expect, "may", "will", "project", "predict", "potential", "targeting", "intend", "could", "might", "should", "believe" and similar expressions) are not statements of historical fact and may be "forward-looking statements". Forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause actual results or events to differ materially from those anticipated in such forward-looking statements. The Company believes that the expectations reflected in those forward-looking statements are reasonable, but no assurance can be given that these expectations will prove to be correct and such forward-looking statements should not be unduly relied upon. The Company does not intend, and does not assume any obligation, to update these forward-looking statements, except as required by applicable laws. These forward-looking statements involve risks and uncertainties relating to, among other things, changes in oil prices, results of exploration and development activities, uninsured risks, regulatory changes, defects in title, availability of materials and equipment, timeliness of government or other regulatory approvals, actual performance of facilities, availability of financing on reasonable terms, availability of third party service providers, equipment and processes relative to specifications and expectations and unanticipated environmental impacts on operations. Actual results may differ materially from those expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements.

ON BEHALF OF THE BOARD

“Keith C. Hill”

President and CEO

Source: www.africaoilcorp.com